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With the onset of the global financial crisis, now more than ever the 
operation of the capital market has been put under pressure. A key objective 
of this research project is to make observations that might enhance and 
support the efficiency of the capital market through the information 
provided by auditors and its impact and influence. At the time of writing, 
there have been few negative observations about auditors and their role in 
the global financial crisis (GFC). While criticisms of bankers, regulators, 
directors and senior executives, advisory firms, hedge funds and other 
financial service organisations (among others) mount, little concern has 
been expressed about the role of audit. To some, this could be unexpected, 
but the presence of no news is to the eyes of some ‘good news’. In some 
ways, the GFC can be seen as a stress test of audit where the stress has not 
resulted in structural failure.
In essence, the aim of this project has been to put a ‘window’ on a 
number of issues in auditing and its operation in the capital market. The 
scale of the project from the outset was large and has grown substantially. 
It is acknowledged that the data collection for this project predates 
the GFC and readers are warned of this limitation. There are, however, 
many instances where the underlying core issues existed before and will 
continue to exist during and after the GFC. Even now, the project is not 
comprehensive, but it is of sufficient scale to allow the opportunity to 
explore quite specific issues and gain considerable insight into the views 
of participants in the market for audit services in relation to those issues. 
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While the authors have provided a list of conclusions, policy issues and 
recommendations on actionable items, this is by no means comprehensive. 
We have sought to list actionable items that need to be considered by the 
relevant organisations and for these items to be considered generally in 
the context of a public policy debate. The Australian Research Council 
and the linkage partners have not endorsed this list. The authors have not 
attempted to be definitive or comprehensive but have simply summarised 
the positions that have been observed in the market and sought to bring 
them into focus so that those charged with decision making might 
appreciate this synthesis of information as having utility.
This report contains not only information that is survey generated; it 
includes the direct words used by many players in the market for audit 
services in face-to-face interviews and inferences drawn from those words. 
We have given over much of this report to direct quotations from these 
participants as the power and authority of much of what we describe is 
best conveyed, we feel, in the participants’ own words. We have, however, 
in each chapter tried to synthesise these quotations into a more efficient 
summary for those who might desire a more concise summation of these 
views. The authors note that while there are summaries that precede the 
chapters and summaries within the chapters, there is no doubt that for an 
understanding of the issues, the reader needs to read in depth the parts 
of the report that are relevant to them. To aid this, Chapter 1 includes 
various directed pathways that will assist particular types of stakeholders 
(users, purchasers, suppliers and the like).
There is no doubt that this project could not have been undertaken 
without the contribution of a large number of individuals and 
organisations. The Australian Research Council is this nation’s premier 
research funding body across many fields of inquiry and its participation 
in this project has been crucial. Also of importance has been the role played 
by two of the major professional bodies within the business community, 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and CPA Australia. 
Their respective contributions—financially and in terms of expertise—
are recognised. All four of the major audit firms—Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG and PriceWaterhouseCoopers—have also made important 
contributions. These institutions and numerous individuals within them 
have played a significant role and we would like to formally acknowledge 
our appreciation for their contribution. In addition, there were the many 
individuals representing various stakeholders’ views—including users, 
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purchasers, suppliers, standard setters and regulators—who contributed 
to the statements contained in the report and to the overall depth and 
richness of the materials that have been presented. We would like to thank 
each of these individuals; we are appreciative of the time and expertise 
they gave so generously. A number of staff within the authors’ respective 
institutions also contributed in different ways and at different times and 
their contribution is acknowledged also. 
Considerable care has been taken in compiling this report, which 
has involved seeking comments from certain key individuals and 
organisations over the past several months. Any remaining errors and 
omissions, however, remain the responsibility of the authors. Any 
comments or observations can be made by contacting the research team 
at <ancaar@anu.edu.au> 
In that connection, please be aware that we have used directly the 
words from a range of stakeholders in the various quotations included 
in the report. We note specifically that the perceptions, beliefs and even 
representations of facts that are described in the report and attributed 
to stakeholders are those of the participants and not the authors. Those 
who made them might think of some of these observations as factual, but 
in reality they might not be. The authors do not necessarily agree that 
all assertions made are true in fact. The authors remain responsible for 
the other components of this report, which are described as summaries, 
issues and implications, concluding remarks and recommendations. It is 
important to note that none of the industry partners to the ARC linkage 
grant has had a right of veto of the recommendations nor are these 
recommendations included at their request. The recommendations come 
as a consequence of the information gathered in the study and have been 
crafted by the research team.
We have attempted to ensure that no person has been or is able to 
be individually identified and no organisation has been named where 
there could be an adverse outcome from that identification. There are a 
few instances where specific firm and company names are referred to, 
however, this occurs in circumstances where we do not believe there will 
be any negative consequences for those organisations and generally these 
are a matter of public record. We trust that this report and any further 
papers, publications and public discussion of its contents will contribute 
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positively to the market for audit services and as a consequence of that to 
the efficiency of the capital market. Others will judge its utility and the 
efficacy of its recommendations and of the report more broadly.
Summarising, the study can be characterised as exploring issues within 
certain major themes:
•	 expectations gap/informativeness of the audit opinion
•	 staffing, skills and social impacts
•	 public policy implications
•	 the audit and assurance service.
A brief discussion of the inferences we draw from participants’ responses 
under the above themes follows. A chapter-by-chapter summary of issues 
raised in participants’ responses and their implications, together with 
suggested actions to address these issues, follows this brief executive 
summary. 
Expectations gap/informativeness of the audit opinion
From the responses of participant stakeholders, we conclude that the 
external financial statement audit is valued and that there is no call for 
change to its mandate. We note that in the context of the global financial 
crisis, its role becomes even more important to confidence in the capital 
market. As a starting point, this is a clear positive for the future of audit. 
On a less positive note, however, the audit expectations gap continues to 
exist (Chapter 3). Further, in our view, it is not possible that this gap can 
be ‘closed’. This is so for a number of reasons, including the perceived 
complexity of financial reports, which is a function of accounting 
standards and for which auditors cannot be held responsible. The wide 
disparity between retail and more sophisticated investors in terms of 
their understanding of financial and related reports is another reason for 
our view that the audit expectations gap is not closable. We therefore 
conclude that efforts to minimise the gap should not focus only on retail 
investors, since the likelihood of success with this group is low, although 
we do explore ways in which auditors might make more of their process 
and work known to a general audience (Chapter 4). Rather, efforts should 
be focused on specific topics our research has led us to believe contribute 
to misunderstandings by even the more sophisticated stakeholders in 
the market for audit services. In particular, we observe a concerning 
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expectations gap between suppliers and regulators and, in our view, this 
gap can be minimised given the common interests of these groups, and 
suggestions are made as to how this might be achieved.
In our view, the standardisation or ‘commoditisation’ of the audit 
and its expression through virtually identically worded audit opinions 
could have contributed to the expectations gap and to an undervaluing 
of the financial statement audit in the market for information. We suggest 
that those relevant stakeholders in the market for audit services give 
consideration to amended audit report wording and reporting formats to 
address this issue.
We infer from participants’ comments that some audit committee 
members and even directors exhibit less than complete understanding of 
matters relating to the external audit and we make recommendations for 
ways that these cohorts might be better alerted to correct this. In particular, 
the issue of ‘materiality’, as this term is used in an audit context, appears 
to be poorly understood and a whole chapter (Chapter 5) is dedicated to 
this important issue. 
Staffing, skills and social impacts
Many of the participants’ comments, including from many junior auditors 
themselves, highlight the perceived ‘menial’ nature of much of the work 
of audit staff. We note that many of these individuals see themselves as 
stereotypical of ‘generation Y’. We infer from their comments that this issue 
has been exacerbated by recent changes to the auditing regime in terms 
of documentation requirements, check lists and reduced opportunities to 
vary work by providing secondments to clients or engaging in non-audit 
service work for clients. The GFC might mask the implications of any 
decrease in the attractiveness of audit as a career in the short term, but 
the underlying image of auditing as a career option, intersecting as it does 
with the expectations of generation Y in terms of seeking a challenging 
and varied work role, needs to be addressed in our view. These issues 
and the issue of developing business acumen and client and industry 
knowledge are explored in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 and suggestions are 
made to address the underlying issues that emerge.
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Public policy implications
In terms of the conduct of audits, our findings reveal at the time of the 
interviews a common concern among suppliers about the increased level 
of prescription of audits accompanying the revised auditing standards and 
inspections by the regulator (Chapters 11 and 12). There is recognition 
that audit documentation quality has improved. If the changes introduced 
to the auditing regime as a result of ‘CLERP 9’ were made with a view to 
decrease the likelihood of unexpected corporate collapse or to increase 
confidence in financial statement credibility, there was little evidence 
that stakeholders perceived that they had succeeded. There is, however, 
consensus among stakeholders that these changes have added to costs 
(Chapter 10). Statements from those in the market provide a view that audit 
partner rotation and some of the constraints on auditor-provided non-audit 
services, often self-imposed by companies, are not maximising economic 
efficiency and suggestions are made to relax requirements in these areas 
(Chapter 9). In terms of competition in the market for audit services, many 
participants express concern about the potential consequences should one 
of the existing ‘Big Four’ firms not survive (Chapter 13). Suggestions for 
dealing with this potentiality are made. 
The audit and assurance service
In terms of the provision of audit and assurance services, we observe 
from participants’ comments mixed views on whether differential 
auditing standards based on listed/non-listed auditee status should be 
introduced (Chapter 14). We observe also that the value of internal audit 
is generally understated and that although opportunities for increased 
liaison between internal and external audit exist, there is little appetite 
by external auditors to undertake the incremental work necessary before 
the work of the internal auditor can be relied on (Chapter 15). We observe 
also from participants’ comments in relation to the potential for provision 
of assurance on information outside the scope of traditional financial 
statements that there is extensive demand but little willingness to supply 
(Chapter 16). In terms of the provision of levels of assurance other than 
‘reasonable’ as pertaining to financial statement audits, evidence of 
some demand but an inability to supply under the current international 




A detailed reading of this report will result in an uninformed reader 
concluding that there are many challenges and sub-optimalities of audit. 
This would not be a sound conclusion. While this report documents many 
opportunities for improvement, it is the case that auditing and other 
such professions rarely see the benefit of a ‘good news’ story. When, for 
example, would we expect to see a newspaper article with the headline 
‘Auditor does good job’ or an investigative television report finding that 
an audit meant that shareholders were protected? The best auditing and 
other experience goods can hope for is the absence of bad news. This 
report needs to be read in this context.
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1.0 introduction
Many challenges for the profession of auditing are presented in this 
report, but we can conclude that the ‘future of audit’ is a positive one, 
with considerable ability to contribute to economic wellbeing. The report 
makes a number of recommendations across a range of issues. Some of 
these challenges are relatively simple to implement but others need deep 
consideration and much time. Several of the issues and recommendations 
are not original to the current authors. There have been other examinations 
of auditing and the authors acknowledge the work of those others and 
their ideas, which have been implemented. Nevertheless, it is hoped that 
this comprehensive study of the perceptions of stakeholders in the market 
for audit services can contribute to debate and policy making about the 
external audit. 
When the project began, there was no global financial crisis; it had 
not even been imagined. The size of the project and therefore the length 
of time it has taken to complete this report have been major challenges. 
As a consequence, some of the issues and underlying circumstances of 
the market for audit services in Australia have changed. The presence 
of the GFC, however, does not change the underlying challenges facing 
the audit profession. It might change the timing of some of the issues 
coming to fruition, but it does not eliminate the issues. Notwithstanding 
changes to the employment market created by the GFC, it appears that the 
nature of the work of auditors is becoming less attractive, especially to 
generation Y, and the greater prescription around maintenance of auditor 
independence, audit documentation, regulatory inspections and legal 
backing for auditing standards is working to deplete the image of auditing 
as a career. While the GFC might mitigate the consequences of these events 
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and occurrences in the short term, there are some aspects of our findings 
that at the least require deep consideration by the relevant stakeholders. 
The next section of this summary of report chapters describes the 
research method used, very briefly, before provision of an overview of 
each of the remaining chapters and the issues and recommendations that 
flow from the content of those chapters. The summary concludes with a 
table that provides an overview of each recommendation reference number 
classified according to likely stakeholder interest.
2.0 Research method (Chapter 2)
This research project uses the voices of participants in the market for audit 
services to explore the current state of that market and gain insights to 
its future. It uses multiple methods (preliminary focus groups to focus the 
survey questions and interview protocols, telephone and mail surveys, 
face-to-face interviews and focus group interviews with more junior 
auditors) to elicit qualitative evidence of the perceptions of stakeholder 
representatives. The stakeholder representatives accessed include 
those who use auditor’s reports (users such as shareholders), those who 
purchase audit services (purchasers such as chief financial officers and 
audit committee members), those who supply audit and other assurance 
services (suppliers), those who set auditing standards (standard setters) 
and those who regulate the market for audit services (regulators). The 
timing of the project coincided with the first year of administration of the 
legally enforceable auditing standards and other changes to the regulatory 
regime as a result of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit 
Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9) that were by then 
well entrenched.
The responses elicited from participants in interviews, which make 
up a large part of this report, have been coded and grouped according to 
themes using a qualitative software analysis tool and reported, along with 
the survey results, within these themes, grouped according to the category 
of the stakeholder. The authors provide ‘summaries’ of responses by each 
category, together with sections on resulting ‘issues and implications’ and 
‘concluding remarks’. In summary, the following issues and recommended 
actions arising as an outcome of this research project can be found in the 
chapters of this report.
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3.0 Understandability of the audit (Chapter 3)
3.0.1 Inferences from survey findings
Suppliers believed there was substantial value added in the audit, but 
this was rarely replicated by other participants in the market for audit 
services. When asked whether the auditor had a good understanding 
of the business, again, suppliers provided a positive response, whereas 
purchasers and users were more mixed in their views. A large proportion 
of users believed that the audit provided a form of guarantee about the 
truth and fairness of the financial statements. 
Users, purchasers and suppliers all reported self-rated understanding 
of financial statements as above the median. Purchasers and suppliers 
indicated that it was really the external auditor’s responsibility to detect 
material fraud. Users, suppliers and purchasers all recognised that the 
auditor had responsibility to detect material error. There was a shared 
view that the auditor had responsibility to warn the audit committee 
about early signs of risk. There were mixed views about whether the 
auditor should act as a whistleblower to an appropriate regulatory body. 
Big Four suppliers were the only respondents who strongly indicated they 
disagreed that the auditor had responsibility to provide direct assurance 
about the adequacy of the internal control system. 
From these survey findings, there is evidence that assurance is valued 
and there is no case to remove or limit the existence of an audit as it is 
currently known to the market. 
3.0.2 Inferences from interview findings
Users report checking whether an audit report exists, that it is provided by 
a brand name auditor and is not modified. Such a simplistic categorisation 
could cause users to miss statements of emphasis of matter. Another 
implication is that the audit report is perceived as a ‘commodity’, which 
is simplistic, standardised and fails to recognise the diversity of expertise 
held by some users. 
Purchasers perceive auditors to be doing ‘the right thing’ but some 
concern exists that the amount of regulation and bureaucracy is a 
distraction from the main objective of providing assurance on the financial 
statements. Suppliers are concerned that audit has suffered because of the 
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complexity of accounting standards and believe that there is scope for 
enhancing what is communicated in the audit opinion. 
What also emerges from all stakeholders is genuine concern about 
the level of complexity and information load jointly contained in the 
financial reporting and auditing disclosures, for which auditors cannot 
be held responsible, but which limits what can be done to enhance the 
understandability of the audit and audit process.
Issue 3.1
Perceived complexity of financial reports limits potential for communication 
solutions for auditors.
Suggested action 3.1
Policymaker recognition that enhancing the readability and 
understandability of financial reports is a multifaceted, multi-agency 
responsibility with no single body taking overall responsibility for 
monitoring more than technical compliance with accounting standards, 
and so on. A body, likely the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), should 
take on explicit responsibility for monitoring aspects of the quality and 
understandability of financial reports.
Issues 3.2 and 3.3
Audit report wording is standardised/commoditised, which hides the 
degree of auditor judgment involved in relation to a specific auditee, 
ignores the diversity of the audience in terms of motivation for and 
capability of understanding audit outcome information and uses terms 
that can be misconstrued (for example, material misstatement, test basis).
Suggested action 3.2
Amend audit reporting standards to encourage more nuanced and auditee-
specific audit reports in order to encourage reading by target audience. 
Perhaps this should be in the form of appendices to a standardised report.
Suggested action 3.3
While audit reports need to fulfil minimum legal requirements, there 
should be positive encouragement by regulators to allow auditors to 
include nuanced and subtle explanations and observations in a way that 
adds value to the report for interested readers.
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3.1 The audit expectations gap (Chapter 3) 
3.1.1 Inferences from interview findings
The majority of participants acknowledged the existence of an expectations 
gap or gaps. Users, primarily large professional users, commonly perceive 
the existence of an expectations gap between themselves and suppliers, 
but also between regulators and auditors. Purchasers too observed multiple 
gaps, including a gap between auditors and regulators. Some purchasers 
were critical of regulators in their inspection and oversight functions. 
Other purchasers indicated that the audit expectations gap arose mostly 
in the presence of business failure and yet in a free market economy there 
will always be the presence of business failure. A number of suppliers 
indicated that they did not believe the expectations gap was closable, with 
several acknowledging there were different sorts of gaps with different 
participants in the capital market. In particular, retail investors were 
uninformed and probably uninformable. There were observations by many 
suppliers of an expectations gap between auditors and regulators. There 
was criticism by non-Big Four suppliers that audit expectations developed 
by regulators were based on their observations of the Big Four. Another 
observation was that the presence of a stronger regulatory environment 
had really added to the expectations gap. Suppliers observed that it was 
not well understood that materiality meant that the audit was undertaken 
at reasonable cost to give reasonable assurance. 
There were few suggestions for resolving the gaps. One comment was 
that the scope section of the audit report described more fully that which 
was undertaken by the auditor and that which was not. One standard 
setter observed that much of the expectations gap was caused by regulators 
who might choose to deflect blame and negative market sentiment from 
themselves and on to the accounting profession. None of the regulators 
interviewed indicated that legally enforceable auditing standards would 
help solve the expectations gap, narrow it or manage it. In terms of policy 
implications, the authors observe that much has been done to encourage 
participation by investors in the Australian capital market, yet there has 
been no parallel public policy support mechanism to help educate and 
inform those participants in the capital market. 
In summary, the audit expectations gap continues to exist, is complex 
and multifaceted (existing at least between users and suppliers, purchasers 
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and suppliers and regulators and suppliers) and at the least is costly to 
the efficiency of the market for information within the capital market and 
could have many other costs associated with it. It goes without saying that 
the audit expectations gap should be minimised to the extent possible. 
There needs to be, however, recognition that the audit expectations gap 
will never be closed and that eliminating differential incentives for a 
gap to exist and ‘educating’ all stakeholders are not possible. Focusing 
on stakeholders who are motivated and have the capability to have their 
knowledge and understanding of audit and its outcomes raised and 
focusing on specific topics known to be the subject of misunderstandings 
(for example, materiality, use of the term ‘test basis’) are the best strategies. 
Because of shared objectives and sophistication levels, the gap between 
suppliers and regulators should be given the highest priority in terms of 
gap minimisation. 
Issue 3.4
Generalised non-reading of the auditor’s report—potential to miss 
emphasis of matter paragraphs.
Suggested action 3.4
Consider the current guidance on location and highlighting of emphasis 
of matter paragraphs to ensure they are conspicuous.
Issue 3.5
The standardised audit report wording uses terms that can be misconstrued 
and that can therefore contribute to the audit expectations gap. In 
particular, there is evidence of misunderstanding of the use of the terms 
‘reasonable assurance’, ‘material misstatement’ and ‘test basis’. 
Suggested action 3.5
Change the wording within the auditor’s report to minimise the audit 
expectations gap (for example, ‘This audit is a certification of the 
X percentage probability of the absence of misstatement in the financial 
report above an absolute aggregate dollar value of Y’ or ‘We are X per cent 
confident that there are no misstatements in the financial report above an 
absolute dollar value of…’).
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Issue 3.6
Several suppliers’ comments indicate that they do not understand that 
authorities in Australia view the external audit as a form of ‘delegated 
regulation’ (Knott 2002). In Australia, audit is privileged by a mandate 
in many cases (that is, is required by legislation), has the shareholder at 
its centre as the client and always is the beneficiary of restraint of trade 
policies (that is, only appropriately qualified people can sign an audit 
report). These aspects of the current framework are not well understood 
by some suppliers.
Suggested action 3.6
Creation and wide dissemination of an overarching, high-level, educational 
piece on the role of audit in Australian society, including content in plain 
English, on for which types of entities audit is mandated, the audit process 
and, for suppliers, a section reinforcing the privileged role that audits hold 
and the rights and responsibilities that level of privilege brings with it.
Issue 3.7
Regulators allegedly sometimes do not practice ‘delegated regulation’ in 
its purest sense, but instead dictate ‘detail’ to a point that interferes with 
audit efficiency, but even more seriously, with audit effectiveness.
Suggested action 3.7
Despite acknowledged existing mechanisms for communication, greater 
communication between regulators and supplier representatives from 
larger and smaller audit suppliers and wider dissemination of feedback to 
the population of audit suppliers are needed to enhance communication of 
what each party (regulators and suppliers) is seeking to achieve.
4.0 Communication of more of the audit process  
 by auditors and/or by management  
 (Chapter 4)
4.0.1 Inferences from interview findings
There was no support at all for management communicating more of the 
audit process to stakeholders; however, there was wide support from users 
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
xxxii |
and purchasers for auditors doing more of this than was the current case. 
In a large difference from users and purchasers, suppliers were more critical 
of this as a possibility and standard setters were mixed in their views. One 
purchaser observed that the current process undertaken in an audit was 
opaque. A purchaser and a supplier observed that the language used in 
audit opinions tended to contain ‘jargon’ and was not easily interpreted. 
Many participants, particularly purchasers and users, perceived the audit 
opinion as a ‘blunt instrument’ conveying only whether the opinion 
was modified or not. That is, suppliers seek the ability to exercise their 
professional judgment, but most of the audit observables are standardised 
or ‘commoditised’. Several, however, observed that the audit report was 
currently not read, so any further disclosures would suffer the same fate, 
could add to confusion and would likely be written with litigation risk 
in mind. One supplier observed that those charged with governance 
sometimes did not want information about how the audit was undertaken 
because this might increase their own legal accountability. Others argued 
that encouraging confidence in the framework and professionalism of 
audit was more important than additional disclosures. 
Issues 4.1–3
Many of the aspects of audit are not well understood by some users and 
purchasers.
Suggested action 4.1
Provision of collaboratively written, widely available educative material 
about auditors’ work and process, focused on users as the audience, written 
in layman’s language and spelling out important things such as the fact 
that the work involves sampling, could be particularly risk focused, deals 
with substantive issues pertaining to that particular industry or entity 
and describing what levels of materiality are used. For consideration is 
whether these descriptions should be specific to the company or might be 
more generalised for a particular audit firm.
Suggested action 4.2
Provide educational materials in plain English in relation to use of the 
words ‘material’ and ‘materiality’ in an audit context. 
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Suggested action 4.3
Consideration to be given to a government-funded public education 
campaign of the type administered to encourage understanding of the 
importance of superannuation contributions.
Issue 4.4
Information search costs for auditor’s reports are high since these 
documents are currently available only by acquiring, and searching 
within, individual company annual reports.
Suggested action 4.4
For listed companies, auditors’ reports should be mandated as a separately 
filed Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) document (as well as located 
within the annual report) so that they can be searched in aggregate as 
publicly available information individually or for a particular class of 
company or type of report.
5.0 Materiality (Chapter 5)
5.0.1 Inferences from interview findings
The issue of materiality was raised in the preliminary focus groups used 
to provide input to development of the survey instrument and interview 
protocol as a major source of misunderstanding in the market for audit 
services. The desirability of having disclosure of the level(s) of materiality 
was expressed by users and purchasers, but was less welcomed by 
suppliers, standard setters and regulators. That the financial statements 
were barely read anyway or that the concept would be confusing 
were major reasons behind unenthusiastic comments. Standard setters 
and regulators observed that misinterpretation, misunderstanding or 
miscommunication of materiality had not caused company failures. Others, 
however, acknowledged that even if a small minority of informed readers 
read and understood the disclosures, it would assist in making the market 
more efficient. Some suppliers argued that fostering more confidence 
in the existing process and framework was the key rather than explicit 
disclosures. 
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Among suppliers, purchasers and some users there was a view that 
providing disclosure of the existence of a materiality threshold influencing 
the audit represented a key ingredient in advising the market that the 
audit was not a 100 per cent guarantee. From users and purchasers, there 
was a focus on the quantitative aspects of materiality. Suppliers invoked 
both quantitative and qualitative characteristics. Some suppliers argued 
that at audit committee level it was common to have a discussion about 
materiality at an aggregate level, but when one discussed line items in the 
financial statements on the basis of materiality, occasionally the discussion 
could become ‘heated’. Also, although not brought out in the interviews, 
disclosing materiality levels could facilitate fraud.
Issues 5.1–3
The concept of ‘materiality’ as it is used in an auditing concept is not well 
understood outside the profession and is a previously under-emphasised 
part of the audit expectations gap. As such, costs are imposed on the 
market for information within the capital market.
Suggested action 5.1
Apart from the inclusion of generalised information about materiality and 
its role within audits, create specific guidance for audit committees in 
terms of their need to inform themselves about audit materiality and their 
right to request disclosure to them by the auditor of the level of ‘tolerable 
error’ used in the audit. 
Suggested action 5.2
The ASX to include in its Corporate Governance Guidelines and 
Recommendations a recommendation that audit committee members 
undertake structured education programs that include content related to 
the statutory role of audit, audit processes and audit outcomes and audit 
committee member rights and responsibilities in relation to these features. 
This could be a recommendation that such requirements be included in 
corporate audit committee charters.
Suggested action 5.3
Consider the integration of audit-related concepts wherever relevant into 
subjects/units within tertiary and professional business qualifications (as 
many institutions do with ethics education).
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6.0 Developing business acumen and client and  
 industry knowledge (Chapter 6)
6.0.1 Inferences from survey findings
In terms of the telephone and mail surveys, in response to a question about 
whether external financial statement audits were of value because of ‘the 
specialist industry expertise of the auditor’, 50 per cent of suppliers, 46 per 
cent of users and only 31 per cent of purchasers responded affirmatively. 
Among the suppliers, there was a sharp differentiation between Big 
Four and non-Big Four suppliers, with 77 per cent of Big Four suppliers 
believing industry expertise brought value compared with only 42 per 
cent of non-Big Four suppliers. This difference could reflect the relevance 
of industry expertise across the levels of market capitalisation and across 
unlisted companies. With respect to agreement with the statement that ‘an 
external audit is of value because the auditor has a good understanding 
of the business’, 55 per cent of suppliers, 33 per cent of purchasers and 
40 per cent of users responded affirmatively. Chief executive officer/chief 
financial officer (CEO/CFO) respondents as a subgroup of the purchasers 
particularly denigrated the value of the financial statement audit as that 
subgroup perceived it.
In response to questions about an audit being of value because of the 
‘business acumen the auditor brought to the audit’, 45 per cent of users, 33 
per cent of purchasers and 55 per cent of suppliers responded affirmatively. 
Specifically with respect to audit partners, most users and suppliers saw 
the business acumen of audit partners as above the mid-point, with junior 
auditors not rated highly. Interestingly, overall, purchasers took a harsher 
view compared with users.
6.0.2 Inferences from interview findings
Purchasers’ expectations were low in terms of the business acumen of 
auditors yet differentiation between expectations of senior and junior 
auditors was present. Purchasers acknowledged the lack of stability in 
audit teams, causing lapses in client knowledge. 
It was acknowledged among suppliers that junior staff did not have the 
business acumen or the maturity of more senior staff, so they could ask 
clients the ‘wrong’ questions. There is, however, also realisation that ‘dumb’ 
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questions can be very useful in uncovering audit issues. Less reliance on 
substantive testing compared with prior periods might have limited the 
opportunity of junior staff to become deeply familiar with how businesses 
operated. Suppliers make frequent observations that inexperience is not 
only evident among junior auditors; it is common among client staff. 
Regulators observe that business acumen is not necessarily one of the core 
attributes of a successful and competently completed audit. Comments 
were received on the size of the market in Australia as a constraint on 
gaining industry expertise in particular industries.
The issues relating to junior auditors and their ability to develop 
experience and acumen—requiring elements of ‘emotional intelligence’—
useful in a business career remains, and perhaps has implications for 
tertiary education. 
One interesting insight that emerged from focus group interviews with 
more junior audit staff was the presence of remuneration schemes that 
rewarded client accounting staff based on the number or extent of audit 
adjustments. The authors note that these schemes could usurp the role of 
the audit committee and encourage conservative accounting rather than 
accounting that reflects economic reality.
Issue 6.1
The personal attributes of maturity, tenacity, self-assertiveness, resilience 
and integrity—many of which feed into the notion of ‘emotional 
intelligence’—could be as important to successful audit outcomes as 
technical auditing skills, yet are seldom targeted explicitly as graduate 
attributes by tertiary institutions and beyond in their teaching and 
learning programs.
Suggested action 6.1
Collaboration between relevant parties to assess the best way to build the 
development of key personal attributes into subjects/units and courses.
Issues 6.2–6
Based on participants’ comments, the present audit business model in some 
practices is under stress. It is seen in some instances as heavily pyramidal, 
tending to rely overly on junior staff—who are least likely to possess 
the ideal ‘personal emotional intelligence’ attributes—at the interface 
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between the client and the auditor and depends on retention of staff with 
the appropriate personal and technical skills for future leadership.
Suggested action 6.2
Consider whether the current widely used audit business model is 
sustainable and optimal in the longer term.
Suggested action 6.3
Consider whether audit practices’ current recruitment techniques test 
appropriately for the personal skills required of a successful auditor.
Suggested action 6.4
Consider developing more effective systems and processes for the 
management of client-specific knowledge and ensuring its continuity 
despite changes in audit team membership.
Suggested action 6.5
Consider developing more effective workplace flexibility practices to 
retain staff at points of major change in their personal lives.
Suggested action 6.6
Alter recruitment policies to encourage the hiring of many more accounting 
honours graduates (and others with higher-level analytical skills).
Issues 6.7–8
A number of stakeholders noted that opportunities for development of 
business acumen and industry knowledge in junior auditors had become 
more limited with increased independence requirements.
Suggested action 6.7
Consider development of a national database divided by industry groups 
and also geographic distribution including data that relate to audit, 
governance and risk issues relevant to auditees within the Australian 
market for audit services.
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Suggested action 6.8
Enhance the adequacy of the teaching of auditing at tertiary level and 
in continuing professional education by developing high-quality, realistic 
multimedia and case-based teaching and learning materials.
Issue 6.9
Remuneration schemes that reward client accounting staff based on the 
number or extent of audit adjustments exist and can usurp the role of 
the audit committee and encourage conservative accounting rather than 
accounting that reflects the economic reality.
Suggested action 6.9
Include in the ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines and Recommendations 
a recommendation that audit committee members be advised if client 
staffers are, in part, remunerated based on the number of audit adjustments 
and how the scheme operates.
7.0 Attracting and supporting staff (Chapter 7)
7.0.1 Inferences from interview findings
Issues that were raised in the context of audit firm attraction of staff 
included the image of the auditing profession, the work/life balance 
preference of generation Y, the fact that the CA program no longer had to 
be completed within a public accounting firm, the attractiveness of other 
employers (especially organisations such as those in banking and finance), 
the comparatively low initial salary scale, the increasingly prescriptive 
and regulated nature of auditing, the available pool of graduates from 
which to recruit and questions about the continued attractiveness of 
achieving partnership. 
Purchasers saw no threat to attracting appropriate talent to the 
profession, although they acknowledged the competitiveness (at the 
time) of the employment market. Some purchasers had reservations 
about whether the pool of graduates had, in relative terms, declined, 
while others observed that the CA in commerce program had affected 
the prior near-monopoly recruiting position of the Big Four. That is, 
accounting graduates entering other occupations are not necessarily lost 
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to the accounting profession, although the Big Four might have lost their 
relative position. One purchaser observed that recruitment to chartered 
accounting via the CA in commerce program might be more attractive in 
view of the level of external oversight and inspection attached to public 
practice. Repeatedly, the observation was made that the accounting firms 
simply did not remunerate adequately. 
With respect to suppliers, more questioning ensued about the total 
pool of graduates available for recruitment. Frequently, observations were 
made that the total pool seemed to be either small or at a ‘tipping point’. 
Auditing was still seen as a good training ground but there was also a 
perception that it held less glamour and prestige than it once did. One of the 
attractions of the larger employers put forward was their multidisciplinary 
nature that could provide alternative careers to ambitious accounting 
graduates who sought diverse employment opportunities. Suppliers 
questioned the number of accounting graduates completing their degrees 
eligible for employment in Australia and their often limited knowledge of 
auditing. The pedagogy of teaching auditing is lamented if it is procedural 
in nature as opposed to thematic. Also, because auditing is often taught 
late in degree programs, applicants for graduate positions tend to have 
little or no understanding of the nature of auditing. The authors note that 
universities are under similar competitive employment pressures for staff 
as are accounting firms.
Standard setters observed that accounting did not have the glamorous 
profile it once had and that the prestige of accounting was declining. As 
observed by a standard setter: ‘It is no longer possible for the auditor to 
be the trusted advisor.’ There was also acceptance that many of today’s 
generation were seeking multidisciplinary careers that were diverse 
and challenging. Questions arise about the sole use of Year 12 scores as 
university entrance criteria. The authors observe that other professions 
have broadened their criteria and that university entry scores are affected 
by factors that influence both supply and demand. If public accounting 
firms were more willing to take more graduates from universities without 
such high entry scores, and were more willing to recruit international 
students whose working visas were yet to be processed, perceptions of 
too few willing graduates might dissipate. One standard setter questioned 
whether firms tracked their selection choices at entry point to evaluate 
those who survived, prospered and contributed to the auditing profession 
in later years. 
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Regulators shared the view that accounting was not as glamorous as 
other employment opportunities and suffered as a consequence. 
Issues 7.1–3
Many participants’ comments indicate that in their view higher levels of 
prescription have led to more ‘menial’ work for junior auditors.
Suggested action 7.1
Consider greater use of mechanisms other than Year 12 scores for entry to 
university accounting degrees (for example, as has been done for entry 
to medicine) since the competitive forces to maintain university entrance 
scores as high as possible might not create circumstances for suitably 
disposed students to enter into accounting degrees.
Suggested action 7.2
Conduct research into whether the presence of alternative pathways (to 
CPA segments and the CA program) have a negative effect on entrance 
standards and the quantity of accounting graduates entering or exiting 
universities in Australia. If there are other alternative pathways then what 
would be the likely consequences? 
Suggested action 7.3
Consider whether the ‘best and brightest’ really represent optimal audit 
firm recruits for the majority of appointments.
Issue 7.4
Auditing is perceived to have an ‘image’ problem and to have become less 
attractive as a career than it once was. The GFC could mask this fact in the 
short term, but it will resurface as an issue.
Suggested action 7.4
Consider how the profile of auditing can be made more widely known as 
an attractive career option.
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8.0 Retention of staff (Chapter 8)
8.0.1 Inferences from interview findings
From the focus group interviews with junior staff, completion of CA and 
time commitments relating to fee reimbursement or when promoted to 
manager were frequently cited as trigger points for departure of staff. By 
and large, remuneration was not a key driver of the decision to leave. 
Often the departure of a colleague seemed to trigger departure. Perhaps 
after the interpersonal connectedness issue was the work/life balance 
and in particular the changing nature of the work, which was repeatedly 
described as either ‘documentation’ or ‘admin’.
Again, from the focus group interviews with junior staff, the following 
emerged as reasons to stay: 1) having someone who was a key role model 
for them; 2) the quality of people and colleagues working around them, 
the level of friendliness and the functionality of that group; and 3) having 
good-quality clients. Opportunities for secondments, especially overseas, 
were also seen as reasons to stay.
In terms of the face-to-face interviews, users did not see audit firms as 
premium employers. Purchasers questioned the recruitment from outside 
public practice to partner as undermining the traditional business model 
for staffing an audit firm. Another level of criticism by purchasers of the 
audit firm business model was the relatively low pay, high hours of work 
and a disconnect with lifestyle for modern, younger staff. Purchasers 
also acknowledged that much of the work undertaken by junior staff was 
‘menial’ and that this provided industry with the opportunity to recruit 
people who were experienced in business, especially at the completion of 
CA or promotion to manager trigger points. Purchasers see a short-term 
monetary gain for an audit firm employee to move to industry, but there is 
less clarity about long-term financial rewards.
Suppliers see the real challenge as being around retention, having in 
mind generational expectations and structural changes in the nature of the 
work brought about by regulatory reform and the perceived lessening of 
professional judgment as a key part of the job. There is a lack of empathy 
from some with generation Y expectations in regard to the desired rate 
of change in their working environment. The authors note that perhaps 
the audit business model cannot facilitate this desired variety of tasks, 
but it then comes to the point of recruiting the appropriate staff and 
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managing their expectations. Some suppliers recognise the need for 
constant change and innovation in the working lives of generation Y 
junior auditors and seek to be proactive in providing this. Some suppliers 
recognise that the traditional incentive structures—in particular, the 
prized goal of partnership—are no longer the attractions they once were. 
Suppliers repeatedly lament that the nature of oversight of the profession 
has degraded it, with the high level of regulation and scrutiny having 
consequences for job satisfaction, employment and retention. 
Standard setters are somewhat cynical that what is happening is 
anything but a desired outcome. There were very penetrating comments 
from a standard setter that even at partner level, there was a serious threat 
from attrition, which had system-wide implications, especially for highly 
specialised industry groups. 
There was an observation that suggested some partners and 
managers belonged to a ‘previous generation’ and were not empathetic 
with generation Y, especially with regard to changes to documentation 
requirements. While some of the participants of the focus groups suggested 
that documentation was one reason to leave the profession, there were also 
some positive advantages seen to better documentation. 
Issues 8.1–4
Widespread observations by participants at the time of questioning result 
in the conclusion that retention of staff is becoming more of a challenge 
than in the past.
Suggested action 8.1
Make sure human resource performance systems work optimally to reward 
merit and potential. 
Suggested action 8.2
Consider secondments to regulators (and others such as ‘policy’ officers) 
since secondments to clients are no longer as possible, presuming any 
potential conflicts of interest can be eliminated or adequately managed.
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Suggested action 8.3
Inform staff about employment opportunities and career development that 
exist within their firm and give benchmarked objective comparators with 
alternative employment.
Suggested action 8.4
Engage with audit firm alumni not just as potential clients but as potential 
returning employees.
9.0 Auditor independence (Chapter 9)
9.0.1 Inferences from survey findings
In terms of a survey question—‘Are you aware of the following specific 
changes that have occurred in the regulation of audit services in Australia: 
reforms pertaining to auditor independence’—57 per cent of users, 79 per 
cent of purchasers and 92 per cent of suppliers were aware.
9.0.2 Inferences from interview findings: auditor-provided  
 non-audit services
In the face-to-face interviews with stakeholders, users generally saw 
a balance between the advantage to auditor independence of more 
prohibitions placed on auditor-provided non-audit services (APNAS) and 
the loss of knowledge from the joint supply of several services. It was 
observed that there was much cynicism on the part of the public about the 
issue and there was a very clear need to be independent and to be seen to 
be independent. 
Among the purchasers, there was scepticism about the efficacy of 
‘Chinese walls’, while there was also mention of the potential loss if there 
was a blanket ban on any form of joint supply of services. Purchasers 
wanted a framework or systems to make choices about service provision 
from the incumbent auditor. 
Suppliers questioned whether the current situation with regard to 
APNAS was optimal. A number of suppliers, particularly those with 
small to medium-range clients, spoke of the advantages and efficiencies of 
joint supply as being substantial and lost in the current environment. It 
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was common for suppliers to comment on the expertise they brought—
otherwise deficient within the client—and that efficient and cost-effective 
joint delivery was in the best interest of all. This includes start-up companies 
with a preference for a ‘one-stop shop’ including capital raising, tax advice 
and financial reporting expertise to be supplied from the one source. 
One of the suppliers indicated a concern with the differential investment 
behaviour of audit and non-audit staff. The authors note that this could 
be a deterrent to retention within audit divisions. One observation from 
suppliers was that tax services delivered were so integral to the audit that 
the distinction between the two could be artificial.
Standard setters varied in their belief about whether the current 
regulatory system was tuned optimally. One standard setter raised 
concerns that the independence debate had been ‘hijacked’, arguing that 
what was sought was objectivity rather than independence.
The authors note that the issue of joint supply of non-audit services 
by an auditor is a classic example of public policy and personal interest 
conflicting. The objective of regulators and regulations is to protect 
business from the potential negative outcomes of possible independence 
threats, whereas the role of individual boards of directors and auditors is 
to provide an efficient and effective supply of relevant services to enhance 
the financial and business outcomes of clients. 
Issue 9.1
Discouraging auditor provided non-audit services for all sizes of clients 
creates inefficiencies and costs for shareholders.
Suggested action 9.1
Apply the ethical rules covering APNAS differentially to different sizes of 
company or according to some other criteria such as listed company size.
Issue 9.2
Companies’ disclosures regarding non-audit service fee categories are 
inconsistent, reducing comparability.
Suggested action 9.2
Provide guidance as to appropriate detailed services that fit within specific 
APNAS classifications.
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Issue 9.3
Audit division staff has reduced freedom with respect to investment 
opportunities compared with other public practice staff, but generally 
might not be as susceptible to losing employment in economic downturns 
because of the mandated nature of audit.
Suggested action 9.3
Investigate whether stability of employment characteristics compensate 
for forgone investment opportunities and, if not, compensate accordingly.
Issue 9.4
Although members of the three professional bodies in Australia (CPAA, 
ICAA and NIA) are bound by the IFAC-compliant APESB’s APES 110, 
there remain registered company auditors who are not members of these 
bodies and hence who are not necessarily bound by an ethical code based 
on IFAC’s code through membership of a professional accounting body.
Suggested action 9.4
Include ethical standards within the AUASB’s legal mandate or else the FRC 
provides the AUASB with a strategic direction to issue ethical standards 
for auditors.
9.1 inferences from interview findings: rotation
The issue of mandated partner rotation is one of the few issues on which 
there is agreement among stakeholders. A large number of purchasers 
and suppliers as well as a number of users, regulators and standard 
setters articulated the desirability of having a ‘fresh pair of eyes’ and the 
‘diversity of view’ that audit partner rotation could bring. Purchasers 
noted that rotation was practised by many audit firms before the current 
regulatory framework, but that the period was typically longer than five 
years. Purchasers also expressed some degree of uncertainty about the 
quality of any partner rotating in. Among the purchasers representing 
companies within the top 50 or so listed companies on the ASX, there 
was deep-rooted concern about the speed of rotation. Purchasers also 
expressed concern that when senior partners rotated off, the next logical 
client could be a major competitor in the same industry. 
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Suppliers also agree with the principle of rotation but have concerns. 
Suppliers noted a significant trade-off between independence—real and 
perceived—and the erosion of client knowledge. It was common to suggest 
that a five-year period was too short, particularly for large, complex or 
highly regulated (particularly APRA-regulated) companies. One supplier 
noted that there was no similar requirement for directors to rotate off. 
Suppliers to larger clients observed that large clients felt they had the 
power to demand any particular partner of their choice. Consequently, 
there is increased pressure on the most expert partners and less ability to 
train more junior partners. 
Some suppliers noted that the five-year rotation was a ‘tipping point’ 
for clients in a decision to put the auditor to tender; it was also a tipping 
point for some individual partners to reconsider their own careers. 
Suppliers also noted the time and energy needed to manage the partner 
rotation process with the need for ‘shadow’ partners for some complex 
clients in the year or more before rotation. The authors note the anomaly 
of this situation in terms of bringing a ‘fresh pair of eyes’.
Regulators, standard setters and users agreed in principle with rotation, 
but also acknowledged a substantial trade-off between knowledge of the 
client and independence. Suppliers and standard setters recognised that, 
generally, the initial-year audit quality was lower than the quality of an 
audit where the partner had been engaged with the client for three or 
more years. The authors note that the balance between engagement time 
and perceived independence might need to be crafted conditionally on 
the size, complexity or regulatory framework within which the auditee 
operates.
Issue 9.5
Five-year audit partner rotations are reported as creating problems for 
large, complex, highly regulated companies.
Suggested action 9.5
Consider differential application of audit partner rotation requirements 
rather than a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.
Issue 9.6
Several participant suppliers commented on the audit partner rotation 
being a trigger point for decisions regarding whether to leave or remain in 
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the auditing profession. No data are available about whether the point of 
partner rotation has increased the rate of exit from the profession.
Suggested action 9.6
Conduct research into movements of registered company auditors 
per capita before and after the introduction of the five-year rotation 
requirement, controlling for other factors likely to affect these movements 
(for example, retirement).
10.0 Regulatory reforms to audit: their impact  
  (Chapter 10)
10.0.1 Inferences from survey findings
Several survey questions were asked about the regulatory reforms and 
their impact. In response to questions about awareness of the following 
specific changes that have occurred in the regulation of audit services in 
Australia, the percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing was:
Users Purchasers suppliers
awareness of introduction of legally enforceable 
auditing standards
54% 77% 90% 
regulation will reduce the number of corporate 
failures occurring
28% 15% 15% 
responses to high-profile corporate collapses 
have assisted in improving the general public’s 
confidence in the capital market
21% 19% 20%
responses to high-profile corporate collapses have 
assisted in enhancing the credibility of financial 
statements
25% 21% 22%
responses to high-profile corporate collapses have 
assisted in enhancing the quality of an audit
33% 34% 42%
responses to high-profile corporate collapses have 
assisted in adding value to a company’s business 
operations
37% 18% 20%
in your opinion, complying with the additional 
mandatory procedures will increase the costs of 
conducting an audit
81% 90% 92%
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10.0.2 Inferences from interview findings
Some users took the view that as soon as a crisis emerged in what would 
otherwise be a free market; the political response was to increase regulation. 
There was concern about unintended consequences, which could in fact 
damage what would otherwise be appropriate public policy settings. Some 
users felt that, broadly, the market would not be well served by a change 
to the status of auditing standards. With respect to engendering more 
confidence in the capital market, users suggested that the market would 
continue to believe that auditors would undertake what they needed to 
do to form their audit opinion. Others supported this with a belief that 
the market would not see much impact from the changes. One respondent 
was somewhat critical of the profession’s ability to enforce standards, 
implying that a high level of regulated enforcement would give rise to a 
higher-quality outcome. In terms of audit quality, some users praised the 
current regulatory requirements, suggesting that they provided a floor 
level of quality. Various users described the present regulatory system 
as giving rise to audits that were ‘standardised’, ‘consistent’, ‘unbiased’, 
‘objective’, ‘comprehensive’ and ‘methodical’. There seemed to be an 
implication in the minds of some that these requirements would give rise 
to higher-quality auditing and they took the view that this would mean 
that the auditors would be better able to comment on the credibility of 
financial statements. A few users suggested that the auditor needed to go 
beyond this and be inquiring and innovative in their understanding of a 
business and the risks that business faced. 
Purchasers were split between whether or not legal enforceability 
was a positive initiative for the Australian economy. Some purchasers 
suggested that it could be worthwhile, while others were concerned that 
legal enforceability would result in auditors withdrawing from offering 
opinions and judgments and moving to fulfil compliance requirements. 
One purchaser lamented the loss of intellectual property rights for the 
profession. This purchaser also observed that the government had no-one 
to blame but itself and its own processes if and when there was another 
round of corporate failure. Few purchasers suggested there was a clear 
increase in confidence in the capital market, and suppliers also shared 
the scepticism that the market would be any different to that which had 
preceded it. In terms of audit quality, some purchasers felt that while the 
audit might not change much of what was done, the current regulatory 
requirements added considerable robustness to the audit, which might 
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not have been present before. A number of purchasers suggested that, 
fundamentally, the audit they observed had not changed with recent 
amendments to regulatory requirements; however, it had driven up costs. 
Few purchasers were able to identify how the audit had been changed or 
whether the auditors provided new and valuable insights into the business. 
Those who were able to make direct comparisons between Australia’s 
current position and the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the United States 
spoke favourably of the Australian position and somewhat harshly of the 
more prescriptive and compliance-driven US position.
Standard setters took the view that legal enforceability was good 
because it would give rise to improved quality. One regulator indicated 
that it would give substance and support and a more clarified approach 
than had previously been the case. 
Users, purchasers and suppliers all acknowledged that costs had risen as 
a consequence of these changes. For users who were somewhat sceptical of 
the value-adding capacities of an audit, these added costs only intensified 
their irritation. Purchasers also acknowledged that costs had risen, but 
there appeared to be some acceptance of these costs being passed on—at 
least in part. Suppliers acknowledged increased costs and that in some 
instances margins had been squeezed. While recognising there was going 
to be a cost gravitation upwards with respect to legally backed auditing 
standards, some standard setters commented that this came about because 
of changes in the international standards, which called for higher levels 
of documentation. One standard setter also made the observation that the 
change to legally enforceable auditing standards could in fact substantially 
increase the threshold costs of becoming an auditor to the corporate 
sector—thereby limiting competition. 
Related to but not directly connected with the increase to operating 
costs of conducting an audit under the new regulatory environment is 
the issue of the costs or potential costs to auditors of litigation risk. One 
regulator took the view that the presence of legally backed auditing 
standards would change the environment in only a relatively minor way—
adding another legal pathway to enhance auditor accountability.
Issue 10.1
Increasingly, prescription of audits is seen to ‘distract auditors’ from their 
tasks.
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Suggested action 10.1
Evidence should be gathered about whether the regulatory reforms of 
earlier this decade have been cost beneficial.
11.0 increasingly prescriptive audits:   
  a distraction for auditors (Chapter 11)
11.0.1 Inferences from survey findings
Respondents were asked: ‘In response to high-profile corporate collapses, 
regulation now requires auditors to comply with additional mandatory 
audit procedures. In your opinion, complying with the additional 
mandatory procedures will distract auditors from the objective of a 
financial statement audit, which is to give assurance on the credibility of 
financial statements.’ Nineteen per cent of users, 27 per cent of purchasers 
and 37 per cent of suppliers either agreed or strongly agreed.
11.0.2 Inferences from interview findings
Users, purchasers, suppliers, standard setters and regulators were all 
interviewed with a query about whether the additional audit procedures 
required as a result of the reforms distracted auditors from the objective 
of a financial statement audit. Many users felt that the current regulatory 
requirements had shifted the focus of the auditor away from the need to 
spend time understanding the business and the risks of the business. Some 
users took a different perspective, suggesting that the current regulatory 
requirements were not a distraction and that in fact an audit could be 
largely irrelevant anyway. Other users praised the current regulatory 
requirements, suggesting that they provided a floor level of quality. 
In terms of policy implication, the descriptors used (‘standardised’, 
consistent’, and so on) by users might represent a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for there to be a high-value audit that attests or gives 
assurance to the credibility of financial statements.
Purchasers were also split between those who believed that the current 
regulatory processes were a distraction and those who believed they were 
not. Those who were critical of the current proposals suggested that for 
the audit to be of value it really needed to look at the substance behind 
the transactions and behind the documentation. Those who believed that 
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regulation was not a distraction tended to share the view of users that the 
current regulatory requirements were there to ensure an appropriate job 
was done and that they represented ‘demonstrable compliance’. 
A number of purchasers suggested that, fundamentally, the audit 
they observed had not changed with recent amendments to regulatory 
requirements; however, it had driven up costs. Those who were able to 
make direct comparisons between Australia’s current position and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the United States spoke favourably of the 
Australian position and somewhat harshly of the more prescriptive and 
compliance-driven US position.
One purchaser questioned why auditors might find increased 
documentation requirements a negative development, alluding to an 
unwillingness to convey their ‘true’ beliefs. In view of this, when 
commenting on the increased requirements, auditors and audit firms 
need to be careful to explain the reasons behind their concerns and 
not give an incorrect impression of an unwillingness to commit their 
thoughts to writing. One purchaser observed that the US jurisdiction was 
very focused on prescription, with a rules-based environment, whereas 
the United Kingdom was conceptually founded on a principles-based 
environment. The commentator observed that in Australia, regulatory 
agencies had gone on to interpret these principles to create guidance, 
which in turn was interpreted as rules. This is not meant to be a criticism 
of regulatory agencies because sometimes they create this guidance at 
the behest of participants in the market to assist them. The commentator 
also observed, however, that the difficulty with rules was that they could 
become outdated as circumstances changed or even irrelevant because of 
environmental changes. The second difficulty with a rules-based regime is 
that rules can be used as a substitute for good judgment.
Similarly, suppliers were divided between those who believed the 
current regulatory requirements were a distraction and those who believed 
that they were an enhancement. Those critical pointed to the ever-
increasing time spent on documentation, which had distracted them from 
committing to understanding the business while clients were reluctant to 
absorb substantially increased fees. Those who were critical suggested that 
some audit partners were becoming ‘gun-shy’ of the possible penalties 
and that they had to change their approach to being less principles based 
and reliant on judgment to being much more check-list oriented. Other 
suppliers suggested a ‘heightened regulation risk’. One standard setter 
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observed that the whole debate of rules versus principles was not helpful. 
Although Australia has come from a background of a principles-based 
environment, even principles-based standards have included an amount 
of prescription. 
Standard setters see the current regulatory requirements as a useful 
part of the quality control of an audit and not as a distraction from 
the real, continuing operation of the audit. They observe that the 
requirements give rise to demonstrated evidence that a good job has been 
accomplished. One standard setter observed that although auditors called 
for audits to be judgment driven and principles based, when interacting 
within professional bodies, they sought greater ‘clarity’, which inevitably 
became something akin to a check list. 
Regulators acknowledged that the current requirements could give rise 
to a loss of focus and audits could indeed become bogged down in some 
of the tedium. Given the scale of the change in the nature of the work, it 
has consequences for the working lives of many individuals who might be 
attracted to and retained within the profession (refer to Chapter 8). 
Issue 11.1
There appears to be no agreed minimum documentation requirement 
between the regulator and auditors. It appears that, by default, PCAOB 
documentation requirements have been adopted by the Big Four in 
internationalising their audit processes and applied to PCAOB and non-
PCAOB regulated audits alike. In turn, suppliers interviewed advised that 
they believed that Australian regulators saw this as the minimum and 
onerous when applied to Big Four and non-Big Four auditors in relation to 
the bulk of audits inspected.
Suggested action 11.1
Greater dialogue between auditor representatives and regulator 
representatives should take place.
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12.0 The approach, operation and resources of  
  the regulators (Chapter 12)
12.0.1 Inferences from interview findings
Both purchasers and suppliers recognise the need for regulatory inspections 
and their benefits, which provide quality control and potentially useful 
information to the capital market—albeit that the regulators’ reports 
tend to highlight negatives only. Nonetheless, purchasers and suppliers 
were sceptical about the inspection process. One purchaser observed that 
there was never an opportunity to gain an understanding from working 
paper files of events as they unfolded in the real world. Purchasers and 
suppliers provided criticism that inspectors did not have sufficient ‘real 
world’ auditing experience and that inspections were limited because of 
this deficiency. 
Supplier members of firms that had been inspected were mixed in their 
evaluation of the inspections process and some were overtly negative. Those 
in the non-Big Four observed that the process had been contaminated by 
inspectors observing resources available to the Big Four and expecting the 
non-Big Four to operate at the same resource level. There was, in the view 
of one non-Big Four supplier, a lack of empathy for the fact that they did 
things differently.
Users, purchasers and standard setters observed that the regulator 
was inadequately equipped to undertake inspections. One user expressed 
disappointment that there was a need to obtain greater interaction 
between practice and regulators and to attain more practical experience 
for regulators from those in regulatory environments. One purchaser 
observed that resources assigned to regulators were almost by definition 
inadequate for fully undertaking the task entrusted to a regulator and that 
the efficient operation of a regulator was to be selective and strategic about 
the work undertaken rather than attempting to be comprehensive. This 
purchaser also noted the beneficial use of secondments and sabbaticals 
from private sector suppliers into regulators, which was common in the 
United States but until very recently rare in Australia. 
One standard setter observed that audit was in fact an outsourced 
form of regulation, but there was a potential disconnection between the 
outcomes of the audit and what the regulator might ultimately wish to be 
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reported. This is not the responsibility of the auditor per se, but suggests 
a subtle re-engineering of regulatory objectives and outcomes.
It is interesting to observe that while participants in the market have 
their criticisms of audit documentation requirements, users, purchasers 
and suppliers and perhaps particularly standard setters all observe that 
there is a benefit to enhanced levels of documentation. 
Issue 12.1
There was evidence of tension and misunderstandings between suppliers 
and regulators at the time of the interviews. The authors note that current 
forums such as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC) Chairs Committee and various task forces, the Regulatory Discussion 
Group, APRA’s Superannuation National Auditors Consultative Committee 
(SNACC), ASIC Accounting Liaison meetings, the Research Group and 
other informal as well as formal meetings and discussions did not all exist 
at the time.
Suggested action 12.1
Establish a new forum or make more effective existing forums for 
communication between suppliers and regulators and create wider 
dissemination of outcomes of those communications to ensure transparency 
and a comprehensive understanding of these communications by the 
supply side of the market.
Issue 12.2
It is difficult to encourage communication between suppliers and regulators 
when there is no peak body for registered company auditors.
Suggested action 12.2
Encourage formation of a peak body for registered company auditors.
Issue 12.3
It is noted that there has since been increased funding to ASIC, but at 
the time of the interviews several participant stakeholders perceived 
continuing under-resourcing of ASIC—in monetary and expertise terms.
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Suggested Action 12.3
Adequate resourcing of and training in audit related matters of regulatory 
inspection staff so they hold relevant expertise and experience.
Issue 12.4
There is an alleged ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach by ASIC to inspections.
Suggested action 12.4
Introduce a more nuanced and informed approach to inspections, which 
might include engagement with the peak body for registered company 
auditors.
Issue 12.5
Reports on ASIC inspections tend to focus on negative aspects.
Suggested action 12.5
Introduce a more balanced approach to ASIC reporting on inspections.
13.0 Competition (Chapter 13)
13.0.1 Inferences from survey findings
In response to the assertion that ‘for larger companies in Australia, there 
is a lack of competition in the market for audit services’, 57 per cent of 
users, 52 per cent of purchasers and 55 per cent of suppliers either agreed 
or strongly agreed. In response to the assertion that ‘an external financial 
statement audit is of value to you because of the brand name of the audit 
firm’, 32 per cent of users, 34 per cent of purchasers and 30 per cent of 
suppliers either agreed or strongly agreed.
13.0.2 Inferences from interview findings
A significant number of users were concerned that with only four major 
audit firms there was a lack of competition. Users also observed that for 
a significant portion of the market, the Big Four were the only potential 
suppliers and that certain investors sought out and gave preference to 
global brand names such as the Big Four. One user made the observation 
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
lvi |
that the sheer scale of the Big Four provided opportunities for training 
and skill development unmatched by the non-Big Four, which created 
potential dominance and quality-level implications. 
Purchasers were more mixed in their views. A positive view was that 
the quality of the non-Big Four meant that the sector could be turned 
to for specific advice on certain matters. Other purchasers believed 
that, for the big end of town, the market was sufficiently competitive 
and that there was significant competition once one looked beyond the 
larger ASX-listed companies. One of the more complex observations was 
that too much competition could drive down quality. Other purchasers 
suggested that for some services the non-Big Four were stepping up and 
becoming more competitive. Purchasers noted that at the margin between 
the Big Four and the non-Big Four there was considerable competition, 
with the Big Four establishing ‘enterprise’ or ‘middle-market’ divisions 
that competed fiercely with non-Big Four firms. While some purchasers 
believe that the market encompasses self-correcting mechanisms, other 
observations suggest the difficulty of another large audit firm developing 
through natural market forces. One observer suggested nationalisation of 
the audit industry given the low level of competition. Others observed, 
however, that much competition existed, particularly at partner rather 
than firm level, and that the Big Four could move partners around the 
world. 
Several suppliers observed heavy price competition and that tender 
battles were intense. There are repeated suggestions of tight margins and 
considerable fee pressures. On the other hand, suppliers recognise that 
purchasers at the upper end are limited in choice. One supplier commented 
that competition could be generated where a large listed company might 
have an inner circle of three of the Big Four in one way or another, but must 
have one not supplying it. Several suppliers observed that for some clients 
the market comprised three rather than four large suppliers. Suppliers 
also recognise that some of the mid-tier firms are moving up and some of 
the Big Four activity is moving down into smaller audit purchasers. One 
supplier suggested that the presence of the Big Four with work divisions 
that catered for middle-market clients effectively created a second brand 
name of the Big Four, with potentially different standards of quality and 
cost structure. 
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Other suppliers indicated that the Big Four competed with consulting 
firms since divesting their own consulting arms, which meant less work for 
the Big Four, placing pressure on all parts of the organisation, including 
on staff retention and the ability to interchange between audit and non-
audit work. Some suppliers observed that more competition would mean 
some firms not having the expertise or skill set to undertake quality audits 
because of the pressure on recruiting qualified staff. Other suppliers 
expressed concern that the regulatory environment and the expectations 
of the standards of quality for audits meant that some suppliers were 
moving out of the market, thereby lowering competition. A related 
issue is that increased regulation has meant that the ability of each Big 
Four firm to differentiate itself on quality terms is limited and in fact the 
quality differentiation comes at partner level not at firm level. This in turn 
represents a challenge due to mandated requirements for audit partner 
rotation.
One standard setter also observed that in the 1980s audit firm fee 
competition was intense and initiated essentially by the audit firm in 
order to win consulting activity. Through regulatory change, this is now 
not possible but there is still considerable price pressure in fees, driven 
this time by clients rather than audit firms. Their motivation appears to be 
the desire for cost efficiencies.
There were repeated comments about the moral hazard for regulators 
should another large firm fail. As economic circumstances adjust with 
the GFC, the potential moral hazard could be more real—at least in some 
jurisdictions around the world. One regulator made the observation that 
the moral hazard problem had already occurred in Asia, where, while one 
firm was subject to regulatory sanction, sufficient concessions were given 
such that it continued to trade. The authors observe that despite sometimes 
intense competition, the majority of purchasers do not currently see 
financial statement audits as a value-for-money service provided to the 
market.
Issues 13.1–2
In the unlikely event that there is a failure of one of the Big Four accounting 
firms, it is probable that there will be adverse effects on the market for audit 
services and particularly for competition in that market. The continuing 
viability of these partnerships, however, cannot be observed and there 
appear to be no contingency plans by those who regulate this market.
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Suggested action 13.1
If not already in existence—and although unlikely to be needed— 
a contingency plan to deal with the threatened failure of one of the Big 
Four should be established.
Suggested action 13.2
There should be regulatory oversight, perhaps on a confidential basis, of 
the financial statements of the Big Four accounting firms.
Issue 13.3
There is no single regulatory body responsible for oversight of the 
‘wellbeing’ (for example, number per capita, level of activity, level of 
maintained competence) of the pool of registered company auditors.
Suggested action 13.3
A body responsible for oversight of the wellbeing (for example, number 
per capita, level of activity, level of maintained competence) of the pool 
of registered company auditors should be established. Alternatively, 
existing mechanisms could be adapted to deal with this matter. As a 
minimum, continuing registered company auditor accreditation should be 
dependent on carrying an appropriate amount of professional indemnity 
cover, complying with minimum annual continuing professional education 
requirements and subject to appropriate quality review processes.
14.0 Differential auditing standards  
  (Chapter 14)
14.0.1 Inferences from interview findings
The notion of ‘differential auditing’ causes confusion in the minds of 
at least some participants and in particular users, who tend to confuse 
the issue of differential auditing standards with differential mandates. 
From users, there is a mixed view with regard to the advantages and 
disadvantages of differential auditing standards. Some of the motivation 
for the positive view comes from the perception that they will create 
cost savings. Some users, however, were adamant that they would cause 
capital market inefficiencies by enhancing the attractiveness of remaining 
SUMMARy oF REPoRT CHAPTERS 
| lix
private as opposed to going public. Also, there is concern that differential 
auditing standards will cause decreased understandability and increased 
confusion in the capital market. 
Purchasers showed little support for differential auditing standards. 
They note that the criterion of listed versus unlisted is inappropriate, with 
a size-based criterion seen as more functional. Suppliers describe concern 
about the ability to effectively communicate what level of assurance is being 
given. Standard setters were also not supportive of differential auditing 
standards, although one drew a sharp distinction between differential 
auditing standards and differential accounting standards and suggested 
that the debate might be confused because of the intersection of the two. 
Regulators did provide some support for differential auditing standards. 
Much of the positive motivation focused on the costliness of obtaining 
assurance; however, the case against focused on the undesirability of large 
unlisted businesses being audited to a differential standard. 
In summary, there was limited support for differential auditing 
standards and, if there was to be a discussion around this issue, it should 
focus on the size-based criterion rather than listed/unlisted.
Issue 14.1
Entities that require what might be called ‘micro-audits’ often are 
required by their constitution or by legislation (for example, incorporated 
associations) to be subject to an audit, when a review would suffice.
Suggested action 14.1
Consider reviewing with a view to amending (often state and territory) 
legislation so that the term ‘review’ rather than ‘audit’ is used—or indeed 
a choice between both, where appropriate.
15.0 internal audit (Chapter 15)
15.0.1 Inferences from interview findings
Many users valued internal audit capacity—whether outsourced or 
inhouse—however, they saw little interaction between the work of 
external auditors and the role of the internal auditor. Additionally, there 
seems to be little support for the proposition that users value the internal 
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audit as part of the value of a company. Purchasers do see a relationship 
between the internal and external audit functions. Purchasers also value 
internal audit as an important part of risk management. There is scepticism 
about whether the capital market has a view on the role and value of the 
internal audit function.
Many suppliers commented that not all clients maintained an internal 
audit function. Suppliers provide little evidence that external auditors rely 
on the work of internal auditors, but recognise that boards of directors, 
audit committees and management value the internal audit function. 
Standard setters do not support the proposition that external auditors 
rely on the work of internal auditors. Regulators do see external auditors 
as placing more reliance on the internal audit function, but they do not 
recognise that it is perceived as being valuable to the market, probably 
because its work is not observable to the capital market.
Issue 15.1
Reliance by the external auditor on the internal auditor requires procedures 
to investigate the competence and level of independence of the internal 
auditor that tend to negate any efficiencies involved in reliance.
Suggested action 15.1
Consider ways in which external auditor reliance on internal audit can be 
facilitated. This can emanate from the internal or external audit side of 
the market.
Issue 15.2
It is difficult for the market to perceive the value of internal audit when 
present in a company. 
Suggested action 15.2
Companies should be encouraged or required to disclose details about 
the internal audit function, what level it reports to, the type of work it 
engages in, the number of personnel involved, and so on.
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16.0 other assurance services and reports  
  (Chapter 16)
16.0.1 Inferences from survey findings
Survey responses to questions about whether the external auditor was best 
placed to provide reports on various forms of non-financial information 
resulted in the following percentages agreeing or strongly agreeing.
levels of support for auditor provision of reports on: Users Purchasers suppliers
presence of material fraud in a company 81% 66% 69%
internal control procedures 80% 79% 81%
integrity of senior executive managers 50% 33% 27%
risk-management approaches of a company 75% 70% 63%
performance of senior executive managers 34% 14% 12%
environmental and corporate sustainability 
performance
44% 31% 32%
quality of corporate governance 77% 74% 68%
conflicts of interest of directors 74% 74% 53%
senior executive managers’ projections 40% 32% 30%
reasonableness of non-financial information 48% 49% 47%
16.0.2 Inferences from interview findings
Users particularly expressed the desirability of reports on material fraud, 
internal control procedures, risk-management approaches within the 
auditee, the quality of corporate governance and reports on conflicts of 
interests of directors, but even then responses were nuanced. Purchasers 
and suppliers were not so enthusiastic, with positive responses in relation 
to reports on material fraud, internal control procedures, the quality of 
corporate governance and risk approaches of the auditee. It was observed 
that additional assurance around these disclosures might inhibit the 
provision of enhanced disclosure by directors and/or management. Users 
expressed scepticism about disclaimers that would accompany these 
assurances. Purchasers were concerned that they would result in ‘second-
guessing of the board’. Suppliers were sceptical that purchasers would 
be prepared to pay for these assurances. Some questioned whether these 
additional assurance services would be well understood. Standard setters 
were more positive but suggested the need for universal reporting and a 
framework within which to report. Regulators were sceptical, questioning 
whether there was value in these assurance engagements other than in 
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the unrealistic circumstance of provision of real-time assurance, but were 
more positive with respect to additional assurance around the presence 
of material fraud. Regarding internal controls, again, more positive than 
negative views were expressed and suppliers saw a nexus between their 
current role and the provision of additional assurance around internal 
controls. Each specific type of potential report received comments, but the 
most universally disliked report was assurance over the integrity of senior 
management, which was generally seen as not possible when auditors 
worked so closely with management. 
Issue 16.1
There is demand for assurance on various non-financial information types, 
much of which falls within a ‘risk-management’ framework.
Suggested action 16.1
Provide thought leadership by developing subject-specific guidance 
for assurance on certain types of non-financial information within an 
overarching framework of ‘risk management’.
17.0 Differing levels of audit assurance  
  (Chapter 17)
17.0.1 Inferences from interview findings
Users revealed some confusion about the level of audit assurance but did 
express a desire for higher levels of audit assurance. Suppliers were less 
enthusiastic, observing that users were not enthusiastic about even the 
current audit product, repeatedly describing it as ‘a necessary evil’ or 
seeing it as a compliance commodity that was not necessarily high value 
adding. Additionally, legal liability associated with higher-level assurance 
was raised. One supplier observed that there could be circumstances in 
which a lower level of audit assurance might be desired. Some suppliers 
believed higher levels of assurance were possible but only if privately 
communicated to directors. Also raised was the prohibitively high cost 
of higher than existing audit assurance. Generally, standard setters 
were not positive about differing levels of assurance, expressing that 
it was a challenge just to communicate adequately the current level of 
audit assurance. This viewpoint contrasted with that of one regulator, 
SUMMARy oF REPoRT CHAPTERS 
| lxiii
who believed that it was possible to have differential levels of assurance 
where those differential levels attached to different components of what 
was communicated to shareholders. In summary, in certain conditions, 
differential levels of audit assurance might be possible, but there is little 
enthusiasm for them.
Issue 17.1
The auditing standards constrain the level of assurance to ‘reasonable’ 
even when there is client need for something above this level and when 
the circumstances exist in which it can be delivered.
Suggested action 17.1
Provide a framework whereby higher than ‘reasonable’ assurance can be 
given within auditing standards, in circumstances in which there is client 
demand and an ability to deliver at that higher level. It is acknowledged 
that this suggestion would mean a departure from the present position of 
the assurance framework of the IAASB.
Issue 17.2
Agreed-on procedures engagements cannot provide any assurance.
Suggested action 17.2
Consider whether agreed-on procedures engagements should be able to 
provide a level of assurance. It is acknowledged that this suggestion would 
mean a departure from the present position of the assurance framework 
of the IAASB.
18.0 Conclusion
This summary of report chapters provides an overview of the whole report. 
It is not a substitute for reading the chapters in full in order to examine 
the issues giving rise to its 53 recommendations. With this number of 
recommendations, some of which would be relatively easy and quick to 
implement and others of which need a longer-term view, it might be helpful 
to consider which recommendations are likely to be of most interest to 
which set of stakeholders. The table below lists each recommendation and 
classifies it according to the authors’ view of where the interest might 
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lie. The concluding chapter, Chapter 18, includes a table that summarises 
all of the issues and recommendations and provides the authors’ view of 
which party might best be given responsibility for implementation. It is 
important not to confuse the table below with author-perceived assigned 
responsibility, but rather to view it as the authors’ attempt to assist 
stakeholders in focusing on recommendations most pertinent to them.
The reader might also find of assistance content towards the end of 
Chapter 1, which provides various diagrammatic pathways or ‘road maps’ 
to reading this report, contingent on reader interests and motivations.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A  Summary of expected stakeholder interest in specific  
 recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . li
Table 2.1  Four phases of the study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 2.2  Phase 1 focus group participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 2.3  Phase 4 junior auditor focus group participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 2.4 Interview participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Table 2.5 Survey participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 2.6  Number and proportion of total responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 2.7  Number and proportion of user responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 2.8  Number and proportion of purchaser responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 2.9  Number and proportion of supplier responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 2.10 Responses on reading and reliance of financial statements . . . . . 23
Table 2.11  Age demographic by respondent category: users’ age  
 bracket by category of decision perspective and by  
 accounting credentials  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Table 2.12  Educational qualifications of respondents: users’ educational  
 credentials by category of decision perspective and by  
 accounting credentials  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 3.1 Responses: whether audits represent value for money . . . . . . . . . 38
Table 3.2  Responses: why the external audit is of value  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Table 3.3  Respondents’ self-rating of the level of understandability  
 of financial statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 3.4  Respondents’ self-reported extent of reading of audited  
 financial statements and the level of usage and reliance . . . . . . . 43
Table 3.5  Responses: impact of complexity on understandability of  
 financial statements, notes to statements and audit reports  . . . . 46
Table 3.6  Responses on confidence that an auditor will detect all  
 material fraud and error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 3.7  Responses: auditors’ responsibilities to detect material  
 fraud, material error, warn audit committees about risk  
 or to act as a whistleblower  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 3.8  Responses: what does the audit provide direct assurance about? . . . 49
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
lxx |
Table 6.1  value of financial statements audits because of the industry  
 and client knowledge of auditors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Table 6.2  Responses on the business acumen of auditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Table 9.1 Responses on awareness of changes in regulation . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Table 10.1 Responses on awareness of the introduction of legally  
 enforceable auditing standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
Table 10.2 Responses to the impacts of changes to the regulation  
 of audit  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
Table 10.3 Responses on the cost impact of regulatory reforms to audit . . . . 440
Table 11.1 Responses on regulatory changes as a distraction . . . . . . . . . . . 457
Table 13.1  Responses on competition and auditor brand names. . . . . . . . . 547
Table 16.1 Responses on services best provided by an external auditor . . . . 613
| lxxi
lisT oF ABBREviATions AnD ACRonyMs
AASB Australian Accounting Standards Board
AGM annual general meeting
AICD Australian Institute of Company Directors
AIFRS Australian Equivalents to International Financial  
 Reporting Standards
ANCAAR Australian National Centre for Audit and Assurance  
 Research 
APESB Australian Professional Ethical Standards Board
APRA Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission
ASA Australian Shareholders’ Association
ASX Australian Securities Exchange
AUASB Auditing and Assurance Standards Board
AQRB Audit Quality Review Board
CALDB Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board
CEO chief executive officer
CFO chief financial officer
CLERP 9 Act Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform 
 and Corporate Disclosure Act (2004)
CPAA CPA Australia
FRC Financial Reporting Council
FSR Financial Service Regulation
GFC global financial crisis
IASB International Accounting Standards Board
IAASB International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
lxxii |
ICAA Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards
IIA Institute of Internal Auditors
IQP internal quality process
NIA National Institute of Accountants
P&L profit (loss) statement or income statement
PCAOB Public Company Accounting Oversight Board  
 (United States)
SDM staff development manager
SEC Securities Exchange Commission (United States)







inTRoDUCTion AnD sUMMARy 
oF FinDinGs 1
1.0 introduction
This monograph is the culmination of an extensive project examining the 
value and future of audit in Australia. The objective of this study is to 
provide policy advice to key stakeholders in the market for audit services 
on the current challenges and future opportunities in that market. 
This advice is informed and enriched by a comprehensive survey of major 
stakeholder groups in the capital market of their concerns about and 
expectations of the market for audit services in Australia. The data form 
the backdrop against which the future directions of the Australian market 
for audit services are shaped to ensure that audit and audit-related services 
are of the highest quality and that the credibility of, and confidence in, 
the market for audit and audit-related services are enhanced.
1.1 Aims and background
The breadth of this project was scoped from the results of a preliminary 
study of the future of audit in Australia conducted in 2005 as a commissioned 
report to certain relevant participants. The preliminary study facilitated 
the identification of broad questions and issues, which were then pursued 
in greater depth in the current project, utilising a larger sample size and 
wider geographical dispersion.
In September 2007, the Australian National Centre for Audit and 
Assurance Research (ANCAAR) hosted the Future of Audit Symposium 
at Parliament House, Canberra. The purpose of this symposium was to 
communicate preliminary results from the survey and to use the results as 
a basis to encourage further discussion, thus supplementing the richness 
of the data set through additional insights from different stakeholders’ 
perspectives. 
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This project has received the support of the Australian Research 
Council (ARC) through an ARC Linkage Grant. Additional support 
has been provided by industry partners, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia, CPA Australia, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG 
and PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
1.2 Research method
This project utilised a mixed-method research design (comprising focus 
groups, telephone and postal surveys and in-depth interviews) to capture 
qualitative and quantitative data. By drawing on the strengths of the 
various data-collection methods, methodological triangulation facilitated 
the unravelling of dynamic and complex issues.
Focus groups are particularly useful to explore and generate ideas 
and issues through group interactions. The nature of the focus groups, 
however, presents limited opportunity to probe issues in greater detail. 
In-depth interviews, on the other hand, provide a source of data richness, 
as the researcher is able to probe further into the complexity of issues. 
The personal interaction that is required, however, restricts the number 
of interviews that can be conducted within a reasonable time frame. 
The strength of telephone and postal surveys lies in their capacity to 
reach a large sample of participants across diverse geographical locations. 
Surveys are, however, restricted in the extent to which issues that are 
raised can be explored. By drawing on the strengths of each technique, 
this mix of methods was the most efficient and cost-effective means of 
collecting a wide range of responses yet provided a rich and meaningful 
context within which to tease out and analyse underlying issues related to 
the value and future of auditing in Australia. 
Views were canvassed from a wide cross-section of key stakeholders, 
representing the supply and demand sides of the market for audit services. 
Specifically, the project sought participation from the following major 
stakeholder groups:
•	 users of audit reports, including
 – users with accounting expertise (for example, accounting 
professionals)
 – professional (for example, financial advisors, financial planners, 
lenders, analysts, investment managers, stockbrokers)
 – private investors
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•	 purchasers of audit and assurance services, including
 – directors and audit committee members
 – management (CEOs and CFOs)
•	 suppliers of audit and assurance services 
 – Big Four
 – non-Big Four 
•	 standard setters
•	 regulators of audit services.
1.3 Issues considered
This project covered a broad-ranging set of questions, enlarging on the 
themes identified in the 2005 preliminary study and incorporating themes 
of particular interest to the industry partners. Given this, the guidelines 
set at the inception of this project centred on: the expectations gap; 
business acumen; corporate law reforms; and the risks faced by suppliers 
and users. Specific issues within these broad themes unfolded during the 
course of the project, including: 
•	 the value placed on the audit product
•	 understandability of the audit product
•	 expected deliverables from an audit compared with real deliverables
•	 the adequacy of communications surrounding auditors’ work and 
processes
•	 auditors’ use of ‘materiality’ and stakeholders’ interpretation of that 
concept
•	 attracting, supporting and retaining quality staff in the audit 
profession
•	 development by audit personnel of business acumen and client and 
industry knowledge
•	 auditor independence issues involving auditor-provided non-audit 
services and audit partner rotation
•	 competition in the market for audit services
•	 the costs and benefits of the new regulatory regime for auditing 
introduced after the high-profile corporate collapses earlier this 
decade, including
 – awareness and understanding of the reforms
 – impacts of the reforms on financial statement credibility
 – costs
 – risk of being a distraction to the auditor
 – regulatory processes for monitoring and enforcement.
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In addition, some other matters were addressed, including:
•	 the case for and against differential auditing standards
•	 the value of internal audit and the external auditor’s reliance on it
•	 the case for and against provision of assurance on certain financial 
and non-financial information, not commonly subject to audit or 
review 
•	 the case for and against provision of levels of assurance beyond 
currently sanctioned levels.
Each of the above issues is examined in the chapters that follow. Examination 
of some issues involves survey questions as well as interviews, whereas 
others involve interviews only. Focus group interviews with more junior 
auditors were incorporated for specific issues. In all cases where there 
were interviews, the stakeholder groups included users, purchasers 
(management and board), suppliers (Big Four and non-Big Four), standard 
setters and regulators.
1.4 Structure of this report 
This report comprises eight divisions including this introductory one. 
The seven further divisions are: B) expectations and understandability; 
C) competency and expertise; D) independence; E) regulation; F) the 
market for assurance services; G) other issues; and H) concluding remarks. 
Division B (expectations and understandability), comprises:
•	 Chapter 3: Understanding of the audit and perceptions of the 
deliverables 
•	 Chapter 4: Communication 
•	 Chapter 5: Understanding of materiality. 
Division C (competency and expertise) comprises: 
•	 Chapter 6: Developing business acumen and client and industry 
knowledge 
•	 Chapter 7: Attracting and supporting staff 
•	 Chapter 8: Retention of staff. 
Division D (independence) comprises:
•	 Chapter 9: Auditor independence (which discusses auditor-provided 
non-audit services and audit partner rotation). 
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Division E (regulation) comprises:
•	 Chapter 10: Regulatory reforms to audit—their impacts 
•	 Chapter 11: Increasingly prescriptive audits—a distraction  
for auditors? 
•	 Chapter 12: The approach, operation and resources of regulators. 
Division F (the market for assurance services) comprises:
•	 Chapter 13: Competition. 
Division G (other issues) comprises:
•	 Chapter 14: Differential auditing standards 
•	 Chapter 15: Internal audit 
•	 Chapter 16: Other assurance services 
•	 Chapter 17: Differing levels of assurance. 
Division H (concluding remarks) comprises: 
•	 Chapter 18: Conclusions and recommendations.
Since it is likely that different readers will be more interested in some 
topics included in this report than in others, the next few pages describe 
different pathways to reading the document that might be helpful 
in creating a road map to the topics and pertinent recommendations. 
Since the topics are interrelated and hence so are many of the 
recommendations, the following diagrams represent but a few ways in 
which the document can be dissected. 
1.6 Road maps to reading this document
Topic orientation 1
Of course, interest in specific topics lies in the eyes of the beholder, 
but the first road map presented suggests dissection of the report into 
communication, technical, staffing and societal issues and suggests in the 
figure below the relevant chapters and recommendations to read under 
each issue.
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Figure 1.1  Road map 1: topic orientation
Topic orientation 2
The second suggested road map dissects the report into expectations gap/
education, materiality, staffing, independence, regulation and assurance 
on other than financial report issues, and suggests relevant chapters and 
recommendations under each topic.
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Figure 1.2  Road map 2: topic orientation
Topic orientation 3
The third suggested road map to reading this report takes a stakeholder 
approach and suggests the chapters that might be of interest to users, 
purchasers, suppliers, standard setters and regulators. 
Also of assistance in reading this report might be the summary of 
expected stakeholder interest in the recommendations, which appears at 
the end of the executive summary.
Chapter 2 concludes Division A. It discusses the research method used 
in this study.
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This study uses multiple methods to derive data in order to extract the 
richness of the experience of those whose working lives are connected 
in some way with the market for audit services and the audit product. 
Surveys, focus group interviews and face-to-face interviews are the 
methodologies employed to gather the data that are then analysed using 
various techniques—quantitative and qualitative.
1.1 Sample 
To reflect as wide a range of opinions as possible, this project sought the 
participation of representatives of key stakeholder groups from the supply 
and demand sides of the market for audit services, encompassing: users of 
audit reports (for example, financial advisors, financial planners, lenders, 
analysts, investment managers, stockbrokers and private investors); 
purchasers of audit and assurance services (for example, management, 
directors and audit committee members); suppliers, representing the Big 
Four and non-Big Four firms; and regulators.
Participants were drawn primarily from the following sources: nominees 
from the industry partners, purchased databases, data collected from 
the Connect 4 database and professional association membership lists. In 
total, 7296 records were purchased from the Fairfax and Accountable List 
Brokers’ databases, covering finance professionals, chief executive officers 
and directors. An additional 2530 records on directors and audit committee 
members of listed companies were collected by the researchers using 
Connect 4. We also approached relevant professional associations for their 
assistance in securing the participation of their membership. Participating 
professional associations were: the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia, CPA Australia, Australian Shareholders’ Association, Financial 
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Planners Association of Australia Limited, Securities and Derivatives 
Industry Association, the Association of Financial Advisors Limited, 
Australian Bankers’ Association, Group 100, Australian Securities 
Exchange and the Financial Services Institute of Australasia. Typically, 
these professional associations contacted their membership on our behalf 
to participate in interviews or surveys.
As different sources were accessed, it was expected that there would 
be overlapping listings, as it was likely that stakeholders would belong to 
more than one group.
While effort was made to reduce the possibility of multiple listings, 
privacy legislation prevented us from eliminating overlapping listings. 
We also encountered difficulties in recruiting participants. There was 
reticence to participate in this project, with many of those contacted 
declining the opportunity to participate. The extent of our difficulties is 
clearly evidenced by the numbers reported in the following sections.
1.2 Research design
Data for this project were collected using a mixed-method approach, 
combining focus groups, telephone and postal surveys and in-depth 
interviews. The advantages of methodological triangulation were outlined 
in the previous section. These three techniques were conducted in four 
phases, using the strengths of each technique to build an understanding 
of the issues.
Table 2.1 Four phases of the study
Phase Technique
Phase 1: July – November 2006 Focus groups
Phase 2: December 2006 – February 2007 In-depth interviews (pre-survey)
Phase 3: April – May 2007 Mail and telephone survey
Phase 4: May – November 2007 In-depth interviews (post-survey)  
and focus groups of junior auditors
The project was sequenced in this way to first allow the scoping of the 
project in the Phase 1 focus groups. While the broad themes had been 
identified at the inception of this project (that is, the expectations gap, 
business acumen, company law reforms and risks faced by suppliers and 
users), the focus groups provided the setting to explore issues of concern 
and to generate ideas within these broad themes. Since focus groups do not 
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provide much opportunity to probe issues, in-depth interviews were also 
conducted (Phase 2) to develop a better understanding of the issues. To 
ascertain the views and concerns of a wider cross-section of stakeholders, 
mail and telephone surveys were conducted (Phase 3). Finally, as a 
culmination to the data-collection process, we allocated the opportunity 
for additional in-depth interviews and focus groups to consolidate the 
findings of the earlier phases.
The following sections outline the scope of the questions and the type 
of participants in the focus groups, in-depth interviews and survey. 
1.3 Focus groups 
Scope of questions
Phase 1 focus group participants were asked to consider three broad 
questions relating to:
•	 audit services
•	 the audit expectations gap
•	 the risks faced by suppliers and users.
The specific questions used as a starting point for discussion were:
•	 ‘What types of audit or audit-related services are wanted by 
shareholders and management to enhance the credibility of financial 
statements?’
•	 ‘Are there other audit or audit-related services that are wanted by 
shareholders and management?’
•	 ‘Do you believe a gap in expectations still exists? If so, in what areas 
and among which groups?’
•	 ‘Can the gap be closed? Does it need to be closed? What are the 
mechanisms that can help to manage expectations or narrow the gap?’
•	 ‘What are the major risks faced by: i) audit suppliers, and ii) other 
participants in the market for audit services (for example, users, 
preparers)?’
Each session was approximately 1.5 hours in duration, and different 
approaches were used to elicit responses from participants, including 
individual assessment and group discussion. These procedures facilitated 
the identification of relevant issues, which were then developed and 
pursued further during the interviews and in the survey.
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The purpose of Phase 4 focus groups was to glean the opinions of 
auditors of their perceptions of staffing issues and industry and client 
knowledge. The inclusion of junior auditors in this project is significant 
as these individuals provide the cornerstone of the future of auditing 
in Australia, and their views on the attraction and retention of quality 
audit staff are important. These auditors are also in direct interaction 
with audit clients and can therefore provide insights into the day-to-day 
auditor–client working relationship. The following questions were used 
to facilitate discussion with the junior auditors.
•	 ‘How is it that you came to be employed at your current firm?’
•	 ‘What are the factors that cause you to stay employed at this firm?’
•	 ‘Do you personally know anyone who has left the employ of this 
firm? If so, what factors caused them to leave the employ of this firm?’
•	 ‘Are you thinking about leaving the employ of this firm? If so, what 
are the factors that led to this thinking?’
•	 ‘What factors are key to an audit firm retaining your employment?’
•	 ‘Does your firm seek to retail all employees? If so, how do they do it? 
If not, why not?’
•	 ‘Do you think it is important to have client knowledge in completing 
a quality audit?’
•	 ‘How do you gain that client knowledge?’
•	 ‘Are there any other ways to gain this knowledge not utilised by your 
firm?’
•	 ‘In terms of your learning about client-specific issues through 
interactions with clients, can you share some of your experiences 
(both good and bad) or relate any examples?’
•	 ‘Do you think it is important to have industry expertise (for example, 
in banking, media, marketing)?’
•	 ‘How do you gain that industry expertise?’
•	 ‘Are there any other ways to gain this expertise not presently used by 
this firm?’
Where permission was received from the focus groups, the sessions were 
tape-recorded and transcribed for analysis.
1.3.2 Participants
Phase 1 focus group participants were drawn primarily from the 
nominees provided by the industry partners and the databases. Five 
focus group sessions were held: two in Sydney, two in Melbourne and 
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one in Brisbane. It was also planned to conduct one focus group session 
in Perth, but difficulties were experienced in obtaining a sufficient 
number of participants within a reasonable time frame. In total, there 
were 23 participants, though the numbers of participants in each session 
varied. The difficulty experienced in securing participation, however, 
was evidenced by the number of contacts that had to be made to secure 
these 23 participants. One hundred and twenty contacts were made, 
which reflected initial contact and follow-ups. Details of the focus group 
participants are provided in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2  Phase 1 focus group participants
stakeholder groups
location (no. of sessions) Total no. of 
attendees
Users Purchasers suppliers
Sydney (2) 10 8 1 1
Melbourne (2) 10 5 2 3
Brisbane (1) 3 0 2 1
Total 23 13 5 5
Phase 4 focus groups comprised junior auditors drawn from Big Four 
firms. Three sessions were held—two in Melbourne and one in Sydney. In 
total, 25 junior auditors participated in these sessions.
Table 2.3  Phase 4 junior auditor focus group participants
stakeholder group




Sydney (1) 10 1
Melbourne (2) 15 2
Total 25 3
1.4  Interviews
1.4.1 Scope of questions
The interviews provided an opportunity to probe issues in more depth. 
In total, 58 interviews were conducted, providing ‘richness’ to the data 
that could not be accomplished solely through questionnaires and focus 
groups. Each interview was approximately one hour in duration. This 
time limit was set partly to provide scheduling certainty to the potential 
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interviewees—all with limited time to devote to such a commitment—
and partly to minimise fatigue for interviewers and interviewees. Given 
the volume of interviews to be covered, the interviews were staggered 
across two broad periods: December 2006 – February 2007 and May 2007 
– August 2007. Spreading the interviews over time also facilitated the 
opportunity to refine questions as new ideas or issues came to light. 
Given the time constraint for the interviews and our aim to probe issues 
in depth, it was also necessary to be conservative in terms of the number 
of questions that could be asked. Hence, once we believed that we were 
in receipt of consistently similar responses for a question, the question 
was replaced. This facilitated greater circulation of a broader range of 
questions within a limited time frame, but did eliminate quantification of 
the percentage of interviewees whose responses to a particular question 
fell into particular categories (for example, agreement/disagreement) and 
any scope for statistical analysis of interviewee responses. Some questions 
were, however, maintained consistently across the periods. 
The questions asked in the interviews were broadly classified as being 
about: expectations gap, law reform, business acumen and risks. The 
following are questions representative of those asked during the interviews.
•	 Materiality drives the levels of work external auditors have to do 
and affects the assessments they make. Given that potentially many 
shareholders do not understand the concept of materiality, should 
this be a concern for the accounting profession? Can you suggest 
ways to address this concern?
•	 To what extent, if at all, do auditors and regulators have different 
perspectives on how financial statement audits should be conducted? 
If there is a gap, what is its nature? If this gap is a problem, what 
changes need to be made?
•	 In your view, do external auditors have sufficient knowledge of their 
clients’ business and operations? If this is an area of concern to you, 
can you identify ways in which it could be addressed?
•	 To what extent, if at all, do you agree that the current required 
regulatory processes and procedures distract external auditors from 
the objective of the audit, which is to give reasonable assurance of the 
credibility of financial statements?
•	 To what extent, if at all, is there sufficient competition in the market 
for quality audit services?
•	 To what extent, if at all, is attracting and retaining high-quality staff 
a concern for the auditing profession? 
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Where permission was received from participants, interviews were tape-
recorded. The responses to the interview questions were analysed using 
content analysis techniques.
1.4.2 Participants
The participants were drawn from the nominees provided by the industry 
partner, the databases and the professional associations’ membership. 
Three hundred and thirty-two initial and follow-up contacts were made, 
giving rise to 58 participants. Interviews were conducted in Perth, 
Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. Details of the interview participants 
are provided in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 interview participants
stakeholder groups
Time Total Users Purchasers suppliers Regulators
December 2006 – 
February 2007
18 8 3 4 3
May 2007 – August 2007 40 7 15 15 3
Total 58 15 18 19 6
Interview data from the focus groups and the face-to-face interviews were 
analysed using a qualitative software package, Nvivo 7.
1.5 Surveys
1.5.1 Scope of questions
A questionnaire was used to garner the views of a wide section of 
stakeholders. The instrument comprised more than 50 questions. Section 
A of the instrument asked respondents to indicate the stakeholder group 
to which they belonged. Section B asked questions covering:
•	 the scope and value of external financial audits:
 – in this section, respondents were provided with a range of services 
that might be provided by auditors and asked whether they 
perceived that each service would be best provided by auditors 
and whether the value of the service warranted an additional fee. 
Respondents were also given the opportunity to list additional 
services. This section also asked respondents a series of statements 
pertaining to expectations about the external financial statement 
audit, including expectations about the assurance that the audit 
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provided, auditors’ responsibilities, the aspects of an audit that 
provided value and the complexity of audited financial statements, 
notes and the audit report. Respondents were asked to rate their 
level of agreement or disagreement for each statement, using a five-
point Likert scale.
•	 perceptions of business acumen:
 – respondents were asked to rate their perception of the business 
acumen of audit partners and also of junior auditors on a five-
point scale, ranging from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). In addition, 
respondents were asked to rate how confident they were that an 
auditor would detect all material fraud and also all material errors. 
Respondents were asked to provide a numerical percentage for 
these two questions.
•	 the legal and regulatory environment for audit services:
 – in this section, respondents were asked their perceptions of the 
effect of regulatory and market changes on a series of items, such 
as improving the credibility of financial statements, enhancing the 
quality of audits, reducing the number of corporate failures and 
adding value to a company’s business operations. Again, a five-point 
Likert scale was used to capture responses. As not all respondents 
would necessarily have been aware of the regulatory changes, 
respondents were also asked to indicate whether they were aware 
of: i) the introduction of legally enforceable auditing standards in 
Australia; and ii) the reforms pertaining to auditor independence. 
•	 general questions relating to the provision of audit services:
 – these general questions asked respondents whether they perceived 
that external financial statement audits represented value for money, 
and whether there was a lack of competition in the market for audit 
services. Two open-ended questions were included to gain insights 
into the future directions of auditing in Australia. Respondents 
were also provided with an opportunity to comment on the issues 
that they believed the audit profession had to address to ensure 
that auditing was highly valuable and to comment on the way audit 
services were provided and regulated in the future.
Respondents were also asked a series of biographical questions, which 
were captured in Section C. A copy of the questionnaire is provided in 





The sample for the mail survey was drawn from the professional 
associations and the databases. Mail questionnaires were sent to 19 300 
stakeholders. Of these, 335 questionnaires were returned to sender for 
various reasons, including wrong addressee details and the person no 
longer worked there. A total of 1202 completed questionnaires were 
returned, but 37 did not indicate the stakeholder group to which they 
belonged. Given the likelihood that stakeholders could appear on more 
than one listing, our introduction letter to respondents apologised for 
the duplication of requests that they might receive and instructed them 
to respond only once. We also relied on the professional associations to 
distribute the questionnaires to their membership, and therefore the 
timing of distribution was beyond our control. As the distribution of 
questionnaires would be done at different times, we could not reliably 
examine for non-response bias.
The sample for the telephone survey was drawn from nominees from the 
industry partners and the databases. The conduct of the telephone survey 
was outsourced to a social and market research firm with the expertise 
and resources to cater for the number of telephone calls. A sample of 3616 
names and contact details was provided to the firm. When contacted, 
approximately 36 per cent of the sample did not wish to participate. Due 
to other reasons (for example, difficulties in contacting individuals, wrong 
numbers), the telephone survey resulted in 350 responses.
Table 2.5 provides details of the participants in the mail survey and 
telephone survey.
The difference in the mix of stakeholder groups between the telephone 
survey and the mail survey is not unexpected given that the telephone 
survey sample relied primarily on the databases, which contained more 
finance professionals and directors.
Table 2.5 survey participants
stakeholder groups
survey Total Users Purchasers suppliers
Mail 1165 769 204 192
Telephone 350 171 164 15
Total 1515 940 368 207
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Despite this differing proportion of representation between the telephone 
and mail surveys, the majority of respondents came from users (62 per cent), 
with almost one-quarter of all responses from purchasers (24 per cent) and 
14 per cent from suppliers to the market for audit services (Table 2.6). In 
all, more than 1500 people provided positive responses, suggesting there 
was considerable penetration into the market for audit services via the 
various survey techniques. As indicated, in addition to these telephone 
and mail respondents were those involved in focus groups and in one-on-
one interviews.
Table 2.6  number and proportion of total responses
number Percentage
1 Users 940 62
2 Purchasers 368 24
3 Suppliers 207 14
Total 1515
1.5.3 Focus groups with junior auditors
During the initial focus groups, it became clear that it would be valuable to 
explore some issues with early recruits to the profession. For this purpose, 
peer groups of early recruits from three of the Big Four firms were made 
available through the auspices of the professional bodies partnering in 
this ARC linkage project. From the first Big Four firm, 10 suitable staff 
made themselves available; from the second Big Four firm, seven suitable 
staff made themselves available; and from the third Big Four firm, eight 
suitable staff made themselves available. A single focus group interview 
was conducted at each of the three Big Four firms’ premises with these 
more junior auditor cohorts.
1.5.4 Biographical descriptive data
With respect to the large group of users, a substantial portion of them 
(approximately one-third) described themselves as private investors, 
while approximately one-quarter of the total represented users who 
were involved in advising or managing investment portfolios and might 
be considered as professional rather than retail investors. The members 
of a final large group of users categorised themselves as accounting 




The private investors group represents what has been argued in the 
literature as generally those who are less sophisticated, whereas the other 
two groups might be regarded as more informed or expert. 
Table 2.7  number and proportion of user responses




1 Accounting professional and 
other
388 26 41
2 Financial advisor, analyst, 
lender, planner, investment 
manager and stockbroker
237 16 25
3 Private investor 315 21 34
Total 940 63 100
In regard to the responses from purchasers, approximately half were 
either the CEO or CFO of a listed company, with a little less than one-
third of the responses from audit committee members or directors of the 
company. The remaining 19 per cent were other purchasers, who were 
typically members of the senior management of companies. This group, 
therefore, represented senior management and director-type individuals 
with decision perspectives reflecting those positions (Table 2.8). 
Table 2.8  number and proportion of purchaser responses




1 Audit committee member 
or company director
111 7 30
2 CEO or CFO 186 12 51
3 Other 71 5 19
Total 368 24 100
In all, with respect to the suppliers to the market of audit services, there 
were more than 200 responses. The majority of these came from the 
non-Big Four suppliers and were drawn principally from membership 
lists provided by two of the sponsoring organisations—the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in Australia and CPA Australia. Privacy 
requirements were observed in the handling of these lists. Approximately 
20 per cent of the responses came from the Big Four suppliers. As will be 
indicated later, there are some notable differences in responses to certain 
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questions between these two groups of suppliers to the market for audit 
services.
Table 2.9  number and proportion of supplier responses




1 Auditor (Big Four) 44 3 21
2 Auditor (non-Big Four) 163 10 79
Total 207 14* 100
* Rounding error
1.5.5 Focus groups with junior auditors
All of the more junior auditor peer focus group members were currently 
working in audit in roles ranging from senior accountants to assistant 
managers. The average time with their firms was approximately three 
years, but ranged from one to six years, with the range for working in 
audit specifically ranging from one to five years.
1.5.6 Reading of and reliance on financial statements
With respect to the reading of and reliance on financial statements by 
users, the majority agreed with the proposition that they read annual 
reports and audited financial statements (Table 2.10). This was so even 
when the respondents were private investors. The extent of the reading 
of financial statements did, however, potentially reflect the research 
methodology used, which would have been biased in favour of sampling 
from those users who were more rather than less interested in financial 
statements. This is so because the lists from which potential participants are 
drawn come from within the business community, including professional 
accounting bodies.
Given this possible bias in the sample selection, it is interesting to note 
that there is some consistency in a relatively low professed reliance on or 
usage of audited financial statements for decision making. On average, 
approximately half of users indicated such reliance or usage. 
With respect to purchasers, the level of reading of audited financial 
statements was high; indeed, the responses suggested near universal 
agreement. The level of reliance was also high, particularly among audit 
committee members and company directors.
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With respect to suppliers, again, there was a high level of reading of 
audited financial statements, but a lower level of reliance or usage, with a 
particularly low level reported from non-Big Four suppliers. 
Table 2.10 Responses on reading and reliance of financial statements
A. users’ responses by subgroup (per cent)







no yes no yes no yes no yes
Do you read annual 
reports and audited 
financial statements?
12 88 13 87 14 86 9 91
Do you use or rely 
on audited financial 
statements in your 
decision making?
47 53 52 48 46 54 41 59







no yes no yes no yes no yes
Do you read annual 
reports and audited 
financial statements?
5 95 4 96 4 96 9 91
Do you use or rely 
on audited financial 
statements in your 
decision making?
38 62 30 70 41 59 43 56
C. suppliers’ responses by subgroup: firm size (per cent)
statements Total
suppliers
Big Four non-Big Four
no yes no yes no yes
Do you read annual 
reports and audited 
financial statements?
6 94 7 93 6 94
Do you use or rely 
on audited financial 
statements in your 
decision making?
57 43 42 58 61 39
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1.5.7 Demographic information with respect to respondents
With respect to age groups (refer to Table 2.11), the median age of respondents 
for users and purchasers was in the forty-five to fifty-four year old age 
bracket and this was true for those who professed to holding accounting 
qualifications or were professional users of financial statements. Private 
investors were typically older, with more than half of these respondents 
sixty-five years or older. 
The median age of audit committee members and directors was also 
somewhat older, at fifty-five to sixty-four years, with CEOs/CFOs typically 
forty-five to fifty-four years old. Suppliers were typically younger, with 
the median age of all suppliers being thirty-five to forty-four years. 
The younger age group was particularly noticeable among the Big Four 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.5.8 Educational credentials of respondents
With respect to the educational background of respondents in the 
telephone and mail questionnaire survey, not unsurprisingly, a substantial 
proportion of all users were university or college educated, with almost 
80 per cent professing to have at least an undergraduate qualification (see 
Table 2.12). Again, this could be reflective of the sampling technique used 
in the study so that a disproportionate number of responses came from 
well-educated respondents. This same pattern is also true of purchasers, 
where again almost 90 per cent of all purchasers indicated that they held 
at least an undergraduate degree and more than half of the purchasers 
indicated that they held a postgraduate qualification. This was true 
also for the sub-categories of audit committee members and directors of 
companies and the CEOs/CFOs. 
Similarly, suppliers in the market for audit services also possessed 
significant qualifications, with almost 90 per cent of suppliers claiming 
to hold at least an undergraduate degree. There was a marked distinction 
between Big Four and non-Big Four respondents, with very few Big 
Four respondents holding a postgraduate qualification (as distinct 
from a professional designation) and well more than half holding an 
undergraduate degree. With respect to the non-Big Four, the existence of 
postgraduate qualifications was more common. Overall, a very high level 
of qualifications was shown for suppliers in the market for audit services. 
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1.5.9 Conclusion
The sample of respondents used in the research was drawn broadly from 
three groups: the initial focus groups were purposely sampled individuals; 
the in-depth interviews (both pre-survey and post-survey) were purposely 
sampled from individuals expert in the market for audit services, including 
purchasers, users and suppliers as well as standard setters and regulators; 
and the telephone and mail surveys, which were a (broad but not deep) 
mechanism to achieve large-scale responses. 
The structure of the questions asked was developed principally from 
the input of the key stakeholders, who formed the partnership to create 
this ARC linkage grant, but were refined and more keenly focused through 
the initial screening of questions and the use of focus groups.
Ultimately, the number of responses was broad, with more than 1500 
participants involved at some stage of the project.
In terms of sampling bias, the present authors acknowledge that the 
use of the sampling frames did induce responses from those who are 
more likely to have an interest in financial statements, are more likely to 
have financial expertise and are better educated generally than the wider 
population—at least in some instances. As is evident from the educational 
qualifications data, the data reported are beyond the educational 
credentials of the average Australian citizen and resident. With this 
potential bias acknowledged, it is argued that the sample is broad and 
deep and represents an interest group whose responses can help inform 
the debate about the market for audit services and policy surrounding 
this area. 
2.0 limitations
As with all research, certain limitations exist. For instance, in terms of 
the mail survey, there is no assurance that the addressee completed the 
questionnaire themselves, or that it was completed with due diligence, 
without fatigue and without the potential effect of ‘socially desirable 
responses’. In terms of the telephone survey, there can be no assurance 
that the responder was indeed the target of the call or, again, that the 
phone survey was taken seriously and responded to without perceived 
‘socially desirable responses’ being given. 
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In terms of the face-to-face interviews with stakeholders, not all 
participants were asked the same questions and even the same questions 
could have been asked in different ways by the same interviewer across 
time and by different interviewers. Again, the possibility that perceived 
‘socially desirable responses’ were given was present, as was the possibility 
that the presence of the interviewer influenced the responses in some way 
and in differential ways depending on the identity of the interviewer. All 
interviewees were invited to make open-ended responses to all interview 
protocol questions and also, as part of the concluding aspects of the 
interview, were invited to raise any other issues. It is possible that these 
open-ended responses have been interpreted incorrectly by the authors as 
relevant to topics not intended by the interviewees. While all interviews 
have been faithfully transcribed, it is possible that not all intonations or 
emphases have been captured accurately. The authors obviously have not 
been able to represent hand gestures or other communications through 
body language in this report. These are all limitations common to the 
research methodology used in this study.
While every endeavour was made to ensure that there was 
representation of the identified stakeholder groups (users, purchasers, 
suppliers, standard setters and regulators), we were not able to test this 
statistically. We are, however, confident that a wide spectrum of opinion 
from within these stakeholder groups has been captured. If there is a bias in 
terms of participant selection, it could be that for some interviewees there 
is an over-representation of people with particularly strong accounting/
financial expertise. This is so because of the self-selection process of 
people motivated to be involved in this type of study and because the 
organisations providing contact details tend to have more dealings with 
such people.
The quotations have been taken from lengthy interviews and while 
they have been placed in relevant contexts there has been need to edit or 
truncate some of these quotes for reasons of length and grammar. 
Wherever relevant, the quotations have also been adjusted to ensure 
the interviewee, his or her related organisation and/or organisations within 
which examples have been used have been made anonymous. This is so 
other than when names of people or organisations have been identified as 
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I have serious doubts whether you can ever close the expectation 
gap, because it’s not so much the profession and how we actually 
communicate to the users of financial reports…the problem is that 
you’ve got such a significantly wide range of people who do read 
these financial reports…It’s very hard to communicate to such a 
wide group and such a wide level of knowledge; people have got 
different levels of knowledge, et cetera…it’s extremely difficult to 
close that gap to what we would consider to be an acceptable level, 
where basically the readers of the financial reports are fairly well 
in tune with what our process is, and understanding…when we do 
sign an audit report and attach that to financial reports…what that 
actually means. So I’ve got significant reservations that we could 
ever close that expectation gap significantly.
— Supplier
1.0 Key issues
Major challenges in relation to understanding the role of audit and the 
audit process continue to exist for stakeholders in the audit process 
judging by some of the observations made in response to the survey and 
interviews conducted as part of this project. These issues are inextricably 
linked with the audit expectations gap and include the following.
•	 Is it possible to communicate effectively with stakeholders of 
differential levels of sophistication and knowledge about financial 
reports and about the audit process and the existing single public 
outcome—the audit report?
•	 To what extent has the increasing complexity of financial statements 
and notes thereto added to the apparent misunderstanding of the 
audit process?
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•	 To what extent does the level of comfort apparently derived from 
audit, particularly from brand-name audit firms, emanate from what 
is known as the ‘insurance hypothesis’ and the fact that auditors are 
seen to have ‘deep pockets’?1
•	 Should access to and real reading of the auditor’s report be facilitated 
and encouraged and, if so, how?
•	 Have the reforms since the corporate collapses of the early 2000s 
served only to move auditors and regulators further apart in terms of 
mutual understanding?
•	 Whose role is it to educate those stakeholders who are in need so that 
they become informed consumers of audit services?
2.0 introduction to Chapter 3
The authors have included both understandability and the expectations 
gap in this chapter. This has been done in order to provide a more 
comprehensive description of the wider landscape of the issues around 
auditing and reporting of audit outcomes in the context of an efficient 
capital market. The overlap between the two concepts of understandability 
and expectations is important, as is the need to understand the 
interrelationship between the two. Understanding might be seen as a 
precursor to the removal of an expectations gap. Put another way, having 
understandability of the audit is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for a path to lowering or eradicating an expectations gap. 
The absence of an understanding of the audit, its processes, structures, 
incentives and its surrounds is but one part of the elimination of an 
expectations gap. Even in the circumstance in which there is complete 
understanding of the audit, it does not necessarily lead to the elimination of 
an audit expectations gap. In the circumstance in which this understanding 
exists, there still could be a mismatch of expectations around the regulation 
of audit, the framework in which auditing is conducted or indeed even the 
framework within which financial reporting is conducted; these all impact 
on the perceived expectations for the audit. Even when there is complete 
1. The ‘insurance hypothesis’ refers to the fact that auditors must carry professional indemnity 
insurance in order to practice, and hence auditors can be seen to have ‘deep pockets’ if 
investors seek to recoup their losses.
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understanding, an audit expectations gap can still exist. Obviously, if 
there is not shared understanding of key factors between stakeholders in 
the market for audit expectations, there is an even greater rationale for the 
presence of an audit expectations gap.
3.0 introduction: understandability of audit
Understandability of the audit is one of the key issues that has arisen in the 
audit expectations gap debate. Understandability is largely in the eye of 
the beholder and it can be argued that self-evaluation of understandability 
is fraught with measurement error. Despite this methodological difficulty, 
asking key stakeholder groups about their understanding of the audit 
report and the related documents in the financial statements is a key first 
question for investigating the future of audit.
4.0 survey 
The telephone and mail questionnaire respondents were asked about 
several issues relating to the extent of their reading of annual reports 
and audited financial statements, the extent to which they were used and 
relied on in decision making and to what extent the respondents would 
rate their understanding of financial statements and the audit report. 
4.1 do external financial statement audits represent value 
 for money?
One of the key questions to understanding present attitudes and positions 
with respect to financial report audits is whether the market sees this 
service as something of value. These questions are in the context of an 
external audit being, in most circumstances, mandated and outside the 
discretionary choice of users and purchasers.
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28 28 29 29 25 26 24 28 57 75 53
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
In response to the survey, which asked specifically whether ‘external 
financial statement audits currently represent value for money’, a 
relatively modest proportion of users and purchasers responded 
positively. Approximately one-quarter and one-third of users and 
purchasers, respectively, reacted positively (that is, either strongly 
agreeing or agreeing) to this proposition. On the other hand, suppliers, 
particularly suppliers from Big Four firms, responded very positively, 
with three-quarters affirming that current financial audits represented 
value for money. Non-Big Four respondents were more equivocal, with 
approximately half responding positively by either agreeing or strongly 
agreeing. This strong differentiation between purchasers and users on 
the one hand and many suppliers on the other hand is one of the key 
challenging issues for the operation of the market for audit services 
and its regulation. This perception was subject to some comment in the 
interviews discussed below and has important policy implications for the 
future of auditing.
The next three survey questions probed why respondents felt that an 
external financial audit was of value. Allowing for the fact that respondents 
rarely respond with extreme values in surveys, there is a general positive 
view across all stakeholder groups that the audit opinion is something 
that is expert and therefore has the characteristics of expert advice. Much 
less positive is the view that the auditor has a good understanding of 
the company’s business. Both Big Four and non-Big Four suppliers, on 
balance, responded positively to that question, but they were the only 
group in the market for audit services that took this perspective, with less 
than half of all other groups—including CEOs/CFOs and directors/audit 
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committee members—responding positively. Indeed, about one-third of 
all purchasers and slightly more than one-third of users believe that the 
company’s business is well understood by the auditor. 

















































































An external financial statement audit is of value to you because:
The audit opinion 
issued is an expert 
opinion
62 65 57 63 59 60 59 57 68 66 69
The auditor has a 
good understanding 
of the company’s 
business
40 38 34 46 33 41 31 29 55 66 53
The auditor provides 
an unconditional 
guarantee about the 
truth and fairness of 
a company’s financial 
statements
39 36 42 41 28 23 28 37 19 11 21
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
With respect to the auditor providing an ‘unconditional guarantee about 
truth and fairness’, no group or subgroup of the stakeholders responded 
with a particularly positive response to this question and indeed the Big 
Four suppliers responded in a very modest way. The notion that there is 
anything of an unconditional guarantee in the market for audit services is 
not something subscribed to by the majority of stakeholders. 
4.2 Understanding of the audited financial report
The telephone and mail questionnaire respondents were asked about 
several issues relating to the extent of their reading of annual reports, 
including audited statements, the extent to which they were used and 
relied on in decision making and to what extent the respondents would 
rate their understanding of financial statements. 
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As shown in Table 3.3, on a five-point scale from 1 = Poor to 5 = 
Excellent, respondents indicated that the rating of their understanding of 
financial statements was either at or above the mid-point. Overall, users 
rated their understanding just marginally over the mid-point at 3.6 (where 
the mid-point is 3.0), with private investors reporting the lowest level 
of understanding and those with professional accounting credentials the 
highest within the three subgroups. With respect to the same question, 
purchasers showed a noticeably higher level of understanding, with 
a rating of more than 4.0 on the five-point scale, with audit committee 
members and company directors, CEOs/CFOs and other purchasers at the 
upper end of the scale. With respect to suppliers, those from the Big Four 
subgroup and the Non-Big Four subgroup reported very high levels of 
understanding of financial statements.
As reported in Chapter 2, each of three respondent groups—users, 
purchasers and suppliers—rated their reading of audited financial 
statements very highly, but the level of usage among users was about the 
mid-point, with 53 per cent reporting that they used or relied on financial 
statements in decision making and 62 per cent overall of purchasers and 
43 per cent overall of suppliers. These lower levels of usage or reliance 
reflect the different decision perspectives of these two respondent groups 
and the likelihood of access to information sets beyond audited financial 
statements as being useful in their own decision making.
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4.3 Impact of complexity on understandability
As indicated in Table 3.5, aggregated to stakeholder groups and for 
subgroups within the users and purchasers groups, most respondents 
do not regard audited financial statements, the notes to those financial 
statements or the audit report to be too complex to understand. Indeed, of 
these three sets of documents, the audit report is seen as the least complex. 
Suppliers, however, take a somewhat different view. On average, 
50 per cent of suppliers believed that audited financial statements were 
too complex to understand and this was particularly so for the suppliers 
from Big Four firms. They also believed that, on balance, most of the notes 
to the statements were too complex to understand, but with respect to the 
audit reports their concern about complexity and understandability was 
markedly lower.
Interestingly, of the user group, the private investors, as opposed to the 
professional users and those with explicit accounting expertise, were more 
willing to agree to the statement that audited financial statements were 
too complex to understand. Similarly, they believed that notes were too 
complex and they had a high level of concern also about the complexity 
of the audit opinion. Their level of agreement with this concern matches 
the CEO/CFO group within purchasers more closely than it does the 
company director and audit committee member subgroups. Indeed, the 
lowest level of agreement with respect to the issue of understandability as 
a consequence of complexity is housed within users who have accounting 
expertise, professional users, directors and audit committee members. The 
long-held view that private investors are the ‘problem’ with respect to 
the expectations gap does not seem to be confirmed in these survey data. 
Certainly, the survey data indicate that there are widely differing views 
on the understandability of financial reports and related documents, which 
are part of core disclosure requirements for publicly traded companies. 
This would suggest that the audit expectations gap is alive and well.
The richness and complexity of the interview questions unfolded a 
deeper and more meaningful story and this is described in the interview 
section below.
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Table 3.5  Responses: impact of complexity on understandability of financial  



















































































too complex to 
understand.
36 32 35 43 41 39 41 42 50 58 48
The notes to the 
financial statements 
are too complex to 
understand.
37 33 36 42 45 36 48 52 51 55 50
The audit report 
is too complex to 
understand.
25 17 25 33 17 15 16 23 23 23 23
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
4.4 Confidence that an auditor will detect all material fraud  
 and error
As Table 3.6 shows, for all stakeholders in the market for audit services, 
there is a positive level of confidence with respect to the detection of 
material fraud and material error.
There was a markedly higher response rate with respect to material 
error compared with fraud. Once again, suppliers to the market for audit 
services had a noticeably more positive response with respect to error 
compared with all purchasers and all users.
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Table 3.6  Responses on confidence that an auditor will detect all material  

















































































How confident are 
you that an auditor 
will detect all 
material fraud in a 
company’s financial 
statements?
54 55 54 53 50 48 50 54 57 63 55
How confident are 
you that an auditor 
will detect all 
material errors in a 
company’s financial 
statements?
65 66 65 63 67 66 67 69 76 80 75
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
4.5 Responses: external auditor’s responsibilities
Survey participants were asked for responses in relation to their 
perceptions of an auditor’s responsibility to detect all material fraud and 
error, warn the audit committee of early signs of risk areas or to act as a 
whistleblower.
With respect to an external auditor’s responsibility to detect all material 
fraud, there is some degree of shared understanding between purchasers 
and suppliers, with generally less than half responding positively to a 
survey question on that responsibility. Users, on the other hand, see this 
more positively as being the responsibility of the external auditor. 
Similarly, with respect to a survey question on whether the external 
auditor has a responsibility to act as a whistleblower to an appropriate 
regulatory authority, purchasers and suppliers are more ambivalent 
about that being a requirement compared with users. So, with respect to 
responsibilities for detecting material fraud or acting as a whistleblower, 
there is some shared agreement between suppliers and purchasers and 
those two groups can be differentiated somewhat from users. With respect 
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to detecting all material errors and warning the audit committee of early 
signs of risk, there is some degree of shared view on these two issues 
between all members of the stakeholder groups surveyed—again, with the 
user group being rather more positive in its responses to the survey than 
the supplier group. 
Table 3.7  Responses: auditors’ responsibilities to detect material fraud,  
  material error, warn audit committees about risk or to act as  


















































































An external auditor has a responsibility to:
Detect all material 
fraud in a company’s 
financial statements
66 57 68 76 45 49 41 51 35 48 32
Detect all material 
errors in a company’s 
financial statements
80 75 82 86 76 79 74 76 68 75 66
Warn the audit 
committee of a 
company about early 
signs of risk areas
86 86 86 85 81 81 80 83 77 77 77




65 61 65 71 47 53 44 47 53 48 55
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
4.6 Responses: what does the audit provide direct  
 assurance about?
Each of the questions in Table 3.8 goes to the perception of the substance 
and shared understanding of various components of assurance for the 
audit opinion.
With respect to the question about whether an audit provides direct 
assurance on the integrity of senior executive managers, none of the 
groups (users, purchasers or suppliers) responded strongly positively, 
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with suppliers being most reticent about the current financial report audit 
providing that type of assurance. Similarly, there was a generally negative 
response by all groups to the question relating to the provision of direct 
assurance on the prudence of business decisions, with a more positive 
view by all groups other than Big Four suppliers to the question about 
whether the external financial audit provided direct assurance about the 
adequacy of the internal control system of a company. In that question, 
less than 40 per cent of Big Four suppliers reacted positively, whereas with 
all other groups there was a majority view. Some would speculate that 
the Big Four suppliers have a more expert view on this particular issue 
compared with the rest of the capital market. Importantly, the question 
does refer to direct assurance so some might speculate that the other 
respondents have construed the question other than the way in which it 
is specifically worded.
Table 3.8  Responses: what does the audit provide direct assurance about? 

















































































An external financial statement audit provides direct assurance about:
The integrity of 
senior executive 
managers in a 
company
26 21 30 29 14 14 12 29 14 11 14
The prudence of the 
business decisions 
made by a company
22 21 29 20 12 14 9 17 12 7 14
The adequacy 
of the internal 
control system of 
a company that 
is relied on in the 
preparation of 
financial statements
64 65 60 66 61 61 59 66 53 39 59
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
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5.0 interviews
No specific interview question addresses the understandability of the 
audit; however, in responses to many questions, several comments 
pertinent to this issue and to the issue of the audit expectations gap, which 
is discussed later in this chapter, emerge. These comments provide a wider 
context, which sets the scene for what follows in terms of explicitly asked 
questions, the responses to which are covered in later chapters. 
5.1 Users
It is obvious from users’ comments how much reliance is placed on the 
brand name of the audit firm and on the existence of an unqualified or 
unmodified audit report.
I look to see [in the audit report]…who does [the audit]…I’m not 
really interested [in the audit report]—I don’t think I’ve ever read 
one in full, but I look at who does it. And…you’ve got some…
auditing firms that are credible and if their name is on the top of 
that sheet, then it does give us some comfort. So whether that’s 
right or wrong I don’t know, but I’d flick to the back of the annual 
report, have a look at who did the audit, and move on.
You look at the firm they’re from [that is, the audit firm]…there’s an 
assumption of comfort under branding of the firm. You always read 
it, to make sure there are no qualifications in there, and…anybody 
relying on an audit report [is] looking for that.
The key things for an investor when they look at that audit 
statement [are] who signed off on it and whether there’s anything 
in there that says ‘is there anything wrong with the statement’, so 
if there [are] any qualifications or anything that’s been highlighted, 
any limitations that they’ve put on the audit report, or anything 
like that. 
I don’t spend too much time on the audit report…there [are] so 
many other figures to digest. I’m one of those who’s mainly looking 
[for] ‘is there any problem’, ‘have the auditors any concerns’? It is 
looking at the exceptions rather than any details because most of it 
is just standard stuff and a certification that everything is in order.
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As acknowledged in the first quote above, however, and in the one below, 
the audit report is seldom read: 
[I]t would be interesting to line up 100 shareholders and ask them 
have they ever read an audit report. I suspect [they have not].
5.1.1 Summary
Users’ comments indicate the comfort they derive from the reputation of 
the audit firm that is signatory to the audit report. There is not a lot of 
indication that the audit report is read in full; rather, it is scanned for an 
indication of a modification and more particularly of a qualified or adverse 
audit report.  
5.2 Purchasers
The degree of assurance that purchasers derive from the audit and auditors 
is evident in the following illustrative quotations; however, what emerges 
is dissatisfaction with the form of the financial statements themselves. 
[W]e get…comfort that the auditors are doing the right thing, but 
it might just be [a] function of the economy…we appreciate that 
post things like HIH, there has been a tightening of what [auditors 
have] done. We generally have a high opinion of the depth of what 
they do…I suppose the key issue that we’ve got with accounts quite 
often…doesn’t really come back to auditing per se—it’s more what 
they actually say and what they communicate, which is quite often 
not user friendly.
[T]he accounting policy notes now run to 10, 15 pages. Related party 
notes run to 10 to 15 pages…it’s just a joke and it’s now a case of 
everyone’s focusing on this 80 [per cent] that pays 20 [per  cent], 
not the 20 [per cent] that pays 80 [per cent] and the auditors have 
to deliver into all these disclosures. And boards are unhappy and 
management’s unhappy because, for the cost and the effort, it doesn’t 
add value and actually probably distracts auditors from focusing on 
what’s important, which is the financial health and the sustainability 
of…a business. You spend so much time chasing the disclosures and 
all the other incidentals, you can miss focusing enough time on the 
core stuff—and that’s where I see a significant issue.
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This last quotation suggests that not only are there concerns about 
the financial report complexity, the auditor might be positively distracted 
from the ‘real task’ because of this complexity. 
5.2.1 Summary
Purchasers indicate the degree of comfort that comes with the audit, but 
allude to a dismay with the content of the financial report more generally. 
5.3 Suppliers
Criticisms by suppliers of the audit report wording as a contributor to 
a lack of understandability of audit and the audit process emerge in the 
following quotations.
[M]aybe one option is to try and reword the audit reports into plain 
English. But I don’t think you’d want to add too much, because…
one of the issues we’ve got at the moment is [that] there’s just so 
much data out there—financial statements now run to 200, 250 
pages. [If] you now make your audit…sign off four or five pages, the 
question is does anybody really read it? Do they really understand 
it? Because it’s very difficult to put a very complex process into a 
couple of pages.
[T]he audit report formats which we’re obliged to comply with 
seem to be bogged down with legalese rather than plain English 
explanations.
[T]hey’ve started down that track [of better understandability] with 
the wording in the audit report. I’m not sure that too many people 
read it…they determine whether it’s qualified or not and then move 
on.
The audit standards do not allow a lot of scope for variation in 
terms of an unqualified and a qualified report. Perhaps that could 
be looked at. You can have an emphasis of matter, but that’s also 
fairly specific in when you can apply that.
[T]he audit opinion, although it’s distinct…explains the materialities 
at play and there’s sampling, and if someone read that carefully they 
should get a sense of…what an audit is not.
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One of the suppliers points out the inevitability of reduced understandability 
of audit in light of the increasing complexity and sophistication of the 
underlying financial representations and instruments:
If you look at the auditing profession, you look at the financial 
accounting profession over the last 10 years, and you look at the 
financial products in the market, and the level of sophistication across 
all of those has ramped up significantly. And therefore you have to get 
a much more complex reporting framework, a much more complex 
auditing framework to try and deal with the additional complexities 
of doing business in a sophisticated financial market today.
5.3.1 Summary
In comments made during face-to-face interviews, suppliers point to the 
wording of the audit report as one issue influential in the understandability 
or otherwise of the audit product. For suppliers, there is some unease with 
the wording of the audit report itself. It is clear that this issue remains 
‘live’ despite the longstanding convention of adhering to the suggested 
wording included in the auditing standards. This issue is returned to in 
Chapter 4 when the potential for additional disclosures, either by auditors 
themselves or by management, is explored.
5.4 Standard setters
Reliance on the integrity and honesty of the communication that takes place 
between auditor and client emerges in this standard setter’s comments:
[It’s like saying I didn’t know about it so I didn’t go 
and look for it.] That’s an interesting one because…if 
you take a scenario, for example, say you’re doing your 
half-year review and you sit down and you read the 
management reports and you go through everything 
else and…you’ve done all that, then you go and have 
a meeting with management and talk about what’s 
happened in the business and it turns out, for example, something’s 
happened and they don’t tell you about it. It’s not in the management 
reports, it’s not even, from reading anything else—a legal claim, for 
example. They don’t tell you about it. We’re being sued by party 
X…You’ve asked questions and you’ve probably even asked the 
‘[H]ow do I know  
all your stuff’s in  
the shoebox?’
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question ‘Is there any major litigation from partners?’ No, there’s 
no major litigation. Nothing’s come to my attention. He could tell 
me that. 
The same standard setter continues with a simple analogy that highlights 
the dilemma of the auditor:
I’m of a completely different view…the greatest example I always 
give of trying to get someone to understand the concept of an 
audit would be if you went along with a shoebox with all your 
financial transactions in it for one year and go over to someone off 
the street and said: ‘I want you to write me a letter that I could 
give to anyone else that tells me that my income, all of my income, 
and all of my expenditure that’s in that shoebox is everything I did 
in the year financially; if you could just write that down and put 
down my revenue, my expenditure, my final cash balance, and I’m 
done, I’ll pay you to do it’…And then the person says, ‘But how 
do I know all your stuff’s in the shoebox?’ It’s very simplistic but 
the concept becomes bigger but…there is a fundamental reliance 
on the transparency of the process and the integrity and honesty 
of communication that is fundamental to the audit process and 
without it I believe the whole process is flawed. 
6.0 issues and implications
With respect to understandability, the researchers use survey and 
interview techniques to investigate a series of related questions: first, 
the issue of whether the audit is of value. This question is asked against 
the background of the audit being generally mandated and outside the 
discretion of purchasers of audit opinions. While generally suppliers 
believed there was substantial value added in the audit, this was rarely 
replicated by other participants in the market for audit services. This 
would be consistent with other forms of ‘compliance’ goods and other 
markets where there is compulsion. The ability to value add and to be 
seen to value add is always a challenge. Perhaps equally as concerning are 
the responses about whether the auditor has a good understanding of the 
business. Again, suppliers to the market provided a very positive response 
whereas purchasers and users were more mixed in their views. Finally, 
a key issue about understandability—which also relates to the whole 
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issue of the expectations gap, to be addressed later in this chapter—is 
whether the audit provides any form of guarantee. While all respondents 
reacted positively in the minority, a disturbingly large proportion of 
users, including those among whom one might expect relevant expertise, 
believed that the audit provided a form of guarantee about the truth and 
fairness of the financial statements. 
It is noteworthy to acknowledge that while levels of understandability 
of financial reports might not be high among users and purchasers of 
financial reports, when asked about self-rated understanding of the 
financial reports and related documentation, they rated the audit opinion 
as the most easily understood. This does not necessarily mean there is not 
some room for improvement, but it shows more acceptance of the level of 
complexity of audit reports as opposed to financial statements and notes 
to the accounts. 
Users, purchasers and suppliers all professed a self-rating with a 
level of understanding of financial statements above the median point, 
with users generally being more modest on that scale. Given this level 
of self-reporting for understandability, more worrying was the fact that 
the majority of surveyed respondents indicated that although they read 
annual reports and audited financial statements, their use within decision 
making was markedly lower.
Respondents of all types were more rather than less confident that 
auditors would detect material fraud and material error. Purchasers and 
suppliers were much more circumspect, indicating that it was really the 
external auditor’s responsibility to detect material fraud. Users, suppliers 
and purchasers all recognised that the auditor had responsibility to detect 
material error. There was also a considerable shared view that the auditor 
had the responsibility to warn the audit committee of early signs of 
risk. There were mixed views about whether the auditor should act as a 
whistleblower to an appropriate regulatory body. 
In terms of whether the financial statement audit provides direct 
assurance, one interesting deviation is whether the auditor has the 
responsibility to provide direct assurance about the adequacy of the 
internal control system of the company. Big Four suppliers were the only 
respondents who indicated they strongly disagreed with this proposition. 
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With respect to the one-on-one interviews, the user group could be 
typified by the proposition that they check whether an audit report exists 
and that it has been provided by a brand-name auditor (or someone in 
the view of the market who has the credibility to conduct the audit) and 
for qualification or modifications to an otherwise ‘clean’ audit opinion. 
Their interest in going beyond these three basic elements seems to be very 
limited. For purchasers, there seems to be comfort in that the auditors are 
perceived to be doing ‘the right thing’ but some concern that the amount 
of regulation and bureaucracy is a distraction from what they see as the 
main objective of the audit, which is providing assurance on the financial 
statements. Suppliers, on the other hand, have concern about the audit 
opinion itself—that it is not overly lengthy, that in some ways the audit 
has suffered because of the complexity of accounting standards and that 
there is scope for enhancing what is communicated in the audit opinion, 
including, but not limited to, plain English statements. 
As indicated above, this chapter has been structured so far to set the 
scene and a number of these issues are picked up more directly when we 
refer specifically to stakeholders’ statements about the audit expectations 
gap later in this chapter and beyond. The second half of this chapter 
explores more deeply what lies behind some of these misunderstandings 
in relation to the deliverables that can be expected of an audit.
7.0 Concluding remarks
There are three areas in which policy implications have arisen from the 
discussion thus far: 1) the value of the audit; 2) the wording of the audit 
report; and 3) the complexity of the material that is provided for the 
consumers of information in the capital market. The first policy implication 
relates to the value to the capital market of the assurance given by an 
auditor. There is evidence that this assurance is valued and the policy 
implication is that there is no case to remove or limit the existence of an 
audit as it is currently known to the market. Put another way, sceptics of 
the audit are unlikely to find any comfort in the material provided to us.
The second issue is the wording of the audit report. It seems there is no 
doubt that at least a proportion of users in the capital market will view an 
audit report and judge it virtually by its length and categorise it into one of 
two groups: 1) modified (qualified), or 2) other (clean). Policy implications 
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are involved here. For example, such a simplistic categorisation based on 
casual observation (with no reading of the audit report undertaken) of 
the audit opinion could in fact cause users to miss important but short 
statements of emphasis of matter. Indeed, with respect to emphasis of 
matter paragraphs, we observe later in this publication that understanding 
of them and their intent might not be universal. 
The second policy implication is the type of wording used in the 
audit report in that the standardised wording, which in the minds of 
some includes legal jargon, is received as a ‘commodity’. If the auditing 
profession seeks to be seen to exercise a considerable amount of professional 
judgment then it has the difficulty that the principal outcome it delivers 
to the market for information is highly standardised and not fulsome in 
terms of its contents. The parallel that might be drawn here is where an 
oncologist diagnoses a patient as having contracted cancer or not having 
contracted cancer. The professional judgment leading to such an outcome 
cannot be standardised in a simple statement of the presence or absence 
of cancer. There is a need to elaborate further by the explication of the 
exercise of the professional judgment of the oncologist. Is the cancer 
developed? What type of cancer is it? Has the cancer metastasised? 
Where is it located and is it operable? The standard form audit report is 
perceived as a ‘commodity’, which is simplistic and standardised rather 
than subtle, nuanced and fulsome. The subsequent policy implication in 
this circumstance is that a standardised audit opinion fails to recognise 
the diversity of expertise in the market for audit services and hence the 
ability to understand more complex information is ignored—at least for 
some users. While audit reports need to fulfil minimum legal requirements, 
there should be positive encouragement by regulators to allow auditors to 
include nuanced and subtle explanations and observations in a way that 
adds value to the report for interested readers.
The final policy implication is the reference to the complexity and 
burdensome nature of financial statements. This complexity and its 
challenges for understandability of financial statements are outside the 
scope of this project and indeed auditors should not be held accountable 
for this complexity. There are, however, consequences for the audit process 
and for the information-handling capabilities of users, since the extent of 
this complexity can pose a limitation to what might be done to enhance 
what is reported in the audit opinion and audit information presented 
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elsewhere. The receipt of audit information by the market will of course 
occur simultaneously with receipt of information within the financial 
report and therefore policy setters must recognise this as a joint burden. 
We would conclude that there is very genuine concern about the level 
of complexity and information load jointly contained in the financial 
reporting and auditing disclosures. Our inquiries reveal that no-one 
seems to take responsibility for or accountability of this. This joint 
level of complexity makes the probability of significant reduction in the 
expectations gap improbable. We recommend that the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) gives consideration to setting up a task force that examines 
the competing challenges of comprehensive and technically accurate 
financial reporting and auditing information together with the need for 
understandable disclosures that have genuine utility to the capital market.
While we appreciate that in a purely technical sense only a small 
number of people need to read and interpret the financial report in order 
for there to be a share price reaction, there is also a political and societal 
aspect that should not be any longer ignored and it is for this reason that 
we recommend a single body takes responsibility for enhancing the utility 
of these joint auditing and accounting disclosures.
In terms of policy issues, the three issues that have emerged in 
this chapter thus far are: 1) auditors and auditing should not be held 
accountable for the complexity of financial statements and notes; 2) the 
assurance given by an audit has value to the market; and 3) consideration 
might be given to allowing and encouraging more diverse and fulsome 
wording of the audit opinion in terms of outcome and in terms of process.
8.0 introduction: the expectations gap
Among the stakeholders, there are few who protest that there is no such 
thing as the audit expectations gap. Rather, although not universal, there 
is acknowledgment of the gap not just between the public and auditors, 
but between regulators and auditors. Common issues raised among user, 
purchaser, supplier, standard setter and regulator groups include gaining 
a more definitive understanding of who the users of financial reports are 
and their diversity in capability of accurately receiving the message sent 
by financial statement preparers and auditors, presuming that message 
is appropriate—which in itself is by no means agreed. Another common 
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issue raised relates to varying expectations of the auditor’s responsibility 
for fraud detection. Materiality, as that term is used in an auditing context, 
is another area that emerges as commonly misconceived. This issue of 
materiality arose in the initial focus groups too and a separate chapter 
is dedicated to it (Chapter 5). Regulators in their comments remind us 
that deliverables from an audit are price sensitive, but confirm that their 
expectations of the audit are often not met. The gap between regulators 
and auditors appears to have widened with recent reforms and particularly 
the ASIC inspections, and so much rich material on this issue has been 
forthcoming that only a taste of it appears in this chapter, with the rest 
dealt with in later chapters on regulation (Chapters 11–13).
8.1 Interviews
In the conversations in the individual interviews, there were innumerable 
references to the ‘audit expectations gap’, even though there were few 
explicit questions or prompts raised by the interviewers. Many of the 
observations about the gap, its existence or otherwise, which parties the 
gap falls between, whether the gap is resolvable or not and suggestions for 
ways to reduce it presuming it exists, are included in this chapter. These 
observations were made in many different contexts during the course of 
extended conversations between the interviewer and the interviewees. 
As a consequence, many of the observations described below are also 
relevant and should be borne in mind when reading other chapters on 
more specific or technical issues.
8.2 Users
Users in their interview responses make it clear that an audit expectations 
gap continues to exist. Further, the illustrative responses below signal that 
regulatory reforms introduced after the collapse of HIH Limited in 2002 
and other noteworthy collapses elsewhere in the world have made little 
impact on the way in which this group perceives the auditing profession.
You’ve probably got more sophisticated people in the regulators…
be it ASIC [or others]. They’re probably a bit more aware about what 
auditors do and what the auditor’s responsibilities are. I don’t see 
as big an expectation gap between the regulator and the auditor as 
between the auditor and the general public, the user.
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The diversity among users of audit reports in terms of understanding of 
the audit process is elucidated in this next user’s comments:
[A]s far as professional investors are going to go, they’re quite 
aware about what the audit statement is actually saying, but for the 
general retail investor they’d probably take more comfort from the 
audit statement than maybe some of the professional investors do. 
We accept it for what it is, which is a sign-off to a certain degree, 
but it’s certainly not giving you blanket coverage as to this is a great 
investment, go out there and invest in it.
Somewhat disturbingly, one user sees the expectations gap as having been 
lessened by the corporate failures in a perverse way:
[I]n terms of what is debated as the audit 
expectation gap, if anything, those collapses 
have lowered the public’s perception a little 
bit and thereby closed the gap in terms of 
lowering their expectations, but I don’t 
think that they’ve got more confidence in 
the auditing standards than they had before. 
And…I don’t think the broad public is 
that aware of the regulatory responses, the 
tightening of regulations, and rather would, 
if anything, if you mentioned to them an Enron or an HIH, they 
would mainly see that as a failure of the audit profession, and it 
would undermine their confidence rather than say, ‘Okay this has 
led to a regulatory response and a tightening up of standards that 
now makes us actually more secure than we were before.’ We just 
didn’t know how unsecure[d] we were. But in terms of perception, 
I don’t think it’s improved really…The…naive expectation from an 
analyst and shareholder point of view is that the auditor is there 
to make sure that what the company says is based on fact rather 
than arbitrary decisions by management…gilding the lily in terms 
of their accounts. The auditor is there to stop them doing that—
fudging the numbers. 
8.2.1 Summary 
Users confirm the presence of an audit expectations gap. Perversely, far 
from the regulatory response to the corporate collapses of the early 2000s 
‘[T]he naive expectation 
from an analyst and 
shareholder point of view 
is that the auditor is there 
to make sure that what the 
company says is based on 
fact rather than arbitrary 
decisions by management.’ 
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having increased confidence in the profession, one user’s perception is 
that the collapses in themselves have lowered the public’s expectations 
of the audit profession. This is arguably not the way the regulators or 
the profession would prefer to see the gap narrowed. The responses 
also confirm that there is diversity of competencies between different 
subgroups of users. 
8.3 Purchasers
Purchasers, perhaps because some of them have been auditors in past lives, 
tend to be sympathetic to the notion that too much is expected of auditors, 
particularly by retail investors and the media. The idea that part of the 
expectations gap lies between regulators and auditors also receives some 
sympathy—in favour of the auditors. This next quotation emphasises the 
commonality of goals that exists between auditors and regulators, but also 
perceptions of divergence in the means to achievement of those goals:
I don’t think there’s an expectation gap or a different 
perspective [between regulators and auditors] on 
how [auditors] should do the audit…they’re both 
trying to achieve the same end. The difference is 
in how you go about it: if the regulators are trying 
to drive a higher degree of certainty, or if the 
auditors are trying to achieve through their own 
audit…they want to achieve it in different ways. 
The auditors want to achieve it in the most cost-
effective, least wasteful way for them and the regulators are trying 
to push them down a different path.
The means to achieving goals is alluded to in the following quotation, 
too, with the alleged check-list approach of the regulator coming in for 
criticism: 
[D]oes the general public care? I think they have an expectation 
of what…the financial statements are and I don’t think that that 
will have changed. Maybe there was a bigger gap before in that 
expectation and maybe the gap has closed a little now…there is a 
gap between what the regulator thinks the auditor should be able to 
pick up and what the auditor realistically can…it’s very dangerous 
having a check-list kind of approach being [used] by regulators. 
‘The auditors want to 
achieve it in the most 
cost-effective, least 
wasteful way for them 
and the regulators are 
trying to push them 
down a different path.’ 
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The same purchaser goes on to provide an analogy of directors’ relationships 
with management and that between regulators and auditors—in terms of 
delegating tasks to achieve a mutually required goal:
When you study the practice of directorship versus management 
of an organisation, one of the first things you learn is that directors 
don’t tell [managers] how to do things. They…should be saying to 
management what [they] want to be achieved, what’s the outcome 
and what don’t you want management to do and then let management 
be innovative in how they get about achieving those objectives. 
And I would say the similar kind of thing should apply between 
regulators and auditors. The regulators should be specifying what’s 
the outcome that they require. The auditor ought to be able to come 
up with the most appropriate way of achieving that outcome.
The different world views of regulators and auditors are blamed for the 
perceived gap between these parties by this next purchaser:
[I]f there’s an expectation gap between regulators 
and auditors…broadly speaking…regulators 
understand what auditors do…people I’ve 
spoken to in ASIC and APRA…understand that. 
The problem…[that] arises is that regulators, and 
particularly the legal profession, are trained to 
think in a prescriptive sense. They do not think 
in terms of generalities or principles—at least 
that’s been my experience. And…that’s where 
the difficulties arise, in that they look for prescription and they 
tend to not see the value as much in informing…judgments based 
on subjective information. 
Public expectations surrounding the level of scrutiny of transactions 
when an audit is conducted are pointed to by this next purchaser:
[Y]ou’ve got to do it at a material level and I absolutely understand 
the concern is…going back to the fact that…there’s an expectation 
in some people’s minds that auditors would review every single 
transaction and I don’t think they understand what that would 
cost…I don’t know how…you educate them because when you 
look at Sarbanes-Oxley and all the rest of it…[the] general public 
was wildly enthusiastic and it plugged a political gap at that stage 
‘The problem…[that] 
arises is that regulators, 
and particularly the 
legal profession, are 
trained to think in a 
prescriptive sense.’ 
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and it’s now turning out to be one of the worst interventions that  
I can think of.
Misperceptions of how an audit is conducted in terms of the thoroughness 
of the coverage of transactions are alluded to in this next quotation:
One of the problems…with the auditors is that 
there’s this perception in the general community 
that the auditors are there to catch every fraud 
and to detect every single issue that goes wrong 
and…they’re never going to be able to do that…
so I don’t know if disclosing more information 
makes any difference at all…because where you’d 
disclose it would be in places like the annual 
reports…and I don’t actually think anybody 
reads it. I quite honestly don’t.
A reminder of the link between corporate financial failure and the audit 
expectations gap emerges in the following quotation:
I have a reasonably sanguine view of what an audit 
is or what an audit can do and…we can set our 
expectations too high. Whenever there’s a failure 
in the country…there’s a cry put out: ‘Well, you 
know it shouldn’t have happened, they should 
do this, they should regulate that.’ And the 
reality is failure happens and…the expectation 
of the auditing profession is too great among the 
mum[s] and dads and the media, and of course 
the sophisticated investors will pull the lever and press the button 
when it suits them. Maybe I’m too cynical, but the altruism of the 
institutional investor is [that] they just want to get recompense…
or sue a deep pocket. We’re all partners in this model that has now 
developed to where it’s at. 
The same purchaser continues, expounding on the current model under 
which auditors conduct their work and about how a more adversarial model 
would need to be adopted before an auditor could give an alternative 
representation of company performance. 
‘[T]here’s this 
perception in the 
general community 
that the auditors are 
there to catch every 
fraud and to detect 
every single issue that 
goes wrong.’ 
‘[T]he altruism of the 
institutional investor is 
[that] they just want to 
get recompense…or 
sue a deep pocket.’ 
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[W]hat I’m getting at is that unless you have some radical view as 
to what the model should be, and frankly you have to create a more 
contentious model, a model that in fact became more adversarial…
then you talk about the type of people that would be in that model. 
If you want…the auditor to stand up at an annual general meeting 
and give an alternative representation of the performance of the 
company to the shareholders and to point out the weaknesses both 
in the business model and in the financial statements, then you’d 
move to a completely different model. 
An explanation of this different model is given as the same purchaser 
continues:
If you’re looking for a model that moves from 2 per cent of qualified2 
reports in the top-200 companies over the last 10 years to a model 
that is 25 per cent qualified then you’re going to have to define what 
qualification means. It’s going to have to have various graduations 
on it. It’ll become totally burdensome and then you say, ‘What 
kind of people do you want?’ Do you want [audit] partners who are 
advocates who effectively become shareholder activists…That will 
require a different kind of person. 
One purchaser, despite acknowledging the link between corporate 
financial failure and the audit expectations gap, still does not perceive the 
gap, if it exists, to be a pressing issue:
[M]y question would be is there really an expectation gap today 
that is crying out for some particular area? Typically this comment 
gets made when there’s a series of financial disasters and people 
are saying well, what happened? And the last time it occurred was 
when there was a series of failures back about the early ’90s. Now 
if you turned around and said ‘Is there an expectation gap at the 
moment that’s got to be solved?’, I’d query whether there is…I don’t 
see in the literature great drama…saying people don’t understand 
what the auditors are doing.
2 Under the revised auditing standards effective from 1 July 2006, the correct term 
is ‘modified’ reports.
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8.3.1 Summary
Purchasers are not as sure that the expectations gap persists as the illustrative 
comments suggest. Those who continue to acknowledge its existence tend 
to see the public and regulators’ expectations of auditors as being excessive 
and beyond that which can be achieved. There is acknowledgment of 
misunderstanding, particularly on the part of retail investors, but also on 
the part of regulators—in particular of the concept of materiality and of the 
role of judgment as opposed to prescription. The difficulty in overcoming 
this misunderstanding through education is acknowledged also.
8.4 Suppliers
Suppliers, from their comments, take for granted the fact that the audit 
expectations gap exists. Their comments indicate a preoccupation with 
the gap they see as existing between regulators and auditors in an 
emphasis that the research literature pertaining to the audit expectations 
gap has not previously emphasised. The next quotation alludes to the link 
between corporate financial failure and the audit expectations gap. It is a 
link that appears in several quotations by suppliers in this section.
[T]here’s just always generally an audit expectation gap…it more 
happens when you get fundamental financial failure and people just 
say, ‘Well, the auditor should have predicted that.’
The role of the audit report in conveying what it is that the audit represents 
is the topic of the next two quotations.
[W]hat’s in the audit opinion now [is] in terms 
of explaining to people that we don’t test 
everything, there’s a judgment involved. We’re 
not out there looking specifically to identify 
fraud per se, so we’re not on the trail—we 
don’t set the whole audit up on the basis of 
looking for that…there’s probably enough in 
there…we could add more but I don’t think 
they would read it; I really don’t think they 
even read it. So we could make a five-page 
thing but would they read it? It doesn’t help that whenever there’s 
a disaster they’ll all go sue the auditor because that automatically 
makes people think that the auditors are ultimately accountable 
for the financial statements, which is absolutely not right. So the 
‘[I]f shareholders and if the 
financial markets are relying 
on auditors…to make sure 
that the accounts are not 
materially misstated, it’s just 
made for disaster, because 
that’s not what we do.’ 
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perception they’ve got is from a whole host of things that happen 
in the environment, and when your regulators come out and say 
well ‘we’re going to make the auditors do…’—everyone seems to 
focus on the tail end of the chain of events. Look, we’re the people 
that come in right at the end and we do a sample of things, we 
look for things, but…if shareholders and if the financial markets are 
relying on auditors—100 per cent on auditors—to make sure that 
the accounts are not materially misstated, it’s just made for disaster, 
because that’s not what we do.
The next quotation also emphasises that auditors examine only a sample of 
transactions and balances, but, like many suppliers, refers to this process 
as a ‘test’ rather than a sample, which in itself will be confusing to some 
in the market for audit services. This is so because the word ‘test’, which 
is used in the recommended audit report wording, could mean testing 100 
per cent of the population of items or a tiny proportion of that population.
At the moment whilst…in the audit opinion reference is made to 
the scope and that it deals with tests rather than absolute assurance, 
there’s probably still a little bit of a gap there…that could probably 
go some way to being addressed by maybe stating…in a little bit 
more detail what constitutes the scope of an audit and…what might 
be excluded from the scope of an audit. 
The difficulties of having a wide range of knowledge levels among users 
of the auditors’ output are evident in some of the comments that touch 
on the audit expectations gap. The first quotation points to a deficient 
understanding by the public of the context of audit.
[There are] a couple of issues. One, the expectations 
gap from the point of view of the general public. 
I don’t really think they know much about the 
audit profession, and I don’t really believe that 
they understand the context of audit within the 
profession…the general public probably thinks 
that an auditor is just simply a policeman acting on 
behalf of someone, but they don’t really know who 
they’re acting on behalf of…And consequently the expectation is 
that they should uncover anything that’s wrong with the company 




an auditor is 
just simply a 
policeman.’ 
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Another supplier reiterates the assertion that the public does not 
understand what it is that auditors do: 
[T]he public don’t quite understand what we do. And we specifically 
state in the scope section of our audit reports the work that we do, but 
the expectation…of the public, of…investors, is quite often ‘Well, 
the auditors are the people who are in there and they’re meant to be 
checking what’s going on, and if they’re not doing the checking, if 
they’re saying that there are certain things that they don’t give an 
opinion on, that they don’t check, well who is meant to be doing 
that?’…there’s that expectation that everything’s being checked. 
And the reality is that if everything was being checked to the ‘nth’ 
degree, that…is unrealistic. Then the company’s management will 
be tied up for months on end answering inane questions and you 
wouldn’t necessarily get anything of great value. 
[T]he concern I have is that when something goes wrong, no matter 
how you’ve tried to explain it, and you say ‘Well, actually, our audit 
wasn’t designed to pick it up, et cetera’…the expectation gap is 
there. The same way if a bank were to collapse, the expectation in 
the Australian public would be that the government through the 
RBA is going to pay out.3 
A non-Big Four supplier laments ASIC’s regulatory approach, which he or 
she sees as unfair:
So ASIC have been very critical of the mid-tiers and 
I think unfairly…they need to understand that it’s 
a relative issue. The mid-tiers, in my experience, do 
a pretty good job auditing businesses which are of 
the right level for them, perhaps with turnovers of 
$10 to $200 million, that sort of thing. Yeah…there’s 
an expectation. I don’t think the regulator properly 
understands their role. 
Recent reforms to the regime under which auditors operate are not seen 
as a solution, as the following illustrative comments demonstrate. More 
commentary on this issue is included in Chapter 11.




critical of the 
mid-tiers and  
I think unfairly.’ 
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[Legal backing for auditing standards has] done nothing for [the 
expectations gap]…because the public don’t read the auditing 
standards. So no, from their point of view, they would have no 
idea…from that point of view, it’s done nothing for the expectation 
gap.
A perceived gap between regulators and auditors was the subject of 
comments by suppliers. The next two quotations signal a perception that 
this gap is not large, but other comments after these are less sanguine 
about this gap. 
[T]he expectation gap between regulators and 
auditors is the smallest expectation gap…auditors 
have understood for a long time how to do audits…
[With regard to] the audit quality argument and 
the legally enforced auditing standards, the debate 
is around where an auditor can or can’t exercise 
judgment…I don’t believe that the legally enforceable 
auditing standards have changed the substance 
of what we’re doing…a lot of what we’re doing we were already 
doing…Maybe it’s a little bit more prescriptive in certain areas to 
give some certainty to it and take out that judgment.
A perception that regulators have a tendency to extract from the external 
audit more than is warranted given the circumstances under which it 
operates is suggested in this next quotation: 
[T]here is an expectation gap with regard to an 
external audit between the accounting profession 
and the regulator…the regulator’s trying to draw 
as much as possible from an external audit that’s 
probably not really there and…there is danger in that 
for the accounting profession in that if something 
does go wrong then the regulator will try and draw 
more from the audit than it should do and it will also 
try and defend itself and use the accounting profession to defend 
itself, to deflect blame…and HIH is probably a prime example. 
Things have tightened up considerably since then as well…But…
all the accounting profession should actually work closer with the 
regulators to manage expectation gaps. Without a doubt that will 
happen too through ASIC’s regulation of the auditing standards. 
‘[T]he debate is 
around where an 
auditor can or can’t 
exercise judgment.’ 
‘[T]he regulator’s 
trying to draw as 
much as possible 
from an external 
audit that’s 
probably not  
really there.’ 
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No doubt, there’ll be lots of liaison and discussions. What that will 
show too is what the regulators’ expectations actually are because I 
don’t think we really have any evidence of them. We have a sort of 
understanding of what they are.
A perceived disconnection between what auditors see as the key issues 
within a particular engagement and what the regulators see is elucidated 
by this next supplier:
Is there a gap? Look…if there’s a gap in terms of expectation…
there…[are] more files…being subject to ASIC review. As you know, 
a lot of other financial partners as part of their own review process…
look at what [ASIC’s] focusing on and what they do is what ASIC 
focuses on as part of their surveillance program…At times, I am a 
little bit surprised at what they are focusing on versus what I see as 
the key issues…there might be a bit of a disconnection. Why does 
that occur? I’m not 100 per cent sure…they probably have their hot 
spots as to what are the indicators of some anomaly…they’re trying 
to achieve ultimately the same thing in true and fair reporting, 
transparency, the provision of information to shareholders, all those 
things, which is what we effectively are trying to do through our 
audit process. So I’m sure there’s a big disconnect, but…at times I 
do see that and I may even see it by the question that I get asked 
from the regulator when they go through a file. Their focus is on 
something which I don’t see as important—issues that they raise a 
question [about]. I don’t know why that is. It probably goes to…
the level of experience that…some of those within the regulator 
[possess] to be able to implement.
The regulators have created the perceived gap between regulators and 
auditors according to this next supplier:
[T]he expectation gap between regulators and auditors has been 
created by the regulators. The regulators have taken a position as to 
where they think…an audit should necessarily be conducted, and 
what their expectation [is] on how an audit should be conducted. 
And primarily we’re talking about things like documentation, and 
the way we maintain an audit file and document procedures that 
have been done. So I’m of the view [that] they’ve actually created 
the expectation gap. 
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The same supplier continues along the same theme:
Has that been of any assistance to the capital 
markets? In my opinion, no. I’m not sure whether 
the regulators really know what they’re trying 
to achieve out of this whole exercise that they’re 
going through now…But to form an opinion on 
how an audit should primarily be done is…not 
the role of the regulator. And because they’ve 
taken what I would…describe as this high moral 
ground, then they’re going to be disappointed, 
absolutely. But that doesn’t mean that what we’re doing is wrong, 
or is not the right way to conduct an audit. And that’s the problem. 
And this is where I say you’ve got this almost expectation gap 
because they’re saying this is the way we think you should do 
things. But [what] we’re also saying is well you’re not actually doing 
it wrong, but this is the way we think you should do these things. 
And…that’s the problem.
The issue of materiality as a component of the audit expectations gap 
featured among suppliers’ comments that were pertinent to the expectations 
gap. Below are two such illustrative comments, with Chapter 5 dedicated 
to the issue of audit materiality.
The thing I think is well and truly misunderstood is the concept 
of materiality, probably across a lot of users not just mums and 
dads—but for big…multinational groups that…obviously can be 
a very big figure and…a lot of shareholders would struggle if you 
said to them ‘We can still sign a clean audit opinion but the audit 
error might be X many tens of millions.’…that would stun them…
so there is still this expectation gap between what an auditor knows 
an audit opinion actually is versus what a reader of accounts might 
expect an audit to be.
[T]here is certainly a disconnect between what we do and what the 
general public would perceive an auditor does. I’m sure there’s no 
disconnect really between what the analysts believe we do, and 
certainly there’s probably not a super disconnect between us and 
what management believes we’re doing, although I would imagine 
in some cases the materiality might be a surprise to some people. 
However, there’s been more disclosure of that with management, 
‘I’m not sure whether 
the regulators really 
know what they’re 
trying to achieve out of 
this whole exercise that 
they’re going through 
now.’ 
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but certainly not with outsiders.
8.4.1 Summary
Suppliers’ comments indicate little ambivalence about whether or not 
a gap exists between shareholders and auditors. There is virtually 
unanimous support for the proposition that it does exist. Further, there 
are few suggestions as to how that gap can be reduced. Tellingly, many 
suppliers see a gap between regulators of the market for audit services and 
auditors—and some auditors see regulators as primarily responsible for 
this gap. Perceived discrimination by regulators against the mid-tier firms 
compared with the Big Four comes through as an aspect of the perceived 
gap between regulators and auditors. Some suppliers lament the difficulty 
of having all users of financial reports—no matter what their background 
or level of business sophistication—read and understand the audit report 
and what it is that the audit can achieve. 
8.5 Standard setters
Standard setters tend to take a philosophical view of the audit 
expectations gap and position it relative to many other gaps they perceive 
in stakeholders’ grasp of an informed view in relation to companies in 
which they hold an interest.
[T]he audit expectation gap isn’t the only gap…what we’re 
acknowledging [is] that clearly there is a whole raft of issues around 
how much or little shareholders know about the company. So do 
they read the annual reports? Do they look at who the directors are 
and have a sense of their capacity or reputation, or the management 
team for the same thing? Do they understand the strategy of the 
company and what it’s about…Fraud?…that’s a classic example 
of does an audit report sign-off mean that no fraud has been 
conducted. Clearly, it doesn’t. There’s an expectation I suspect on 
the demand side that certainly a substantial fraud would be found. 
But the auditors…?
An expectations gap exists not only between auditors and stakeholders in 
the audit process but between regulators and stakeholders in the regulatory 
process and the reader is reminded through the next quote of the pervasive 
nature of the gulf that can exist in perceptions of what can be achieved. 
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Over the years there’s been lots of debate in the US and discussion…
that we should explain more about what the audit process is, and 
[the] expectation gap and all that stuff. It doesn’t matter…you can 
write books on it and it makes no difference…apparently in all the 
cross-examination in the [HIH]…case they can’t find anybody who 
actually can claim they read the audit opinion. Not one person from 
any of the claimants can categorically say they actually read the 
audit opinion.
This same standard setter goes on to point out that auditors are not the 
only group subject to an expectations gap. Regulators too can be the focus 
of such a gap. 
[T]he body that I believe is now focusing on 
this expectation gap for themselves is ASIC, 
who are struggling right now with the [name of 
a company failing at the time of the interview] 
and all of a sudden…they’re now the victims of 
this expectation. Where was ASIC? Why didn’t 
ASIC stop this from happening? It’s always why 
didn’t someone stop this from happening? So an 
audit shouldn’t stop something from happening. 
It should stop something from continuing…I don’t think there [are] 
different expectations around what can be achieved in an audit…
ASIC themselves are now victims of the expectation gap…[and] 
they now are perhaps more sympathetic, but they have a job to do 
and once you’re a regulator with a role to review, you’ve got to work 
to a standard and so they’re looking for a standard to work to. And 
remember when you come in after the fact to review something 
it’s very different to being there during the process. Imagine if a 
surgeon conducting brain surgery also had to…document what he 
was doing as he did it at exactly the same time.
That all stakeholders, including regulators, need to work closely to 
minimise the gap, which is seen as unresolvable by this next standard 
setter, is drawn out:
[I]n some ways, it’s not so much an expectation gap…it’s also 
[that] there [are]…elements of different interpretations of what 
responsibilities are and what would be reasonably expected. So 
whether you say that’s an expectation gap or whether you define it 
‘[A]ll of a sudden…
they’re now the victims 
of this expectation. 
Where was ASIC? Why 
didn’t ASIC stop this 
from happening?’ 
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more as an interpretation issue…those fundamental issues have not 
been dealt with. And so what we loosely call ‘expectation gap’…
[hasn’t] gone away…I don’t think you can solve the overall or the 
broader expectation gap, but…it’s incumbent on all the stakeholders 
in the process to…work hard with the closer stakeholders…the 
regulators, the politicians.
Just which categories of stakeholders can be said to represent users of 
financial statements is eloquently drawn out in the following quotation:
[W]e’re saying or implying that we can never close [the expectations 
gap] because you’ve got a moving target or perhaps a difference in 
perception, but the real question is, who are the real users of the 
financial statements when we come to what is the expectation gap? 
And is it the mums and dads or is it the analysts, the brokers, the 
superannuation funds et cetera…those groups of people are not 
idiots and they pick up a set of financial statements that most of 
these analysts have their own assessment of the areas of judgment, 
hence, the questions they ask off the record and on the record. [At 
m]ost of the AGMs you go to there are one or two key questions 
around the business. The reasons I would assume there aren’t any 
more is they’ve already received the responses outside of that arena. 
The same standard setter continues, questioning how there can be reliance 
on the audit report when research shows that few actually read it:
[W]e come to this issue of how do you narrow or 
manage the expectation gap? Perhaps one of the key 
factors is—and it’s clear in most investor relations-
type publications—if in doubt, consult your 
financial advisor or accountant…one of the more 
interesting…studies…was a project done on the use 
of audit reports and…the statistics showed that most 
people don’t even read the audit report when they 
read a set of financial statements. If you take that at face value, 
then fundamentally you would ask the question when something 
did go wrong and someone then sought to find someone that they 
might like to be responsible, you’d ask the question, well if they 
didn’t read the audit report in the first place, how could they have a 
reliance on the report and then, more importantly, how could there 
be an expectation gap? Because if you’re not actually even using 
‘[T]he statistics 
showed that most 
people don’t even 
read the audit 
report.’ 
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the report, the question is well, how…do you have an expectation 
gap because you’ve got no expectation in the first place because you 
haven’t even seen whether the auditor’s qualified [the report] or not. 
The same standard setter goes on to explain that in his or her view, it 
is the fact that investors want certainty in their investments but are not 
prepared to accept the commensurate low returns that gives rise to the 
expectations gap:
I would suggest that the expectation gap lies in…what I call the 
classic syndrome of people wanting to know the answer before 
they know the question and we see that…in our profession, with 
people wanting advice, is this going to work and you haven’t got all 
the facts, and…the expectation gap is that people want a certainty 
when they invest…People want ‘guaranteed’. Now if everything 
was so certain, the returns would be very low. 
A standard setter highlights the concept of materiality as an area in which 
misunderstanding by stakeholders occurs—as this illustrative comment 
reveals (the topic of materiality is returned to in Chapter 5): 
Potentially, many shareholders do not understand 
the concept of materiality and they’d be the 
retail shareholders. Should that be a concern 
for the accounting profession? I mean, it might 
be a concern for the retail investors. Should it 
be a concern for the accounting profession? 
Only if…that creates an expectation gap that 
could result in retail investors feeling aggrieved 
for something that happened subsequent to the 
audit that impacts them financially in a share price or whatever. If 
I was an accounting firm…I don’t know that I’d be too concerned 
about it because…with good quality-control processes within an 
accounting firm with a good methodology, with sound basis for 
conclusions, that expectation gap is not necessarily something that 
can…cost you. 
The practical difficulty in appropriately signalling corporate failure is 
highlighted in this comment from one of the standard setters:
‘[T]hat expectation 
gap is not necessarily 
something that can 
actually cost you as an 
accounting firm.’ 
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This whole concept of trading whilst insolvent is 
going to become greyer and greyer…because what 
you’re going to be faced with is businesses that are 
one day going reasonably…the automotive industry’s 
a classic. A customer who then turns around and 
says, ‘No, we’re going to change supplier but in the 
interim, can you keep supplying us?’ And they keep 
them going. The question is, at what point does it tip? 
8.5.1 Summary
Among the standard setters’ comments is one that compels us to view 
the audit expectations gap within a wider perspective of a much more 
fundamental gap—a presumed gap in shareholders’ knowledge and 
understanding of companies in which they invest. Interestingly, attention 
is drawn to another gap—between what is expected of regulators and what 
they can reasonably be expected to deliver. The thorny issue is raised of 
the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud and shareholder understanding 
of the auditor’s role in that respect. Some exasperation comes through 
in terms of how infrequently the audit report is actually read; however, 
how important this is when reports are standardised is another matter. 
The issue of stakeholder misunderstanding of materiality in the context 
of auditing is raised in an illustrative comment among those above, but 
from the initial focus groups this issue took on such prominence that a 
subsequent chapter is dedicated to exploring perceptions of this concept 
and the communication of it by auditors. Despite some pessimism that the 
audit expectations gap can be resolved, there is evidence that standard 
setters have not given up striving to bridge it. 
8.6 Regulators
Regulators do not flinch in acknowledging the expectations gap—not just 
in terms of expectations of audit by the public, but between themselves 
and suppliers. 
Comments relating to public expectations of audit and auditors include 
the following.
[T]he expectation gap between what people think an auditor should 
do and what they really do is probably a bit wider than I had first 
imagined before I came to this job.
‘This whole 
concept of trading 
whilst insolvent is 
going to become 
greyer and greyer.’
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[I]t seems as though there’s a vast amount of effort going into the 
audit process but it doesn’t seem to turn up things that people are 
actually interested in. And…that’s of course the audit expectation 
gap and…the auditors say, ‘Well, you can’t expect us to have found 
that.’ 
There is certainly a huge difference in expectation between what 
people understand audited accounts to mean [and] what auditors 
think they mean and obviously what regulators mean. So probably 
it’s partly a function of auditors to explain what it is that [they have 
done or]…they haven’t done and what they’re really willing to say 
is the true position with respect to a company…A professional class 
of investor who makes the vast majority [of] investment decisions 
in Australia in terms of value—well, they probably don’t need any 
more education. I’m not sure how much reliance they place on 
audited accounts anyway. But…for ordinary people who are trying 
to run their own super funds or whatever…they probably would 
need quite a bit more help.
An illustrative comment regarding the regulator–auditor expectations gap 
follows. This topic is returned to in a Chapters 11–13, in which the issue of 
‘regulation’ as it impacts on auditors is discussed in detail. 
[T]he first thing is that there is a huge expectation gap between 
regulators and auditors. [The regulator’s] view of what an auditor 
should be turning up in an audit was radically different to what 
auditors thought was reasonable…so we would look at numbers of 
examples where it would seem to us to be fairly glaring problems 
seemed to have slipped by. Whereas the auditor would say, ‘Well, 
you know you can’t expect me to find all of these things.’ Partly 
as well is of course what underlies all of these issues…money—in 
the sense that…how much do you want to spend…If you want to 
spend vast amounts of money on audits, well—that’s what auditors 
used to say to us. You’ve got to be realistic about how much people 
are willing to spend on an audit, and if we had unlimited resources 
we could find all of these things, but otherwise…
Again, the mystique surrounding the auditor’s use of the materiality 
concept is identified as part of the gap:
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There would be very few shareholders who 
would understand materiality as applied by an 
auditor. And…some of them would be quite 
staggered to learn…if you take [one of the top-
100 listed companies], the materiality on that 
job might be 20 million—I’m just picking a 
figure—and therefore the numbers are right, 
plus or minus the 20 million. Well…the 
shareholders would absolutely be staggered 
at that…and they wouldn’t understand the 
correlation between that materiality level and…the cost of the 
audit…if you were going to be dropping that down to just say five 
million then you’re going to have to be doing four times the amount 
of work that you presently do…therefore that concept hasn’t been 
well put out there because…it’s started to get into the audit report. 
8.6.1 Summary
From a regulator’s perspective, the gap in their expectations of what an 
audit can achieve and that of auditors is evident. Similar distinctions 
between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors’ capacity to 
understand emerge, as is the case with the comments of other stakeholders 
earlier in this chapter. One of the comments draws us back to the reality 
that, among other things, it is what can be achieved for a given price that 
constrains the audit deliverable. Again, an illustrative comment about 
the auditor’s use of the materiality concept is included, completing the 
mention of this notion by all stakeholders as part of the audit expectations 
gap. Chapter 5 is dedicated to analysis of stakeholders’ views about this 
important topic, which has not been identified particularly as a component 
of the audit expectations gap in the research literature.
9.0 issues and implications
In the detailed individual interviews of users, purchasers, suppliers, 
standard setters and regulators, the majority acknowledge the existence 
of an expectations gap or gaps. Only a relatively small proportion of the 
interviewees believe there is no expectations gap or that it is limited, and 
the majority believe there is an expectations gap and indeed many argue 
there are multiple gaps. 
‘[T]he shareholders would 
absolutely be staggered at 
that…and they wouldn’t 
understand the correlation 
between that materiality 
level and in a sense the  
cost of the audit.’
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The users interviewed were by and large professional users as opposed 
to retail investors. It was common for users to perceive the existence 
of an expectations gap between themselves and the suppliers of audit 
opinions, but it was common for them to express a concern that there 
was a substantial expectations gap between regulators and auditors. 
Some users commented that the expectations gap had narrowed but in 
a way that might not be consistent with increasing the prestige of the 
profession. Some users commented that the failures that occurred earlier 
in the past decade caused expectations of what the auditor could achieve 
to be lowered and therefore the gap narrowed. Interestingly, some users 
took the view that the changes to the regulatory environment meant that 
the expectations gap had lessened because auditors were now working 
more closely with regulators. 
Purchasers too observed that there were multiple gaps and in some 
cases commented at length about the expectations gap between auditors 
and regulators. Purchasers expressed some criticism of regulators. Much 
of this criticism centred on the fact that there was a belief that regulators 
needed to specify the objective of the audit in their inspections as well as 
in their oversight of the auditing profession rather than just tell them how 
to achieve that outcome. 
There was a series of perceptions within the purchasers that auditing 
involved undertaking validation of the financial statements to a level 
of materiality that was healthy and achieved within a reasonable cost. 
One purchaser observed that while the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the 
United States had ‘plugged a political gap’, it had done so at enormous 
cost to the economy. One might argue that this legislation has gained little 
benefit for the efficiency of that country’s capital market. 
Other purchasers indicate that the audit expectations gap arises mostly 
in the presence of business failure and yet in a free market economy there 
will always be the presence of business failure. Concerns are raised about 
the auditing profession, which might be motivated by false expectations, 
due in part to an attempt to gain some economic recompense from a party 
who has ‘deep pockets’. There was also critical comment with respect to 
the media reaction to business failure and the role of auditors. 
One purchaser indicated that if we wanted to change the role of 
auditing one would have to adopt quite a different model. Rather than 
having an audit process that yields a small proportion of audit opinions 
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that are qualified or modified, one might have to increase modifications to, 
say, 25 per cent to present a more varied set of outcomes for the market to 
consume and absorb. Possibly, then, there might be a more active interest 
and readership in the audit opinion.
Leading from this is the issue that standard form audit opinions could 
in fact generate a lower level of interest by participants in the capital 
market and indeed could result in the users of financial statements looking 
at the length of the audit opinion rather than really reading the opinion 
itself. Suppliers confirmed the expectations of certain other participants 
in the market. Their assessment is that the expectations gap is focused on 
essentially two aspects: 1) materiality; and 2) that an audit opinion does 
not guarantee all transactions and all events. 
A number of suppliers indicated that they did not believe the 
expectations gap was closable, with several acknowledging there were 
different sorts of gaps with different participants in the capital market. In 
particular, retail investors were uninformed and probably uninformable. 
There were observations by many suppliers of an expectations gap between 
auditors and regulators, although comment was made that regulators were 
aware of what it was that auditors did, they just chose not to believe that 
this was the ultimate objective of the audit process. There was criticism by 
suppliers from the smaller audit firms that audit expectations developed 
by regulators were based on their observations of the Big Four and that 
those expectations were inappropriate in different parts of the capital 
market—in particular, for those companies that were smaller in market 
capitalisation. 
Frequently, suppliers observed that auditing could be cast in many 
different ways, but the presence of materiality meant that auditing was 
able to be undertaken at reasonable cost to give reasonable assurance and 
this in itself was not understood by a large proportion of the market. 
There were few observations from any of the interviewees about how 
the audit expectations gap might be resolved. One positive comment 
nominated was that in the audit report the scope of an audit could include 
comment on that which was undertaken by the auditor and that which 
was not, so that there was a more fulsome description of the scope of the 
audit process. 
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Another observation was that the presence of a stronger regulatory 
environment had in fact added to the expectations gap. This could be 
so because if regulators undertake their inspections with a particular 
purpose, as a consequence, they might miss the key issues of an audit 
engagement compared with those identified by the auditor at the time of 
the engagement. 
One standard setter made the observation that many investors paid 
little or no attention to the audit opinion unless there was a business failure 
involved. Hence, there should be no expectation on auditors by those 
who did not use the audit opinion in their investment decision making. 
Others reading this report might conclude that such a view is naive and 
slightly condescending, as one does not have to read an audit opinion 
comprehensively to be able to understand what it says. As observed 
above, one might reasonably conclude the contents of a standard form 
audit opinion by its length.
There was also a comment that audits had a further type of expectations 
gap in that they could not stop the existence of certain behaviours (such 
as directors continuing trading while a company was insolvent); the best 
they could do was to terminate or minimise that behaviour once it had 
been discovered. One might say that they can also disclose information 
about this behaviour to the investing public. 
One standard setter observed that much of the expectations gap was 
caused by regulators who could choose to deflect blame and negative 
market sentiment from themselves and on to the accounting profession. 
One might also observe that the expectations gap between the accounting 
firms and the regulators can be particularly damaging to the suppliers of 
audit services and to the efficiency and credibility of information available 
to the capital market.
Regulators also took a ‘big-picture’ view. None of the regulators 
interviewed indicated that legally enforceable auditing standards would 
really help close the expectations gap, narrow it or manage it. There 
was also a view that many players in the capital market did not require 
assistance in understanding the role of audits, but some players did. 
We would like to comment on an issue not expressly raised by any of 
the regulators—that in the Australian economy, much has been done to 
encourage participation by a wide spectrum of investors in the Australian 
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capital market. There have been many government floats and increased 
participation by a wide section of the public in various pension plans. 
There has, however, been no parallel public policy support mechanism to 
help educate and inform those participants in the capital market. 
10.0 Concluding remarks
This second part of Chapter 3 touches on the often-quoted issue of the 
expectations gap. While this part is linked to the earlier part of this chapter, 
focusing on understandability, there are also certain distinct differences. 
Among a large and disparate group of stakeholders there is widespread 
but not universal recognition of the audit expectations gap and one can 
conclude that with few exceptions no-one believes that this issue has 
been bridged. The policy question becomes: does it matter? From one 
perspective, the view is that the presence of an expectations gap or gaps 
is not costly to audit firms, but there is evidence that it is costly to the 
efficiency of the market for information that operates within the capital 
market. It is therefore still an important policy issue that warrants the 
investment of time and effort by those interested in the efficiency of the 
capital market. 
Importantly, as a policy consideration, there was reference to the 
existence of three potential gaps: 1) between users and suppliers—the 
traditional gap referred to frequently in the literature and in discussions 
more broadly; 2) between regulators and suppliers; and 3) between 
purchasers and suppliers.
In terms of the policy considerations, these issues will be dealt with 
in turn. 
First, the expectations gap between users and suppliers is dealt with. 
In this study, as there has been with previous studies, there is recognition 
of a wide diversity of expertise among users. One policy consideration 
not widely contained in the literature is that the diversity of expertise is 
not played to by the current provision of audit information. Many users 
have high levels of expertise but the same commoditised audit report is 
provided to all. A second policy issue is that for the less expert users of 
financial reports, the population is poorly defined and probably constantly 
moving. As such, there is a serious question about the feasibility in a 
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public policy setting of building that expertise or educating those users 
to a point where they will not have an expectations gap, but rather a full 
or at least reasonable understanding of the audit process and outcome. 
The question becomes, is it worth embarking on any process to close an 
expectations gap with such a population of users? This does not presuppose 
that nothing will be done, but that we do not have as an expectation that 
this gap can close completely.
Additionally, with regard to the expectations gap between users 
and suppliers, there is the issue of diversity of incentives. Where 
corporate collapses occur there is the possibility of an enhanced or even 
‘manufactured’ gap existing. On the one hand, we have users who might 
not have ever relied on an audit report claiming such reliance to access the 
‘deep pockets’ or economic substance of large audit firms. On the other 
hand, we have suppliers to the market for audit services claiming that the 
limitations on what they seek to undertake in an audit are not understood, 
thereby attempting to avoid accountability in the circumstance of corporate 
failures. Put another way, from a public policy perspective, the audit 
expectations gap will come and go depending on economic circumstances. 
If this is the case, there is the question of what is the legitimacy or validity 
of the expectations gap in a stable or neutral setting?
With respect to the expectations gap between regulators and suppliers, 
the policy issue is: what is an audit? It is well understood that auditing in 
a free market economy is a form of delegated regulation. The presence of 
an audit comes about because of legislation in order to provide some form 
of assurance of the disclosures made by companies and others trading in 
the market. Is it the case that suppliers and regulators understand that 
this is in fact a form of delegated regulation? The implication for auditors 
is that the audit process is a form of regulation that they are asked or 
required to undertake for and on behalf of a client who is from neither 
the directorship nor the management of the company. For regulators, do 
they understand that delegated regulation means they must pass on that 
delegation in a fulsome way? Put more directly, do regulators understand 
that the role of regulation is to specify the objective or outcome of the 
audit process rather than to specify the means and processes by which the 
audit is undertaken? Do regulators need to withdraw from the specifying 
process and more clearly specify the objective and outcome? If they do 
specify the process, do they have unintended bias about specifying that 
the processes used by the Big Four represent best practice and therefore 
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should be used as the benchmark? 
There is also reference to an expectations gap between purchasers 
and suppliers, but this is not seen in the same dimension or at the same 
level of complexity as the other two. If there are some issues around this 
expectations gap, they could relate to particular topics that are dealt with 
in the next paragraph.
One possible policy implication of a discussion of the audit expectations 
gap is a need to attempt to obtain greater focus on the gap by specifying 
which topics of the audit process or outcome are subject to an expectations 
gap. From the evidence available to us, there are three issues that are 
clearly of substance: 1) the issue of forward detection and whether this 
is an expectation and, if so, whether it should be expressly removed 
from the expectations of users by way of scope paragraphs; 2) the issue 
of materiality and the extent to which there is no or insufficient public 
description of materiality in an audit context and the consequences on 
the audit process and outcome; and 3) the use of certain language. The 
key in this last category is the use of the word ‘test’ in the audit report. A 
test can be a test of 100 per cent of the population of items or it can be a 
test of a much smaller proportion. The word ‘test’ does not in and of itself 
suggest that the work of the auditor is on a sample basis. Substitution of 
the word ‘sample’ for ‘test’ might be a simple action, but it could provide 
much greater shared meaning of a key part of the audit process. 
Another issue with respect to the expectations gap is whether we can 
expect removal of the expectations gap when there is evidence that the 
audit report is much less than universally read. Again, this returns us to 
the issue of what incentives, behaviour or actions would help ensure that 
the audit report is more frequently read rather than scanned, and we refer 
to comments made in the earlier part of this chapter in relation to this 
matter.
Another policy implication is whether the legal backing of auditing 
standards will assist in the eradication of the expectations gap. That is, 
based on conversations with stakeholders, those responsible for public 
policy should not expect that legal backing of auditing standards will 
have any consequences for the audit expectations gap.
There were some alternative propositions put by various stakeholders. 
For example, do we want to adopt a quite different model to the current 
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
84 |
audit model? For instance, one in which auditors may be given the 
responsibility of providing an alternative set of financial reports to those 
of management. This is an extreme alternative and possibly not worthy of 
any consideration, but it does illustrate the point that there are alternative 
models to the existing audit process. Whether these models are acceptable 
or even remotely achievable is not so much the case as that there are 
alternative models available. Another model might be to undertake a 
much more comprehensive sampling of items in the financial reports, but 
that would come at a significant cost, which in turn would result in much 
lower returns to shareholders. 
The policy issue here is that the current model is based on certain 
parameters, which include reasonable costs and the absence of a guarantee. 
Are these the parameters we want to live with in the future? Because these 
parameters are now so universally accepted, do we have any choice in the 
matter?
In conclusion, the biggest single policy issue in this part of the chapter 
is that the expectations gap is alive and possibly is not subject to closure. 
Indeed, it is complex and involves multiple gaps. With respect to the gap 
between regulators and suppliers, the observation made is that these are 
clearly defined populations of stakeholders, which one would expect to 
have considerable shared levels of expertise and understanding, and that 
it might be efficient in public policy terms to work on the expectations 
gap between these two stakeholder groups as a matter of urgency.
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CoMMUniCATion 4
I would question how useful…[detailed information about the audit 
process and outcome] really would be, because…if there was an 
agreement amongst the audit firms or a direction from government…
that they’re required to make more disclosure…it would literally 
be lawyers sitting round a table working out how to word that 
disclosure, and the wording would be similar amongst all the firms, 
and very soon it would be pointless in terms of adding real value…
to the reader of the financial statements…It would be a motherhood 
statement…that says we’ve conducted this, this, this and this, and 
my guess would be it would be fairly similar between each audit 
client…They [would] put a lot of effort into getting the words right 
initially, but they wouldn’t be putting a lot of effort into tailoring the 
words for each audit…so I’m not sure that it would really provide 
that much value to a sophisticated user of the statements.
— Purchaser
1.0 Key issues
Responses to the proposition that either auditors or management should 
be charged with the responsibility to disclose incremental information 
about the audit process and/or the audit opinion are mixed, within and 
across categories of stakeholders. Key issues include:
•	 is there value in further disclosure in the audit process and/or 
outcome that is subject to regulatory requirement
•	 if either auditors or management provides additional disclosures in 
the context of audit, what would be the most appropriate content and 
location
•	 if such disclosures are to be provided by either management or 
auditors, what mechanisms could be used to monitor the disclosures 
to ensure that they are not misleading or deceptive?
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•	 if such disclosures are not to be provided by auditors or management, 
what other mechanisms might be introduced to provide that content, 
presuming the content is deemed desirable for distribution
•	 will additional disclosures, no matter where they are located, merely 
exacerbate information overload to the point that a counterproductive 
effect occurs?
2.0 Disclosure of the audit process by auditors
Within the literature, some commentators have suggested that, at least in 
aggregate, one way of helping overcome differences of view in the market 
for audit services is to provide more disclosure to the market on audit 
processes. This, it is suggested, will enable users of audit opinions and 
other participants in the market to be better informed about what occurs 
within an audit. While there was not a specific survey question about 
this issue, the individual interviews revealed a rich and diverse array of 
opinions in this regard. 
Interestingly, there were many comments from users, purchasers, 
suppliers, standard setters and regulators, including some that were 
introspective and possibly even self-interested. For example, purchasers 
tended to focus on information potentially provided to management of 
auditees rather than to the wider stakeholder group of shareholders. Even 
standard setters tended to think of their own position rather than that of 
the efficiency of the capital market. Typical comments are provided below.
2.1 Users
Several of the users felt that having auditors disclose information about the 
auditor’s work and processes would be useful, particularly at the individual 
client level, but overall there was scepticism that this information would 
be taken advantage of as a useful resource, especially by retail investors 
who some might argue were most in need of this type of additional 
information. The following quotations reveal reactions among users when 
the question is put to them about the worth of auditors disclosing more 
about their work. Several made suggestions about the type of information 
thought desirable to be disclosed by auditors and suitable outlets for it. 
This first quotation provides the interviewee’s perception that as long as 
the information is presented in a highly readable way, it is of merit:
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I can see some merit in…[a] statement that’s included in the annual 
report if that…gave a few more details about what’s actually done…
at the moment all you’re looking at is ‘have they signed the dotted 
line?’ ‘Is there any qualification?’ That’s all you’re looking for. So 
people may not spend all that much time…reading if you put more 
details in it, but you could imagine that if it’s set out nicely and 
easily readable, people would actually at least scan and see this is 
what they’ve done…Yes, there’s some merit in that.
This next quotation suggests content, including verification of the 
existence of assets and liabilities and their value and whether internal 
controls are reviewed to ensure accurate capture of data:
I actually think [auditor disclosure of the audit process is] a really 
good idea. I don’t think they [provide] enough [explanation] of what 
they’ve [done], how they arrive at their opinion and…it would help 
people who read the assurance statements to formulate in their 
mind what’s been done. Things like ‘we’ve verified the existence of 
assets and their value, we’ve undertaken an internal controls review 
of the business to ensure that the capturing of accounting data is 
accurate, we’ve verified assets and liabilities where we can, we’ve 
got independent views’…If they went through all of that process…
it would be really good and it doesn’t need to be hugely wordy…
obviously it’s going to take up a bit of space, but it wouldn’t be a 
bad thing…even if that was something on a company’s web site.
More suggestions for content are included in this next user’s comments, as 
well as disclosure of whether invoices and contracts have been examined, 
the level of testing of subsidiary ledgers and the materiality level: 
[M]ainly the confusion arises when the reader of the audit [report] 
doesn’t really know how much work or how much background 
checks or information the auditor has actually done to come up 
with the response. So whether it’s…the level of testing of things 
like debtors, creditors, ledgers, whether they actually checked 
invoices, whether they’ve looked at contracts, what the materiality 
has been et cetera, because…from a [lender’s] point of view, when 
you’re looking at a balance sheet, have they really gone behind 
the numbers to validate things or have they just relied on the data 
given to them by the customer and then perhaps [a] random sample 
of that particular testing and if so, that’s okay, but what’s the level 
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of confidence [that] can be gained from that…if you knew what 
sort of testing they have done or what…methods they’ve used, you 
can then draw your own conclusions [about] whether you need a 
further assessment on that particular aspect or whether you can 
rely on it totally.
This next user would like to see the auditor’s views on matters that go well 
beyond what is included in the financial audit, such as the operational 
efficiency of the audited organisation or the transparency in obtaining 
information relative to experience with other organisations. 
If I’m referring to our own organisation, probably things like if they 
come across operational issues where they feel…there’s something 
behind it that’s not quite right, or if they come across [issues] 
that aren’t necessarily just related to the figures but…in actually 
getting hold of figures or getting hold of data and they find either…
unnecessary complexity or difficulty in obtaining that information, 
or that it seems to be not documented or any of those sorts of 
things…that would be a good concept to disclose…So just from 
their point of view in operating, in going and auditing a number 
of organisations, a view as to maybe the operational efficiency or 
the operational transparency in actually obtaining that information 
relative to other organisations.
The next user seeks greater disclosure by the auditor of his or her 
subjective assessment of the financial position of the company:
[W]e deal with clients who have shares…[and] the majority 
wouldn’t have any idea of some key measures that you’d like to 
think that they’d know about the company…when you look at…
company reports a little bit more, you really have to look hard and 
unless you’re a specialist or you know what to look [for], it’s hard to 
get certain kinds of information. You get the core information but 
any more detail—which…sometimes gives you a feel[ing] of what 
the company [and] its financial position is—it’s a little bit harder. So 
I would like to see a lot more [disclosure by the auditor].
One user feels the venue for enhanced disclosure by the auditor should be 




[I]t probably wouldn’t be a bad thing. You could probably do it at 
an AGM, run through the financial reports, say, potentially even 
have…a statement read out from the auditors to say, ‘We’ve actually 
read through these financial reports and they’re in compliance with 
standards’, any events, extraordinary events or whatever it might 
be that need to be read out—need to be read out as well…that 
would be a good thing. Just to heighten the awareness of people 
at AGMs of what’s happening with the financial reports. Because 
quite often you get read out the financial reports from the CFO and 
they’re brushed over pretty quickly…And it doesn’t give a feeling 
of independence…at an AGM, which is shareholders’ only real 
avenue to management, there’s always a bit of a feel[ing]…of spin 
doctoring, et cetera, by the company to say, ‘Listen, this is fantastic, 
we’ve had a great year’…and there’s no real clarification of reports 
by the auditors at all.
This next user implies that it is the financial statement and note 
presentation, not the audit, which needs attention: 
[P]eople just need to understand in general…terms what’s gone 
on, but…I do think that they just assume it’s right…what the 
frustration of the capital market is, is not with the audit itself, but 
with the way in which the information is then presented.
Less supportive comments by users include concerns that any additional 
material will not be read, especially by retail investors:
It would help, but [for] the retail market, reading accounts is such 
a small part of their life.
[T]he retail investor does take comfort from the fact that an audit 
firm is doing the audit, that gives…a level of comfort. But I don’t 
think they really want to know too much more…[and] nine times 
out of 10, everything is right…for listed companies anyway.
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[T]hey’re really pushing it uphill to start with. I don’t 
think they need to disclose any more, because when 
things are going well, people don’t read it. They don’t 
read what they’ve already got…it would be interesting 
to line up 100 shareholders and ask them have they 
ever read an audit report. I suspect most would say no. 
Because…most retail shareholders struggle to read the 
accounts. It’s a real reflection on the accounting profession, how 
poorly we present financial information.
The next user raises the issue of information overload, with the auditor’s 
responsibility for detecting fraud being singled out as a worthy disclosure:
[T]here is already so much information out there that it’s difficult to 
digest…if the concern of auditors is that there’s a gap…people are 
expecting them to pick up fraud when they’re not, then perhaps in 
general that needs to be addressed. I’m not sure how you do that 
exactly, but in terms of audit by audit, whether that needs to be 
paraphrased in some manner at the end of the financial statements. 
I just don’t think people will read it.
I don’t think the average person would look at it. I mean, 
if you read the audit report, it tells you what they’re 
looking at anyway. If you’ve got any understanding of 
financial statements, you can take quite a lot away from 
that. The issue is that the average person doesn’t have 
that knowledge about the financial statements, so that’s 
when it becomes more difficult…it’s the general view 
that if the auditor signed off on it then it all must be okay, and 
that’s the layman’s understanding about what an audit statement 
is. It’s probably something that’s going to change over time. It’s a 
bit like superannuation—people don’t understand superannuation, 
even though they have to put 10 per cent4 of their salary towards 
it each year…the education of investors will happen slowly over a 
period of years.






‘I don’t think 
the average 
person would 
look at it.’ 
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There were several other comments, not reproduced here, to the effect 
that the annual report itself was not the place for such further disclosures 
by auditors.
2.1.1 Summary
Although some users are enthusiastic about the notion of greater auditor 
disclosure of the audit process, reservations are expressed about whether 
one part of the user group—the retail market—would find the time 
or motivation to read such additional information. As to what type of 
information about the auditor’s work and processes would be useful, users 
suggest a variety of things—from detailed information about assets and 
liabilities, operational issues and difficulties encountered in accessing the 
underlying needed information to unnecessary complexity or difficulty in 
obtaining that information, or required information that is not documented 
and further information about the company’s financial position. Each of 
these disclosures is well beyond the current requirements of auditors. 
2.2 Purchasers 
As with users, purchasers provided mixed responses to a question put to 
them about the worth of having auditors make additional disclosures about 
the audit process. Some, as illustrated below, were quite enthusiastic about 
this type of communication as an educative process—but more for company 
insiders than for shareholders, as suggested by this first quotation. 
[F]ace-to-face is the way to go. Certainly, an audit-wide perspective to 
a selected audience…I’d appreciate that very much. I wouldn’t expect 
too many changes between the audit firms, especially the Big Four, 
but…you do understand there are different cultures. So I would be 
very interested [if], as one of the first things that our new auditors 
did, would be to say, ‘Look, this is how we’re going to be approaching 
the audit and these are the key areas that we’re looking at.’ I guess not 
just as a start-up to the audit, but…wherever they head out. 
The next purchaser suggests disclosures from the auditor about changes 
to regulations and standards as potentially useful:
[T]here would have to be a constant education to shareholders 
on the changing regulations and what auditors are doing…there 
were some new standards coming out for the auditors a few years 
back, [and] it’s definitely an education process to shareholders.  
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I mean, to the extent that they don’t know, then…they should know, 
and…it would be up to the accounting profession, or the auditing 
profession, to be in a position where they are educating the wider 
community on exactly what they’re doing and how they’re doing it, 
and where things are heading and changing. 
Information sessions run by the auditing firms to which purchasers and 
users are invited is the suggestion of another purchaser:
Even me, for example, I’m not fully sure of what those new auditing 
standards meant. I’ve got the perception that there’s a lot more red 
tape that auditors are going through now, and there [are] a lot more 
sign-offs and qualifications, and peer reviews and all these sort 
of things. But I’m not really sure of what is meant and how that’s 
reflected in the audit work that’s now being done in our organisation, 
or in our audit fees or any of that. So education…I definitely want 
to know a bit more and in some more succinct environment to do 
that. We get invited to plenty of forums that our auditors give…
whether it’s [on] tax updates or accounting updates and all that. 
But I’ve never seen a general two-hour session in the afternoon…
with maybe drinks afterwards, or tea or coffee, talking about the 
profession and where it’s heading and what the new standards 
mean. If…shareholders and the wider community [are invited to 
that type of activity]…that could be worthwhile.
Information about the client-tailored expertise of audit personnel would 
be a worthwhile disclosure from this next purchaser’s point of view:
[T]here needs to be a certain level of disclosure from 
accounting firms about how they approach things, 
the expertise that they’ve got—because it’s not just 
simply a process, it’s also…how do they ensure 
they’ve got the right people? If you’re basically going 
in and you’re auditing, for example, the resource 
entities that are cropping up now in Western and 
South Australia, well a lot of the audits of those kinds 
of organisations probably require some kind of resource expert…
somebody who’s basically had two to three years post-university 
who’s doing the audit doesn’t have that skill…so how do auditors 
get the right blend of skills for the different types of organisations?
‘[I]t’s not just simply 
a process, it’s 
also…how do they 
ensure they’ve got 
the right people?’ 
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What comes through in this next quotation—which includes suggestions 
for enhanced disclosures around accounts or the processes used to verify 
them that the auditor is not comfortable with—is the ability for insiders 
to converse with auditors about these issues. Shareholders have this 
potential at AGMs, but rarely use it to elicit this type of information from 
auditors—at least according to views expressed in this chapter by all 
categories of stakeholder.
[W]e’re reasonably happy on this front…the 
key thing for us is, if there is something [that] 
is not a straightforward matter…say, a reserve…
[which is] normally what happens now, it either 
gets signed off or it gets signed off subject to 
qualifications…We would like just a bit more 
description as to the particular…fields in the 
accounts that [they]…maybe aren’t as comfortable 
with, or they’ve gone through a rigorous process 
to verify the accuracy [of]. There’s not a lot of description, so what 
we don’t really know is how much time has the auditor actually 
spent looking at a particular reserve or a particular accounting 
number and how comfortable they are with it…[and] particular 
items in the accounts where auditors might have a particular issue 
rather than having a qualification instead of a sign-off. Just maybe 
some more colour around how they’ve verified…or even just…
at the beginning of a set accounts…a statement of what they’ve 
actually verified. Because at the moment what we get is ‘true and 
fair’ or whatever [as a] sign-off from the auditor. It’s…very broad…
we don’t actually know what have they actually verified. How close 
do they look at things…we talk to the auditors in detail and we find 
that out afterwards, but we can’t tell that from the actual accounts.
I’m a firm believer that the annual report should…
give a shareholder a good understanding of the 
organisation, not only its financial statements, 
but its operations and its business. So I would 
punt for greater disclosure in the annual report 
over [an AGM]…not everybody can make an 
AGM, not everybody has…access to the web or 
even wants to sit there and listen to broadcasts, 
‘It’s…very broad…we 
don’t actually know 
what have they actually 
verified. How close do 
they look at things?’ 
‘[N]ot everybody can 
make an AgM, not 
everybody has…access 
to the web or even 
wants to sit there and 
listen to broadcasts.’ 
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and let’s face it, if you’re actually sitting there listening to an 
accountant talk about how they audited financial statements, it’s 
not going to be the most exciting thing to listen to. 
The same purchaser continues, explaining that whatever information is 
provided needs to be linked to potential implications for the shareholder:
[A]ny additional disclosure, especially in these sort of areas…needs 
to be kept simple. There’s no point having disclosure in the annual 
report that is…caught up in jargon. And what I mean by simple 
is, you should be able to give the average shareholder out there 
a nexus between… ‘this is why we’re auditing, this is what we’re 
doing, so this is what it means to you, and this is what it doesn’t 
mean to you’…I don’t know how you would do this…but linking 
that to the financial statements…instead of just having a page on 
the auditor saying, ‘We did a controls-based audit and we looked 
at this, this and this and we judged that their revenues are recorded 
accurately and their expenses have been recorded accurately and 
everything’s capitalised that should be capitalised’…That’s all well 
and good, but [it should be linked] back to what…it mean[s] for the 
shareholder, reading that, as opposed to just getting a blurb? 
The next purchaser would prefer to see enhanced disclosure by the 
auditor about how the firm goes about preparing and undertaking the 
audit in the audit engagement letter—again, a medium that capital market 
participants are not privy to.
As a manager in a business, and being a CPA but 
not an auditor myself, and not having an audit 
background, I’m constantly trying to struggle to 
understand what they call their audit approach, 
the proprietary approach that they adopt for 
each audit. And as a customer of the audit firm, 
I’d like to understand more about how they go 
about that, so that I can evaluate whether we’re 
getting the right level of service; whether they’re 
undertaking processes that with a little bit more information and 
insights as to how they go about preparing and doing their audit… 
I could actually say, ‘Do you realise this or that?’ And ‘that’s not 
ever going to be material’, and ‘you don’t really need to worry 
about this’. And it could actually drive efficiencies in the process 
‘I’m constantly trying to 
struggle to understand 
what they call their 
audit approach, the 
proprietary approach 




that way because, obviously, with the purchase of these audit 
services we’ve got a big interest in keeping the fees down. So…
I’d like…some more information in that regard to be disclosed. 
And…the logical way for them to disclose that to their customer is 
through the engagement letter process in almost a couple of pages of 
explanatory memorandum about their audit process and how that 
ties back to specifically what we’re going to do for you, rather than 
just the normal engagement letters, which are pages and pages of 
just canned information, disclaimers and those sorts of things.
Enhanced disclosure by the auditor about materiality is the suggestion of 
this next purchaser:
So the people that are interested can actually seek it [from the 
company’s web site] without cluttering up [the audit report]…
maybe something about materiality…might be of interest.
Making the management letter public is the preference of another 
purchaser, who has capital market participants in mind in responding to 
this question:
[W]hen you look at the bland innocuous report 
that appears in the annual report and when you 
look at the fact that very few auditors are actually 
ever questioned at AGMs, one really wonders what 
people get out of the report other than the brand 
name of the firm, the brand name of the individual 
that’s auditing the firm and the clean certificate…
the management letter that is disclosed to the 
board should be made available to shareholders on the web site.  
The auditor should be required to present it and take questions on 
it at the AGM. There will be the usual complaint that it contains 
confidential information. The reality is that if the matters are 
significant enough to be brought to the attention of the board, then 
as the proxy of the shareholders, the board should be comfortable 
with that being disclosed.
As with users, several of the purchasers, however, are sceptical 
about incremental disclosure of the audit process by auditors. This next 
purchaser points to the potential for information overload as a reason to 
maintain the status quo:
‘[T]he management 
letter that is 
disclosed to the 
board should be 
made available to 
shareholders on 
the web site.’ 
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I would generally say that annual reports, financial 
statements, have probably already got too much 
information. So I’m not in favour of…putting more 
and more information about more and more things 
that many people won’t want to read. But, having 
said that, I also recognise the fact that there needs 
to be an avenue for people to get information if they 
want to. So perhaps the issue is the halfway house.
From the financial service industry point of view, the disclosure, 
of itself, is actually quite onerous. It’s quite extensive already…
both in preparing the financial statements and other audit work 
that the external auditors have to prepare for the regulators or for 
management or for the external managed [funds]. So there’s actually 
quite a bit of information and on top of that they also present at the 
various board meetings on what they do, how to do it and it’s up to 
the individual boards to ask them. 
The same purchaser continues, pointing to the AGM as the opportunity 
for shareholders to ask questions of the auditor: 
[A] simple answer, if there is a simple answer…to this question is 
[that the auditors]…have discussed quite a bit in terms of what 
they do, how they do it and also there’s always opportunity for 
key stakeholders to ask them more questions, especially if it’s 
a listed company. Nowadays external auditors have to actually 
attend the annual general meeting…so obviously it’s up to ordinary 
shareholders…And I must say that obviously a lot of the information 
might be verging on too technical, too complicated and could be 
confusing and misleading to the uninformed or un-technically 
trained readers. So…especially from the financial service industry 
aspect…the current level of disclosure is…quite extensive already.
Another purchaser similarly invokes the AGM as providing an opportunity 
for shareholders to learn more about the audit:
They have the information. They can come to the AGM, and the 
auditors come to the AGM. 
One purchaser, responding to this question, makes clear his or her feelings 










My initial reaction to that question was no, they 
shouldn’t, because I’ve got no idea what they 
would actually disclose…and why they would 
disclose more information…it comes back to 
a further question, which is what’s the role of 
the auditor? What are they actually trying to 
achieve? What I do think is that the current 
disclosures and the opinions that are provided are 
jargonish…mumbo-jumbo statements. So no-one 
understands them and no-one reads them…there is an expectation 
in the…public arena, and that’s what people measure auditors’ 
performance against. So I don’t think additional disclosure in their 
report actually addresses that expectation gap, if you want to call it 
that. I don’t think it is the expectation gap. 
The suggestion for a ‘simple English’ report stating what the auditor has 
done is the reluctant suggestion from this next, unconvinced purchaser:
[Auditors] should just state…in simple English what they did. What 
does it add? I suppose I’m very in favour of a simple English-type 
report, but I’m not sure what [more disclosure] adds.
This next purchaser enunciates the likelihood of a ‘motherhood’, ‘boiler-
plate’ generic statement, vetoed by lawyers, if the suggestion is to go 
ahead, with little or no tailoring to the specific circumstances of each audit 
engagement and hence with limited value:
[E]ven if I was an active retiree investor in the habit of reading 
financial statements, which…is probably a very small minority, 
would I get value out of reading a statement that said exactly 
what sort of work was done and, more importantly, would I make 
investment decisions or be guided by that? I still don’t know that it 
would add a lot, unless there was a requirement somehow to tailor 
those words very specifically to that audit and that organisation…if 
it was a generic statement about the processes that were undertaken, 
I don’t think it would add a lot, but if it was a statement that was 
very specific…[it might].
Three purchasers point to the importance of users being able to rely on the 
professionalism of the auditor and the professional nature of the conduct 
of the audit, rather than any need to rely on enhanced disclosures:
‘[C]urrent disclosures 
and the opinions 
that are provided are 
jargonish…mumbo-
jumbo statements. So 
no-one understands 
them and no-one reads 
them.’ 
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[M]ost people probably could understand but I don’t know if they’re 
really interested. They can go and read the auditing standard…and 
we don’t get anybody doing that…all they want to know is do the 
auditors tick it off or not and then there’s an assumption that if 
they’ve ticked it off there’s a professional level and standard to that 
which applies. So it’s really…that integrity around the profession 
which is the…critical one.
I don’t know where else it could be disclosed quite frankly. I don’t 
know what [the disclosure] would be. I don’t think you want auditors 
busy explaining sets of accounts to the investors or anything…that’s 
up to the companies…and the other thing is…these are professional 
firms and…you’ve just got to rely to an extent on [their] professional 
nature. That may be a bit of an old-fashioned concept.
I don’t think it’s really necessary for auditors to disclose any more 
than they do today…what shareholders have got to have confidence 
in is the selection of the auditor, the auditor’s independence, and 
[that] the company through its audit committee has processes to 
ensure auditor independence. At the end of the day, auditors will 
give an opinion that is also based on certification and representation 
letters from management…when you stand up there at an AGM, or 
sit on the stage like I do, shareholders today are really looking at 
that CFO and saying, ‘You’re accountable for all those numbers of 
disclosures and we’re trusting you that they’re right.’ 
The same purchaser continues, arguing that what is more important 
than auditor disclosures about the audit process is transparency by the 
organisation about auditor selection and mechanisms the organisation 
uses to enhance auditor independence.
[Y]es, auditors will give an opinion, but auditors give disclaimers. 
And, as you’ve seen from the various litigations around the world, 
CFOs go to jail first. Now, would there be any greater protection 
for a CFO if the auditor was required to disclose more information 
about their audit? Probably not. So I don’t think it’s necessary. But 
what is necessary, and we are required to disclose this now as part 
of good governance, [is] that you have a good process in place for 
your auditor selection, that there are good processes in place to 
ensure their independence. And…once you’ve got that, that should 
be adequate comfort for shareholders.
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The same purchaser explains the content of his or her organisation’s 
disclosures about auditor selection and independence-affirming 
mechanisms. Of concern is this purchaser’s last observation—that even 
analysts do not read the financial statements. 
[The auditor’s independence declaration] does 
help, but if you read our disclosures…you will 
see we have in our governance attachment to 
the directors’ report the process we actually go 
through as a company to ensure the auditor is 
independent. So, yes, the auditor’s got to give 
a certification they are, but we’re disclosing 
how we also verify their independence. And 
we have a cap on how much other work they 
can do. We’ve got a process of approval for 
non-audit services. We list the prohibited services and so on. So 
to disclose more I don’t think is necessary. And I happen to be 
one of those people who believe that we’ve gone over the top with 
disclosure. And I’ll give you an example why I say that. Analysts 
today don’t even read the financial statements and disclosures. They 
wait for a CEO and CFO to get up on announcement day and distil it 
for them. They can’t understand it all.
The explicit or implied claim of these next few purchasers is that enhanced 
disclosures by an auditor of the audit process will not achieve anything.
It just won’t help. [The reality is n]obody’s interested…and I just 
don’t think you can…make people interested, that’s the trouble. 
I don’t think you can legislate…what you’ve got to do…is make 
sure that there’s…a professional standard that goes on there, which 
people can generally rely on.
No, I think current disclosures are fine.
I presume…you’re talking about in a set of statutory accounts, 
should the auditor…provide a 10-page report rather than a one and 
a half page report like they do at the moment? And my view would 
be no.
[M]y view would be the auditor’s got to follow auditing standards. 
The standards are a public document. Why would they need to do 
anything more?
‘Analysts today don’t 
even read the financial 
statements and disclosures. 
They wait for a CEo 
and CFo to get up on 
announcement day and 
distil it for them. They can’t 
understand it all.’ 
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
100 |
I strongly don’t believe that by providing a lot 
more detail they’ll get that information. As a side 
comment, the published accounts at the moment 
have gone crazy with the amount of disclosure we 
do under the new accounting standards. Because, 
for a company like the ones I’m associated with, 
typically a set of accounts now is over 100 pages 
and I don’t believe the majority of shareholders 
either read them or understand them. So…in 
that context, if you actually say, do they need another 10 pages to 
explain…if you actually said they’re going to provide a document 
which was a proper description of the way the audit was conducted 
in detail, you wouldn’t do it in under 10 pages. It would be…very 
dense material and I just don’t think it would actually help the 
situation at all.
2.2.1 Summary
Few of the purchasers feel that it would be useful to disclose more 
information about audit work or audit processes, wherever disclosed. 
Several make reference to the extensive disclosures in annual reports and 
the fact that few users understand these, without adding more. Three refer 
to the AGM as an opportunity for financial report users to ask questions 
of the auditor. Three refer to the auditing standards as being available for 
reference if information is needed. A fear that such disclosures, if made, 
would become standardised or ‘boiler plate’ was also expressed. That 
such disclosures might lead to negative outcomes for auditors is a concern 
expressed by one of the group. Interestingly, in this group’s comments, 
there is a high degree of knowledge demonstrated of what is entailed in 
an audit and sympathy for the auditor in terms of unrealistic expectations 
of what an audit can achieve. 
2.3 Suppliers 
Suppliers were generally, although not universally, against greater 
disclosure of their audit processes than that already existing. Added 
‘confusion’ and difficulty in explaining the exercise of judgment was the 
verdict that filtered through in comments such as those reproduced below.
[D]isclosing more information potentially runs the risk of creating 
more confusion around people in the marketplace understanding 
‘[T]ypically, a set of 
accounts now is over 
100 pages and I don’t 
believe the majority 
of shareholders 




what the auditor does or what he doesn’t do…there is a large 
amount of judgment involved in the conduct of an audit, and the 
procedures you would undertake and the work you would do vary 
significantly from entity to entity, and can differ from entities even 
within the same industry sector, depending upon their risk profile, 
depending upon their individual circumstances. So…to come up 
with some form of disclosure [about]…the work…undertaken…
would be quite [hard] in my view to try and create something that 
would be meaningful, other than something that would be fairly 
generic, if you were to say well, this is broadly conducted across 
any financial statement audit. 
The next two suppliers allude to the likelihood of generic disclosures: 
should auditors disclose more of their audit process than is the current 
case? 
I doubt it. In fact, you’re much better informed about 
the structure of an audit opinion and what’s supposed 
to be in there and you know to look for a heading 
called ‘qualification’ or ‘modification’…Most people 
don’t know that. But there [are] two or three other 
paragraphs around directors’ responsibilities, scope, 
et cetera…so whether we extend that to three pages 
of discussion around [a] director’s responsibility and 
our processes, it’s just three pages of boiler plate that no-one’s ever 
going to look at. And the other question I’d put…is, well to whose 
benefit would it be for us to disclose more about our work and our 
processes? I don’t think the users really get any benefit from it. 
All they seek is our assurance. So long as they’ve been given that 
clearly…that’s all they would want to know.
‘[I]t’s just three 
pages of boiler 
plate that no-one’s 
ever going to  
look at.’ 
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I can’t see that it would add much value…When 
we do internal audit work or a[n]…assignment or 
whatever, the typical outline of our report…is an 
introduction and context, if you like…that has 
the genesis of this job, and then obviously has 
scope, and particularly any limitations thereto, 
and then you have work performed. So, when we 
are writing a report to a client or to whoever it is, 
we would give that context. External auditors do 
phenomenal amounts of work and end up with…one page in the 
annual report that basically says nothing much…If we are going 
to change that and have the auditors explain what work they do, 
you’d probably have a lot more to disclose. The auditor will then…
either want to say a lot, or say as little as they do now. It sounds a 
bit like opening Pandora’s box…It would either be a very generic 
statement that I don’t think anyone would read, or it’d be a genuine 
description of everything they did, which would be voluminous, 
and written with a view to the defence lawyer further down the 
track, rather than to…informing the capital markets.
Like the previous supplier, the next one cannot see a happy medium 
between saying little and saying more than enough to cause confusion 
in order to explain the audit process adequately. Succinctness in the 
explanation is not a characteristic that suppliers see as possible because of 
the complexity and ambiguity of the audit task.
[M]y concern in disclosing more information is that does that then 
create even more confusion? The question is whether there’s a happy 
halfway house between disclosing nothing and just saying we do an 
audit in accordance with auditing standards to a disclosure which 
lays out in gory detail exactly what steps we take. And I’m not 
comfortable that there’s a halfway house between the two. 
Confusion is the theme in this next supplier’s reaction, too:
[T]he investors in the street probably…don’t understand financials, 
and therefore if you start to add more information to that 
framework…you create more confusion rather than less confusion. 
There probably is a need to create some form of simplification. 
‘External auditors do 
phenomenal amounts 
of work and end up 
with…one page in 
the annual report that 




The difficulty in adequately articulating the application of professional 
judgment in the audit process is the concern of another supplier:
The only reservation I have…about that is…
how far do you go, and what information do you 
disclose to them…whilst we certainly need [to] 
try and do something to close the expectation 
gap, I’m not convinced that giving them more 
information about the process that we go through 
is necessarily going to close that expectation 
gap [to] any great degree. The way we conduct 
audits…[is] particularly regulated by standards, 
et cetera…but there still is an element of professional judgment that 
goes into the way we conduct it. So it’s very hard to articulate that 
sort of thing into further information to disclose to the reader. So 
I would find it very difficult to see that particularly closing the 
expectation gap to any great degree.
Determining what it is that is relevant to disclose is the dilemma as far as 
the next supplier is concerned:
[I]t’s near…impossible to succinctly explain that to someone…so 
my concern would be if you go away from what we’ve got now—
which is a straight page, a page and a half that says we’ve done 
an audit according to the standards, the directors are responsible 
for the accounts, we’ve done an audit—where do you go? Because 
obviously there’s the full audit manual as to what an audit is, but 
where do you draw the line [on] what is relevant for them to know?
The next supplier is of the view that there are accessible sources 
of information about the audit process for those who are interested: 
I would’ve thought that the capital market, which is allegedly relying 
on the work that these auditors have done, should have a statement, 
which would be fairly general admittedly, but [which] would explain 
what the role of the auditors was and what level of reliance people 
could place upon it…if anyone really wants to find out, we have 
the Internet nowadays. If anyone wants to find out what the role of 
auditors is, it’s actually very easy to find it out. If anyone wants to 
understand assurances, there’s a plethora of published information 
that people can go and look up and understand. 
‘[T]here still is an 
element of professional 
judgment that goes 
into the way we 
conduct it. So it’s very 
hard to articulate that 
sort of thing.’ 
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Some of the suppliers’ responses are more nuanced, conveying that the 
notion has merit, but also that there is difficulty achieving effective 
communication in this respect.
I guess they’ve started down that track with the wording in the audit 
report. I’m not sure that too many people read it…they determine 
whether it’s qualified or not and then move on…therefore it’s got 
to be in fairly simple words…The one [audit report] in Australia…I 
think they’ve made a good attempt [with]. It’s easy for an auditor 
to read and understand. I’m not sure that anyone who hasn’t had 
any auditing training would really understand that. And then it 
comes back to who’s going to read it and what would they gain 
from that…if you could put it in simple language that makes sense 
then…that would be good. But the ability to do that, it’s easy to 
say, it’s probably a little bit harder to work out what the wordings 
could be. But…there is an ability to disclose what an audit really is 
in somewhat layman language, and…that would be a help.
The difficulty of explaining the auditor’s use of the concept of materiality 
is explicitly and eloquently referred to in the next quotation (the issue of 
materiality is returned to and analysed in more depth in Chapter 5).
[I]t’s a difficult question because if I say yes they should [disclose 
more], the way in which you would do that then becomes awfully 
complex…but obviously professional judgment is a strong part 
of what we do and if you then try and explain…everyone’s going 
to have a different view about what an audit should be…I’ve had 
experiences where I’ve just worked through materiality with 
boards of listed entities and while they might agree with what the 
materiality is in regards to the financials as a whole, when we then 
try and apply that and talk them through how we apply that to 
different line items or captions in accounts, even that discussion 
with board members who are well educated, often with a finance 
background, becomes quite a heated debate and people have 
different views. 
The same supplier gives the example of ‘sampling’ to illustrate how 




[I]f we put this question and applied it purely in regards to 
materiality to try and take that debate into a forum and a broader 
group so shareholders, maybe the institutional investors, could 
get that…the mum and dad investor I don’t think will have the 
ability to do that…if you then say, ‘Well, what about the audit as 
a whole and forget materiality. Tell us what you do and when you 
do it—sampling and how that might work’, I cannot imagine how 
you could possibly explain that to an average [shareholder]—and 
professional judgment is the main reason. As long as we’re able 
to apply our professional judgment while working within the…
standards and the relevant regulations, I can’t imagine how you 
could properly explain that to a broad user base.
More disclosures by the auditor around the issue of accounting estimates 
would be the somewhat reluctant preference of this supplier:
I suppose the area in the accounts that…can cause a lot of issues 
is in terms of accounting estimates within balances. And perhaps 
the audit report could have a framework that allows comment in 
relation to those estimates. Other than that, I haven’t got any other 
specific changes that I would recommend.
The diversity in reader sophistication is raised by another supplier as an 
obstacle to greater disclosure by the auditor of the audit process:
The issue there is that of course [greater disclosure of the audit 
process] is being read…by a knowledgeable audience that knows 
what they’re looking for in reading that and how to interpret that. I 
guess the challenge we’ve got with the public financial statements, if 
we begin to try and explain in an audit, it’s to retail investors [and] 
mums and dads. Is it any more helpful for them to…[get more] more 
detail? I’m not sure whether that will actually narrow or manage 
the expectation gap. 
There is, however, some support for disclosing more information about 
the audit and its processes. There is also acknowledgment that even 
professional training in related financial fields (for example, financial 
planning) does not always encompass other than high-level information 
about audit and its processes. The implication for those with no financial 
training is left unsaid, but is clearly implied in the following quotation:
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Someone I know is actually going through the Certified Financial 
Planner course, and there’s really nothing in there…to any degree 
about accounting and auditing in a way that would allow [that 
person] to really understand what we do or why it might be 
important to have an audit…the focus tends to be more on the 
higher-level stuff…the logical place is the audit report to explain 
what we do…So…it would make sense but you’d need to have it in 
layman’s language so it’s able to be understood.
Among suppliers, even though there is not support for auditor disclosure 
of work and processes, there is acknowledgment of the lack of transparency 
surrounding the audit process. One suggestion to overcome this is to seek 
other means of engendering confidence in the process—for example, 
through external reviews of the audit firms, as indicated in the following 
quotation:
[T]he simple answer to that question…is the 
disclosure about process might actually beg more 
questions than it provided answers or clarity on, 
but what I’m quite sensitive to is the apparent lack 
of transparency around audit and how it’s done. 
So, in order to address that issue about the lack 
of transparency…[there is a] need to ensure that 
the market is aware that there is confidence, or 
give them a basis rather for having confidence in what it is that 
auditors do. And it’s in that context that…the external reviews 
of the auditing firms that are taking place make sense…it’s about 
confidence that an appropriate process is taking place. How do you 
deal with it? Well, you could try and explain it and explain it and 
explain it and…without an appropriate background, you won’t 
necessarily increase understanding but…it’s more in confidence 
than understanding, which is actually why I go back to what KPMG 
did with the Houghton and Trotman5 report. It was to say to people 
that [there is awareness] of their concerns and [a willingness] to 
have what [is done] open to external scrutiny. So, the profession 
is required to do that now. ASIC is doing that. The firms also have 
both the Institute [of Chartered Accountants in Australia] and this 
body called the AQRB [Audit Quality Review Board]…doing it. 
5 These were reports about quality reviews of one of the Big Four firms undertaken by  
K. Houghton (one of the current authors) and K. Trotman.
‘I’m quite 
sensitive to…
the apparent lack 
of transparency 
around audit and 
how it’s done.’ 
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And…[external oversight] is an appropriate response…as opposed 
to trying to explain even more about the audit process, because I 
think it’s about addressing confidence.
Interestingly, suppliers speak of this type of information being demanded 
by and available to those charged with governance, including members of 
audit committees. Outsiders such as shareholders, however, are not privy 
to the same type of information.
Some audit committees, some individuals or 
groups within those charged with governance, 
have an interest. Why do they have it? 
Probably because they believe that’s the 
way they need to discharge their duties. The 
mechanism…our firm and others [use is] we 
present them with an auditor plan of some 
sort at the start of the year and that’s generally 
well received. For even this small group of 
legally trained…legally focused individuals, 
[they] still appreciate…receiving an audit plan. It’s a question of 
just how it’s presented and what level of detail is in it and what they 
might struggle with. So that’s the mechanism for doing it for that 
group of stakeholders in the audit process and those other people 
who basically pay us, and they are the subjects of our audit, of 
course. So they’re informed. But remember they have an agenda 
as well, which is [that] they effectively carry the same if not more 
responsibility for the financial information put into the marketplace 
as the auditor does. Our objectives should be totally aligned.
2.3.1 Summary
Suppliers voice concerns that disclosures of the audit process by them 
beyond those already existing would confuse rather than help and might 
in fact exacerbate the audit expectations gap, particularly for retail 
investors. Fears surface that further explanation is unlikely to be read, that 
it would manifest only as a generic statement in view of the potential for 
litigation and hence it would be of little value. A preoccupation emerges 
with the difficulty of articulating the nature of professional judgment 
integral to the audit process. A reminder is given that ‘deep pockets’ 
make auditors a target in the event of a corporate failure, regardless of 
the level of information available about the audit or understanding of that 
‘So that’s the mechanism 
for doing it for that group 
of stakeholders in the 
audit process and those 
other people who basically 
pay us, and they are the 
subjects of our audit, 
of course. So they’re 
informed.’ 
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information. In summary, suppliers’ perceive that there are many people 
in the capital market who have no interest in understanding the audit 
work and processes. There are a small number who want no information 
about it. There is a smaller number that do have some interest, but the 
conventional vehicle of the audit opinion is not the way to communicate 
the work and processes involved in the audit. 
2.4 Standard setters
Standard setters reiterate the doubts expressed, especially by suppliers, 
about how valuable greater disclosures can be when they are likely to be 
poorly understood by users. One (immediately below) even suggests that 
exposing more of the limitations of an audit might be counterproductive 
in terms of reducing confidence in the process rather than increasing it.  
[W]e actually know what auditors do and for those 
who don’t know what auditors do, how much do 
they really need to know and what would it add 
if they did [know]…if there was disclosure then 
how much would it be understood by the general 
users of financial statements anyway? Not being 
experienced…in the accounting or the auditing 
world, would the extra disclosure actually 
mean a lot? Now, if there was more detail on the 
principles behind an audit and maybe some of the limitations of an 
audit, that might be useful, but it may also be dangerous because 
if you start using that disclosure as a kind of liability limitation 
thing then you could actually reduce confidence in the audit rather 
than increase confidence, because the more detail you put down 
probably the more evident it will be that audit is just a test of a 
small proportion of a large population. 
Disclosures will not necessarily increase confidence, according to this 
next standard setter’s response:
[There are] a lot of pitfalls potentially with further disclosure that 
don’t necessarily add to the confidence of the investment community, 
but on the other hand I’m not convinced that [investors] actually 
want it—that they’re actually asking for it.
‘[T]he more detail you 
put down, probably the 
more evident it will be 
that audit is just a test 
of a small proportion of 
a large population.’ 
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I don’t know whether it would be meaningful going forward on a 
regular basis for an entity…you would be finding you would have 
quite voluminous reports, which…I [would] question whether 
there would be an advantage for [the general user] in that…in the 
abnormal situation where something’s going wrong, I could imagine 
that being the case, but in the day-to-day thing, probably not.
My initial thoughts are that I don’t think an 
auditor should need to disclose more because there 
is what I clearly believe [to be] an appropriate 
framework…I balance that up against certain 
situations where I’ve found in practice…you can 
have specialised audit approaches. That needs to 
be weighed up against whether in fact the reader, 
if I could say, the un-knowledged reader, of the 
financial reports is going to get any benefit from 
it…what we will get is a more complicated report, which for the…
users…may raise more questions because they just don’t know the 
process [rather] than the outcome. So I see that as a downside. So 
having thought about it…I don’t know whether I would…support a 
more detailed response in the audit…of the individual steps which 
you’ve gone through. I don’t think that’s the case…the auditors 
should give a very clear and precise opinion that the accounts 
are true and fair or a review opinion, the negative opinion. So my 
feeling would be in that vein more than [that] we need to provide 
more detailed scope…that’s probably outside…an audit. That may 
be into another engagement.
I don’t think it’s going to achieve very much. For some of the other 
stakeholders—regulators, directors—I think that’s a good thing to 
do because…you can educate and you can change some of those 
views. But…it’s that subset that it’s worthwhile [for]…trying to do 
it[for] the…millions of retail shareholders, I just don’t see that that’s 
ever going to happen.
Perhaps not unsurprisingly, some standard setters point to the public 
availability of the suite of auditing Standards as a source of information 
about the audit process.
‘[W]hat we will get is 
a more complicated 
report which for the…
users…may raise more 
questions because they 
just don’t know the 
process.’ 
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I don’t know that it’s really needed and…the 
only people that could really answer that would 
be the users of the accounts. But the thing is…
that all the firms use similar audit techniques and 
procedures, so…they’d probably gravitate to a 
standard [disclosure] and if they gravitated to a 
standard one then it would just be a bit like an 
auditing standard and what [the standards] do 
say is that we did the audit in accordance with 
Australian Auditing Standards, so if you want to read the Australian 
Auditing Standards you’d get an idea of what [the auditors] did. So 
in theory it’s available. 
The fear of another of the standard setters is that more disclosures would 
involve ‘second-guessing’ users’ views of important and non-important 
audit procedures:
[I]t becomes a question of how much information do you provide 
and where do you stop…[and] it becomes a question of the auditor…
second-guessing what the users’ view as being important procedures 
or non-important [procedures]…the standards are specific enough 
in terms of the requirements of an audit and if a user of the financial 
statements was that interested in understanding the conduct of an 
audit then presumably they would familiarise themselves with the 
standards or at least the core standards that sit behind the scope of 
an audit, what the objective of an audit is. 
[W]hen I look at this question—should we 
disclose more information about work and 
processes—it just raises a lot of questions as 
to how far can you go and who is it going to 
be any use to when you do it? And it really 
raises the question of who actually reads the 
audit opinion in the first place, assuming you 
believe the audit opinion is the appropriate 
forum for making this disclosure. The auditing 
standards…in some ways have taken us along 
the path of disclosing more about our processes to our client base 
[and] those charged with governance, and…there is a general move 
in the audit profession…probably…progressively over the last 10, 
‘I’m not sure it would 
add anything to the 
financial statements. 
[I wonder] whether 
it could be made 
available on request.’ 
‘[I]t really raises the 
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reads the audit opinion in 
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you believe the audit 
opinion is the appropriate 




20, 30 years to give those charged with governance more information 
about the audit process.
The next standard setter draws attention to the various reports available 
from the range of bodies that provide oversight of the audit process: 
I’ve got a very particular perspective, but…there’s been a lot of 
discussion about the oversight of the profession. We’re in the…year 
of reviews by ASIC. We’re in the…year of reviews by AQRB…the 
PCAOB will come and visit Australian audit firms with ASIC in the 
future…So…for those who are sensitive to that, there’s information 
out there and…the FRC oversight, [and] what it is that ASIC is 
doing in this space. So I think there’s enough there.
Interestingly, one standard setter makes reference to those with legal 
training who prefer not to be informed of the audit process:
[T]heir view appears to be, look, I need you to assure me you’ve 
done what you must do, but please don’t share with me how you did 
that because I don’t want to…assume any responsibility for that.
2.4.1 Summary
Standard setters in general are not in favour of greater disclosure by auditors 
of their processes and work. Perhaps predictably, they are confident in the 
auditing standards as a source of knowledge about the audit process. That 
few outside the profession read these standards does not seem to perturb 
them; their point is that the standards are publicly available. Faith in the 
various review processes of the regulatory and professional bodies is also 
expressed as being enough to provide confidence in the processes and 
also as a source of reports on audit. There is great uncertainty among the 
standard setters about whether greater disclosures in the audit report or 
elsewhere will be read, understood or valued by users, and there is even 
a suggestion that it could be counterproductive in drawing attention to 
limitations of the audit process.
2.5 Regulators
Regulators had mixed responses when asked the question in relation to 
the desirability of auditors disclosing more details of their audit work and 
processes. At least one did not feel such disclosure would be particularly 
valuable. One alluded to the flagship nature of the audit product and the 
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existing understanding of it in the community. The other felt the content 
of the current audit report gave sufficient detail. 
On the financial statement audit, I think that’s a fairly tried and 
tested product…I see that as the flagship product in the sense that 
it’s not one of these newer areas that auditors tend to work in…in 
terms of procedures…people understand what an audit is—right?
In their view, an audit is something that the auditor does fairly 
rigorously and…as a diligent person, and…they do all the 
procedures that are necessary to come to an opinion. So it’s the 
highest level of assurance and…in terms of procedures…that 
becomes more relevant when I compare an audit with a review 
rather than when I look at an audit…with the financial statement 
audit, it is more communicating the outcomes of the audit which is 
an issue, where people actually use an emphasis of matter when a 
qualification would be more appropriate.
Another regulator, however, does seek greater disclosure:
[T]hat’s a good idea. I can see a lot of merit in that so…you 
narrow the expectations gap. As long as the language is…easily 
understandable, I would subscribe to that.
I would like to see some kind of education campaign 
or some way to get to investors generally to explain 
what an auditor does…there is quite a gap in terms of 
what the public think auditors do and what auditors 
actually do. In terms of process-driven risk-based 
approaches, the public really needs to know that it’s 
not a ticking bomb…it’s more of a risk-management 
exercise…Something that maybe an independent 
organisation could try and get across to the public, rather than the 
company itself.
2.5.1 Summary
The regulators interviewed expressed mixed reactions to the notion of 
auditors providing more information than was currently available about 
their processes and work. Regulators see the audit as an already well-
understood product compared with the review engagement, and one 
‘[T]he public really 
needs to know that 
it’s not a ticking 





takes the opportunity to emphasise how important it is to provide an 
appropriate audit opinion as a form of communication.
3.0 where should auditors disclose incremental 
 information?
In responding to a question from the interviewer about whether more 
information should be provided by the auditor about the audit process, 
several of the stakeholders provided suggestions about where any such 
information, were it to be provided, should be located. This section 
analyses these suggestions.
3.1 overview of interviews with stakeholders
Suggestions in relation to the positioning of additional information 
provided by auditors about their audit work and the audit process include 
corporate, auditors’, regulators’ and professional bodies’ web sites, the 
audit engagement letter, publishing of the management letter to the 
auditor, in the annual report, in the auditor’s report (with a suggestion to 
file the auditor’s report separately from the annual report with the ASX) 
and in recordings or web-casts of annual general meetings.
3.2 Users
Users made various suggestions about where more information disclosed 
by auditors about the audit process might be positioned. Some of the 
quotations in the previous section, which focus on perceptions of the 
merit of having auditors disclose more information, mention potential 
locations for this information and should be borne in mind when reading 
this section. 
The first user thinks the company’s web site is the appropriate location:
It may be that they can cross-reference…to something a bit more 
detailed on their own [company’s] web site about the typical sorts 
of procedures.
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Professional body web sites are the solution for this next user:
I don’t think you want to add pages to the 
annual reports…Perhaps that’s more a financial 
education process that the auditors should be 
doing themselves…most people who have become 
professionals in this space go through commerce or 
economic[s] or an accounting [course] that…is a big 
part in the education of young financial professionals 
[so] that they understand the limitations of an audit 
and what they’re doing…they should have available on the ICAA 
web site…a clear description of what [audits] are, and then telling 
people you can go and find that. But then in the annual reports 
they’re referring to places where you can go and see what the scope 
of an audit is, and…If you want more information on what we’ve 
actually done, go and find it. You could make that available on 
companies’ web sites, but I wouldn’t be encouraging making those 
annual reports any thicker. 
Two users suggest placement within the annual report as part of the audit 
opinion or linked to the opinion.
I tend to think that you’d have to put it in an annual report as part 
of an opinion or at least a reference back into an opinion…if it’s 
on a web site, it’s unlikely to be read or…it may not really have 
enough prominence for those that probably have the greatest need 
to know what an audit constitutes…I’m not advocating that it 
should be reams and reams because…that goes to the other extreme 
and probably wouldn’t be relevant…the more information you 
provide…in terms of scope, the less likely it is that it’s going to be 
understandable and you can put it into some context, but…there 
probably needs to be something a little bit more than is there now.
Another suggestion for the location of this additional information is the 
audit opinion itself:
I look at things like the American 10K, which is much more 
information than we have even in our annual reports…[However,] 
you can still achieve it without necessarily overwhelming…the 
reader with more information…it’s more just to provide clarity, it’s 
not really changing anything in terms of what gets performed, it’s 
‘[T]hey should have 
available on the 
ICAA web site…a 
clear description of 
what [audits] are.’ 
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more really just to define a little bit for the reader to understand what 
does get performed…whether that gets read within the context of 
an audit opinion…the readers probably read the factors and a clean 
opinion or otherwise and maybe [leave] out a bit of the scope, but…if 
it’s there for those that want to know, [they] can probably refer to it.
One user, who suggests the audit report is the place for the additional 
information, also has a suggestion about provision of access to audit 
reports that is somewhat left of field. The suggestion is that all audit 
reports should be lodged separately from the annual report with the ASX 
so that they can be referred to. 
You tend to see a lot of…statements come through 
in company announcements, around AGM time. You 
get the AGMs, you get the chairman’s address, which 
will come through the ASX news wires. You get the 
CEO’s address, but you don’t ever get any qualification 
of those reports unless you go into the actual annual 
report itself…the audit statement should also probably 
be released to the market. I’m not 100 per cent sure 
whether it is or not, but that should be something that probably 
pops out, that the company is obliged to release as a company 
announcement…the actual audit statement, with the figures that 
come out post the AGM—just…to build awareness that there is 
someone reviewing and auditing the company…that’s probably 
fairly important, because the audit function is probably a little bit 
unknown…me being an accountant…in terms of the undertaking of 
an actual audit, what it’s supposed to achieve and what it’s supposed 
to prevent is still a little bit hazy for me, and I would imagine even 
more so for the everyday end user of a financial report. How you go 
about clarifying that, I’m not too sure. Other than publishing the…
auditor’s report into the company news wires, and just [having] that 
as part of the whole process to build credibility.
Several other users suggest the audit report as a suitable location 
for incremental auditor-provided information.
[It should be] in the audit report because you like to think…that the 
audit report gives something that is a little bit more—I’m trying to 
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[T]he actual form of the audit report has changed in the last 12 years 
or so and…there is more being put in there—what is not done and 
who is responsible for what—so…that’s probably helped a little 
bit. Maybe there’s something else that could be put in there, but I 
wouldn’t know. [It] might be helpful.
You always read [the audit report] to make sure there are no 
qualifications in there and anybody relying on an audit report’s 
looking for that…probably, if they are qualified, that’s where you 
have the opportunity to perhaps provide more information than 
there is at the moment. But other than that…it does get back to 
educating expectations, and I don’t think the annual report should 
be the vehicle for that.
Yet others’ suggestions for a location include the ASIC or ASX web sites.
In terms of whether they should actually disclose [information 
about the audit process] or not, possibly…as a separate document to 
the actual audit and financial statements; maybe just as something 
that could be on the ASIC web site, that you can say okay what’s an 
auditor looking to do or what’s their role? And, as a shareholder, if 
you’re really interested, you can go and read up on that. But…these 
annual reports are getting large anyway. To add something like that 
in there…most wouldn’t read it. But if you wanted to, maybe there 
could just be a link to a site where…whoever runs the auditing of 
that company can just say look this is what we’re aiming to achieve, 
we’re bound by this and this is what we’re going to be looking at, 
and then you cover both bases.
[M]aybe the answer is through the regulators or the stock exchange, 
or through their shareholder information sessions or the like…I 
don’t know which is the best way because there’s going to be an 
extra cost obviously associated with this sort of marketing exercise. 
One user suggests placement of the information in the recording of the 
annual general meeting and a transcript of proceedings:
I’m not aware if [questions of the auditor at the AGM are recorded 
and available], but that would be…quite a simple [exercise]…it’s a 
record of meeting anyway. Many meetings are web-cast, but not for 
all companies…you could have a transcript of the meeting made 
available, but that’s an additional cost for small public companies, 
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listed companies. It’s surprising that that avenue has not been 
addressed…There’s an opacity regarding what is the work of the 
auditor. And, as organisations become immense, the understanding 
of what an auditor does is very difficult for shareholders to 
comprehend, particularly at certain levels of shareholder interest.
[N]ot only through the AGMs but through their web broadcast 
would help.
3.2.1 Summary
Users were quite inventive in their suggestions of where to locate 
incremental information provided by the auditor about the audit process 
and auditor’s work. Suggestions range from company web sites and the 
ASIC web site to audit reports, annual reports, recordings and transcripts 
of annual general meetings. Perhaps one of the most lateral thinkers 
suggests it be included in the audit report, but the audit report itself 
should be filed with the ASX as a separate document rather than having 
to be found within an annual report. 
3.3 Purchasers
A variety of sources were suggested for greater disclosure than exists 
currently of the auditor’s work and processes.
Audit firms’ web sites were suggested as a source, as per the following 
quotation:
If you go to PWC’s web site there [is]…a statement about, in broad 
terms, how they approach audit. What is their philosophy around 
audits…in fact, materiality was another question, but perhaps 
these issues…[are] more an [opt in]. Giving [opt in] capability and 
ease of accessibility for that information to retail shareholders in 
particular…is the way to go. I wouldn’t want to be putting more 
information into my financial statements and making [them] even 
longer and bigger than they are already.
One purchaser wants to extend the disclosures to results of an audit of the 
audit firms themselves and their procedures:
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I wouldn’t put in financial statements the 
statement…of what they do…there’s obviously their 
audit statement in terms of their opinion on the 
accounts. There’s their independence opinion that 
goes in there. Personally, I’m okay with that, but…
perhaps all we do is…add a line…in that statement 
at the bottom that simply says, ‘Look, if anybody 
would like to know the approach to the audit, et 
cetera…here is the relevant web site’, and you can go and look up 
KPMG’s link and you can basically look at and get a full disclosure 
on their site of their philosophy and how they approach audits, 
what they cover, what they don’t cover…given…the key role [that 
audit firms] play…once we feel that whether ASIC gets to a level of 
maturity or whoever it is…an audit of the audit firms themselves 
and their procedures and…that being publicly available is clearly 
very relevant. I wouldn’t have an issue with that per se.
This next purchaser makes the point that several stakeholders would need 
to be involved in creating the wording:
[I]n conjunction with quite a number of key parties…the regulators 
probably have to…play a certain role. It depends on the…industry 
itself because I speak on behalf of the finance service industry, 
which is heavily regulated. And I do believe that APRA and ASIC 
would need to play a certain role, without being too prescriptive, 
especially because you’d be talking about education and here is not 
a pure disclosure issue. And…the audit profession probably need to 
play a certain role because they are the expert[s] and they have to be 
comfortable with the actual wording and sign-off and the company 
management [and]…the board has to be comfortable as well. They 
have to play a certain role because they will expect their readers to 
be not mislead and to actually understand what we are trying to 
disclose in here and, again, hopefully try to becom[e] a bit more of 
a marketing concept as well for the particular company, because…
we invest the time and the money and actually try to…educate our 
shareholders, for example.
The audit report as a source of this information is popular with some 
purchasers.
‘[A]n audit of 








[I]t should be in a report in the sense that there should be a separate 
section perhaps on what procedures and what sort of sampling or 
what materiality is being used, et cetera, and what they’ve actually 
checked against and what reliance they’ve placed on…directors’ 
information…perhaps a page…unless we see [it] on a web site which 
talked about audits or…a CPA web site or Association of Chartered 
Accountants web site…which talked about what the rules were and 
what the expectations were…maybe that’s one…place [where] you 
could have that sort of information.
3.3.1 Summary
Purchasers are very familiar with the web sites of those audit firms that 
place information there about their audit product. Other suggestions 
from purchasers include the financial report, references within the annual 
report directing readers to web sites and the web sites of the professional 
accounting bodies. 
3.4 Suppliers
Since suppliers did not, in general, support provision of incremental 
information about the audit, few made suggestions about where such 
information, if provided, should be located. Below are suppliers’ 
suggestions, beginning with the audit report as a location.
[I]n terms of how do you disclose the information…there’s been some 
development in the audit report…maybe one option is to try and 
reword the audit reports into plain English. But I don’t think you’d 
want to add too much, because…one of the issues we’ve got at the 
moment is there’s just so much data out there. Financial statements 
now run to 200, 250 pages. You now make your audit report or your 
audit to sign off four or five pages. The question is does anybody 
really read it, do they really understand it, because it’s very difficult 
to put a very complex process into a couple of pages.
The suggestion of another supplier is that the professional bodies could 
do more:
I don’t think our professional bodies do enough. The institute and 
the CPAs—their profiles in terms of these sorts of issues out in the 
market are very, very low…the regulators [also] need to be making 
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the market informed of what it is that the auditors are doing…if that 
would enhance the market, that should be part of their role as well. 
3.4.1 Summary
The auditor’s report and the various available output locations of the 
professional bodies and of regulators are suggestions made by suppliers 
in relation to where incremental audit product information made available 
by auditors might be located.
3.5 Standard setters
Only one comment by a standard setter touches on the issue of the location 
of auditor-provided incremental information: making such information 
available on request or on the audit firm’s web site.
I’m not sure it would add anything to the financial 
statements. Whether it could be made available on 
request…[is] something that could be quite possible 
or practical and you could make a statement in the 
accounts…[that] something could be made available 
on request, but it would still be a standard kind 
of document that they’d just keep in a drawer for 
anybody, or they could put it on [the audit firm’s] 
web site. So, if the audit firm was to, say, give more detail, they 
could basically give a summary of the audit process on their web 
sites if they wanted. You could…refer to the auditor’s web site…it 
would be a general statement…the audit report actually does say 
in itself anyway that it’s not designed to pick up all weaknesses in 
internal control.
3.5.1 Summary
Audit firm web sites and the auditor’s report itself are the suggestions 
from the lone standard setter who canvassed this topic, although he or she 
does not really support such an idea.
‘[T]he audit report 
actually does say in 
itself anyway that 
it’s not designed 





4.0 issues and implications
Generally, users and some purchasers were in favour of some form 
of extended disclosure by auditors of those processes that occurred 
within an audit. Suppliers were more guarded and even critical of this 
as a possibility, while standard setters were more mixed in their views. 
Importantly, the gap in the perspective of suppliers on the one hand and 
users on the other was quite significant, as were their relative views of the 
current situation of disclosures. One purchaser of a major listed company 
made the observation that the current process undertaken in an audit was 
opaque and not viewable by the capital market or indeed by many other 
interested stakeholders. 
A purchaser and a supplier both made reference to the fact that the 
language used in audit opinions tended to contain ‘jargon’ and was 
not easily interpreted by many stakeholders in the market for audit 
services. Many observers, particularly from purchaser and user groups, 
perceived the audit opinion essentially as communication of a single item 
of information—that is, whether the opinion was unqualified or not. In 
that sense, it is a ‘blunt instrument’, which essentially conveys a simple 
message without the nuances or details of how that conclusion has been 
reached. There was some recognition that current audit opinion wording 
was better than it had been in the past. The presence of jargon and the 
carefully crafted words that are standardised, however, do not represent 
an opinion in the same way that an opinion is crafted by an expert witness 
for a piece of litigation or for the conclusions and outcomes described by 
auditors when they complete an agreed-on procedures engagement. Put 
another way, on the one hand, suppliers seek the ability to exercise their 
professional judgment, but on the other, most of the observables provided 
by suppliers to participants in the capital market are standardised (or, as 
cynics might say, ‘commoditised’) without any regard for the individual 
circumstances of the auditee.
The notion that the audit opinion is currently crafted as a simple 
statement with very little information about what underlies it is a common 
theme among users and purchasers. One supplier, however, suggested that 
any more detailed wording was probably going to be written by lawyers 
and the additional disclosures would need to be crafted with an eye to 
exposure to litigation risk. 
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The respondents to the questions and their conclusions can be divided 
into three groups.
•	 Group 1: Those who believe there is merit in the proposal to make 
further disclosures about the work undertaken by the auditor.
•	 Group 2: Those sympathetic to the need to more fully inform the 
market but who believe that there can be a more subtle alternative of 
achieving this by supporting the current framework and processes.
•	 Group 3: Those quite dismissive of further disclosures and possibly 
even cynical about the prospect.
The third group dismissed the idea on a number of grounds. Several 
questioned whether anything could be gained by further disclosures. 
Some would argue that the audit report is currently not read, so any 
further disclosures will suffer the same fate. Those who take this view also 
frequently add that further disclosures will add confusion to the market 
rather than clarification. Several made the observation that if one was to 
make further disclosures, how was one to judge how much was enough 
and that the sheer weight of further disclosures would contribute to a 
situation of information overload, which already existed with financial 
reports? Finally, another criticism was that if there were to be further 
disclosures they would almost inevitably be written with litigation risk in 
mind rather than being useful in decision making for the capital market. 
A more subtle observation made by one supplier was that in his or 
her experience those charged with governance sometimes implicitly 
or even expressly did not want information about how the audit was 
undertaken. This is because if they are fully informed about the processes 
and procedures used, they might expose themselves to accountability 
for those processes, which could involve their own legal accountability. 
Interestingly, aspects of the audit related to difficulty in accessing 
required information are generally recommended by corporate governance 
guidelines as a discussion to have with audit committees, but not as the 
subject of communication with the public.
The group that was somewhat supportive of the fact that more needed 
to be done in this area of disclosure took the view that the current audit 
opinion could be broadly acceptable as it was. The key is not in disclosing 
more, but in ensuring that the current framework is one that has the 
confidence of those in the capital market. Specifically, they suggest that 
the confidence in the processes undertaken can be gained through the 
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public disclosure of inspection reports (such as the current regime of the 
ASIC inspections), which gives overarching support to the processes used 
by auditors. This transparency and oversight of the process could cause 
the capital market to have more confidence. A purchaser commented that 
companies might do more to describe for themselves how they chose their 
current auditor. Again, this level of disclosure and transparency would 
give reason for shareholders in particular to have confidence in the choice 
and in the outcome of the work of the individual signing auditor of that 
company.
5.0 Disclosure of the audit process by  
 management
The researchers conducted interviews with users, purchasers, suppliers, 
standard setters and regulators with regard to the role of management in 
explaining the audit process and opinion since it was one of the topics 
that had come up in earlier discussions in focus groups as well as in the 
Future of Audit Symposium held in Canberra. 
5.1 overview of interviews with stakeholders
Overwhelmingly, there is opposition from all stakeholder groups to the 
proposition that management should be charged with responsibility 
for conveying information to stakeholders about audit processes and 
the auditor’s opinion. A common objection is that it is not management 
but the board or audit committee that should have this responsibility. 
The objections to the idea are, however, unlikely to disappear even if 
responsibility is ceded to these parties. The objections relate primarily to 
potential conflicts of interest and potential misrepresentations—especially 
if management is the conveyor of the information. Other objections relate 
to management not having sufficient time or interest to be involved in this 
task and the argument that the financial statements should stand alone. 
Those few stakeholders who support the idea see management’s reach to 
stakeholders compared with that of auditors as an advantage and see the 
annual general meeting, or a web-cast of it, as an appropriate forum in 
which management can take the opportunity to inform shareholders of 
these issues.
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5.2 Users
As the comments below reveal, users are overwhelmingly against 
management providing information about the auditor’s work and processes 
or the audit opinion. The sentiment expressed in the first two users’ 
comments is that it is the auditor’s and not management’s responsibility to 
provide information about the audit process.
No, I think it’s…the auditor’s report, it’s the management’s 
accounts, it’s the auditor’s audit report and I don’t see that it’s up 
to management to inform people about what the auditor does. The 
auditor’s the best placed to do that.
I don’t think it’s the management’s responsibility to educate 
investors on how to understand…financial statements, so their job 
is to prepare it and to run the company. Maybe another group [can] 
create awareness out in the greater community by having seminars…
for those that are interested in finding out more or learning more 
about how to understand financial statements. But I don’t think it’s 
the management’s responsibility.
Another user, who feels that statements by managers about the audit 
would not achieve a great deal, raises the issue of information overload:
I don’t know that it would be helpful if management went out and 
said, ‘Our auditors—this is what they’re doing.’ I don’t know that 
shareholders would care that much. One of the problems that I have 
with a lot of the measures that are proposed about widening the 
scope of the audit is that we already have an awful lot of information 
and we’re suffering, if anything, from information overload. So an 
annual report that has more and more sections about reports that 
essentially say everything is fine—and only once in every 100 
reports…would you read a critical line in there—isn’t very helpful. 
So…a regular statement in the annual report [saying] this is what 
our auditors do—I don’t know that that would achieve very much.
Several users feel that if information about the audit process is to be 
provided from the client rather than the auditor side, it should come from 




[T]he board should be more involved in providing that information 
rather than management…in the way in which it communicates 
to the shareholders. But…the shareholders need to feel that the 
board is actually really representing [them]…it’s really the board 
that through their communication have to show their leadership in 
this role by not only showing that they’re doing a required audit, 
but they’re actually doing audits which are perhaps relevant also 
to the particular type of business or the sector that they’re [in], to 
ensure that they are actually receiving or that they have the ability 
to receive information.
I don’t know if managers are allowed to provide that information 
independently of the directors.
The financial statements should be able to stand alone without 
having to speak to management…they should give a clear picture, 
because you’ve got two years of what’s happening. [Management’s]…
ability to get to all its investors…is through written or some 
communications means…they’re never going to be able to speak 
one-on-one to all…the stakeholders in the investment market. 
So…in explaining the numbers, the annual report becomes very 
important…I’ve followed companies for years where you can read 
the annual report, and if people bothered to read it, it is exactly 
what the company is doing. [For o]thers, the annual report is so 
poor it’s complete marketing, or there’s no information in it, in the 
descriptive bits, and maybe that is where management needs to play 
a role. But again, the board comes over that to ensure that there is 
full and fair disclosure and all the rest of it.
Only one user is in support of the proposition that management should 
disclose more about the audit process or the audit opinion:
[T]here’s merit [in it]. We have to provide a copy 
of our audited financials to our people that have 
invested with us. And at the moment we just 
provide them, without any cover note or letter or 
any explanation or anything like that…there would 
be merit in that to probably give more confidence…
So to reassure the investors that the information that 
they’re being presented with has been audited, has 
been signed off, has been through a rigorous process 
‘The information 
that you’re 
receiving is being 
provided after 
a rigorous and 
lengthy audit 
process.’ 
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
126 |
and reviewed prior to them receiving information. ‘The information 
that you’re receiving is being provided after a rigorous and lengthy 
audit process.’ We don’t do that, but I can see merit in it.
5.2.1 Summary
Users are overwhelmingly opposed to the notion of management 
disclosing more information of the auditor’s work and processes. Reasons 
given include a perception that management is not responsible for the 
auditor’s report, that the auditor’s role is to prevent management from 
manipulating earnings—so implying a potential conflict in having 
management explain the audit outcome—that it is the board of directors, 
rather than management, that should have this role if a party external to 
the audit takes the role on, that the financial statements should be capable 
of standing alone without the need for management explanations and that 
there is already so much information available that more can only lead to 
information overload. The only user supporting the concept felt that such 
disclosures by management could increase confidence in the integrity of 
information included in financial reports.
5.3 Purchasers
Although not a great number of purchasers responded to this question, 
as with users, purchasers were overwhelmingly against management 
providing incremental information about the auditor’s opinion and 
processes. Disbelief that management would even be interested in 
providing this information is the reaction in this first quotation:
I just can’t see why management would be interested in doing that. 
Management wants to talk about what the company is doing, and 
what they’re planning…to do in the future. In my experience, with 
the management teams that I’ve dealt with, I just can’t see that 
they’d be very interested in doing that.
It’s not in management’s [interests]…to do that…the 
second reason for my initial response, and maybe 
as important a reason, is that I don’t actually see 
the education gap there. I do think that taking this 
trickle-down view of the market as the people who 
have the most knowledge of the company, of the 
processes, publishing analyses or media material, and 
‘I don’t perceive 
that there is that 
risk or gap, or lack 
of information 
that is actually 




just going down further to the enthusiastic amateur, I think at the 
top level those…leaders in the market know (and obviously there 
[are] a lot of ex-accountants, ex-auditors in that level anyway)…
entirely how important an audit is. And I don’t perceive that there 
is that risk or gap or lack of information that is actually causing any 
market dysfunction.
Only one purchaser saw merit in the concept of management-provided 
information pertinent to the audit process and opinion and pointed to 
corporate web-casts as a useful device to achieve this.
[T]he answer to this is, yes. One of the things that…was a very 
good development was the web-casting of briefings that were given 
to the financial analysts. Public companies often have these every 
six months or so, and every quarter, and then [they are] put out 
on the web so that every investor has equal access. As part of that, 
the chief finance officer normally presents fairly detailed analysis 
of the financials, and…the questions and answers that come from 
it, so the combination…is quite good. But we tend not to do these 
things at annual general meetings. Some companies do, but very 
few. Normally, the CEO gets up and gives an overview, but you 
don’t get any of that other information.
5.3.1 Summary
Purchasers are divided about the idea of management provision of audit-
oriented information. The lack of a reason or incentive for management to 
take on this task is the main reason behind the opposing purchaser. The 
supportive purchaser sees this type of management activity taking place 
in the same way that analyst briefings are web-cast.
5.4 Suppliers
Two suppliers saw a great deal of merit in the idea that management 
should convey the audit processes and issues surrounding the auditor’s 
opinion to stakeholders. Their responses to this question appear below; 
the first points out how much more reach with shareholders management 
has compared with auditors.
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Yes [there is merit in the idea]…because it’s very difficult for 
auditors…our engagement is with the members of the company, 
but we don’t have access to them, we don’t have the day-to-day 
access or the regular access to that group of people. And they really 
do need to understand—and the market as a whole really needs 
to understand—what exactly are we getting when we read an 
audit opinion? And you’ll notice in recent years the way the audit 
opinion is drafted is a lot better, it goes more towards explaining 
to readers and users of the accounts, right here’s the responsibility 
of the auditor, here’s the responsibility of the company, this is 
what an audit is, there’s judgment involved. So…a lot has been 
done in terms of what’s in the audit opinion. It would be great if 
management could do more. I’m not quite sure what more that they 
could do, but…users probably flick to the audit opinion to make 
sure it’s not qualified. I doubt they even read it [which] is probably 
the real problem.
The next supplier makes the point that the external audit is just part of a 
wider assurance agenda that management needs to meet and communicate 
to its stakeholders:
The avenue through which we can do it is 
limited to answering questions at the AGM. 
If we’re talking about listed companies, [it 
is by] answering questions at the AGM, 
either on the day or on notice and under 
the act, or through our audit report…it is 
from our audit report, so it [is] clear [that it 
is] from us. Management’s slightly different 
because they’ve got two options. They can 
either attempt to do it through the financial 
statements themselves, and in the public area through an AGM or 
a shareholder information session, or they could do it through the 
company’s web site and explain what happens on that…there is 
scope for that because…what management and the board are across 
is a broader degree of assurance. 
The same supplier articulates further what he or she means by ‘a broader 
degree of assurance’:
‘[T]he question of how risk 
management and internal 
audit and external audit 
and anything else they 





We, as external auditors—and this [is] half the problem…have 
responsibility in certain areas and there are caveats around that. 
But management have a much broader responsibility for risk 
management generally, and the question of how risk management 
and internal audit and external audit and anything else they 
might happen to do [fit] together…is management’s responsibility. 
And if they are describing—partly under the ASX guidelines—
the 10 Corporate Governance Guidelines, number 7 [is] on risk 
management, [and] there [are] good descriptions they’re beginning 
to put in…with the increased disclosure on how the business 
manages risk and so on; there’s quite a neat nexus between that 
and what internal audit does and what external audit does. So I 
suspect there’s more scope for doing that because they can explain 
the external audit in the context of assurance overall and who does 
what. Whether it’s management or the board, I’m not sure. I tend to 
think it’s the board because it’s the board that communicates with 
the shareholders on that. But management would do it. So I can 
see that in the same way that management try [to] communicate in 
more voluminous documents…if you go to a number of web sites 
now they do have their codes of conduct, audit committee charters, 
quite a list of things. So…it would give better context to what the 
external audit does, rather than just a list of here’s what we do and 
what we don’t do.
Two suppliers, however, are quite strongly opposed to this suggested role 
for management, as the quotations from the interviews below show. The 
first quotation reveals doubts about the capacity of management to convey 
accurately what has transpired:
I would have a real issue with that because you’ve got an issue of 
how well they actually articulate what’s…transpired and what’s 
been done, and I don’t think management could adequately deal 
with that…[And] you’ve got real problems from, potentially, 
misrepresentations et cetera that might come through. So I don’t 
think that that would help in any way, shape or form.
Another feels that this task is not among management’s priorities:
[M]anagement will feel they have a lot of more important and urgent 
things to do than publicising the role of financial statement audits. 
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This final quotation from a supplier reveals his or her belief that boards 
and audit committees rather than management have responsibility for 
communication with shareholders about the audit: 
I don’t think management should [have responsibility]—if you 
mean management as management within the company. I think 
boards and audit committees should…it is incumbent upon them. 
At the end of the day, the board, the chairman of the board and the 
audit committee are appointed by shareholders. They’re the ones 
that have the responsibility to really appoint the auditors, [and] 
direct the auditors. They’re the ones that should be ensuring that 
there’s effective communication back to shareholders as to what an 
audit is and how that operates. 
5.4.1 Summary
Suppliers’ responses are mixed about whether management should be 
charged with the responsibility to explain the auditors’ processes and/
or audit opinion. Arguments used in support of the notion include the 
fact that management has greater access to the stakeholders than do the 
auditors, and that management has a good grasp of the nexus between 
internal and external audit and risk management and is best placed to 
convey these concepts in a holistic way. Reasons given by suppliers in 
opposition to this suggestion include the possibility that management will 
misrepresent the situation as it pertains to audit-related matters and the 
possibility that management will not agree to undertake this task because 
it is fully occupied with other matters. Finally, one supplier baulks at this 
being management’s role rather than that of boards and audit committees.
5.5 Standard setters
Like suppliers, standard setters are equally divided between support and 
opposition for the proposition that management be charged with the task 
of conveying to stakeholders information about the auditor’s processes 
and audit opinion, as the quotations below show. The first comment is 
supportive, but implies that it is only through a trickle-down effect from 
sophisticated market players that this information might be picked up:
[T]hat’s desirable. The question about this is, if management or 
directors can put information out, whether it’s actually picked up by 
shareholders directly, maybe it’s picked up by the analysts as part of 
the information flow that impacts on the analysts’ recommendations. 
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Because you’ve got so many levels of shareholders, from sophisticated 
institutional and sophisticated high net-worth individuals, down to 
mum[s] and dads who are in a different space altogether…through 
the formal reports out to the market [is the way it would manifest]. 
[In response to whether it is desirable for management or the board to 
do it:] Well, isn’t it going to be a combination, because the releases 
to the market are overseen by the board…again, management does 
the work but the board also oversights the output.
The second supplier echoes the view that it is the board of directors’ 
responsibility rather than that of management: 
I would substitute directors for management firstly…it’s much 
more the directors’ responsibility, as being the delegates of the 
shareholders…it’s very difficult to do that and…the only forums…
realistically are AGMs and financial statements or annual reports. 
Conceptually, it’s a good idea but…in practice, it’s very hard to do.
5.5.1 Summary
One of the standard setters, who is in support of the proposition, recognises 
that although this management-provided information is targeted at those 
with less understanding of the audit process and opinion, it might be the 
analysts who become the primary recipients of the information, which 
then ‘trickles down’. The other standard setter responding to this question 
would prefer it to be a board role and sees the AGM as the only practical 
implementation device.
5.6 Regulators
Perhaps predictably, regulators are opposed to management being charged 
with the responsibility of conveying information about the auditors’ 
processes or audit opinion, as can be seen in the following quotations 
from the interviews.
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[I]t’s an interesting question about who is really 
looking at these financial statements, because 
your average person on the street who buys or 
sells shares, they’re probably not really buying 
or selling shares on the basis of information in 
those financial statements. But…the people who 
are looking at those documents are the analysts 
and…more sophisticated investors like fund 
managers and people like that, and those people 
probably don’t need someone to explain to them what it is that the 
documents mean. What I mean is that the key financial [and]…
investment decisions by and large are made by professionals only…
and they won’t need that sort of thing. 
The same regulator continues, articulating further on the differentiation in 
the marketplace between sophisticated and unsophisticated stakeholders 
and how the first group does not need the information and the second is 
unlikely to read it:
[T]he reason why I’m a little wary about it is because…[of] the cost 
of going through all of that division of resources to…[provide] 
information to a fairly select class of people. I’m sure there are some 
people who invest in shares who actually get out the annual report 
and read it from cover to cover, but…I haven’t come across…that 
many, and people seem to invest on the basis of other…market 
releases…if they’re interested in companies, rather than the annual 
report…and, in a sense, you’re probably talking partly about two 
entirely different groups of people, because if you’re talking about 
people on the street who are buying and selling shares, they’re not 
going to understand much about any of these issues…A professional 
class of investor who makes the vast majority [of] investment 
decisions in Australia in terms of value, well, they probably don’t 
need any more education. I’m not sure how much reliance they 
place on audited accounts anyway.
The next regulator sees management provision of information about the 
audit process as a conflict of interest:
I see that as management wearing two hats, because management 
prepares the financial statements and then it sounds as though the 
question is directed towards them selling the financial statements 
‘[K]ey financial and…
investment decisions by 
and large are made by 
professionals only…and 
they won’t need that 
sort of thing.’ 
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to people, and I would see that as a conflict…AGM’s substantially 
are a waste of time and are quite cynically dated and timed for 
when investors can’t turn up…auditors are hardly ever asked 
the questions and, if they are asked a question, their response is 
unsatisfactory. But…because it’s management who prepared the 
financial statements, they try to market them anyway, try to put 
themselves in a good light in terms of the year’s results and I can’t 
see that they would be the appropriate people to give an explanation 
of the financial statements.
5.6.1 Summary
Regulators oppose management-provided information about audit 
processes and/or opinions. One sees such an eventuality as a conflict of 
interest for management. The other believes that the retail investors—the 
group most in need of a deeper understanding—would be unlikely to gain 
much from it while the more sophisticated investors would not need it.
6.0 issues and implications
In summary, there was a generally negative reaction among all stakeholder 
groups for the proposition that management had a significant role in 
explaining the nature of the audit process and its outcome. A small 
number of users took a more positive view, stating that this could be done 
at the annual general meeting, in that the role in explaining the audit 
process and outcome pointed more to the board of directors as being the 
appropriate body to undertake such a task.
In terms of how this might be achieved, one observation was that 
as a very minimum the auditor needed to play a more significant role at 
the annual general meeting and possibly read out a statement about the 
audit process or at very least read out the audit opinion. One purchaser 
suggested the possibility of further disclosure occurring via web-casting 
related to analysts’ briefings or other important events. Those who had 
negative views about management’s role observed that this approach 
might cause a conflict between the role of management and the role of 
the auditor. It is the auditor who comments on the representations made 
of management and to then make management an advocate for the role of 
auditing sets up a potentially conflicting relationship.
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On the whole, there was more enthusiasm for auditors, audit firms and 
the accounting profession more generally, together with more overarching 
organisations, including the accounting bodies and the Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board, playing a more positive role in explaining to 
the market about the role of auditing, its processes and outcomes.
7.0 Concluding remarks
There was a substantial group, particularly among users and purchasers, 
who supported the idea of added disclosure in relation to auditors’ work 
and processes. The questions arising of their support were:
•	 what to disclose
•	 to whom
•	 by whom
•	 where should the disclosure occur
•	 when should the disclosure take place
•	 what is the nature of the disclosures to be made?
In terms of what to disclose, in general, interviewees suggested a 
description of what work the auditor undertook. Generally, in layman’s 
language and spelling out important things such as the fact that the work 
involves sampling (arguably a less ambiguous word than ‘testing’), might 
be particularly risk focused, deals with substantive issues pertaining to 
that particular industry or entity and describes what levels of materiality 
are used. There is diversity of opinion about whether these descriptions 
should be specific to the company or might be more generalised for a 
particular audit firm.
There was also some diversity of view about the appropriate audience 
for these further disclosures. By and large, there was an underlying 
assumption that the ultimate risk taker in the capital market was the 
investor and this was the primary audience for these additional disclosures. 
There was a further view that the key audience was in fact those charged 
with governance in the company who in turn might seek to disclose it by 
some mechanism to the shareholders. Embedded in this is the issue of who 
will understand these additional disclosures and whether these additional 
disclosures need to be understood by everybody or in fact only by those 
who are ‘price makers’ rather than ‘price takers’ in the capital market.
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By and large, there is little support for further disclosures by auditee 
management. Rather, stakeholders see that responsibility for these 
disclosures rests with the body that undertakes the work—that is, the 
auditor—albeit that existing publicly available information (for example, 
auditing standards) might have a role.
There were a number of innovative suggestions with regard to where 
these disclosures should be made. A substantial view was that the financial 
report was already overly complicated and represented ‘information 
overload’, so there was some scepticism about whether this would be the 
appropriate vehicle for additional disclosures. Additionally, while some 
suggested that the annual general meeting might be a means by which this 
information was described, those who had a user perspective were more 
likely to suggest that AGMs were sparsely attended and auditors were rarely 
asked questions at these meetings, so that too might not be an appropriate 
vehicle. If one accepted that those charged with governance made up the 
appropriate audience, there were a number of suggestions about how that 
disclosure might be made, including in the detailed audit plans presented 
to audit committees or boards of directors or in a detailed management 
letter. There was one suggestion from a user that those charged with 
governance should, as a matter of obligation, publish the management 
letter on the company web site and have it available for shareholders to 
ask questions about at the AGM or some other appropriate point. Several 
suggested that further disclosures could be on the individual company 
web site or on the web sites of audit firms or even of professional bodies 
or regulators and quasi-regulators. Obviously, if one is publicising these 
additional disclosures on an audit web site or on a professional association 
web site, they would tend to be more generalised than specific to the 
individual auditee. This, in the eyes of some, would limit their value. 
There was also another body of thought that there was not enough known 
about what the audit process entailed, public education documents had fallen 
into disrepair and that, as a public policy issue, there needed to be more time, 
energy and resources spent on informing the public of the work of an auditor.
There was overwhelming support by all of those who made comment 
about it that the language used in disclosures should be jargon free and be 
able to be read by an intelligent but not necessarily professionally educated 
individual. The reference to jargon and technical language by respondents 
made it clear that because the responsibilities are to communicate with the 
capital market, there is a need to communicate in plain English.
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One issue that was raised was when these disclosures should be made. 
There was one suggestion that one might make these added disclosures 
where an auditee was experiencing a particular set of circumstances. One 
presumes what is meant by this is financial distress, but it could also be 
at a time when a particularly substantial transaction occurs or when the 
auditor believes there are particularly pertinent transactions or events 
that need to be described or attention drawn to.
In concluding this chapter, we must observe that there are important 
public policy issues relevant here. We have seen changes in public 
policy on a number of matters relating to the financial circumstances of 
individuals within our society and our economy in the past several years. 
We draw as a parallel the fact that there have been substantial changes in 
policy position on superannuation (otherwise known as pension plans) 
and the fact that there has been a significant investment in informing the 
market about superannuation paid for by both the public and private 
purse. These education and information programs have helped inform 
the market of the circumstances and changes that have occurred in the 
market. While there have been substantial regulatory changes and a focus 
that is said to be an important public policy debate in relation to audit, 
there has not been a parallel investment in informing the market in the 
same way as there has been in regard to superannuation. The striking 
difference between the regulated response with respect to auditing and 
the public policy response with respect to superannuation is remarkable. 
One policy issue here is to ensure that those responsible for undertaking 
public policy fulfil their responsibility in ensuring that the market is 
informed, that the public expectations of auditing are understood and 
that the changes and enhancements to the capital market through auditing 
are appreciated by all relevant stakeholders. At a practical level, having 
audit reports filed with the regulator in a form that enables searching 
comprehensively across any and all audit reports rather than individually 
by auditee would be one small step.
We observed in the conversations that whether it was standard setters 
or purchasers—that is, management of listed corporations and others—
they did not particularly focus on shareholders as being the ultimate 
clients of auditors. Rather, there were either implied or explicit beliefs 
expressed that the key stakeholders for these additional disclosures were 
those charged with governance. At present, the legal position in Australia 
is that the ultimate client and consumer of the audit opinion is the body 
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of shareholders and this can be compared and contrasted with the US 
position (after Sarbanes-Oxley), where those charged with governance are 
formally the client of the audit firm. Given this legislative position, it is 
hard to argue that the ultimate client of the auditor is anything other than 
the shareholder of the auditee.
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UnDERsTAnDinG oF MATERiAliTy 5
[A]nother question is: ‘Do they actually understand that they 
don’t understand what materiality is?’ Because if it’s never 
actually mentioned to them, they may not be aware that they 
don’t understand this term…So…rather than just the concept of 
materiality, if you…start disclosing what your materiality level is…
in simple terms…if your materiality’s 10 [million], that means that 
the auditors will want accounts restated if they find errors that total 
that sort of money, for example.
— Purchaser
1.0 Key issues
The contribution to the audit expectations gap of the issue of the level of 
understanding of the concept of materiality in an auditing context might 
be one of the most important findings from this study. The issue presents 
many challenges for the profession and for regulators, including:
•	 how can the role of auditor judgment surrounding the auditors’ use 
of materiality in the conduct of the audit be best explained
•	 what are the mechanisms used for auditors to determine the level 
of materiality (tolerable error) and when and to whom is this 
information communicated
•	 can information about materiality be articulated effectively to users of 
the audit product of varying levels of sophistication
•	 is developing deeper understanding of quantitative materiality 
alone sufficient, or must it be accompanied by developing deeper 
understanding of qualitative materiality
•	 should the real levels of materiality used in conducting the audit be 
disclosed publicly or could this be ‘dangerous’ to the audit product
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•	 is developing greater understanding about materiality of a higher 
priority than developing understanding of other aspects of audit
•	 is board and/or audit committee member understanding of materiality 
sufficiently well developed
•	 if educative material about audit materiality is to be made available, 
which party/parties should take responsibility for it and where 
should it be located?
2.0 introduction: shareholders and materiality
The notion of materiality arose frequently in interviews and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, in focus groups. Its importance to the debate after 
the interviews seems to be unquestioned and indeed might be one of the 
more underdeveloped issues in the whole audit expectations gap debate.
2.1 Users
Most users favour auditor provision of more information around the issue 
of materiality in the context of audit conduct, as the following comments 
illustrate. The first user foresees a day when disclosing materiality 
thresholds is required:
They [users] probably don’t understand the materiality and [for]…
large organisations, the materiality threshold can be quite large. 
So maybe a bit more work can be done there to inform about the 
material. And I could even see a day when you have to disclose your 
materiality thresholds.
The difficulty of explaining to those earning modest incomes the size and 
application of materiality thresholds for the audit of a very large company 
is the subject of this next user’s quotation: 
[I]s it just materiality that drives the level of 
work, or is it risk…it’s very hard to explain to 
a schoolteacher that a $200 000 difference is 
irrelevant, because to a schoolteacher, to a taxi 
driver, $200 000 is a vast sum of money, and for 
someone to say: ‘Well, in the scope of the BHP 
accounts, it’s totally irrelevant’—it’s a very hard 
concept for them to grasp. But…I would question 
how many retail shareholders even know the 
‘$200 000 is a vast 
sum of money, and for 
someone to say: “Well, 
in the scope of the bHP 
accounts, it’s totally 
irrelevant”—it’s a very 




word exists. Yes, there is an audit function in there, that’s in [their] 
checking, and they probably think they are doing far more checking 
than they really are, but they do take comfort from the fact that the 
auditors are in there. Well, at least the big firms, they have a chance 
of recognising the name when the auditor has any issues.
The same user continues, highlighting his or her understanding of the 
personal responsibility involved when an audit partner signs an audit 
report: 
When all’s well…I don’t think anyone’s concerned. But the auditor 
of [a recently collapsed company] must have had worries. It didn’t 
just all happen overnight and go down the gurgler. And I’m not 
sure how you would do it…I don’t have an answer, but the audit 
partner who signs off on [one of the largest blue-chip companies] is 
a lot more relaxed than the audit partner who signed off the last set 
of accounts for [a recently collapsed company]. 
The need to explain the concept of materiality in layman’s terms is 
articulated by this user:
[M]aybe [materiality] just needs to be explained in layman’s terms, 
or less accounting type of terms, because…from experience, it’s 
something that if you don’t understand, you just go over it and it 
could be quite crucial in the scheme of things. 
This next user believes that auditors should bring material issues to the 
attention of investors before issues cause problems; otherwise people tend 
not to identify problems until they have emerged.
[Auditors] should [explain materiality]…investors 
understand it intuitively in the sense that if you’ve 
got something major in accounts and it has the…
potential to impact a company’s performance, then 
they understand it. But…people don’t identify the 
problem until, typically, it’s already emerged. So 
that’s why…while [accountants] understand the 
concept…the auditors should be striving to identify 
those issues, so [as to] at least to bring those issues to the attention 
of people prior to them causing problems…people have an intuitive 
understanding of that without understanding the technicalities of 
the accounting, if you like.
‘[I]f you’ve got 
something major in 
accounts and it has 
the…potential to 
impact a company’s 
performance, then 
they understand it.’ 
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Lack of understanding of the auditor’s use of materiality by retail investors 
is one thing, but if boards of directors are struggling with the concept, it 
could be of greater concern.
Yeah, it is a concern [that potentially many shareholders do 
not understand the concept of materiality]…it’s even not well 
understood by a lot of boards either. There’s always a bit of…an 
explanation required to the board as well.
The interviewer then asks whether that communication to the board is 
effective and the response given is negative, with the claim that the audit 
profession should take action to create better understanding: 
Not necessarily, no. I’d say with issues like that…the audit industry 
could probably go a long way in trying to clarify some of those things 
a lot better to everybody. I don’t think they’re well understood. 
The interviewer then asks whether this issue is a major driver of 
expectations gaps between suppliers and purchasers and this user does 
not seem to think so, but it is difficult to see how it would not be, given 
the full context of his or her response:
[A]t the end of the day, when you get the outcome, it leads to either 
a better or a confused understanding of the situation. So, you can 
be in meetings where you’ll be going through something and these 
issues come up and…it’s news to people how that is actually defined 
or how it’s clarified.
2.1.1 Summary
Users, when asked whether auditors should explain more about their 
implementation of the concept of materiality in the conduct of the audit, 
feel that this would be a positive, but somewhat difficult, thing to do in 
layman’s terms. Comment was received about the likely incomprehensibility 
to some of the large threshold dollar amounts of audit materiality used in 
the conduct of audits of the largest companies. The need to explain the 
concept in layman’s terms, if it is to be explained, and the foreseeability of 




Remembering that in a past life, purchasers had sometimes been auditors, 
two purchasers expressed a perception that there was not a problem with 
the understanding of the concept of materiality as used by auditors.
[T]o me, it’s…not an issue at all…I can’t speak…for retail 
shareholders, but…I used to be an auditor myself [and] I don’t 
think there is an issue with materiality at all.
[A]s a concept, no, I don’t think so. Because…
the auditor’s approach of applying materiality I 
don’t think has led to any of the significant audit 
failures…it’s a valid approach that says we can’t 
look at every single transaction that the company 
has undertaken in the past 12 months. We have to 
determine where to focus the audit effort, and we’re 
going to make that determination on considering the 
risk associated with any particular aspect of the client’s business 
and, providing we’re satisfied that an error that we miss in our audit 
is not going to have a significant effect on the financial statements, 
then that’s acceptable, and that probably should be acceptable…the 
big audit failures have not really been materiality driven. They’ve 
been driven by either incompetence or just a lack of understanding 
of the client’s business and/or the clients themselves not properly 
disclosing what’s happening in their business—and the nature of 
risks that they’re undertaking.
Another purchaser feels that developing deep understanding of the 
concept of audit materiality is not high on investors’ agendas and that 
what is more important is having faith in the professionalism of the 





I don’t think has 
led to any of the 
significant audit 
failures.’ 
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
144 |
[A]s far as the wider community [is concerned], 
it’s important to have more education and 
have that information out there so that people 
are well informed…if you’re well informed 
of materiality and what auditors are actually 
doing and how they’re going about it…
you’ll have more comfort in the work they’re 
performing…otherwise…a couple of those 
subjectivity-type areas on what you disclose 
and what you don’t, and more around the 
nature of what’s material…would possibly raise a concern [as to] 
where it’s headed.
The same purchaser continues with the theme of the importance of 
confidence in the professionalism of the auditor:
[A]t the end of the day…materiality is just…a mechanism, of how 
auditors go about their work…and do investors want to know that 
or do they just want to know that they’re doing a good job and 
they’re doing what they should be doing? I can see how it plays a 
role internally, but…for investors, as long as they have confidence 
in the auditing profession—the professionalism—then…that’s 
probably more of just another mechanism of how they go about 
their work, which they should have confidence in. 
The remaining purchasers, however, constituting the majority, did feel 
that there was a problem with understanding materiality and that greater 
disclosure by auditors of the level of materiality to which they worked 
and/or around the concept of materiality more generally was desirable. 
Some, as in the next three quotations, want more detail of materiality as it 
pertains to the conduct of specific audits.
[W]here they might be signing something off…tell 
us a bit more about the issues you do have a material 
issue with and what you [have] done around it and 
how you’ve satisfied yourself. Just doing a more 
generic statement in terms of ‘this is a process we’ve 
undertaken to review these accounts’. [What I 
would want] from the generic statement would be…
to try and explain to people what the account is 
doing if you haven’t been an expert, haven’t been 
‘[T]hose subjectivity-type 
areas on what you disclose 
and what you don’t, and 
more around the nature 
of what’s material…would 
possibly raise a concern [as 
to] where it’s headed.’ 
‘[Q]uite often, 
I’m sitting there 
explaining to 
people what an 
auditor actually 




familiar with the process of what they do…quite often I’m sitting 
there explaining to people what an auditor actually does and how 
they review things…it just gives the reader of the accounts a bit 
more feeling as to…materiality and does it actually get explained 
in the accounts, what materiality thresholds are, et cetera…even 
the standards are a bit broad in terms of ‘is this material?’…if it’s 
going to impact on users’ economic decisions…I haven’t looked at 
the statement in detail for a while but…the [auditor’s] sign-off…
does it refer to materiality or not…it’s not really a high order of 
priority-type issue that we’ve got.
That different risk tolerances exist among key stakeholders to the audit is 
articulated by this next purchaser as a reason for disclosure by the auditor 
of the materiality level used.
[M]ateriality affects everything external 
auditors do in many ways. How they disclose, 
how they make a decision, determine whether 
certain adjustment needs to be made or need[s] 
to be disclosed, so materiality is definitely…
going to affect the way that certain financial 
information’s being interpreted…there is some 
need to actually incline towards disclosing 
some more information on that particular 
part because materiality is basically…a risk-
tolerance level, and therefore slightly different shareholders or 
key stakeholders would have a different level of risk appetite, so 
they need to be able to make an informed decision. They need to 
understand what materiality the auditors use. I work in a company 
and…I therefore understand what materiality our external auditors 
use in respect of my own company. But, obviously…[the] general 
public perhaps may not be aware of that. There will be a need for 
them to understand it. 
The same person goes on to articulate a dilemma in explaining the 
materiality concept in an auditing context. Could it raise more issues than 
it solves?
‘[M]ateriality is basically…a 
risk-tolerance level, and 
therefore slightly different 
shareholders or key 
stakeholders would have 
a different level of risk 
appetite, so they need 
to be able to make an 
informed decision.’ 
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Having said that, materiality itself is not…simple. 
A lot of the time we’re not talking about just 5 per 
cent, 10 per cent of P&L [profit and loss] items 
because obviously external auditors also make 
their own judgment based on materiality…so 
there will be some judgment call required [about] 
how to actually disclose it without…misleading 
the audience because [there’s] nothing worse 
[than] when we just give information and it’s 
actually misleading…So, rather than just give…figures—because 
probably a certain number of figures may not actually apply in most 
situations…people would therefore need to understand when they 
read the financial statement, they need to be a bit more informed in 
what they actually read. It may not be, for example, 100 per cent 
correct [which] is probably one of the main things they need to be 
aware of and…is probably important. But then, obviously, we don’t 
want to suddenly ring the alarm bells; not 100 per cent correct—
what does it mean? Is it only 50 per cent correct…that’s probably 
not what we are trying to drive…people need to understand 
perhaps what we’re talking about [with] materiality is anything 
maybe under a certain level or something which is a little bit more 
important to the readers. 
The next purchaser’s comments reveal that he or she sees more explanation 
around materiality as useful not for retail investors, but for professionals 
who can use that information more effectively.
[Y]ou need to maybe spell out what percentage or 
what level of due diligence or materiality have been 
put into it, as against just a standard statement that 
‘we’ve done audits based on section something that 
says [what] materiality is’…that needs to be further 
clarified…as a note as to what you’ve really done and 
what you haven’t done. If you’re looking at a normal, 
common shareholder…they’re pretty sceptical 
anyway overall, so it’s not going to help to that extent. If you’re 
looking at professionals using the information…you can ask the 
question and it’s just that much easier if it was disclosed: what have 
we looked at, what haven’t we looked at, et cetera? And then, say 
somebody is looking at that or analysing the balance sheet, whether 
‘[o]bviously we don’t 
want to suddenly ring 
the alarm bells; not 100 
per cent correct—what 
does it mean? Is it only 
50 per cent correct?’ 
‘[I]t’s just that much 
easier if it was 
disclosed: what 
have we looked 
at, what haven’t 




it’s a fund manager or a banker, maybe the questions have been 
answered in those notes, or if they haven’t then they could [drill in] 
to a particular aspect.
In the following comments, purchasers make clear the way in which 
misunderstanding or miscommunication of auditors’ use of materiality 
(otherwise thought of as the level of ‘tolerable error or omission’) in the 
conduct of the audit can feed into the expectations gap.
[T]here is quite a big expectations gap on the materiality threshold, 
which is, in a very big company…a very big number, and I don’t 
think that number is really stated clearly enough…most people in 
the [name of a major ASX-listed company] issue didn’t realise that 
that very big number—was it [a] $120 or $140 million…hole in the 
foreign exchange—might’ve ended up being higher in the end, but 
that it was under the auditor’s threshold of what they actually said 
they would catch. So I wonder if that number should be stated. 
Obviously, that number…[is] approved by the audit committee 
each year, and obviously also that number is very sensitive for the 
audit fee…if they bring down the threshold, there’s the implied 
assumption that there’ll be an increase in the fee, which obviously 
the auditee never wants. 
The same purchaser continues, concluding with a positive affirmation 
of just how much the insider knowledge that the auditor possesses is 
appreciated and valued:
[T]he auditor may be seen as a warrior for the P&L as well as the 
capital…on the balance sheet, and…that is an expectations gap and 
probably could be better communicated…the reason I say that is, 
talking to…people in the market, whether they’re on the buy or sell 
side…the market has a very lively knowledge of just how deeply 
the auditor understands the operations and risks of the company.
Constantly reiterating the cost consequences of failing to set a materiality 
level to which the auditor works is the suggestion of this next purchaser 
as a means to educate the public about the materiality issue.
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[Y]ou’ve got to do it at a material level and I 
absolutely understand [that] the concern…[goes] 
back to the fact that [there] is an anticipation…
there’s an expectation in some people’s minds that 
auditors would review every single transaction 
and I don’t think they understand what that 
would cost and I don’t know how…you educate 
them because when you look at [Sarbanes-Oxley] 
and all the rest of it…[the] general public was 
wildly enthusiastic and it plugged a political gap at that stage and 
it’s now turning out to be one of the worst interventions that I can 
think of…it’s just caused billions of dollars of impost with virtually 
no return and it would be the same with materiality…I know this 
business about letting the people regulate themselves is a tricky 
one politically, but…you’ve just got to drive to a materiality level 
and I don’t know how you do that except at every instance suggest 
what the consequences of not doing it [are]. So…if our audits…are 
costing over a million dollars, well, if we did it to a materiality level 
of zero, we probably wouldn’t make a profit. And what would be 
achieved? I don’t know how you do get that whole management-of-
risk concept across.
That it is not feasible to expect that retail investors can be educated 
about the role of audit or audit materiality comes through in this next 
purchaser’s quotation:
The ordinary person cannot in any genuine sense understand the 
auditing framework, so when we talk about this issue of materiality 
or any other issue, you really have to segment the audits. Let’s 
abandon the mum and dad because, frankly, an annual report is 
beyond their comprehension…So let’s move to the sophisticated 
end. The problem is that an audit is limited assurance6—we all know 
that—so what’s the problem? It is not a thorough investigation of 
every transaction. It is effectively looking at the control posture of 
a company, looking at the risks and seeing if those risks and the 
6 An audit provides ‘reasonable’ assurance and reviews provide ‘limited’ assurance in the 
language of the auditing standards; however, it is, in the authors’ opinion, reasonable 
to presume that this purchaser uses the word ‘limited’ here to signal less than absolute 
assurance, given the context of the remainder of this quotation.
‘[T]here’s an 
expectation in some 
people’s minds that 
auditors would review 
every single transaction 
and I don’t think they 




controls are properly reflected in the financial statements and in the 
narrative that’s given to the shareholders—that’s what an annual 
report is about. 
The same person goes on to allege that auditing firms are ‘captured’ and 
he or she asserts that the regulatory model under which they work is 
flawed in that the contract effectively becomes one between directors and 
auditors rather than between shareholders and auditors, as is the legislative 
intent. It is therefore not regulatory capture that is being spoken of here, 
which is the way in which the word ‘capture’ is often used in the research 
literature. Rather, it is capture of auditors by the auditee that is alluded to.
[T]here’s a sense that, frankly, audit firms are 
captured. There are four big ones and they deal 
with the top-200 companies…The auditors 
are—it’s almost a rote that they go through…
the appointment and the contractual model 
is…flawed in today’s world. It’s a contract 
with the directors—understand [that] it used 
to be a contract with the shareholders—it’s 
no longer a contract with the shareholders 
even though the words say it is…I don’t have 
a problem with that, but don’t try and create any link between 
auditor and shareholder when in fact the auditor directs literally 
99 per cent of their attention to the management and the directors 
and 1 per cent of their time to the shareholders when they now, 
for the first time in years, turn up to an AGM and can be subject to 
questions…this question of materiality—how many top-200 audits 
have been qualified in the last 10 years? It’s not even a fat tail on a 
normal distribution curve. It’s such a low number…So then when 
you get down to materiality it is only the sophisticated end that 
understand what the materiality concept is. There is no mum and 
dad shareholder who has read the relevant accounting standard 
on materiality or the relevant auditing standard, so how can they 
possibly understand it?
This next purchaser implies that even when the concept of audit materiality 
is understood, it is conveniently overlooked when something goes wrong 
and a scapegoat is sought—often the auditor.
‘It’s a contract with the 
directors—understand 
[that] it used to be 
a contract with the 
shareholders—it’s no 
longer a contract with the 
shareholders even though 
the words say it is.’ 
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Yes, [the audit concept is] easy to explain. 
There are certain things that are too small to 
worry about. But…there’s almost a selective 
amnesia about it. If something goes wrong and 
the managing director is being hauled over the 
coals because of problems in his organisation, 
the default response is to look for someone to 
blame. And generally the person to blame is 
the auditor, on the assumption that they’re 
checking 100 per cent every process, every 
account balance, every whatever, and they miss the fact…[of] what 
the auditors are trying to achieve in an audit. 
Another purchaser alludes to the same tendency of management to 
selectively ignore the application of audit materiality levels if something 
goes wrong. This purchaser also indicates that non-accounting or finance-
specific management personnel need education with regard to materiality 
as auditors apply it.
[N]ot being a listed business and not having to 
think too much about shareholders, I guess I’m 
changing the word ‘shareholders’ for ‘general 
management’ and use them as my reference. 
Outside of the accounting and finance people, 
the general management, in this business at least, 
doesn’t understand the concept of materiality. 
They know about it, but they seem to selectively 
forget about it if ever issues arise. And there’s a 
general presumption that the auditors are actually checking that 
we’re 100 per cent right. And if anything goes wrong, the default 
position is to blame the auditors—be that even not just external 
auditors but internal auditors for missing something. I don’t know 
if that’s indicative of the fact that they don’t understand materiality 
or selectively they choose to ignore it when it suits their own 
ends…addressing the issue of materiality…as the customers of 
the audit firm, purchasing their service…if they were to provide 
more information about how they conduct the audit in terms of 
the process, and their proprietary method, that would probably 
‘[T]here’s almost a selective 
amnesia about it.  
If something goes wrong 
and the managing director 
is being hauled over the 
coals…the default response 
is to look for someone  
to blame.’ 
‘I don’t know if that’s 
indicative of the 
fact that they don’t 
understand materiality 
or selectively they 
choose to ignore  




address materiality at that point. So…that would be useful as an 
educator for management in the purchase of these audit services as 
to what materiality is and how it fits into the whole process. 
Several other purchasers also differentiated between sophisticated and 
retail users of financial reports in terms of their level of understanding of 
the auditor’s use of the materiality concept.
I did a quick search on our annual report from last year…just on the 
word ‘materiality’, and the only place it was really mentioned was 
in the corporate governance disclosures. So, you’d have to…[ask 
whether] materiality really [is] discussed out there in the public 
forum, being through annual reports or whatever. You’d probably 
say no. Does that mean people don’t understand what it is…
if you’re an experienced or a sophisticated shareholder then you 
would understand these types of concepts, especially since those 
corporate governance principles have come in and three or four 
of them specifically mention material misstatement, or words to 
that effect. So if you were…a sophisticated shareholder…and you 
didn’t understand something, you should research it and find that 
out yourself. The ones…[who] maybe…don’t really understand the 
concept…[are] some of your mum and dad investors…or maybe 
ones who have just become investors through demutualisations or 
things like that. 
One apparently knowledgeable purchaser observes the profoundly 
different attitude of the regulatory regime in the United States. He or she 
points to the more conservative approach in the United States, where all 
errors are treated as material because a user might be affected if they are 
not corrected.
We’re talking about someone making an 
assessment. So people make assessments for 
a variety of reasons—and not all of them are 
financial. So, if we just stick with financial 
analysts and funds…the big end of town have 
a good handle on the concept of materiality. 
So, I would suggest you have to stratify your 
shareholder base to answer this question. And 
then [ask] should this be a concern? Well, 
yes…it should, because…what you do get is 
‘[W]hat you do get is the 
situation in the US where 
everything’s material in 
the view of the regulator. 
If it’s a mistake, it’s not 
appropriate not to correct 
it, because you don’t 
know if that would change 
someone’s view.’ 
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the situation in the US where everything’s material in the view of 
the regulator. If it’s a mistake, it’s not appropriate not to correct 
it, because you don’t know if that would change someone’s view. 
And so you err on the side of caution and say that everything’s 
material…I’m not sure how you address the concern around 
materiality…the only way that you cannot backslide further is to 
maintain a substance-over-form framework.
One purchaser felt that information about materiality should be available, 
but only for those interested and on an ‘opt-in’ basis.
[S]hareholders have to have an avenue that’s made clear where they 
can find [information about materiality]…what I’m saying is…that, 
effectively…1 per cent should actually opt in to…be able to have a 
very efficient way through an information market to be able to find 
out their answer to their question, as opposed to working [to] a 
scheme that sends the information to all 100 per cent [of] them—for 
99 [per cent] not to read it.
As is the case with some of the above quotations, several purchasers’ 
comments, illustrated explicitly by the next two quotations, go to the 
desirability of providing educative material around the issue of materiality.
[M]aybe it’s more an education and disclosure issue than actually 
changing the way an audit is done, or changing the use of the 
concept of materiality. Maybe you do have to educate people to 
say we undertake our audit under the umbrella of materiality, and 
this is what that means. It means that we will miss things, or we 
may miss things, that are not appropriate, but the implication of 
that is not going to have a significant effect on the wellbeing of the 
company or the share price or other aspects to do with the audit.
There is a group of shareholders that do understand materiality, 
but…there still needs to be materiality thresholds…Rather than 
try and address materiality, let’s try and address the education 
of the shareholder, [provide] an explanation to the shareholder, 
without just standing up at an AGM…[or] a shareholder meeting 
and just saying ‘it wasn’t material’, [which goes] straight over the 
head. So just explain what we mean by that…it’s a fine CFO trick 
to say ‘it wasn’t material’. It’s not a trick, but it’s true. You don’t 
help a shareholder by not explaining what you mean. So if you 
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actually say, ‘The impact of that court case was only $3 million on 
this company and you all know the cost of it, you all know our 
expenses are $12 billion’—sorry, that’s why it’s not addressed…So, 
my point is this: the way to address the question is to explain it 
better to the shareholders.
The difficulty of providing effective educative material alluded to in some 
of the preceding quotations is, however, explicitly pointed out in this 
next quotation:
[I]f you’d never ever bumped into any of this before but you had a 
whole series of shares and companies and things, I really do think 
there’d be an expectation out there that you wouldn’t have a clue 
that it’s been done to a materiality level, although it’s put in this 
statement. I don’t know how you do educate people that way, I 
really don’t. 
The same person, when pressed by the interviewer about whose 
responsibility it was to educate about materiality, saw that squarely in the 
remit of auditors, but pointed out that the concept needed to be placed 
within a risk framework and there was also the danger of it being seen as 
an attempt to absolve the auditor from responsibility.
Auditors collectively…probably [have] a 
responsibility [to educate on materiality]. 
But…what you don’t want…is…a perception 
with everybody saying, ‘Oh well, they’re just 
absolving themselves from everything’, and then 
they lose confidence in it. So there’s the balance 
of perception that, yes, we are detailed, we are 
following it up, because…having that mind-
set out there probably has a governance role in 
itself. But…maybe it’s trying to drive the fact that they’re managing 
risk, which is what they’re all doing now…they’re auditing to 
risk…and…that’s—certainly at our board meetings—all well 
understood…But I wouldn’t anticipate it to be [understood] at 
the…general shareholder level.
The next purchaser points to a wider perspective of materiality and how it 
needs to be applied to many engagements to maintain cost parameters and 
obtain meaningful information.
‘[y]ou don’t want 
a perception with 
everybody saying, 
“oh well, they’re just 
absolving themselves 
from everything”, 
and then they lose 
confidence in it.’ 
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[Y]ou’ve got to put it into a context. If you say, ‘Do people understand 
the issue of materiality?’, it’s like all things in the literature and 
the auditing and accounting standards. I don’t think many readers 
would understand most of the accounting standards or the auditing 
standards in detail. So the fact that…they might not understand the 
materiality issue in great detail, that’s not surprising. But you’ve got 
to have a notion of materiality just to be able to do a job within a 
reasonable boundary of economics and the cost of doing it, and a 
reasonable exercise as to what does the information mean.
The next purchaser raises the subjectivity of the more qualitative aspects 
of materiality judgments. This purchaser, unlike an earlier one, feels that 
there will be more confidence in the audit process if the wider community 
is well informed about this issue:
[T]he main area of materiality that would probably cause some 
concern is that area where there’s subjectivity…there’s not as much 
subjectivity if we’re just talking pure numbers—if you find an issue 
worth X amount. But when we talk about perhaps the nature of 
some items, or disclosure…and what’s material and what’s not, and 
where subjectivity creeps into that decision, there could be some 
concern there as to what’s disclosed and what’s not and should it 
be…as far as the wider community [is concerned,] it’s important to 
have more education and have that information out there so that 
people are well informed…if you’re well informed of materiality 
and what auditors are actually doing and how they’re going about 
it…you’ll have more comfort in the work they’re performing. 
Purchasers were also asked explicitly about audit committees and boards’ 
understanding of materiality. Their responses indicate perceptions of a 
much deeper understanding of materiality by the members of these bodies 
compared with retail investors and even average sophisticated investors.
[E]verybody who sits on an audit and risk committee should 
understand the concept at the very least, if not the board…from a 
shareholder’s point of view, do they need to know what materiality 
is…It’s probably questionable because if the auditors have signed off 
the accounts then they’re saying everything…is true and correct…
Does a shareholder need to know that it’s true and correct to a 
certain level of materiality? For example, that’s why the audit firms 
have materiality. It’s because anything below that would generally 
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mean that it’s not going to affect the financial performance of the 
company. So does the shareholder need to know about it? You’d 
probably question that and maybe say no. But certainly management 
and the audit risk committee should definitely know what that is. 
Although I don’t think they have a lot of input in setting the level 
of materiality, they should understand why it’s set at that level and 
how it’s set at that level. At least ask the questions.
The next purchaser provides a suggestion that it be within the charter 
of the audit committee that committee members become educated about 
audit materiality.
[T]hey do [understand materiality]…
because audit committees generally are 
made up of people who’ve been around 
the traps for a long time…they’ve been 
involved in a lot of discussions on financial 
statements. They understand and also 
they’re seeing the unders and overs and 
things that haven’t been adjusted…again, 
it comes down to how does the audit risk 
committee function? What does it see? And 
that’s all around governance and what is…
best practice in terms of [the] audit committee as to whether directors 
are really on top of the game—and that, to me, is best addressed 
through that avenue…But the ones I’ve been involved with…I don’t 
think there’s any issue about people understanding what materiality 
is and at what levels it’s applied because it’s very transparently 
advised by the auditors to the audit committee…Perhaps…there 
ought to be an obligation on the external auditors to be educating 
members of the audit committee and likewise the audit committee 
should have on their charter that they should get education…from 
the external auditors on their process and what materiality is and all 
the other bits and pieces. There’s a two-way obligation there.
The next purchaser points out that audit committee members who do not 
understand audit materiality are in peril:
Certainly in respect of the way that auditors report to audit 
committees now, I’d be surprised by [a lack of understanding of 
materiality] because of the fact that—and I’m not sure if this is 
‘Perhaps…there ought to be 
an obligation on the external 
auditors to be educating 
members of the audit 
committee and likewise the 
audit committee should have 
on their charter that they 
should get education…from 
the external auditors on their 
process and what materiality is.’ 
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a requirement of the auditing standards—but certainly the whole 
reporting of audit differences is pretty much standard now, and 
that’s been driven largely out of the US. Tell us if you’ve got an audit 
difference, and we want to know the audit differences that were 
there and [were] adjusted as much as anything. So if you’re dealing 
with audit committees…that’s a ‘horses for courses’ issue…if you’re 
a director and you’re not understanding the financial report and 
you’re on the audit committee, well, you’ve got bigger problems 
than the auditor does.
Explicit in this next quotation is the fact that in some circumstances audit 
committees demand to know and are aware of the level of audit materiality 
to which the auditor is working:
I don’t understand why it’s a concern because when the issue 
comes up of materiality, on the audit committee, we’re very specific 
about…what level of materiality they’re working towards…for 
example, recently I was in a board meeting and they said they were 
working to a broad materiality—hundreds of thousands. And that 
was in theory, but in practice they were working to a much stricter 
[level]. And we said we want it spelled out—what you’re working 
to—because it’s important for us to know exactly, so we can present 
to shareholders what materiality means. And that point of it’s so 
broad that you could have a major problem and it wouldn’t be…
covered in the sense of having been considered to be material under 
their much broader guidelines.
[T]hat can sometimes happen because 
you get to a situation…typically it arises 
where you get something that’s gone 
wrong, and let’s just say there’s been an 
error or a defalcation or something of that 
description and if someone says, ‘Well, 
gee, that’s material’, in their mind it’s a 
material number because it’s more than a 
certain dollar impact. And…in my own 
mind when I’m looking at accounts, I say 
forget about the 5 per cent test…tell me 
the items that are over $1 million. Now…$1 million might only 
represent 1 per cent, but I still want to know about it because…
it’s not so much that it’s material as such in final accounts, but it 
‘Now…$1 million might only 
represent 1 per cent, but I 
still want to know about it 
because I think it’s not so much 
that it’s material as such in 
final accounts, but it becomes 
significant to me in managing 
the process by which those 
accounts are prepared.’ 
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becomes significant to me in managing the process by which those 
accounts are prepared. So the context in which people can raise it 
is different. 
The same purchaser continues, explaining that in his or her experience, 
even among audit committee members, differential levels of understanding 
of the concept of audit materiality exist: 
[A]n audit partner might say to me, as a chairman of an audit 
committee, ‘But that’s not material’, and I say, ‘I don’t care.’ I want 
to know about it because it is important [to] me understanding the 
process of what’s happened. He might then turn around and say, 
‘Well, you’re trying to put too fine an interpretation on something.’ 
Well, so be it, but that’s something you agree with the audit 
engagement team up front about what’s a reportable item. You’ll get 
different people on audit committees that have different levels of 
knowledge and expertise. And on the audit committees I chair, I 
have people who have a very high level of financial sophistication 
and knowledge and others that are more business oriented and not 
so much into financial issues. And the ways they approach things, 
and the questions they ask, and the way they get to their comfort, 
[are] entirely different. So you can get differences in terms of people 
understanding it or not.
2.2.1 Summary
With the exception of an ex-auditor purchaser, there is general agreement 
among purchasers that the concept of materiality as used by auditors 
is not well understood by retail users of financial reports and even, as 
some observe, by some auditee managements and even audit committee 
members. Some purchasers in their comments, however, make it clear 
that the situation is complex, with the more sophisticated readers of 
financial reports much more able to grasp and understand the concept and 
its utilisation in the conduct of an audit. Directors and audit committee 
members create another level of sophistication and accountability again 
and are seen generally by purchasers as competent in their understanding 
of auditing concepts surrounding materiality. 
Given purchasers’ comments about the concept of materiality and 
the perceived potential of a failure to fully understand it to exacerbate 
the expectations gap, several advocate the need for education of users 
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about the audit product. The use of materiality in terms of ‘tolerable 
error’ emerges from purchasers’ comments as particularly misunderstood, 
although two comment that this could be a deliberately selective, self-
interested misunderstanding. 
2.3 Suppliers
Suppliers’ comments about their application of the materiality concept 
and their perceptions of users’ understanding of that concept range from 
those asserting that materiality is of little interest to shareholders to those 
who believe it is crucial that understanding of the concept becomes more 
widespread. 
The first two quotations below express suppliers’ perceptions that 
there is little need for shareholder concern or interest in the concept of 
materiality as it is used in the conduct of audits, although education about 
the issue is desirable.
[P]robably all shareholders wouldn’t care about materiality; all they 
care about is the value of their shares and whether or not their 
investment is going to be returned to them at some stage with a 
reasonable interest or capital improvement. So they probably don’t 
even care or know about the concept of materiality. But from the 
audit point of view, we still have to recognise materiality and 
we still have to recognise risk assessments and so on, and I don’t 
think the auditor should change. But the educational process to 
the end user should be beefed up so that if materiality should be 
an issue to the reader of the financial reports, or the stakeholders, 
or the shareholders or whoever they are, they should be educated 
more about the concept of materiality, or whether they should 
even concern themselves with materiality. Materiality should be a 
tool of part of the audit; it shouldn’t necessarily concern the end 
user. But…there must be much more education [of] the end user of 
financial reports than exists at the moment about the whole concept 
of financial reporting in the disclosure [area].
I don’t see [materiality] as a major concern. Occasionally, you do 
get questions, but if they are answered…I haven’t seen it as a major 
issue, no. Yes, it can be explained to [mum and dad investors]. I 
don’t think it’s a difficult concept…I would’ve thought a lot of 
people do understand it. I don’t see it as a major issue…the people 
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that I see are quite accepting of the concept. Once you explain it to 
them, they can understand. 
The potential for lack of understanding of materiality to exacerbate the 
audit expectations gap is, however, acknowledged by the next supplier:
[I]t is part of the expectation gap, because…
there would be very few shareholders who 
would understand materiality as applied by an 
auditor. And…some of them would be quite 
staggered to learn…if you take [one of the top-
100 listed companies], the materiality on that 
job might be 20 million [dollars]—I’m just 
picking a figure—and therefore the numbers 
are sort of right, plus or minus the 20 million. 
Well…the shareholders would absolutely be 
staggered at that. And they wouldn’t understand the correlation 
between that materiality level and…the cost of the audit—that if 
you were going to be dropping that down to just, say, five million 
then you’re going to have to be doing four times the amount of work 
that you presently do. And I think therefore that concept hasn’t 
been well put out there because, again, it’s started to get into the 
audit report. 
Another two suppliers agree that the concept of materiality is not 
well understood, but they express the belief that articulation of more 
information about the concept is likely to be of limited usefulness because 
of its technical nature.
[Ordinary shareholders] don’t understand the concept of materiality. 
Materiality doesn’t just come in numerical form…which is largely 
the way we would do it, but there are other non-numerical concepts 
which apply to materiality. If it was on a just non-numerical form, 
it probably wouldn’t be difficult to communicate as to what our 
materiality [is]—whether you call it materiality, whether you call 
it tolerance, whatever you like to call [it]. Quite possibly, that 
could give them some level of comfort…I don’t know…How we 
communicate it…where we have, let’s say, non-numerical materiality. 
And what I mean by non-numerical [is] it’s really where something 
is just absolutely material by nature regardless of what the amount 
is. So how you articulate that might be a little bit difficult. Would 
‘[T]he numbers are sort 
of right, plus or minus 
the 20 million. Well…
the shareholders would 
absolutely be staggered at 
that. And they wouldn’t 
understand the correlation 
between that materiality 
level and…the cost of  
the audit.’ 
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it give them any more comfort…it might give them some comfort…
to know what the tolerance level is, but I’m not sure how much 
comfort that would give the users on those financial reports.
[I]t’s such a technical issue, I don’t think that we necessarily expect 
the public to understand it…materiality always comes down to 
commonsense. If you’ve got a million-dollar profit and there might 
be $10 000 of dubious revenues, well, why would you spend any 
time at all looking at that? You would just simply say, ‘Well, look, I’ll 
accept that because it makes sense to me, because I expected them 
to make some money on that particular little venture’, or whatever 
it was. It might be donations or it might be reimbursements or 
something like that. But…that’s an easy commonsense-type thing. 
It gets a little bit harder when, obviously, the numbers get bigger. 
And the auditor does in fact need to have empathy…[he or she] 
needs to put themselves…pretty much in the shoes of the investor, 
or the member of the company…or prospective investor even, 
and just say, ‘Well, if I was going to be investing here would I be 
concerned about whether the profit was X or X plus 100 or X less 
100?’ Does that make a difference? We can come up with all the 
statistical analysis in the world but it doesn’t necessarily give us 
the answer as to whether something’s material or not. And of course 
one of the age-old problems with the materiality is that something 
might be material for the profit and loss statement, but not material 
for the balance sheet…that’s a technical issue, which I don’t think 
most people necessarily get. 
The perceived difficulty of articulating understandable explanations of 
the auditor’s use of materiality and its association with the degree of 
auditor judgment is demonstrated in the next few quotations.
Both within the accounting standards and within 
the auditing standards there are standards of what 
is materiality and guidelines to materiality, so if 
you really are concerned [about] getting people to 
understand it, I don’t think that those standards 
are overly complex. What they do outline is that 
materiality is a particularly complex issue that 
is made up both of quantitative and qualitative 
factors. There are some broad guidelines, but…
it comes down to individual judgment around 
‘[y]ou could speak to 
four different people 
and you’d get four 
different interpretations 
of what materiality is in 
a particular context.’ 
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something as material and…you could probably start to address the 
broad concepts of materiality with users of the financial statements, 
and with shareholders if you did that through some form of 
education marketing campaign. But is that really a concern for the 
accounting profession? Even within the accounting profession…
you could speak to four different people and you’d get four different 
interpretations of what materiality is in a particular context…it’s 
a very complex issue, it requires judgment that is particular to an 
individual circumstance, and therefore…you can give some broad 
guidelines, but…you’ve got to leave it…to individual practitioners 
to exercise their judgment.
[I]t’s a huge area, materiality. And we all struggle with it as 
professional accountants. So how the hell people who are not 
accountants can look at materiality and properly understand it,  
I don’t know.
[T]he issue of materiality is no more a concern than 
shareholders understanding what an audit does and 
doesn’t do…the materiality effectively drives that 
and how you apply things…Whether…and quite 
how you’re able to articulate a materiality…it’s quite 
difficult for me to stand up in an AGM in front of 
700 people and try and explain the principles of 
materiality. If they ask me, that’s what I’ll do, but…
you’ll lose people after a while, and…you’ll get into a philosophical 
debate about well ‘gosh, shouldn’t you do more to give the comfort’, 
which comes back [to] the heart of what an audit is and what an 
audit isn’t.
[I]t’s a difficult question because if I say 
yes, [auditors] should [explain materiality], 
the way in which you would do that then 
becomes awfully complex…Obviously, 
professional judgment is a strong part 
of what we do and if you then try and 
explain…everyone’s going to have a 
different view about what an audit should 
be…I’ve had experiences where I’ve just 
worked through materiality with boards of 
listed entities and while they might agree 
‘[I]t’s quite difficult 
for me to stand 
up in an AgM in 
front of 700 people 
and try and explain 
the principles of 
materiality.’ 
‘[W]hile they might agree 
with what the materiality is 
in regards to the financials as 
a whole, when we then try 
and apply that and talk them 
through how we apply that to 
different line items or captions 
in accounts…that discussion…
becomes quite a heated  
debate and people have 
different views.’ 
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with what the materiality is in regards to the financials as a whole, 
when we then try and apply that and talk them through how we 
apply that to different line items or captions in accounts, even that 
discussion with board members who are well educated, often with 
a finance background, becomes quite a heated debate and people 
have different views. 
The same supplier continues, expanding on the complexity of explaining 
not just ‘materiality’, but ‘sampling’ to a broad user base:
[I]f we put this question and applied it purely in regards to 
materiality, to try and take that debate into a forum and a broader 
group…maybe the institutional investors could get that, but the 
mum and dad investor I don’t think will have the ability to do that. 
So, if you then say, ‘Well, okay what about the audit as a whole and 
forget materiality, tell us what you do and when you do it, sampling 
and how that might work’, I cannot imagine how you could possibly 
explain that to an average [investor]…and professional judgment is 
the main reason. As long as we’re able to apply our professional 
judgment while working within the accounting standards and 
the relevant regulations, I can’t imagine how you could properly 
explain that to a broad user base.
The same supplier goes on to explain the nexus between the audit 
materiality concept and the audit expectations gap:
[T]he audit opinion, although it’s distinct…explains the 
materialities at play and there’s sampling, and if someone read that 
carefully, they should get a sense of maybe what an audit is not. 
The thing [that]…is well and truly misunderstood is the concept 
of materiality…across a lot of users, not just mums and dads. For 
big…multinational groups, that obviously can be a very big figure 
and…a lot of shareholders would struggle if you said to them we 
can still sign a clean audit opinion but the audit error might be X 
many tens of millions…that would stun them…so there is still this 
expectation gap between what an auditor knows an audit opinion 




The divide between retail investors and more sophisticated players among 
users of financial reports is apparent in several of the preceding suppliers’ 
comments and is made explicit in the next quotation:
[I]f you ask most…mums and dads…who knows 
what they know? But if you were to ask most 
analysts, most brokers, most lawyers…what’s…
material, they’ll say 5 per cent…[so] that kind 
of quantitative threshold is capable of being 
reasonably well explained…whether…you 
mandated putting some extra disclosure about 
that in the audit report so everyone understood 
it, I don’t know. Where it gets harder of course 
is…[where] in the auditing standard it talks about the quantitative 
and then the qualitative threshold and the qualitative threshold will 
always make you lower your materiality. It will never say ignore 
the quantitative, go higher. And so there’s always judgment around 
that…[but] I’m not a big fan of making things more prescribed, 
so I don’t know how big an issue this is…most people other than 
mums and dads would say 5 per cent is material in anyone who 
deals in financials…Whether you’d want to go to the next step of 
highlighting that, I don’t know.
No suppliers are explicitly in favour of disclosure of the real level of 
materiality used in the audit and one voices his or her express wish that 
this not be done since it could be detrimental:
[W]hat we need to do is get a better understanding 
out there of how the audit works and what does it 
mean, because I still think that generally people 
think that we are there to stop fraud. And…they 
don’t understand materiality…I’m not sure how you 
get to the average shareholder…I don’t think you’d 
be smart to be [saying] this is our materiality on this 
job…you need an educational process of somehow 
putting information out there which allows the people to get a feel 
for materiality, and then you can be starting to maybe allude a bit 
more to that in the audit report…But I doubt that they’d ever get to 
the point of actually putting a dollar figure [on it].
‘[T]he qualitative 
threshold will always 
make you lower your 
materiality. It will 
never say ignore the 
quantitative,  
go higher.’ 
‘I doubt that they’d 
ever get to the 
point of actually 
putting a dollar 
figure [on it].’ 
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[I]f people actually sit back and think about things, they ought to 
understand materiality and that that 5 per cent threshold’s not a big 
concern. So, now the audit report as it currently stands talks about 
things being material…whether you’d actually want to go [to] the 
next level and prescribe the amounts—I don’t know. I think that 
would be unwise and probably detrimental.
Several of the suppliers’ comments—some prompted by a specific 
interviewer question—turned their attention to directors and audit 
committee members’ understanding of materiality in the context of an 
audit. 
Generally, suppliers are positive about board understanding of the 
concept, as is revealed in the next few quotations. The first comment also 
reinforces doubt that the materiality level should be publicly disclosed:
[There are] often some significant items that are left on our 
unadjusted schedule that the board concurs with or is happy to lean 
with—unadjusted—but [which] never see the light of day either in 
value or in the quantum of errors…I [would] like to put those on 
the table now, or I have an obligation to anyway, but…not in terms 
of just the value, but the fact that if you’ve got pages and pages 
of unadjusted differences it also goes to show that there are other 
deficiencies—potentially control deficiencies. So from that point of 
view, I know that you come back to the question of materiality…I 
would never get to the point…of necessarily disclosing that to 
shareholders because it’s not just quantitative, it is a qualitative 
assessment and…if you start talking quantitative, it does take 
away the qualitative. But…in terms of the amount of…the profile 
materiality…has now maybe to what it did five–10 years ago, I can 
certainly say the board is more conscious of it now, management is 
certainly more conscious of it now. Sometimes they use it as a bit of 
a tool themselves as to what they can and can’t do. 
The same supplier continues, explaining his or her perception that, 
increasingly, management is using the materiality concept to say to the 
auditor ‘don’t worry about that, that’s not material’:
[O]ne thing that I would hate to think would happen is that companies 
start to think materiality in their own right. I’ve seen that creep in 
a little bit more over the recent years where management will say, 
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‘Don’t worry about that, that’s not material.’ And our view is well, 
that’s your objectives, you should really get it right; materialities 
has [sic] just become more of an audit function rather than for in the 
first instance not to address something because you don’t believe it’s 
material. So as long as there’s not a disconnect there as well.
Generally, suppliers are also positive about the skills of audit committee 
members in understanding the concept of materiality as pertaining to 
audit. The next quotation, however, makes the point that understanding 
it does not mean approving of its use:
I don’t know if [audit committees] don’t 
understand [materiality]; they just don’t like it. 
So they will understand that the audit’s done to 
materiality, but nevertheless they expect you to 
know everything. So if there’s a million-dollar 
fraud, then why didn’t you pick it up? If there’s 
something like the wheat board type of thing, 
with all those facilitation payments…would they 
necessarily have come to the auditor’s attention 
based on materiality? No.
The next supplier’s comment points out that even audit committee 
members can be surprised by the numbers involved in audit materiality:
[W]hen you deal with audit committees and things like that, 
when you start talking about materiality and you put [out] ball-
park figures, you still get a bit of a reaction from people. ‘What 
does that mean—that’s a big number?’ And it’s the complexity of 
the systems…which requires you to do testing of a representative 
sample. But because of the volume of transactions, that’s why we 
end up with materiality. Yes, it is a concern…because that’s part of 
that. I don’t think they understand that. 
The next supplier explains what he or she sees as one of the reasons for the 
level of audit committee understanding of materiality:
‘[T]hey just don’t like it. 
So they will understand 
that the audit’s done 
to materiality, but 
nevertheless they 
expect you to know 
everything.’ 
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[T]he audit committee has certainly elevated 
their understanding or the level of inquiry 
that they make beyond just the normal 
reporting mechanism—being the kind of…
board reports. Probably what’s given them a 
greater appreciation as well, just in the context 
of materiality, is the kind of factors that we 
as the auditors are grappling [with] as well—
whether something might be material from a 
disclosure-deficiency point of view…that’s 
certainly something and we’ve moved down that path in the last 
couple of years…We’re not just reporting financial statement errors 
in terms of [the] quantitative, but we’re also reporting disclosure 
deficiencies…We won’t qualify because of that deficiency, but it’s 
certainly not preferred practice. It’s not enough for us to give a 
qualified opinion, but certainly a preferred position would be to 
have more disclosure and therefore…even there, you’re starting to 
see boards in particular start to think…[about asking] the question 
of management: ‘Well, why not? Why haven’t you gone down that 
path?’ And if there’s not a reasonable explanation there then…
that’s where we think you should take it. You should move towards 
the preferred position…there’s a general view that more disclosure 
is better than less.
Not all suppliers, however, are complimentary about the knowledge levels 
of management, boards and audit committees, as the next few interview 
quotations show.
Now, the shareholder doesn’t have any 
idea on a particular entity whether we’re 
working to $1 million [or] $10 million. 
Right, so a shareholder—a big perception—
may think that we’re auditing everything 
and even though we say an audit can’t test 
everything, they may still [think] that. 
Would it help to say that we’ve used a 
materiality of $10 million? The only issue 
with that is, do they really understand the 
concepts around materiality and how that 
drives it? So you get caught either way. But 
‘Probably what’s given 
them a greater appreciation 
as well, just in the context 
of materiality, is the kind 
of factors that we as the 
auditors are grappling 
[with] as well—whether 
something might be 
material from a disclosure-
deficiency point of view.’ 
‘[I]f there is one area…[where 
there is] still…confusion 
between even boards and audit 
committees, and something 
that we’ve got to decide, [it] is 
making them abundantly aware 
of the standard on materiality 
and what that means and how 
it’s been set.’ 
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if there is one area…[where there is] still…confusion between even 
boards and audit committees, and something that we’ve got to decide, 
[it] is making them abundantly aware of the standard on materiality 
and what that means and how it’s been set. Because often a board will 
say, ‘Well, how come you didn’t spot that 200-grand adjustment?’ 
Well, you’re never going to spot the 200-grand adjustment if you’re 
working with a materiality of 10 million. It’s just not how an audit 
will work…[that area is] still fraught with danger as to how you 
explain that to the general public.
The next supplier has experience with a board that understands that to 
lower the materiality level below that set by the auditor will increase 
the cost, with a preparedness to pay that incremental cost to acquire the 
requisite level of assurance.
[Q]uite often management and the board don’t 
have a good appreciation of materiality and 
how it works and how it fits in. And I’m very 
keen to set out my materiality to the board 
so they understand exactly where it is, how 
we’ve applied the…standard on materiality. 
But firstly…it actually helps me when you’re 
selecting the benchmark to confirm that’s 
where they view it. I recently had an example 
where we had a good discussion with a very 
major listed company, and I’d set the materiality absolutely in 
accordance with the standard and judgment and so on. And they 
accepted that that was the benchmark, it was a right benchmark, 
or a benchmark. But they actually had another benchmark that was 
important to [them] and [they wanted to know] could we reduce 
our materiality to come to that benchmark? And I said, ‘Yeah, 
absolutely’, because that’s an extension of the scope of the audit. 
There’s a cost element to it, which the board understood and were 
comfortable with. So we varied that. And both materialities in fact 
are acceptable under the standard, which actually shows that the 
standard itself can lead you down to different answers. So…the first 
point I have is that I want to make sure that the board understands 
the concept of materiality and therefore what is or isn’t going to get 
picked up in an audit. And that leads us into another one, which is 
extending the audit and so on. 
‘[C]ould we reduce our 
materiality to come to 
that benchmark? And I 
said, “yeah, absolutely”, 
because that’s an extension 
of the scope of the audit. 
There’s a cost element 
to it, which the board 
understood and were 
comfortable with.’ 
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2.3.1 Summary
Several suppliers position the understanding of audit materiality within 
the context of other understandability challenges presented in the form 
of complex financial reports more generally, the issue of audit sampling 
and what it is that can and cannot be expected of an audit. Suppliers are 
eloquent in expressing the qualitative as well as quantitative nature of 
materiality and the role of their judgment in applying materiality, leading 
to the difficulty they perceive in articulating to unsophisticated users of the 
audit product their use of materiality in their audit conduct. Most suppliers 
are positive in their comments about the level of understanding of the 
materiality concept displayed by directors and audit committee members; 
however, this is not a universally held view. While there is little dispute 
that retail investors do not understand adequately the concepts involved, 
there is not agreement that this situation can be resolved, even with more 
disclosure. There is no support by suppliers for public disclosure of the 
real level of audit materiality employed, but it is evident that there are 
many instances—although not universally so—where the materiality level 
is disclosed to clients, either auditee management or audit committees. 
Suppliers are particularly knowledgeable that the level of materiality and 
the related use of sampling have consequences for the cost of the audit.
2.4 Standard setters
Like the comments of suppliers, those of standard setters range from 
conveying no discomfort with existing levels of understanding of audit 
materiality to those who see further education being required.
One standard setter reminds us that there are many aspects of audit 
that are not well understood and uses an analogy to convey the point that 
not all the intricacies of a product or service need to be known before use 
can be made of that product or service.
I challenge what is it that they need to know. 
I don’t want to get too off the track here, but 
we can joke about using inappropriate analogies 
around brain surgery and nuclear physics or 
whatever, but if I went to a doctor and needed 
to be fixed, how much do I need to know about 
the process and how he goes about fixing me? 
Does a brain surgeon need to explain to me 
‘does a brain surgeon 
need to explain to me 
every intricacy, or do I 
just need to know that 
he knows what he’s 
doing and he’s going to 
fix me up?’ 
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every intricacy, or do I just need to know that he knows what he’s 
doing and he’s going to fix me up? So I could equally talk about 
shareholders not understanding the difference between controls 
testing and substantive testing, understanding what we report to 
audit committees or those charged with governance. I could pick up 
lots of individual aspects of an audit in addition to materiality and 
say ‘people don’t understand’. 
One standard setter claims that it would be ‘dangerous’ to disclose the 
materiality level itself, and believes that the auditing standards should be 
the source of information about materiality, with education about where 
the standards can be found as a potential solution. 
[The disclosure of the materiality level itself is] 
probably dangerous and you don’t really want 
to dig those kind of holes for yourself because 
it’s subject to interpretation and you get a dollar 
above or a dollar below. Who knows what kind 
of impact that’s going to have in the minds of 
some investors…the auditing standards do set 
out materiality pretty well and…maybe there’s 
scope for increased awareness of the auditing 
standards to some extent. So we say that we have conducted this 
audit in accordance with Australian Auditing Standards and maybe 
some reference to key elements of auditing standards…[with] 
materiality—probably the risk standards around assessing the risks 
of an organisation, the risk of material misstatement and procedures 
designed to address those risks. That’s a general [statement], which 
you could include and then refer to the main body of standards 
and where they might be found…It makes them aware that the 
information’s available but now they’d probably just read the word 
in accordance with the Australian Auditing Standards without 
any concept of what that actually is…So if you can increase their 
awareness of what the Australian Auditing Standards actually are 
and where they can be found then…that’s probably a good thing.
Several standard setters make it clear that in their view there are more 
important audit issues than materiality for which understanding needs to 
be clarified, as the quotations below demonstrate.
‘[I]f you can increase 
their awareness of 
what the Australian 
Auditing Standards 
actually are and where 
they can be found 
then…that’s probably  
a good thing.’ 
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[C]ertainly, wherever I’ve worked, yes, [materiality is understood 
by boards of directors]. And it’s now absolutely the norm for the 
auditors to disclose their level of materiality in terms of the work 
they’re doing. That seems to me now to be standard practice at audit 
committees and then [there is] potentially a robust discussion around 
whether that is an appropriate level. In terms of shareholders…it’s 
just another facet of the difficulties of understanding the complexity 
of the work that auditors are expected to do. So yes, I’m sure that’s 
not well understood, although it’s not a difficult concept to grasp if 
you can engage someone and have a discussion. But how do you do 
that with the shareholders?
Education about the fact that a financial report audit does not give absolute 
assurance, which is a corollary of the application of audit materiality, is 
seen as the way to tackle the issue, according to the next two standard 
setters. 
[T]he profession would benefit…by having a greater understanding 
in the marketplace about the fact that an audit isn’t absolute 
assurance, so I would perhaps focus more on not so much defining 
materiality, but defining just what an audit is…So an audit provides 
reasonable but not absolute assurance. What does that mean…more 
discussion and disclosure [are needed] about the fact that it’s not 
a 100 per cent review, but…the message to convey there is more 
one of concept than the fact that it isn’t absolute assurance, rather 
than getting into the detail of describing materiality and what 
your thresholds are and the technical concepts…[it should be] the 
reinforcement that it’s not absolute assurance.
In discussing the materiality issue, this standard setter also comments on 
the issue of probability and the lack of desirability of disclosure of the 
dollar value of materiality:
[A]s long as people understand that the opinion an auditor gives is 
not an absolute opinion, but [that] really it is done within a range and 
you’re up in that 94 [per cent range]…If they understand it’s in that 
area that the opinion is given…that would be of benefit. I don’t know 
how you’d go around better educating the user base out there…it’s 
a task which you will never get a satisfactory answer [or] outcome 
on. In other words, there will always be someone who believes 
you’re giving absolute assurance, which is clearly not the case, and  
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I notice that in the review opinions where you’re giving the negative 
opinion…there is the level of confidence which is being expressed…
that is probably even less well known. And so [for] the materiality 
level, my preference would be that…we give a general recognition 
to it, but I wouldn’t like to see the number being flagged or disclosed 
because…the materiality does vary. In other words, you might have 
one materiality for an area but in terms of, say, the related parties and 
the materiality in terms of that may in fact be less than what you’ve 
used for receivables and payables because of the…qualitative nature 
of the materiality, and materiality is based on both quantitative and 
qualitative…so therefore it’s just not one figure. 
The same standard setter continues, affirming the need for greater 
understanding of the concept of audit materiality:
[W]hile I would support…a greater recognition, it would be 
interesting to see how that is done in terms of the…general or 
whether in fact it should be [in] the audit report…[in] my opinion…
the audit report [doesn’t need] to give any more than what it’s 
currently got on it, but…the general kind of awareness in terms of 
what an audit is about and the role of materiality…would be good 
and…that goes generally without saying. We’ve got to increase 
users’ understanding of those concepts. Whether it’s achievable 
or not, it’s probably hard to say, but…we have to certainly devote 
more in that area.
The same person goes on to infer, as with certain other comments cited in 
this chapter, that there could be negative consequences for the public’s 
views on auditing if there is universal understanding of materiality and 
its implications for ‘reasonable’ assurance.
[F]rom a public interest point of view, it probably 
would be helpful for the retail investors to 
understand more about materiality. And I’m 
trying to think of the wording of the audit 
report…in terms of whether it helps investors 
understand that we’re not saying the accounts 
are correct to the dollar—within reasonable 
limits…there are statements about reasonable 
assurance. But…the retail investor probably 
doesn’t understand what reasonable assurance 
‘[T]he other side of that 
coin is that it may lead 
to a negative view of 
the audit opinion in the 
invested community. It’s 
a doubled-edged sword 
really. How much do 
people need to know?’ 
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actually is…it could be helpful if something was said that this audit 
report is not a cast-iron guarantee. But there’s always a pro and a 
con and the other side of that coin is that it may lead to a negative 
view of the audit opinion in the invested community. It’s a doubled-
edged sword really. How much do people need to know…Having 
said that, if you make these disclosures, you make them across the 
board…an audit report is what it is, so…one firm’s audit report’s 
going to be the same as another firm’s audit report. So if investors 
are not happy that they don’t get [a] cast-iron guarantee down to 
the dollar, they’re still not going to find that anywhere. Even if 
they want it, they’re not going to get it. So…awareness is always a 
good thing…I always believe in being transparent about things…
that’s a good principle in itself, but you’ve always got to do things 
with caution and think about whether you’re achieving the right 
objectives, because [what you’re trying to do is] objectives driven.
The next standard setter expresses the difficulty of dealing with tiers 
of sophistication among users of the audit product and having all tiers 
understand materiality:
[W]ho are the…core users of these reports? 
And you go back to analysts [and] brokers—
they understand materiality because they 
look at the risk. Your average punter on the 
street probably [does] not, but then again, 
research would show they don’t read audit 
reports, so you ask the question, ‘Well, would 
they even understand what the basis of an 
audit was before you get to materiality?’ And 
the fact that the audit scope actually discusses 
the concept of materiality and the risk of material error and the 
risk of collusion and breakdowns in controls and all sorts of things 
that can lead to problems…materiality is one element of variance 
that could result. I actually query…whether materiality is the 
real issue or whether what we’re looking at here is in terms of the 
assessments people make. My concern would be that…businesses 
are projecting, forecasting, communicating their outcomes and it’s 
achieving those outcomes that then becomes the focus and…the 
audit becomes the verification of whether they did achieve that 
forecast, and does materiality come into that?
‘[A]nalysts [and] brokers…
understand materiality 
because they look at the 
risk. your average punter 
on the street probably 
[does] not, but then again, 
research would show they 
don’t read audit reports.’ 
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The same standard setter goes on to argue that it is qualitative materiality 
that could end up having a more important consequence than quantitative 
materiality:
Materiality has two elements—qualitative 
and quantitative—so you’ve got your two 
branches. You’re probably dealing with the 
qualitative aspect…more than the quantitative 
in a lot of these types of situations, because 
you can get some fairly significant variances 
of earnings over a period…[about which] 
arguably no-one would have done anything 
different even if they’d known about it. But 
let’s just say you’ve got a new start-up in 
your business, [a] new segment, et cetera. The qualitative aspect 
there is, is that segment delivering what you said it would deliver 
based on a forecast basis? And, that segment in its own right may 
not necessarily be material today in terms of its relevance to the 
business, but going forward, it may be what everyone’s betting 
on. And qualitatively that information is far more important than 
anything else you would read in the accounts or want to know about 
and…that’s probably where materiality is of greater importance 
than [whether]…earnings per share [were] 11 cents or…10 cents 
or nine cents. 
Among the standard setters, there is confirmation that board and audit 
committee members are conversant with the concept of materiality as used 
by auditors and that there have been improving levels of understanding 
among these parties in recent years.
We [auditors] have probably driven that discussion in the sense of…
[having] consciously put it fairly and squarely on the table, going 
back a little bit, and built a discussion around what that means 
in that framework, and that has then engendered, in some cases, 
an ongoing discussion around materiality and what does it mean. 
What does this issue mean in the context of materiality? So, yes, 
absolutely. It’s been a bit of push/pull…The auditors have pushed 
that issue more front and centre into the board at some places…[but] 
what’s happened is…you get these cross networks of directors…it 
actually filters through the director network over a period.
‘[T]hat segment in its own 
right may not necessarily 
be material today in 
terms of its relevance to 
the business, but going 
forward, it may be what 
everyone’s betting on.’ 
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[Materiality does not cause confusion in their minds]…not within 
the audit committee environment…We give them the audit plan at 
the start of the year and we explain our process and…the auditing 
standards make it fairly clear these days. Not that audit committees 
are familiar with them but…you’ve got to aggregate a number of 
issues. On the other hand, you’ve got qualitative aspects of issues 
to be addressed by management and by others charged with 
governance as well. So we have a professional obligation to report 
a number of things that we would never deem to be individually 
or in aggregate material. But now under the standards we must still 
make those charged with governance aware of these issues. So…
over the last three to four years, between ourselves and our clients, 
everyone’s become quite educated on that.
2.4.1 Summary
Standard setters, many of whom are suppliers also, tend to position the 
issue of understanding of materiality within a broader perspective of 
other aspects of audit that need to be understood just as much, if not 
more. Addressing these understandings among an audience comprising 
varying levels of sophistication is perceived as a difficult issue to overcome. 
Several standard setters are not convinced the issue needs to be given high 
priority, even though it might be contributing to the expectations gap. 
Confirmation that directors and audit committee members, on the whole, 
have appropriate levels of understanding is forthcoming from interviewed 
standard setters. 
2.5 Regulators
Not unexpectedly, regulators’ comments focus on the application 
of auditors’ judgment around materiality considerations.
[I]f you see the review-level reports…that the big firms produce 
today—and this is closely related to materiality—you’re very 
limited in terms of what they’ve done, and the audit profession 
uses materiality all the time. The thing with materiality is, where 
do you…draw the line…I don’t expect an auditor per se to detect 
every error. I expect an auditor to pick up all the big-ticket items…
And there’s a commonsense test…let me [give] a simple example…If 
you’ve got a balance sheet with assets of 100 million and you find a 
$10 or $20 million asset…is misstated—that’s material. It gets tricky 
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when it’s five…[which is] in the grey area…When you’re in the five 
to 10 area…the auditor needs to actually justify quite clearly in 
their work papers at least why they’ve reached that conclusion and 
how they’ve made that conclusion.
This regulator goes on to advocate more information being provided in the 
audit report if further testing does not resolve an issue that is in the ‘grey’ 
5–10 per cent quantitative materiality range. Adding content to the audit 
report over this type of issue is currently not encouraged by the auditing 
standards.
[T]he idea of prudence with professional judgment 
seems to be lost on an auditor sometimes…if you’re 
dealing with an issue, and there’s a material issue and 
it’s in the grey space. If you adopt a very prudent 
approach—let’s put aside the cost considerations of 
the audit—in a perfect world, the auditor will do 
further testing and satisfy themselves that that’s not 
going to cause me concern going forward. So that 
grey area will become either black or white. So you’ll do either 
more procedures or whatever, in the 5–10 per cent [range]. If you 
can’t reach that conclusion and you believe in aggregate they’re 
material…you should state it in the audit report. If you’ve got three 
errors, on its own it’s not material, but in aggregate if the three of 
them are material, you should…communicate that.
When asked whether it would help just to disclose the quantitative side, 
this regulator’s response is: 
No…you need to disclose both.
2.5.1 Summary
The grey area of quantitative materiality where the item at issue is found to 
be between 5–10 per cent of the relative base preoccupies this regulator’s 
comments, with a call for more disclosure in the audit report when such 
issues cannot be definitively resolved with more testing.
‘If you can’t reach 
that conclusion 
and you believe in 
aggregate they’re 
material…you 
should state it in 
the audit report.’ 
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3.0 Materiality: responsibility for and location  
 of disclosures
In making comments about the level of understanding of the auditor’s use 
of the materiality concept, several stakeholders made suggestions as to 
where incremental disclosures or educative material might be positioned 
and who might be made responsible for provision of this information. 
Some content relevant to this section appears in the comments in the 
previous section too, but below are stakeholders’ comments dedicated to 
this issue of responsibility and positioning.
3.1 Users
Only one user makes a comment with respect to responsibility for provision 
of information on audit materiality:
[W]hen you have a concept like that, that auditors rely so much 
on…the education needs to come out there. The Auditing Standards 
Board [is the body to provide it]. Impose that consistently across the 
profession…the problem is that it’s not just quantitative it’s also 
qualitative judgment…and also can be cumulative.
3.1.1 Summary
One user comments that it is the role of the Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board to provide educative information about the role of audit 
materiality.
3.2 Purchasers
One purchaser is wary of any more disclosures made in the financial report:
[T]he way to educate shareholders is not through more disclosure 
in financial statements. That’s not the place to do it…that has to 
be just clear, simple, to-the-point opinions…that’s the right way to 
go, and where it is at the moment, I’m happy with that as a general 
statement. But…there needs to be the ability for shareholders very 
easily to be given explanations of materiality and how it operates.
Another purchaser would like to see a general educative statement that 
explains materiality, presumably in the financial report, although this is 
not made entirely clear:
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[A] general statement in terms of educating shareholders or [the] 
general public especially, who are not familiar with the term 
materiality, is probably…important—as to what is materiality in 
the first place and what does it actually mean…when the reader’s 
reading the financial statement…that is probably [more] important 
than anything else…[It shouldn’t be just] a figure, because 
probably a certain number of figures may not actually apply in most 
situations…people would therefore need to understand when they 
read the financial statement, they need to be a bit more informed in 
what they actually read. It may not be, for example, 100 per cent 
correct is probably one of the main things they need to be aware of 
and…that is…important.
One purchaser wanted disclosures to be made by the auditor, presumably 
in the auditor’s report, tailored to the audit. This same type of comment 
also featured in purchasers’ quotations detailed previously in this chapter.
[W]hen there is a material number, we’d rather have more disclosure 
on material numbers rather than [less.] And…it comes back to 
material in terms of…signing this off, but it might be worth saying, 
‘Well, it’s a very generic statement that the sign-off is well’…and 
it might just be a bit more detail as to this is the process that we’ve 
undertaken to review the account.
3.2.1 Summary
From purchasers’ comments, it is clear they want auditors to have 
responsibility for disclosing more about materiality. The content of 
the disclosure ranges from a wish to have audit engagement-specific 
information in the auditor’s report to a wish to have educative material 
made available somewhere other than in the financial report.
3.3 Suppliers
Few suppliers made suggestions about which party should take 
responsibility for provision of more information about materiality in an 
audit context. One who did suggested the location should be within the 
financial statements:
[M]aybe the solution to this is…[and this is] where certainly the 
International Accounting Standards Board has been going, and I 
know the PCAOB in the US has been going…and this is why financial 
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statements are blowing out, but more disclosure about some of the 
judgments, more disclosure about the estimates, more disclosure 
about some of the qualitative factors behind the financials and 
behind the actual companies you’re putting to that is…as important 
as the quantitative numbers themselves.
The other supplier making a comment in the context of which party might 
be responsible for incremental information surrounding auditors’ use of 
materiality suggested the professional accounting bodies or the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors, but acknowledged the difficulty in making 
it highly readable.
[I]t’s the professional accounting bodies and the 
directors’ association, [the] Institute of Company 
Directors…[who are responsible] so that people 
understand a bit more about what auditing is and 
how it works. How you make that interesting so 
people will read it I have no idea, because that 
would be the hardest thing. And that’s why you 
then come back to a simplistic way of saying…if you 
know materiality, mention [it]. And there’s mention of it already 
in the audit report, but there [are] no parameters or context…Mr 
Joe Average…might think anything over 100 000 is quite material 
without relating it to the company. So that’s the problem at the 
moment, because everyone has their own concept of materiality. 
And…there is an issue there and how you overcome that I’m not 
actually too sure. But…there needs to be more information out 
there, more articles and a variety of things. And maybe a bit more 
prescriptive description of what an audit is and what it can achieve. 
3.3.1 Summary
Suppliers suggest the professional accounting bodies and/or the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) as appropriate parties 
to take responsibility for generalised provision of incremental materiality 
information. A suggestion for location of the material is in the financial 
report disclosures.
‘How you make 
that interesting so 
people will read 
it I have no idea, 
because that  





One standard setter believes the audit report or the publications of the 
accounting firms would be the best locations for incremental materiality 
information:
[There are] two options…One is in the body 
of the audit report, which is in the auditor’s 
responsibilities…if it was reasonably brief 
and, in terms of managing the expectation 
gap, there’s obviously a cost associated 
with everything and the cost of more than 
reasonable assurance is increased costs [to] the 
organisation. So it’s assurance at a reasonable 
cost as well as reasonable assurance. The…
only other place to basically educate the 
community…is in the publications of the accounting firms…or 
somewhere in the financial statements. But it’s not a client entity’s 
issue…for them to disclose. So the only places auditors can disclose 
things really are in their own reports and in their own web sites…
You don’t want to make the audit report too long.
Another standard setter believes the profession—presumably through the 
accounting bodies—would be best to take responsibility:
[The accounting profession] could do [it], but they tend to 
communicate more with their own constituency than anything else. 
The accounting profession communicates with accountants around 
the place. They don’t really put pronouncements out to the public. 
The public probably would never look at them or read them or be 
interested in them. 
Another standard setter suggests the incremental materiality information 
be placed within reports by regulators, or through forums such as those 
held by the Shareholders’ Association or the professional accounting 
bodies. The Auditing and Assurance Standards Board is mentioned also as 
playing a potential role.
I don’t have a simple answer for that because…we do it in the audit 
opinions at the moment, but that’s really a statement that it’s not 
absolute assurance…when we’re providing a statement of the scope 
of the audit opinion…How would I demystify the process a little bit 
‘[I]t’s not a client entity’s 
issue…for them to disclose. 
So the only places auditors 
can disclose things really 
are in their own reports and 
in their own web sites…
you don’t want to make 
the audit report too long.’ 
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more…[and say] it’s appropriate? Perhaps through reports from the 
regulators around how they assess whether an appropriate piece of 
work is done or not, but…if it’s shareholders generally, how do you 
[do it?]…the retail people are difficult. Institutional investors and 
larger interest groups are…more easily touched…forums through 
the Shareholders’ Association and obviously bodies that represent 
assurance practitioners are forums [where] we can do this, but only 
if we touch the people who are interested in the message…how do 
you get a message out…it’s more about confidence in the process 
and that it’s applied appropriately rather than having to understand 
the process in detail. But perhaps there’s a role here for the Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board as well. 
3.4.1 Summary
Standard setters vary in their suggestions as to which party might be given 
responsibility for providing incremental disclosures surrounding the 
auditor’s use of the materiality concept and where such disclosures might 
be located. Suggestions for responsibility range from auditors themselves 
and audit firms to the AUASB, professional accounting bodies and the 
Australian Shareholders’ Association. Suggestions for positioning range 
from the audit report and forums held by the above-mentioned bodies to 
the publications of the audit firms.
4.0 issues and implications 
The issue of materiality in the audit was discussed during the interviews 
both as a consequence of specific questioning and more broadly. The 
notion of having some form of disclosure of the level(s) of materiality was 
common among users and purchasers and was mixed among suppliers, 
standard setters and regulators. Those who did not support some form of 
disclosure of materiality included those who believed that participants in 
the capital market did not read financial statements and therefore would 
be disinclined to inform themselves about issues of materiality or that the 
majority of the participants in the capital market would find the concept 
confusing and it would contribute to the audit expectations gap rather 
than assist in closing it. 
Those who played a standard setter’s or regulator’s role also observed 
that while there had been audit failures in Australian corporate history and 
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elsewhere, none related directly to a misinterpretation, misunderstanding 
or miscommunication on the matter of materiality, but went to more 
fundamental issues. There were some responses to these more negative 
positions, including the notion that while not all those who participated 
in the market would necessarily understand the concept of materiality, 
even if disclosed or discussed in some form, there would be more informed 
users who represented the price makers in the capital market and even if 
that small minority was informed it would assist in making the market 
more efficient. 
Some who were negative about further disclosures in this area made the 
observation that the real thrust of what was needed was more confidence 
in the existing process and framework—for with this came a reduced need 
for further disclosures.
While this argument is held with some degree of passion, particularly 
by suppliers, it runs the risk of being interpreted as patronising. By this 
statement, the authors mean that the supply side within the profession 
might be viewed as providing information and therefore accountability 
only when they believe it is in their interests to do so and those people 
expert in the market know enough to be able to protect all market 
interests. The parallel might be a distinguished surgeon who has such 
great knowledge of surgery that he or she makes all decisions with respect 
to the surgery, doing away with informing the patient of key aspects of the 
procedure. Of course, the parallel here is the issue of informed consent. If 
those participating in a capital market know key issues about an audit that 
would more fully inform the capital market then why is this not provided? 
It might represent the equivalent of informed consent in surgery.
A large majority of all interviewees suggested that some form of 
disclosure would be useful, however, suggestions about the nature of that 
disclosure, to whom the disclosure was made, where the disclosure was 
made and what form the disclosure would take were quite varied. There 
were various innovative ideas as to what could be achieved. There are, 
however, some important caveats that need to be considered before any 
final decision is taken. 
Among suppliers, purchasers and some users, there was a view that 
providing disclosure of the existence of a materiality threshold influencing 
the audit represented a key ingredient in advising the market that the 
audit was not a 100 per cent guarantee that the representations made in 
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the financial statements were entirely accurate. That is to say, if the market 
is informed that there is a materiality threshold, the notion of a 100 per 
cent guarantee is immediately removed. 
There is a key set of issues around what type of disclosures are 
necessary or useful with respect to materiality. Users and purchasers 
focus on the quantitative aspects of materiality. When discussing 
this issue with suppliers, there was considerable debate surrounding 
the fact that materiality involved both quantitative and qualitative 
characteristics and hence the complexity of materiality judgments could 
not be underestimated. This gives rise to an important choice in terms of 
disclosures between some aggregated, quantitative, estimative materiality 
or a more simple conceptual disclosure of the presence of materiality. 
Further, some suppliers argued that at audit committee level, it was 
common to have a discussion about materiality at an aggregate level, but 
when one discussed line items in the financial statements on the basis of 
materiality, occasionally the discussion could become ‘heated’. Another 
factor to bear in mind with respect to disclosure of quantitative estimates 
of materiality—although not brought out in the interviews—is that this 
might present a useful piece of information (that could have damaging 
consequences for the auditee) for those who might seek to commit fraud 
to a level below the materiality threshold against the auditee.
Those who favour disclosures of the concept of materiality make a 
compelling argument that the qualitative characteristics are a key aspect 
to the determination of materiality. For example, materiality levels over 
related-party transactions might be very different to materiality levels 
over accounts receivable. The nature of these two items is different, which 
drives dissimilar relevant materiality levels. 
There is also active debate about to whom and when the materiality 
disclosures should be revealed. On the one hand, there is strong argument 
that boards of directors/audit committees are the appropriate audience 
for this information and the appropriate time is at the audit planning 
stage. In this circumstance, both qualitative and quantitative issues could 
be discussed at considerable length. There is a strong argument that the 
existing best-practice guidance, including the ASX corporate governance 
guidelines, could explicitly make reference to the fact that audit committees 
have a responsibility to be informed on matters of materiality and that 
audit committee charters should reflect this. 
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The more controversial disclosure would be to shareholders and therein 
lies the debate about the level of understanding and potential confusion 
these disclosures could cause. There were, however, persuasive comments 
that more complete discussion about general aspects of materiality could 
be included on an auditee’s web site or on the web sites of the audit firms, 
the AUASB or professional associations. 
Some of the more experienced and sophisticated interviewees were 
strongly of the view that better communication of materiality was an 
area where action could and should be taken. The authors of this report 
note that successive governments have encouraged retail shareholders to 
participate in the capital market but this encouragement has not been 
matched by equivalent public support mechanisms to assist them into 
this participation. There has been an implicit assumption that the free 
market behaviour of Australia’s capital market will ensure their rights 
and interests are protected. Disclosures, including that of materiality, 
might be a key factor in effective participation in the capital market. Not 
informing participants is a public policy issue. Put more directly, some 
widespread understanding that materiality levels exist within the audit 
poses a significant benefit in reducing the audit expectations gap if, by 
virtue of its disclosure, it removes the notion that the audit is somehow 
comprehensive and is a guarantee that the transactions and financial 
representations made are 100 per cent guaranteed by the auditor. 
5.0 Concluding remarks
If the capital market had information about materiality then it seems certain 
that it would use it to enhance market efficiency. This can be illustrated 
by reference to two examples. The first example is a hypothetical one, in 
which we have two absolutely economically identical companies trading 
on the stock market with assets, profitability and prospects as well as risk, 
which are identical. One company, however, is audited with a materiality 
level of $2 million and the other with a $6 million threshold. In an efficient 
market, investors would gravitate to the first mentioned company because 
of the prospect that its financial statements are likely to be more ‘finely 
tuned’ than the second company’s. A second example is more realistic 
in a sense that one might have two companies that have different asset 
structures and different prospects for the future. One company, however, 
has a governance structure that ensures it has a very low level of materiality 
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as part of the audit process and the other company is more aggressive 
in its behaviour and has agreed with its auditor to a much higher level 
of materiality. The second company represents for an investor a higher 
level of information risk, which would need to be incorporated into the 
investor’s decision making. If investors have a large appetite for risk then 
they are more attracted to the second of the two potential investments. 
These examples imply that the absence of information about materiality 
results in a cost being borne by the capital market. 
Despite the efficiencies that would flow to the capital market, we find 
little if any empirical evidence of the public disclosure of materiality. 
We also find significant diversity of practice among audit committees 
in asking for or being provided with materiality information. There is 
little direct guidance available for audit committees on this issue. Some—
perhaps many—audit committees seek direct and substantial information 
on materiality from their auditor. One or two might seek to avoid that 
knowledge. Others might not know of its availability and its role within 
decision making on the quality of the audit—hence, our observation about 
diversity in practice. This variability is troubling from a public policy 
setting. An implication is that guidance or even requirements for boards 
and/or audit committees could be enhanced to make express reference 
to the desirability of having a conversation with their auditor about 
materiality, if not their right to ask for disclosure to them of the level 
or levels used. In the same vein, board and audit committee educative 
processes could mandate the inclusion of a discussion of materiality. 
Who could be responsible for providing this guidance? Clearly, the 
AUASB could be a vehicle for providing this guidance, as could be the 
ASX and/or the AICD. Each would have varying attributes and bring 
varying qualities to the provision of such guidance.
Clear communication with management—as opposed to boards 
and audit committees—with respect to the materiality level has some 
potentially disadvantageous effects. It is the case that some managers might 
use knowledge of the materiality level as ‘pushback’ on the auditors and 
it might be used to dissuade auditors from pursuing a line of inquiry if 
the matter in question is under a pre-specified materiality level. In other 
words, management might use this knowledge to dissuade auditors from 
following their own preferred line of inquiry. Similarly, if materiality levels 
become known within an auditee, those who wish to commit fraud or 
engage in other opportunistic behaviour could have valuable information 
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with which to work that would not be available in the circumstance of 
uncommunicated materiality levels.
Despite the fact that the capital market is a global one, any specific 
guidance on materiality has to recognise that there is a sharp difference 
between the US regulatory style—to which some of Australia’s companies 
are exposed—and the common experience in the Australian capital market. 
It would seem that in the US system, if there is error, the tolerable materiality 
level is zero. This comes about because of accounting standards that are 
interpreted to mean that any error might affect the decision making of users 
and hence needs to be corrected. This is not the application in Australia. 
One consequence of this is that there is a higher proportion of modified 
audit reports in the Australian jurisdiction than in the United States and it 
would seem that there are more restated accounts in the US system. Some 
might argue that the Australian system is more tolerant of imprecision.
In the eyes of retail investors and possibly even some more sophisticated 
users and purchasers of audit services, as well as accounting students who 
might be useful surrogates for some of the above, there is the possibility 
of materiality being misconceived because some of the dynamics of 
materiality are counterintuitive. In common language, the convention is 
that the ‘more material, the better’. In its application to auditing, however, 
the higher the level of materiality, the ‘weaker is the audit’. That is, where 
materiality levels are higher, the screen through which the auditor puts 
the transactions and balances is coarser. Put more directly, more gets 
through the screening device undetected. As noted above, the alternative 
expression to materiality is ‘tolerable error’. The authors would speculate 
that usage of the term ‘tolerable error’ in guidance or elsewhere might be 
received with more clarity than the term ‘materiality’.
Some respondents made the suggestion that the key to understanding 
materiality was to turn to the auditing standards. These standards, even 
in the hands of experts, are insufficient in order to calibrate levels of 
materiality for any given engagement. The rationale that all can be found 
in the auditing standards is, in the view of the authors, false because so 
much rests on the proprietary audit models of the audit suppliers. This 
further supports the necessity for clear guidance.
The evidence we have gathered, either expressly or impliedly, refers to 
quantitative materiality thresholds, but there is also reference, particularly 
from suppliers, to qualitative materiality. This introduces a level of 
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subtlety and complexity that is hard for even sophisticated stakeholders 
in the capital market to get a good handle on. Further, it makes the audit 
more opaque, less understandable and more mysterious. 
In addition to the complexities introduced by qualitative aspects to 
materiality, it is the case that there are multiple levels of materiality that 
apply in any given audit and so a conversation that talks about a (singular) 
materiality level is in many instances overly simplistic and makes the 
difficulties of communication to relevant stakeholders on materiality more 
complex than might be represented. 
Among the unforeseen consequences of this project have been 
some observations about undergraduate auditing education and its 
placement within the curricula and the perspective with which it is 
taught. Conventionally, because of the perceived need to have a fulsome 
education in financial accounting, auditing is taught towards the very 
end of a commerce degree. A non-conventional alternative would be the 
early introduction of auditing so that a student’s exposure to financial 
accounting issues can be informed from an audit point of view. This 
could give the student a more subtle and insightful perspective on their 
education in financial accounting. 
It is also possible that with auditing being taught earlier in the 
curriculum, it might be less technically focused and more conceptual. This 
being the case, the use of case studies could lend itself more positively to 
the educational experience of the student. The consequence of this would 
be lower levels of technical knowledge of auditing standards; however, 
one might speculate that those students who go on to auditing are re-
educated on these through their professional training. 
From our discussions, it would seem that materiality is crucial to the 
quality of the audit, is never expressly referred to in the audit report 
and is less than universally discussed even among audit committees. 
This being the case, we would argue that materiality has a significant 
role in the existence and extent of the audit expectations gap. It is the 
case that auditors use materiality as a crucial screening device for the 
conduct of their professional work. Closely related to this is their use 
of sampling. Sampling and materiality are keys to audit quality and to 
cost. This, together with the quality of the staff undertaking the audit, 
the methodology employed, the wider availability of expertise and 
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mechanisms for ensuring independence are keys to the completion of a 
satisfactory audit. 
As conventionally worded, the audit report makes no explicit 
reference either to the level of materiality or to sampling. Materiality can 
be represented by reference to the aggregate absolute dollar value that 
applies generally to the engagement. Sampling has direct consequences 
on the probability that misstatement will occur. Note particularly that 
current conventional wording to ‘test’. ‘Test’ could mean that 100 per cent 
of transactions are tested or that some smaller proportion is examined. It 
gives no hint that it is a proportion or sample that is tested or that there is 
existence of a probability around that test. 
One wonders if an audit report that, among other things, states that 
‘this audit is a certification of the X percentage probability of the absence 
of misstatement in the financial report above an absolute aggregate dollar 
value of Y’, would be subject to the same level of misinterpretation that 
has been attributed to the current wording in the audit expectations gap 
literature. 
The fact that materiality levels and the cost of an audit are so inexorably 
linked is known by a number of purchasers, and probably every supplier 
in the market for audit services. The fact that it is not seen as an express 
part of the negotiation over the quality of the audit (and as an opportunity 
for an added assurance service) is, however, an important oversight in 
the market for audit services. We found little evidence that there were 
negotiations over materiality levels and that this aspect of quality and 
price appeared to be treated as independent from each other in all but a 
handful of cases. Surely, as part of an efficient market for audit services, 






DEvEloPinG BUsinEss ACUMEn AnD 
CliEnT AnD inDUsTRy KnowlEDGE 6
You will always have some clients who say you don’t understand 
my business. Is it getting worse? At the junior end, it probably is 
because you have the mindless drones who aren’t enjoying their 
work, turning up [and saying], ‘Oh yes, just another audit. What 
is it today…last week it was a car dealer, do I care? No, I just fill 
out this check list.’ So if it is getting any worse—and perhaps it is, 
perhaps it isn’t, I can’t make a general statement really on that—at 
that lower end that will be why. At the more senior end—partner 
and director…it’s actually less likely to be getting worse because 
you are increasingly getting…industry specialisation and that has 
been the case for a number of years now.
— Supplier
1.0 Key issues
All stakeholders to a greater or lesser extent recognise the importance 
to audit quality of a supplier having business acumen and client and 
industry-specific knowledge. Some of the key issues for the profession 
around development and maintenance of these knowledge bases include:
•	 does industry expertise add value to the provision of auditing services
•	 to what extent do industry categorisations remain valid between 
different sized levels of market capitalisation
•	 does auditor industry specialisation add to potential conflicts in terms 
of independence
•	 to what extent does specialisation in a specific accounting standard(s) 
overlap and/or conflict with auditor industry specialisation
•	 how is it best to develop client-specific knowledge
•	 what is the role of audit working paper documentation in effectively 
conveying client-specific knowledge
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•	 what is the best way in which to convey client-specific knowledge to 
more junior auditors
•	 how frequent is the occurrence of client staff bonuses being tied to 
few or no audit adjustments being required or made and are there 
consequences for financial reporting or audit quality of this practice
•	 how can it be reconciled that those to whom the client is most 
frequently exposed and those who do most of the day-to-day audit 
work—the more junior auditors—are those least likely to possess the 
business acumen many clients expect to be present
•	 is audit personnel turnover becoming an issue among seniors and 
partners when this group was considered stable previously
•	 what are the most effective training techniques for audit personnel
•	 how can auditors best communicate to clients the engagement issues 
presented by high client staff turnover and/or lack of knowledge
•	 how can auditors best communicate to clients that at times asking the 
seemingly ‘dumb’ questions can uncover areas that need to be the 
subject of audit investigation
•	 is the quality of initial audits different from that of subsequent audits
•	 are there characteristics beyond industry expertise, client knowledge 
and business acumen that individuals could usefully hold and/or 
develop?
2.0 introduction
An important aspect of auditor competence is the development of skill 
in understanding the client’s industry and the client’s business within 
that industry. Indeed, gaining this understanding is a requirement of 
Auditing Standard ASA 315: Understanding the Entity and Its Environment 
and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement. This chapter examines 
survey, face-to-face interview and peer junior auditor focus group 
responses to issues including the development of client and industry-
specific knowledge, whether it is valued by clients, how it is applied to 
clients and the role of business acumen in the delivery of audits. 
While, as acknowledged later, some responses from interviewees 
intertwine the issues of industry expertise, client knowledge and business 
acumen, it is the case that the three have differentiating and distinctive 
characteristics. Business acumen is about having a commercial sense and 
a general insight into the operations of business; industry expertise is 
having knowledge and appreciation of the particular characteristics, risks 
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and critical issues of an industry or group of industries that share similar 
characteristics relevant for an auditor; and client knowledge is a more 
specific understanding of the issues, risks and characteristics of a particular 
auditee, its management and its operations. It is evident that these three 
are intertwined; you could not, for example, have particularly acute client 
knowledge without having well-developed business acumen; it is unlikely 
that you would have business acumen if you had well-developed industry 
specialist knowledge. That being said, we use the three terms below in the 
contexts of the three descriptions given above.
3.0 survey 
One of the questions asked of survey recipients tapped into perceptions 
of the value of industry and client knowledge. In response to a question 
about whether external financial statement audits were of value because 
of ‘the specialist industry expertise of the auditor’, as shown in Table 
6.1, the most positive of the groups was suppliers, with 50 per cent of 
them rating this as being valuable. A similar proportion of users and a 
more modest proportion—at slightly less than one-third—of purchasers 
responded affirmatively to this question. Among the suppliers, there was a 
sharp differentiation between Big Four and non-Big Four auditors in their 
level of agreement, with in excess of three-quarters of Big Four auditors 
believing industry expertise brought value compared with less than half 
of non-Big Four auditors. This could reflect an issue of industry expertise 
and its relevance across all levels of market capitalisation.
Table 6.1 shows that, with respect to knowledge or understanding of 
the client’s business, purchasers and users were more guarded in their 
responses, with less than half responding positively. CEO/CFO respondents 
were particularly harsh, with about only one-third indicating that the 
audit was of value because of the auditor’s understanding of the client’s 
business.
Industry knowledge is valued over client knowledge by users, but 
purchasers and suppliers place a higher importance on client knowledge 
than on industry knowledge.
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Table 6.1  value of financial statements audits because of the industry  

















































































An external financial statement audit is of value to you because:
Of the specialist 
industry knowledge 
that the auditor 
brings to the audit
46 43 47 48 31 37 26 34 50 77 42
The auditor has a 
good understanding 
of the company’s 
business 
40 38 34 46 33 41 31 29 55 66 53
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
As observed in Table 6.2, there is overall concern about the business 
acumen of auditors within some quarters. In response to questions about 
an audit being of value, a minority of purchasers expressed a negative view 
about the business acumen that the auditor brought to the audit, while a 
majority of suppliers responded to the same question in the affirmative. 
Specifically with respect to audit partners, most users and suppliers saw 
the business acumen of audit partners as above the mid-point, with junior 
auditors not rated highly. Interestingly, overall, purchasers took a harsher 
view than users.
A superficial description of these results, however, might not tell the 
full and rather complex story with respect to the market’s view of the 
business acumen of auditors. With reference to users, the comments below 
illustrate that while there is genuine concern about the level of business 
acumen, there is a sharp distinction between the acumen of partners and 
more junior auditors and a realisation that turnover, particularly at the 
junior level, is a part of the audit firm business model, and that juniors 
have to learn.
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An external financial statement audit is of value to you because:
Of the business 
acumen that the 
auditor brings to 
the audit
45 44 41 49 33 32 33 37 55 68 51
In general, how do you rate the business acumen of:
Audit partners 57 64 55 51 60 54 63 61 81 88 79
Junior auditors  9 10  9 8 6  7 27  4 14 16 13
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
4.0 interviews
In the face-to-face interviews conducted among the user, purchaser, 
supplier, standard setter and regulator stakeholder groups, several 
questions relating to client knowledge, industry specialisation and 
the business acumen of auditors were asked. Interestingly, many of 
the interviewees interlaced their responses with comments about all 
three issues and there was interdependency in these responses. As a 
consequence, in the comments made below, we will tease out observations 
about these three important, distinct but interrelated concepts. 
4.1 Users
Among users, there was some scepticism that accounting firms could be 
viewed as business experts at all. 
[Industry expertise is a] bit of a joke. I’m…quite amazed at the 
projection of accounting firms as business experts at all…The 
[professional body advertisements] I find quite amazing. Having 
worked at [name of organisation] and knowing how much involved 
the accountants were in all the projects we developed…the self-
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promotion of that has been very successful, but…[it is] very made 
up and fabricated and I don’t agree with it at all. 
There is acknowledgment of the need for development of industry specialist 
knowledge, but recognition also of conflict between the development of 
this knowledge in a small market such as Australia and maintenance of 
independence, as the following comment reveals: 
[T]hat’s probably a fair criticism [about auditors’ business 
knowledge]. But…in a small market like Australia, you’re going 
to have to run that [independence] risk, because there are many, 
many industries. What do you do? Do you want an auditor that’s 
an expert in auditing just one industry? They’re going to lose their 
independence, because you can get too close…that’s a cost they 
just have to bear. I don’t know how you get around it. They can 
probably get around it in bigger capital markets, [such as] Europe 
or the States…And where does the real knowledge rest? It’s only 
really with the audit partner, because everybody else is changing 
so much. I mean, it’s a training ground, auditing. So where does the 
real industry knowledge rest anyway? It’s with an audit partner 
who directs the work [and] all the rest of it, but it’s the minions 
doing the work, and they’re going to be turned over every year. So 
I’m not quite sure it’s a good argument. 
Auditors possessing core product knowledge within specific industries is 
the desire of this next user when responding to the question ‘Do you think 
it’s important that auditors have that sort of specialist-type knowledge 
of the clients; so we’re talking beyond the industry expertise—a client-
specific knowledge. And, if that’s important, how would they develop and 
maintain that?’
I can…understand a client being frustrated if an auditor comes 
in—and, using a bank as an example—doesn’t understand what a 
derivative is, or can’t get their head around a structured transaction, 
a foreign exchange transaction, whatever it might be. That…would 
be unacceptable…core product knowledge is essential on the part 
of the auditor. I can see that leading more to auditors becoming 
sector specific—industry specific—in terms of their knowledge, 
particularly in more complex industries like insurance, for example. 
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The same user continues, differentiating between senior and junior 
auditors in terms of their client-level knowledge:
As to whether they need detailed knowledge of the client…at 
the more senior level they would definitely need that familiarity 
and ability to talk to senior management in a…knowledgeable, 
strategic way. At the junior level…that’s the age-old problem, isn’t 
it? Everybody has to start somewhere and they’re not going to be 
the world’s best auditors on day one, so every audit team has its 
juniors, and…a client simply has to accept that…But they should 
expect that that person has the product knowledge that they could 
have gained through their studies.
The senior staff [is] pretty good but the junior ones are…learning 
the ropes all the time and they’re doing quite important things.
Another user responds:
[I]t’s still hard for the auditors sometimes to be on top of all the 
different areas of business, particularly if you’ve got a complicated 
business, or an international business, or you’ve got numerous 
transactions going on. Obviously, the greater complexity in the 
business, the harder it is for people to understand it, and…it opens 
the door to transactions going through that people don’t necessarily 
understand.
An interesting interchange takes place, which has relevance for the subject 
of Chapter 9 (independence) and the issue of audit partner rotation, but is 
positioned here to maintain the context of the question. The interviewer 
asks: ‘In your opinion, do external auditors have sufficient knowledge of 
the client’s business and operations? If this is an area of concern to you, 
can you identify ways in which this can be addressed?’ 
I’d have to say no [and the interviewer confirms that this is in relation 
to the sufficient knowledge of the client’s business]…No, they don’t 
and that’s probably of concern too…for the shareholder…No, they 
don’t and they can follow a certain formula, follow a procedure, but 
the depth of actual understanding and therefore the depth of being 
able to identify other issues is perhaps limited.
The interviewer then asks how this situation might be improved and the 
response is:
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[I]t would only be improved if before you get into an auditing 
position, you [are] required to spend time inside [corporations], 
actually operating in a reasonably senior role inside that sector…
you’d need to have that sort of experience level.
The interviewer comments, ‘So, what you’re saying is the life cycle of an 
auditor is not the traditional [one]: you graduate, you go to work for a Big 
Four firm, you get promoted to a senior and manager, but in fact cycling 
through different employment circumstances’, and the interviewee agrees. 
The interviewer continues, saying: 
So, a profession that facilitated cycling backwards and forwards 
and audit firms that actually encouraged interchange. See, I’m 
interested in your reflection on this. I mean, the regulatory changes 
have probably made that more difficult rather than less because 
of audit rotation if you have industry expertise. By and large, for 
big clients, partners and their families have to move interstate 
periodically because there is no… 
The interviewee responds in the following way:
Yeah, it seems like a good thing on the surface—the rotation—
but in practice…it’s another one of those situations where you’re 
having practice and…theory and…in practice…[there are] a lot of 
negatives about it as well and I can understand why, but at the same 
time…it leads to other issues…unless you do have that grounded 
experience in the industry sectors and understand the operations 
of what’s really going on then to do the audit is really more of a 
calculating exercise at a very high level and…a good management 
team can manipulate that process very easily.
In this next exchange too, the issue of audit partner rotation is addressed 
as detracting from the ability to know the client’s business and operations:
No, they never [have sufficient knowledge of their clients’ business 
and operations].
The interviewer then asks, ‘Is that across all levels, or partner and 
managers?’, and the response is:
I think so…it’s more extreme—and obviously with junior staff 
turning over like they do, it’s just physically impossible. Obviously, 
it’s nowhere near as noticeable at the manager partner level, 
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because typically the partner in particular has been exposed to 
that industry. He might do a number of audits within that industry 
and also [has] been exposed to your company for a longer period…
within audit partners, there’s a huge variability in answering that 
question. Some guys are significantly better than others.
The interviewer then asks: ‘So, in your opinion, do you think that trying 
to maintain the same audit team members on a continuing tenure with one 
client would help?’ The response is:
Well…getting rid of these silly rules about audit partner rotation 
would help. 
4.1.1 Summary
Users display awareness of potential independence conflicts that 
could arise when auditors become specialist in a single industry, but 
acknowledge the difficulty of avoiding such conflicts in an audit market 
the size Australia’s. There is also acceptance that client-specific knowledge 
is more important for senior audit personnel than for more junior audit 
personnel and tolerance for junior auditors acquiring this knowledge and 
business acumen on the job. Users are in the main tolerant of the need 
to train junior auditors on the job, but point out that it is these auditors 
who conduct much of the audit work. They recognise the lower personnel 
turnover and higher industry expertise of audit partners. Comment is made 
about the reliance on the audit partner as a relatively stable constant and 
as the source of the real industry knowledge. Understanding is present too 
in terms of the complexity of business and how difficult it is for auditors 
to be across all areas of business. 
4.2 Purchasers
Several purchasers spoke of the importance of selecting an audit firm that 
could supply the appropriate industry knowledge at the various levels of 
personnel. One person from the purchaser group spoke of the importance 
of proactively managing the process by requesting as part of the audit 
tender documents or negotiations that audit staffers with skills in specific 
areas were made available. 
[The level of client knowledge is] not of concern to me because this 
gets down to your selection of the auditor. As we go out to tender…
one of the criteria is industry knowledge. That means that virtually 
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restricts you to four, because when you think about it…we are 
virtually the industry…there are others, but you wouldn’t want the 
auditors of the competition, right? So that limits us to really global 
firms. And…we’ve moved from [firm X to firm Y] over the last 10 
years. And when we changed one of the criteria was [the] industry 
experience, which they had, and you have the people here in 
Australia who have the experience. I don’t want to be given advice 
from [a major US city]. And that’s part of the selection process. 
So for a big firm like ours, I haven’t experienced any difficulty in 
getting the industry experience, and I guess it’s a bit of a plum job.
The same purchaser adds:
If I was to ask my people to deal with the more junior staff, they 
would probably say that [the auditors] don’t know what they’re 
talking about, or they don’t know, so they don’t ask the right 
questions. You’re going to get some of that. I mean, where do you get 
your experience? You’ve got to start somewhere. And can I expect 
that every one of that audit team has industry experience…that’s an 
unrealistic expectation. And we go through the selection process; 
we go through at partner level, at…director level, manager level, 
[to ensure] that there is sufficient mix…it’s part of the selection. 
But of course you’re going to get some people who are going to be 
learning on the job. 
Perhaps surprisingly, some of the purchasers made it clear that they 
did not expect a great deal of business acumen to be displayed by their 
auditors and did not believe it was necessarily part of the job of an audit. 
The following quote reveals the thinking behind this perspective:
Auditors do not understand business models. That is not their job. 
Their job is to understand internal control over financial reporting. 
They want financial reports to reflect the bad, the good and the 
indifferent and, as long as they do, then their job has been done.
The interviewee goes on to comment on the relative client knowledge 
of the auditors versus the management of an auditee:
[A]t the audit partner level…there is what I call broad experience 
and broad knowledge [about] how to apply the audit regime to 
a given company. Do they really understand the business of the 
business? No, they don’t get into the business in the same way, to 
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the same depth, as management [does] or the directors do. No, it’s 
not possible.
Nevertheless, among some of the purchasers, there were very positive 
comments about the client knowledge of the auditors, about how at 
a senior level they tried hard to keep up to date with client circumstances—
particularly where stable audit teams could be maintained. The following 
quotations give a flavour of some of these positive comments. 
I don’t have any concerns [about auditors’ business knowledge]. 
But that comes from having a very stable team, and having a really 
long-term involvement of key people in the job. I’ll give you an 
example…we had a senior manager on the job when I started [a 
number of] years ago. He was the senior manager at [one of the Big 
Four firms]. He got promoted to partner and came back into the job 
as the partner in charge. He was in the job for five years or whatever 
their rotation period was. He moved out of that role and took up a 
regional consolidation role, or a regional partner role to coordinate 
[one of the Big Four’s] functions for our operations in Asia-Pacific. So 
he’s still the same guy as I was dealing with 12 years ago, and I was 
the junior here. I deal with him every quarter when we do a regional 
wrap-up…quarterly audit call…In our specific example, we’ve had 
great continuity of…staff and they understand the business very 
well. So I don’t have any concerns in that area. They get in there, 
they try and find things every year to help us. But…generally they 
don’t find things because we’ve got a fairly stable business model 
anyway. But they do understand the business very well. 
The interviewer probes further about the turnover of audit staff. The same 
purchaser responds:
[I]t could be a lot worse than it is. It happens at the junior level, 
but that’s…a little bit of noise and it’s not the end of the world.  
If one of our junior staff is having to think about something to 
answer an auditor’s position, well our guy’s probably only been in 
the role less than a year anyway, and it’s [an] education exercise for 
him to have to figure out the answer so he can tell the auditor. So 
I don’t think there’s a great cost to us; [there is] a little frustration, 
but I don’t think there’s a great cost to us because of that turnover 
at the coalface. If it was at a more senior level, it would be more of 
an issue, but we haven’t had that problem.
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Another purchaser is also enthusiastic about auditors’ client knowledge: 
[T]hey do have a good idea…it’s very difficult when you’re immersed 
in this day in and day out. This is the world you live in, that’s a 
totally different environment to something where you parachute in 
for a couple of months a year…I can only talk for ourselves, but…
they generally have a good understanding of our business…they 
read quite extensively, they ask quite broadly and…with finance…
in a strange sort of way, there’s quite a lot of cut-over from company 
to company and…that sort of broad industry perspective is…quite 
good.
Probing further, the interviewer inquires about the business acumen of 
junior staff and the same purchaser’s response is:
Well, it’s a bit unfair to say, ‘Oh well, they don’t know how to do it’ 
and they’ve only just stepped out of university…there’s got to be a 
training process and I accept that.
Returning to the issue of client knowledge, however, and the stability of 
audit teams, some see this as a real issue, as the following quote indicates:
From a trained perspective…they’re definitely improving…when 
I first joined the industry…the external auditors would just come 
in, do whatever they need to do and then pull out, but nowadays 
they’re actually spending…a bit more [time]…try[ing] to build an 
ongoing relationship and…the bigger the client, the bigger the size 
of the account. They…spend a lot of time, not just because they 
have to be here doing the quarterly or the half-yearly reporting, but 
because they’re also spending time…especially in the beginning…
to speak to all their key stakeholders within the company and try 
to understand what the business is like, what’s going forward, 
anything they need to be aware of from a [business] point of view. 
So they are definitely getting more and more understanding of the 
particular business. 
The interviewer probes further about staff turnover and the response 
from the same purchaser is:
[T]hey’re always changing their staff, from one year to another, 
especially the more junior level, they tend to change every year…
basically, the one who is really doing the brunt of the work will be 
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changing. Hopefully, the more senior, the manager’s level, they’re 
less likely to change. But having said that, when I say less, maybe 
two to three [years], not forever. And we don’t expect forever, but 
continuity is always a bit of an issue with the external firm…it’s 
something I don’t think they can help too much.
Probing further, the interviewer asks: ‘What kind of costs do you see 
because of that continuity issue, from your perspective?’ The response is:
Obviously, we may have to backtrack a little bit more in terms of what 
we do, what we discuss to get the new person [understanding]…
if it’s a new staff [member]…fairly junior…they are likely to ask 
exactly the same question they asked the year before. So this is the 
comment I tend to get…especially [from] the finance managers, and 
they feel like they have to repeat themselves because [the auditors] 
don’t understand perhaps how we do certain things within the 
finance department and so that’s where they think that—whether 
the time is wasted is probably one thing—[it] is more like…they 
feel like they have to repeat themselves…Why can’t we do it better, 
or why can’t we actually move forward? And then perhaps try 
to quicken the process…or not waste each other’s time…[that’s] 
probably where everyone is coming from.
The same purchaser continues with respect to ways in which to minimise 
the effects of auditor staff turnover:
[T]hey are trying their best…they maintain their documentation 
just like any auditors and every one of them now use[s] electronic 
work too, so hopefully there’s a slightly better maintenance of 
the records…But having said that, the record is only as good as 
the person taking the minutes. It depends on how detailed, how 
extensive [they are]…and the quality of the minutes…but we’re 
still finding from time to time that someone may have to repeat the 
actual process or conversation they may have undertaken.
The interviewer continues on the same theme and asks about the 
proportion of new staff in the audit team:
It varies [from] one year to another sometimes. Just talking about…
the last, say, five to 10 years, sometimes the whole junior team 
might have changed, but sometimes even the manager would have 
changed, so…we are more concerned if the management team 
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change[s] because…they would be the one likely to have all the 
knowledge or corporate memory. And if they change and they don’t 
have a proper handover period then management will start thinking 
‘Do we need to start…repeating what was said to external auditors 
before?’, because a lot of the knowledge might have been lost with 
the person. We have the situation this year that external auditors 
will be changing their manager on sites of all the subsidiaries…this 
is a staff turnover issue [not a rotation requirement]. 
Among the purchaser group, there were those who were quite scathing of 
the client knowledge of auditors.
[I]t’s fair to say out of 10, I would be looking around the four 
mark…there’s huge improvement in this area needed…it’s one 
thing having the partner and the senior manager having knowledge 
and understanding your business, which is generally the case, but 
it’s really the core individuals who are performing the work that 
we find have a big lack of knowledge. And…that’s where there’s 
huge improvement needed by the firms themselves. Now whether 
that’s more regular contact [or not]…there’s always a problem with 
rotation of staff, which obviously affects the broader knowledge.
The same purchaser continues:
[There are] different reasons [for audit staff turnover]…I know that 
the profession is…under a fair bit of pressure on staff turnover. 
If you are constantly changing your staff over, asking the same 
questions the next year, and then the next year…it builds up a bit of 
animosity within the organisation. And the auditors…get annoyed 
and then that’ll lead towards these sort of shutdown questions…
if you can build a good relationship, it’s going to help. If you can 
try and maintain consistency of staff…those two are critical areas 
which should stand you in a better position and move [you] forward 
and you can grow together. 
The same purchaser talks about gaining client knowledge more succinctly 
if audit staff come from non-accounting education backgrounds:
[Having spent] some time in the UK, it’s interesting seeing [that] 
what they do at university has nothing to do with what their next 
job is. So a lot of our auditors, junior auditors and senior auditors, 
when I was working in the UK, their background is something 
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in geography or engineering. It was just a complete[ly] different 
background to what you get here in Australia…which is just your 
standard. And…to some extent that worked well because you did 
get a different view and a different perspective from the auditors. 
They did [not] ask…robotic questions. They asked…a lot more 
commonsense-type questions, whereas…a lot of people coming just 
from [an accounting] background…it’s almost a standard question 
without giving as much thought behind it. Now, whether that came 
from different backgrounds, it would be interesting to look at that.
Many of the purchasers distinguished between senior audit personnel and 
more junior personnel and had praise for the senior staff’s business acumen 
and client knowledge. The following is illustrative of such sentiments:
[M]ost of my interaction with auditors these days is at the partner 
and very senior manager level, so I couldn’t comment below that…
But I’m very impressed with the knowledge that all of those people 
have of the business. They seem to have a much more strategic kind 
of focus than we did…back in my days as an auditor…they seem 
to come to grips with the issues for the business very quickly and, 
in many cases, where you’re having a change in CFO or that kind of 
thing, they provide a very, very valuable service and background 
in helping a new CFO get up to speed.
Others, however, were not so tolerant in relation to the issue of client 
knowledge and business acumen more generally.
I would argue in broad terms that external auditors don’t have 
sufficient knowledge…and it’s no fault of the individuals, it’s just…
structurally in the way that the teams are put together…generally 
most of the partners I’ve come up against have been pretty good…
because they’ve been working in the field for quite a few years. But 
the trouble is [that] 80 per cent of the people on the audit are fairly 
green and inexperienced and they wouldn’t necessarily…see the 
warning sign[s].
Troublingly, there were comments that the lack of client knowledge of 
junior staff was increasingly being experienced at even the higher ranks. 
This is an example of such a comment:
[The more senior audit staff] don’t have time to get amongst the 
business and to understand it…ten years ago, I would have said 
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look, it always happens at the junior level because you’re still 
learning, right? 
The same purchaser continues on the same theme:
[The lack of client knowledge is] starting to creep up to the senior 
or supervisor level…But now…in pockets it’s starting to creep up 
to the manager and director and sometimes the partner level…
[perhaps] because they’ve got too much to do so they can’t get 
an intimate knowledge for businesses. And why do they have 
too much to do? Because they’re chasing…disclosures and other 
requirements. You look at all the regulation that’s come out on top 
of AIFRS…All the ASIC requirements, ASX requirements, changes 
to the Tax Act, [the] GST. There has been just a boom of additional 
work for the accounting or finance function full stop, let alone 
technological change, let alone a skill shortage. You’ve had more 
to do with less people and people with…net less experience. I just 
don’t think this has been approached very strategically and our 
capital markets were fine pre-AIFRS. In fact, I can’t see how we’re 
any better off. 
One interesting comment by a purchaser related to a trend towards 
accounting standard subject matter expertise (by one individual in the 
audit team) in addition to industry expertise (by another individual). 
The share-based remuneration accounting standard (AASB 2 Share-Based 
Payment) was given as an example, with the need to value options and 
opine on that valuation requiring specific expertise that few among either 
purchasers or suppliers possessed. 
For instance…I’ve mostly operated in the financial services area 
and…basically in the big firms you can’t be an audit partner of 
financial services clients unless you’ve had experience in the 
financial services industry. People have got to specialise. So then 
you get to an issue of you’re within the financial services area, 
you get trading banks and you get investment banks and you 
get insurance companies and the like, so you can always [go into] 
sub-specialisations and you’ve got to make sure the expertise is 
appropriate…the big firms generally do a pretty good job of trying 
to address that. 
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The same purchaser continues, giving an example of an accounting 
standard that requires specialised expertise:
It’s always a bit of a struggle because as industries 
are moving rapidly and particularly, say, financial 
services, it’s hard for the people in the profession to 
keep up. You keep up-to-date with what’s happening 
on a product basis and all the rest of it, but it’s 
particularly hard at the moment because of the 
change in the accounting standards. For instance, 
if you…took accounting standards at the moment 
and said, ‘How many people are experts in the application of the 
standards in relation to executive compensation to a public company 
with share options and everything else?’, I would guarantee that of 
the top-200 companies in Australia, probably less than 10 per cent 
of the CFOs would be expert in that area themselves and certainly 
less than 10 per cent of the partners in the firms would be expert 
in that area because it’s such a tricky area that you need experts 
to do it. So invariably, the way that gets done is someone who’s a 
specialist in that area gets called in to look at it.
A comment was made among the purchasers about highly specialised 
valuations (for example, gas and oil reserves) for which auditors were 
heavily reliant on technical specialist experts. 
A very important measure in our world is…our oil and gas 
reserves…the extent [to which]…we get that wrong has significant 
financial statement impacts…the auditors come in and check and 
see if that reserve statement has been verified independently, but 
they’re essentially relying on the qualifications and the expertise 
of the reserve estimator…you know if they’ve got it wrong—well, 
certainly, auditors don’t have the expertise to assess that…They 
just…rely on the process, but have no idea whether the process 
is a good one or a bad one. So in that regard, [in] certain specialist 
areas, basically the auditors do not have the expertise. Is it an area 
of concern for us? No, not really, because we have our experts in 
the area. And the market expects that as well…[The] ASX [has] 
regulations around how you go about measuring reserves and 
things, so you know that is covered in another way. 
‘[I]t’s particularly 
hard at the 
moment because 
of the change in 
the accounting 
standards.’ 
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The same purchaser laments a ‘tick-the-box’ approach being practised by 
more junior auditors. The ‘check-list’ issue is returned to in depth in the 
chapters dealing with regulation (Chapters 11–13). 
I began to think about expertise and 
knowledge and understanding of operations, 
and it’s an age-old [problem], but what you 
get now is…very junior staff who don’t really 
understand the business asking a significant 
amount of questions, spending a significant 
amount of time, and you wonder for what 
end…Are they actually adding to the audit or 
are they just really filling in a form, checking 
off a box? And…if you asked around…you’d 
get a lot of the latter—that there’s this checking…the box…one 
time out of a hundred that check-a-box approach might pick up 
something, but in the end you know the big issues are dealt with 
at the partner and the senior management level. And it’s a question 
of whether those two are up on the business and understand the 
business and understand the risks and are focusing on the risks, 
and asking the right questions around those risks as to whether the 
audit is of a high quality or not.
4.2.1 Summary
With respect to purchasers, many of the comments have potential 
implications for business acumen, industry expertise and client 
knowledge. Specifically, in regard to industry expertise, the observation 
is made that the requirement for having industry expertise is something 
that is expressly requested and indeed demanded at the inception of an 
engagement with a particular audit. Additionally, implied in a number of 
comments is an expectation of industry expertise at least among the most 
senior of the audit team. Working against developing industry expertise is 
a ‘tick-a-box’ procedural style, especially among junior staff. Importantly, 
one purchaser observes that in addition to the necessary presence of 
industry expertise, there could also be, at least for some clients and in some 
circumstances, a need for the development of accounting-topic expertise 
or expertise in particular transactions and how they are reported. 
Generally, purchasers are able to praise the business acumen of 
senior members of the audit team. While there are a number of negative 
‘[W]hat you get now is…
very junior staff who don’t 
really understand the 
business asking a significant 
amount of questions, 
spending a significant 
amount of time, and you 
wonder for what end.’ 
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comments about the business acumen of junior members of the audit 
team, there are observations that the audit process relies heavily on such 
junior people, who are in some circumstances described as ‘green’. There 
is also considerable sympathy for the fact that these individuals have little 
life experience and cannot be expected to have developed the business 
acumen that those more senior in years have acquired. Purchasers observe 
that the business model of an audit firm really demands that a large 
proportion of the staff on an audit engagement have limited exposure to 
businesses either in their industry or elsewhere. It would be reasonable 
to conclude that purchasers understand and in many cases are tolerant of 
the absence of highly developed business acumen in many junior staff. In 
one case, a purchaser saw a potential advantage to this because a ‘dumb’ 
or repetitive question might be asked of relatively junior client staff in a 
business in which they too were new and needed to know.
Many of the comments made related to client knowledge. Again, there 
is a sharp distinction between the level of client knowledge of junior and 
senior members of the audit team and there is a degree of tolerance for 
more junior staff—albeit with the recognition that there is a cost to the 
client due to an absence of client knowledge. There is also recognition of 
high staff turnover on audit teams and that there are ways of minimising 
the cost to the client, particularly with respect to documentation and the 
quality of handover from one group of individuals on an audit team to a 
new team. The level of auditor client knowledge can in fact be advantageous 
in the circumstance of a high-level turnover within the accounting staff of 
the client (such as a new CFO). There is also an observation that insightful 
questions can sometimes be asked by people who have non-traditional 
(non-accounting) educational backgrounds. 
4.3 Suppliers
Suppliers emphasise the importance of understanding the client’s business, 
as the following quotation illustrates:
[Client knowledge is] one of the most critical things you can…
have…in conducting an audit. It’s absolutely critical that you have 
knowledge of your client’s business…what you find is at the higher 
end of audit teams, the knowledge of clients’ businesses is usually 
fairly high because we need to understand where the risks are, 
particularly around that business, and to do that you need to…
understand what [the client does] and how they transact.
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Suppliers, however, recognised the concerns of purchasers of audit 
services associated with the lack of client knowledge among more junior 
staff. Some suppliers also alluded to the problems created by rotation. The 
issue of rotation is returned to in a later chapter.
[Rotation is] less likely to be a problem—well, it jolly well should 
be less likely to be a problem—at the partner level and the manager 
level…this rotation thing is interesting because it does take time to 
build up a knowledge of a business and operations. That’s why all 
firms have brought in the fact that in your fifth year as a partner, 
your successor will shadow you. He can’t say anything at board 
meetings or whatever, but he’s there to absorb and try and pick up 
on that learning curve rather than have a gap.
The same supplier continues with respect to client knowledge and 
industry expertise:
[S]ometimes at a partner level, it [comes down to]…the individual…
you have some people who are deeply skilled and really understand 
the industry very well and are gurus in that…we’d like to think at 
[name of one of the Big Four], as with the other major houses, and 
indeed some of the smaller firms, that you’ve got those specialists in 
there, that they do understand the industry first, and then the client’s 
business and how that works in the industry. You’re never going to 
know it as well as the client because they’re operating in there, but 
perhaps you’ll bring a different perspective…we do have sufficient 
knowledge and sometimes that’s a collaborative effort between a 
number of partners and managers and directors running that. 
The same supplier continues, acknowledging that client knowledge 
is not present at the beginning of an engagement but is systematically 
responded to:
[T]here is sometimes a start-up on that…we’re transitioning onto the 
audit of [name of client], which is fantastic, but there’s a lot for us to 
do to learn the historical issues, how the business works and so on. 
So it’s a very steep learning curve and very enjoyable, but we know 
that in some time we will have got to that plateau…I think we do that 
well…at the junior level, some people do…well and pick it up and 
have…knowledge…others don’t. And…it’s a fair criticism that some 
clients have when we don’t achieve continuity—that they’re forever 
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training our staff and [audit staff] ask the wrong questions…what’s 
important is that the people who need to have the knowledge have 
the knowledge. You could argue that for some of the more junior 
staff, where they’re doing some specific tasks…it would be helpful 
if they had…knowledge, but sometimes it’s not critical. 
The same supplier uses an analogy to explain his or her point further:
As an analogy, if you’re looking at payroll testing and setting out 
some prescriptive tests on how to test payroll…those payroll tests 
will be the same whatever the industry, whatever the client. And 
you could argue that you don’t really need to have a lot of knowledge 
of the client’s business to be able to do that work properly…the 
danger is where the knowledge of business and operations…can 
impact the efficiency. So be it: it annoys the client and it annoys 
you, but the issue is where it impacts the effectiveness and that’s 
the challenge…[and] it’s important we [meet it]. And where you’ve 
got to build it up quickly when you take on a new client or you 
bring in new people, you have to factor that in.
The model and resulting cost structure that audit firms use to bring 
in new graduates and then progress them through a career path were 
acknowledged by some in the supplier group as creating difficulties in 
terms of allowing for understanding of client businesses.
[A]s long as the audit model is appealing in structure, and it’s 
becoming less so given our work is changing, but we do need the 
cheaper arms and legs to be out there doing the field work. So at 
times questions will be asked that maybe shouldn’t be, but if their 
on-job training is sufficient and they’re well educated, the programs 
are right, then really those circumstances should be minimal.
One supplier argued that the structural arrangement of industries in 
Australia had changed and consequently auditing had changed. 
[T]here’s been…a quantum shift in the economy. And…auditors are 
trained to use their knowledge of accounting standards and auditing 
standards, external financial reporting issues, to apply that. But 
they’re not necessarily trained to understand businesses and to 
understand industries. And as much as we do our best to really get 
a fundamental understanding of what we’re doing…it’s probably 
a fair criticism of auditors, because I hear it from potential clients 
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all the time: our auditors are idiots, they don’t 
know what they’re doing and they ask stupid 
questions. And part…of that is always going 
to be there because in order to do this job we 
need to bring in graduates. Now graduates 
have got their three-year degrees and they’re 
twenty-two, twenty-three. They’ve got no real 
life experience and they’re given jobs which 
are appropriate for their level, but the reality 
is that they will ask questions. As much as you 
supervise your staff and you try not to have them doing things 
which are going [to] upset your client, they will ask questions 
which might appear a bit dim because they don’t quite [have] the 
understanding.
The same supplier continues further with respect to client knowledge and 
expertise in the relevant industry: 
[P]erhaps the issue for us is to ensure that we have very well-
documented audit plans, which deal with not just the actual 
business itself but deal with the industry. And we need to really 
discuss those sorts of things. And I know, for instance, what we’re 
doing here at [name of audit firm] is we’ve got a planning day coming 
up in a couple of weeks’ time, and we’re going to run through every 
major client of ours with the 30 June balance date. And we’re going 
to have all the audit team here and we’re going to discuss the fraud 
and error-type issues in the financial report in accordance with the 
new standard so that we can really cover off on the requirements 
of the auditing standards; that we have properly planned the audit; 
that we’d have discussion in a group; and that we’ve considered 
these possibilities for fraud and error. But in our particular case, 
that’ll be four to five hours worth of meeting with our entire audit 
division going through all of our clients. And we’ve just worked out 
that is the most efficient way of doing it. And it’s good because it 
means that people who aren’t necessarily working on other jobs get 
a bit of an understanding. So if we have to move the staff around, at 
least they have a better understanding of the client and the issues. 
But wherever I’ve been, it’s always been an issue that clients have 
complained that the auditors don’t understand. And the reality 
is we’re in there for a week or two weeks of the year, if that. We 
‘[I]t’s probably a fair 
criticism of auditors, 
because I hear it from 
potential clients all the 
time: our auditors are 
idiots, they don’t know 
what they’re doing and 
they ask stupid questions.’
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don’t actually spend all that much time conducting the audit. These 
people who are actually working in the particular industry of that 
entity…work there all the time…and we can never quite get to 
their level of knowledge. So…it’s a bit harsh on the auditors, but 
there’s probably also an element of fairness there that we need to 
properly consider whether we can get a better understanding of 
the business.
The same supplier continues about client knowledge as it relates to the 
‘corporate culture’:
I always enjoy the walk, the tour of the factory…
even if they don’t actually manufacture anything, 
I always say…can you take me through the 
building and I want to meet the people in 
marketing, and dispatch, or whatever it may 
be, distribution, printing, that sort of thing. 
Because…when you see things for yourself 
and then you talk to the people who are 
actually responsible, and it doesn’t matter how 
unimportant it is in the organisation, you just get a better [feeling] 
for what they’re doing…an audit opinion…[is] not a certificate, it’s 
actually an opinion. Who knows if it’s right or not? But a lot of 
the opinion is actually based on your feeling about the enterprise. 
Corporate culture…is an extremely important issue. And if you 
look at the nature of failures in Australia, you look at HIH—there 
was a massive corporate culture issue going on there. And I don’t 
know whether the auditors picked up on that one. But what I have 
seen of late is the Big Four in particular are knocking back audits 
if they think there’s a corporate culture-type issue, because…the 
risk profile is off their scale, they’re not prepared to take on that 
particular business as a client. And that’s actually come as a bit of a 
shock to me because…I’ve seen different Big Four firms knock back 
some fairly useful size audits simply on the basis that they thought 
it might’ve been a bit risky for them.
Suppliers pointed out the difficulties for the auditor if the client 
representative being questioned about the business was inexperienced.
[H]olistically…we do [have sufficient client knowledge]…as you 
go down the…levels…ultimately what you’ve got is…a team 
‘[A] lot of the opinion 
is actually based on 
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that’s leveraged in a certain way…[in which] you’ll have partners, 
managers, seniors, juniors. The further…you go down the tree, 
probably the less appreciation there is of the business, as much as 
you try to instil that in people. Unless you’re out there and you’ve 
got some experience, it’s very, very difficult to have that commercial 
awareness and to put things into context. You might want to 
understand—[and it’s] not through a lack of desire of wanting 
to understand, but some things are complex. And what tends to 
happen is that the more junior people probably have the greatest 
amount of time at a client and as you go up the tree the partners have 
the least amount because they’re managing several engagements at 
one time. The key is can the more experienced people on the team 
get that knowledge through the team; can you do it in a way that 
you don’t compromise the way that you…undertake your audit 
through planning, through regular meetings, through the partners 
being involved in the crucial aspects of the work, whether it’s a 
risk assessment, their evaluation, the reporting…that’s the model 
that you try to achieve…the big issues—we pick them. Where the 
frustration tends to come [in]…is more at the edges and the people 
asking the stupid question, which [they wouldn’t ask] if they knew 
a little bit more about what we did…it’s like anybody, it doesn’t 
matter how well trained [you are]…you can’t have an expectation 
of people [that] they’re going to have this high level of knowledge 
of the business.
The interviewer then comments: 
If the client doesn’t have patience for juniors and they’re just 
answering the question in a way to brush them off so they go away 
then they’re going to be coming back asking the same questions 
again because they really didn’t get the answer they should have 
got in the first place.
The response is:
That’s right. Or what happens is you ask one question and…the 
answer gives rise to three more questions and four more questions 
and then there’s another, and it keeps going. That’s just a fact of 
what we do. Our job is really to get information and analyse it, 
and then what you expect to come out of that is a further analysis, 
further question…this may be a bit of a generalisation, but…the 
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criticisms that are levelled out in, say, the audit profession by…
corporates could very well be levelled by the audit profession [at] 
the corporates. And just as we may be essentially asking a lot of 
questions and sometimes the same question…the quality of the 
response—and not just the response but even competency and 
understanding—has probably diminished in organisations. And 
that would only be fair to say as a generalisation, but what tends to 
happen is [that] it’s more complex than it used to be. There’s more 
to be done by less people, there’s a leverage within organisations 
so those that know are in higher positions versus those that know 
less being in lower positions. So the people that you’re dealing with 
sometimes at those lower levels only know a little bit and they don’t 
know the context, just as the overlords don’t know the context…
Their roles have changed from being pretty much processing and 
reporting to being more holistic [in terms of] responsibility and 
sometimes they don’t have the level of competency to be taking 
on the task that they are—but that’s within their portfolio [and is] 
what they need to do. So…it does cut a little bit both ways.
One non-Big Four supplier opines that there is less industry expertise than 
is optimal other than where there is an appropriate portfolio of clients in 
the same industry:
[W]ith the calibre of the staff…there’s always 
going to be that issue [with client knowledge]…
We are very system driven so we try to find out 
the systems and identify the controls. And…
we have…[an] overview of the firm’s business, 
but…we [need to] get into that a little bit more…
So, if I do one shop, one retail unit…then I’ll 
overlay my general knowledge into it, and so will 
the auditors. If we do a number of retail outlets 
then we’re more likely to put a bit more effort into understanding 
the retail industry and getting research so that can be better 
equipped…there’s an element of truth there that an audit process 
can be overlaid on any business, but you really need to find the 
hot points in the business. And I don’t think we tend to do that 
as well, and then we have less-experienced people. And that’s also 
a major issue at the moment with the staff—in the inexperience 
of the people…But their inexperience doesn’t allow them to put 
‘[T]here’s an element 
of truth there that 
an audit process can 
be overlaid on any 
business, but you really 
need to find the hot 
points in the business.’ 
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any overview. And, in a sense, if you’re looking at that, some of 
the key things are performed by graduates…maybe they should be 
performed by the partners, but that’s the way we tend to operate…
that’s a fair criticism in that we probably don’t do enough research 
about the industry or really find out what the hot spots are. It’s very 
[much] driven by the systems. So it’s where do the forms go and 
who does anything with them, and who then is the control, what 
is the control to make sure that those get correctly processed? Now, 
you could do all of that without understanding anything about the 
industry because it’s systems driven. And that’s part of the issue. 
The issue of cost structures comes to the fore with respect to industry 
expertise, as the following comment demonstrates:
[W]e’re under audit fee constraints. So the concept of really 
overlaying a huge industry knowledge—hell, who’s going to pay for 
that sort of scenario…occasionally with the clients we have, you’ll 
talk to them and they’ll say, ‘Fred didn’t seem to really have a good 
understanding of what we do’…so you…talk to Fred and encourage 
him to really understand the business as part of the process. But…
what we’ve tried to do is very much target information on certain 
of the Internet sites about an industry, and get that put into the 
audit file. We’ve done it with training of the staff to say, ‘Look, you 
know it’s important for you to understand what’s the key driver in 
that business, because if sales are just getting sales without relative 
to margin then that’s going to be short term and we need…you…
to understand those things, and what are the risks that they’re 
facing, and things like that.’ So we build it into the training, but the 
difficulty…is that the young kids nowadays, they don’t know what 
they don’t know, and in fact they think they know everything. 
And…that’s impacting on a bit of it too.
The same supplier notes that the personal skills of the inexperienced audit 
staff also pose certain challenges to the quality of the audit:
[S]ome of the people [in the client’s company] give them the first 
answer that comes into their head. And the problem you’ve got is 
the…inexperienced [audit] staff are maybe not confident enough to 
challenge that until they go back and check with the in-charge. And 
then when they do, they then go back and challenge because they’d 
said, ‘Well, that doesn’t seem right.’ And that’s a bit of confidence 
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thing. It’s also the person going and asking 
the question without having thought about it 
before they ask the question, and that’s a real 
issue. We try to tell the staff [to] think about 
what you’re…asking about, and what do you 
think the response might be…because then 
you’ve got context…[and] that’s [how] you 
know part of the problem too…they don’t 
think because they know, and then they get an 
answer that’s totally left field and they have to 
go back. And some of them then struggle to go back to the in-charge 
and…say that. So they might write something down on the work 
paper, and it’s only when you review the work paper [that] you 
think…that’s nonsense, we need to go back and get that…there’s a 
lot more for the clients to [cope with]…that’s saying that the quality 
of [the client’s] staff quite often…they’re struggling to get staff all the 
time and so the newer people aren’t as knowledgeable as the others…
so it’s a combination. Certainly, from our point of view, we’ve got to 
really work on training the auditors to think about the response, get 
context about it and think about it in relation to the business. But…
the clients also have to make sure their staff understand that it’s 
better to give the auditors more information than less information, 
rather than just kind of brush them off.
Others among the suppliers saw the need to develop client knowledge 
exacerbated by the cost pressures facing audit firms.
Certainly, more knowledge would help an audit. The difficulty 
there is in a market environment, clients are not always prepared 
to pay for that extra knowledge that an auditor will get through 
spending the time. So that becomes difficult. If anything can be done 
to benchmark audit fees or something along those lines then that 
would allow an auditor to spend more time with a client. In a market 
environment which is competitive, it’s difficult to justify that.
4.3.1 Summary
Suppliers do not question whether industry specialist auditors exist—
particularly among the Big Four. Among the supplier group, there are 
comments regarding the cost of nurturing industry-specific knowledge 
and the effort involved in updating and maintaining it, especially in 
‘[T]he clients also have 
to make sure their staff 
understand that it’s better 
to give the auditors more 
information than less 
information, rather than 
just kind of brush  
them off.’ 
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highly specialist industries. Suppliers acknowledge the challenges of 
putting inexperienced auditors into the field, but do seek to support them 
with appropriate training and with mechanisms to help them develop 
client knowledge and industry expertise. In part at least, this could be 
a function of the audit firm business model. Suppliers point out another 
side to the dilemma of inexperience and staff turnover—that affecting 
their staff auditors in the field when client positions remain unfilled, 
client staffers turnover or do not have adequate understanding of their 
tasks or roles. Nevertheless, they acknowledge the crucial importance to 
risk assessment of an auditor possessing superior business acumen skills 
and understanding the client’s business. The issue of client reluctance to 
recompense for the time needed for an auditor to develop appropriate 
client knowledge and industry expertise is raised also within suppliers’ 
comments.
4.4 Standard setters
Standard setters cited banking, insurance and mining as industries requiring 
industry-specific knowledge, especially of the relevant regulatory regime. 
The role of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) in 
recognising only ‘approved’ auditors with senior-level experience in the 
audit of certain industries and hence constraining supply was noted also. 
Beyond that, there was the perception that a competent general auditor 
would be able to cope in auditing other industries.
For heavily regulated industries—banking, insurance—clearly, 
you need a great degree of industry regulatory knowledge and to 
do that you need to understand the operational…aspects, but you’ll 
never have the same industry knowledge as someone who works in 
that industry. Therefore, if I was to say…we need a lot of industry 
knowledge, I’d have to say: ‘Well, how do we do that other than 
bring people in from the industry?’ Generally speaking, I don’t 
think that will add a lot to the audit process.
Standard setters acknowledge the importance of client knowledge and 
industry expertise, but observe that the current prescriptive requirements 
could impact on the application of this information. 
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[G]enerally, auditors do [have sufficient client 
knowledge]. And this has been an experience…
coming from a large firm where we would use the 
term ‘face the market’ on a line of business or an 
industry expertise basis. So we’ve got, in theory, 
the capability to obtain an understanding…
the audit standards appropriately direct people 
to understand the [client’s] business and to 
understand risk, although…a danger or an 
impediment in getting an appropriate understanding is that the 
approach to assessing risk is increasingly becoming…formula 
driven at the front end of an audit. There [are] some reasons for 
requiring that though. The standards have become quite explicit 
to demonstrate that you’ve considered things because, in some 
instances, where there’ve been failures, it’s arguable that that 
understanding wasn’t obtained…this is all about getting the right 
balance, but there is a high degree of prescription around risk 
assessment and because we’ve got the external oversight and the 
need to document, there’s a real focus on documenting how that 
assessment’s been done. So there’s a danger that we get a form-
driven response to this issue rather than a substantive response. 
But…generally, the industry knowledge is there.
There was comment on how the audit itself and training of audit personnel 
and the development of their business acumen had changed in the move 
away from a fully substantive approach. 
[A]cross the board, audit teams don’t have enough knowledge 
and maybe you never can have enough knowledge…The one area 
where…auditors should be generally more proficient in is financial 
systems, financial accounting internal control systems and…
auditors are probably less proficient now than they were 20 years 
ago on that. 
The interviewer asks why this is and the standard setter responds:
Because…methodologies 20 years ago were looking for audit 
deficiency and cutting out understanding systems was the way it 
was done, jumping to the substantive and…what it…means—you 
cut out your knowledge of what’s really happening and it’s very 
hard to reintroduce it when you no longer have the audit budgets to 
‘[T]here’s a real focus 
on documenting how 
that assessment’s been 
done. So there’s a 
danger that we get a 
form-driven response 
to this issue rather than 
a substantive response.’ 
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do it with. Therefore [the issue of] the training of the junior staff…
at the time I had in the late ’70s out at clients, wasting a lot of time 
on transactional testing but learning a lot, absorbing, not realising 
how much I was learning as I was doing it. And the younger 
auditors these days don’t have that luxury and I don’t think our 
training processes [have] kept up with that lack of on-the-job access 
exposure.
The standard setter adds with respect to the possibility of interchange 
between industry and the audit profession:
[W]e need the balance of industry knowledge and awareness versus 
auditing knowledge and auditing skill and once you get out of 
auditing for a few years, it’s very difficult to come back into it.
Having acknowledged that banking, insurance and perhaps mining 
are industries that require specialist knowledge, the standard setter is 
questioned about whether ‘knowledge industries’ also require in-depth 
industry expertise:
I don’t think so. They require a bit of knowledge and it helps, but 
not specialist expertise that is beyond…[what] any general well-
qualified, competent…auditor could easily pick…up.
This standard setter, having acknowledged the role of client knowledge, 
industry expertise and business acumen, also asserts that we should not 
forget the importance of technical knowledge of the business of auditing:
Perhaps [clients are] looking for more from their audit firm to bring 
more value to them, and they see value in terms of their industry 
and that’s still there despite a change in the last five years. There is 
still this pressure on audit firms to justify their existence beyond 
the audit sign-off. But as far as part of the actual audit process, the 
area where…our lack of knowledge…impacts the audit is our junior 
staff’s lack of understanding…of accounting control processes. 
While there is a common criticism of junior auditors asking ‘dumb’ 
questions, the importance of the ‘dumb’ question is noted by the following 
standard setter:
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There will always be the questions and…we 
shouldn’t underestimate the dumb question…
that’s the question which needs to be asked 
and you…find the problems from sometimes 
the dumb questions…therefore I, in part, 
am sympathetic to the comments you make, 
but I also believe that an audit is about 
interaction, communication and…asking the 
right questions…clients will always have their 
day-to-day business to do and then have the 
auditors there for part of the year asking questions and they have to 
devote time to them. I can understand that they can sometimes get 
a little bit annoyed with that, but that’s part of life. So, provided…
the individuals have brought their staff up to the appropriate 
level…and that should be the objective to make sure that there’s 
enough planning and enough question[ing], enough bringing 
the individuals up to speed before they get there, but there will 
always be a bit more [of] that on the job…it’s probably an area for 
improvement but…we will always get that comment because an 
auditor has to ask questions and therefore sometimes it will always 
be people who will be a little bit put out by it or [will find] a little 
bit of annoyance to it.
The interviewer raises the issue of the personal characteristics of the 
auditor and their tenacity in a situation where an answer is provided to an 
auditor and the answer is unsatisfactory. Does that mean the auditor has 
to go back and ask further questions, sometimes to the annoyance of the 
client’s accounting staff?
Yeah, well, that’s right. Now if you…don’t get the right response, 
you’ve got to ask the question. And nor should you be put off…
if someone doesn’t want to answer you, because if it doesn’t stack 
up, you’ve got to keep going back…[There are] always those types 
of situations there and people may not like to be asked, but…
that’s part of what a good audit is all about. In other words, does 
it stack up…when you sit back and look at it…does that lead to 
a further question, you know, I need a bit more evidence or a bit 
more understanding of another part of it. So, in other words, it’s a 
process you go through.
‘There will always be 
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The next standard setter observes that even at senior levels, the industry 
expertise of auditors cannot be at the same level of those working in the 
industry—at least with respect to the highly regulated industry groups:
[I]n our industry, which is financial services, at 
the senior level, at the partner level, yeah, they do 
understand the business because they’re involved in 
financial services across the board, so our business 
isn’t that different from our competitors’ business, 
[at] a macro level. So, at a macro level, the senior staff 
members are up to date with changes in regulation. 
They see what a number of organisations are doing, 
which gives them a very good overview and perspective of the 
industry. So…in terms of the business, they’re pretty strong on 
industry knowledge and that’s good; operations is a different thing. 
So they probably do have sufficient knowledge of the business 
but only at a senior level. Do they have enough knowledge of the 
operations? Well, I don’t think they can because they’re not here 
often enough and…when you’re in and out and you’re here for…
three months of the year or whatever, then you can’t have a really 
detailed knowledge of the operations.
The standard setter does observe that even with senior audit staff with 
considerable expertise, the business model is reliant on junior staff 
elevating important issues:
Do [junior staff] understand [a complex issue] and the context of 
it, and do they really understand what they’re documenting, or do 
they understand the context of what they find in order to evaluate 
it and then bring it up to the right level of attention? No, probably 
not. So, if anything would keep me awake if I was a partner or a 
senior manager, [it] is…are my guys good enough to bring to my 
attention what I need to know? There’s a danger there in terms 
of using inexperienced staff that things can occur that don’t get 
elevated and that’s the biggest danger.
The standard setter observes that managing the risk involves supervision 
of staff:
[T]he only thing you can do really is pretty close on-the-job 
supervision…the key to success in audit…is having the right 
‘do they have 
enough knowledge 
of the operations? 
Well, I don’t think 
they can because 
they’re not here 
often enough.’ 
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management team, and with the right management team then you 
can…effectively supervise those managers who are prepared to get 
involved in the detail and understand the detail and educate the 
staff on the job. Then…you can cover that risk. But…it’s a bit like 
the regulators. Your biggest risk is what you don’t know and it’s 
how you make sure you get to know all the material things that you 
need to know. 
This standard setter suggests industry expertise can be gained from the 
client: 
I don’t see any reason why the external auditors couldn’t attend 
some of the organisation’s training…But you know you’re paid a 
limited audit fee. There’s a limit to how much of this stuff you can 
do.
The importance of the business acumen of the auditor and personal 
attributes, including integrity, is drawn out in the following comment 
from one standard setter:
Clearly, the more commercial acumen that the auditors have, they’re 
able to relate to both management and the board and be seen to 
really understand the business and be a trusted source of advice, 
if you like, in part sort of outside the audit process even, subject 
to independence, the more valuable they can be. They still need 
that…fearlessness about standing up to management if they’re 
pushing the envelope too much. But…as a trusted advisor to the 
business, they’re more likely to be able to do that than if they’re 
perceived as being weak or not sufficiently commercial. They’re the 
auditors that a management with some kind of, not necessarily ill 
intent, but even just trying to fudge things a bit, are more likely to 
be able to get around. 
The standard setter notes that there is variability with respect to industry 
expertise and client knowledge and that those with particularly well-
developed skills in each will command higher fees: 
What I’m trying to say is…it’s variable…the ones that are highly 
regarded will be the ones that are, and [do,] command a premium. 
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The standard setter observes that staff exchanges and secondments would 
aid development of industry expertise, but employment practices in audit 
firms are not conducive to this:
[Employment practices] hinder it. I don’t think that whole sense of 
exchange is welcomed. There is a sense that you keep the people as 
long as you can and that you’re always going to lose a proportion 
who don’t want to go on to be partner or aren’t good enough. Other 
than that, you try and hold them…It’s not that sense of going off 
and working in other places, be it the private sector or indeed in 
government…Or the regulator [at the prompting of the interviewer]. 
And it’s short-sighted.
One of the standard setters emphasised that the existence of industry 
expertise and client knowledge, together with a high level of implicit 
business acumen, was not sufficient. A necessary condition is that clients 
communicate honestly and comprehensively about the issues in their 
business. This standard setter emphasises that, without this, no matter 
what the level of understanding of the industry or the client, problems 
can arise:
[G]enerally, when you…understand the business, there are 
probably what you’d call industry issues which are pervasive to 
the industry within which businesses operate. The businesses then 
have their own issues as a subset of the industry within which they 
operate, and a significant proportion of those issues [is] known to 
management…it goes back to this transparency of communication…
you’d probably sit back and say: ‘Well, if you’d told us about that, 
and given us a bit more information, we would have looked at it 
differently.’ So you can have the…industry issues…you know what 
they are, you go deep, dive down into the business and you go 
through them…how does this affect this operation? And you only 
get half the story. You do some digging around, a bit more cross-
checking. Great story, going around the business, everything’s fine 
and, six months later, ooh bang, problem, and it’s because they 
chose not to tell you.
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4.4.1 Summary
Standard setters’ comments convey a sense of the limit of what industry 
expertise can achieve. While it is seen as crucial to some targeted, highly 
regulated industries, there are other industries where it is not seen as 
crucial and where audit conduct has more generic application. Also raised 
is the difficulty for expertise at any level to overcome client secrecy or lack 
of transparency. The standard setters believe that audit teams generally 
do not have sufficient knowledge of the business, but knowledge at the 
senior levels is sufficient. Perhaps not surprisingly, the audit standards 
are seen as appropriately directing people to understand the business and 
to understand risk. There was, however, comment that an impediment to 
achieving an appropriate understanding was that the approach to assessing 
risk was increasingly becoming formula driven at the front end of an 
audit. There was also the observation that audit firms did not facilitate the 
interchange of staff between audit firms and other organisations and more 
flexibility there would aid in the development of industry expertise. Such 
interchange might be contemplated between external auditors and the 
internal audit functions7 of key industry players. Regulatory requirements 
about independence pose a challenge here.
4.5 Regulators 
One regulator expresses a view that business acumen is developed through 
managerial skills rather than through auditing, which is more compliance 
driven:
[I]t’s a question of training and perspective. When an auditor goes 
in, they think in terms of compliance, right? And when you are 
running a business, you think of profit. You think of growth. You 
think of risk management…there’s a need for balance, commercial 
balance. You take on risk, you take on compliance and you take 
on growth, otherwise you won’t succeed. So [to acquire business 
acumen] it’s more a management issue rather than an auditing 
[issue].
In response to a question about whether audit partners know enough in 
the highly regulated specialist industries, this regulator notes, ‘Not really.’
7 We are not able to include a direct quotation on this issue as the suggestion was made in 
a manner that would directly identify the individual who made the comment.
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With respect to the expertise and use of junior staff, the regulator 
observes:
I just get a feel[ing] that the junior levels…they end up doing a lot 
of the [hack] work…and that’s how they make their profits. They 
keep their cost down. So the point is a lot of this really complex 
stuff, you can’t really get junior people to do it.
4.5.1 Summary
The only regulator suggests that there is room for improvement with 
respect to industry expertise and the auditing business model puts heavy 
reliance on junior (inexperienced) staff.
5.0 issues and implications
In terms of the telephone and mail surveys, in response to a question 
about whether external financial statement audits were of value because of 
‘the specialist industry expertise of the auditor’, 50 per cent of suppliers, 
46 per  cent of users and only 31 per cent of purchasers responded 
affirmatively. Among the suppliers, there was a sharp differentiation 
between Big Four and non-Big Four suppliers, with 77 per cent of Big Four 
suppliers believing industry expertise brought value compared with only 
42 per cent of non-Big Four suppliers. This difference could reflect the 
relevance of industry expertise across the levels of market capitalisation 
and across unlisted companies.
With respect to agreement with the statement that ‘an external audit 
is of value because the auditor has a good understanding of the business’, 
55 per cent of suppliers, 33 per cent of purchasers and 40 per cent of users 
responded affirmatively. CEO/CFO respondents were particularly harsh 
and, again, there was differentiation between Big Four and non-Big Four 
suppliers.
In response to questions about an audit being of value because of 
the ‘business acumen the auditor brings to the audit’, 45 per cent of 
users, 33 per cent of purchasers and 55 per cent of suppliers responded 
affirmatively. Specifically with respect to audit partners, most users 
and suppliers saw the business acumen of audit partners as above the 
mid-point, with junior auditors not rated highly. Interestingly, overall, 
purchasers took a harsher view compared with users.
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Across most interviewee groups, there was recognition of the importance 
of auditors possessing business acumen and yet also an understanding of 
the reality that auditors did not have the same perspective as those running 
the businesses that were subject to audit. Recognition of the difficulty of 
creating truly deep understanding at the more junior levels was present 
also. There was recognition of cost pressures impacting on the use of junior 
auditing staff. There was also recognition that some of the responsibility 
could be placed on clients for their use of inexperienced staff to answer 
auditors’ questions. Two commented on the size of the market in Australia 
as a constraint on gaining industry expertise in particular industries.
As indicated previously, while purchasers in terms of survey data are 
harsher in their criticism of audit firms, there is a real sense from the 
interviews that purchasers’ expectations are low in terms of whether 
business acumen is a critical part of the role of auditors. Purchasers also 
acknowledge that there is a sharp distinction between senior and junior 
auditors. There was also acknowledgment of a lack of stability and 
that this caused lapses in client knowledge. Purchasers make a number 
of observations in regard to the business model of the audit firms and 
perhaps the profession more broadly, which means that the life experience 
and business acumen of more junior auditors are limited.
Suppliers, including those who have a role in standard setting, 
probably have the most detailed comments with respect to the issue of 
business acumen. It is acknowledged, at least in some quarters among 
suppliers of audit services, that junior staff do not have the business 
acumen or certain of the personal characteristics, including maturity, of 
their more senior colleagues and, as a consequence, they might ask clients 
the ‘wrong’ questions. There is, however, also realisation that sometimes 
asking ‘dumb’ questions can cause considerable insight and the ‘dumb’ 
questions can be crucial. 
Suppliers also volunteered that less reliance on substantive testing and 
examination of a business through its transactions had limited the vista 
of some junior staff on how businesses operated and how core activities 
of an auditee were undertaken. Additionally, suppliers made frequent 
observations that inexperience was not just in the hands of junior auditors.
Regulators observe that business acumen is not necessarily one of the 
core attributes of a successful and competently completed audit. 
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On balance, while the survey statistics suggest that business acumen of 
some audit staff (most notably the more junior staff) is limited and might 
potentially be seen as a criticism of the profession, the interviews reveal 
that the issue is more complex. The issue relating to the experience of 
junior auditors and their ability to develop experience and acumen useful 
in a business career, however, remains unresolved in the current debate 
and perhaps has implications for tertiary education. 
6.0 Focus groups with more junior auditors
As part of the Big Four peer focus groups with more junior audit staff, 
questions were asked about the importance, development and use of client 
and industry-specific knowledge. 
6.1 Client knowledge 
Within each of the three separate focus group sessions, there was near 
universal agreement that client-specific knowledge was important to 
designing an appropriate audit approach, however, qualifications to this 
ideal then followed.
[Having client knowledge] definitely helps. It makes it easier…
because in financial services we quite often have very complex 
systems and the technical issues as well, so having that client 
knowledge as a base going into the audit…definitely helps a lot.
[I]t’s good to have specific client knowledge but sometimes you just 
can’t have it. You do not have staff continuance…people [leave] 
and with that documentation, you cannot have [the] knowledge 
you need. Sometimes it’s very discouraging…and to be honest, for 
the financial statements, all the captions look similar…you know 
what you need to do, all the basic audit techniques…you can just 
apply them to all of them…You ask this for reconciliation and you 
ask another one for some sort of [similar] reconciliation, but with a 
different name. This one may be a general ledger one, that one may 
be from some kind of strange system you’ve never seen. That’s the 
most knowledge I would have. Even if you have a very tight budget 
only for one week or two weeks for a client, you can’t even get 
all [the] documentation done. How can you just go on and ask for 
client knowledge? It’s just not possible.
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The point of this focus group member’s comment is that client-specific 
knowledge might not be present at the beginning of an audit—without 
great harm other than to audit efficiency—but it should be present by the 
completion of an audit:
[Y]ou do [need client-specific knowledge] to 
complete an audit but not to commence one…
part of an audit is coming to terms with the client 
and knowing their risk areas and even knowing 
which staff they have in which jobs and making 
some judgment on how competent you think 
different people are in their roles…that’s essential 
to complete your audit because you need to focus 
time and effort and energy where you think there 
[are] going to be problems coming up. But obviously you don’t need 
it to start because you can go out to a client never having heard 
of them before. But you need to spend that time in gaining the 
understanding of their business, who they are, what their culture’s 
like, whether they’re perfectionists or whether they’re not…[so] 
it’s more efficient if you have the client knowledge beforehand, 
and…you need it to complete an audit…but not…necessarily to 
commence one.
The same theme of not being expected to have client knowledge at the 
beginning of the audit is repeated in this next quotation:
When you start at the bottom level, you’re not expected to have…
knowledge on the first day you walk out there, which is good, 
because you generate that knowledge in your first…couple of weeks 
or however long your engagement goes for. Even in our division, 
especially the bigger clients, you have an opportunity, and then…
you have…knowledge of the client and you get more of an exposure 
to their personnel, which is good.
A question put to one of the focus groups was: ‘So, how do you gain 
client knowledge?’ Responses included that knowledge was gained from 
managers and partners, from the previous year’s experience with the 
client and/or prior year files, site tours, the Internet and from clients with 
similar systems and processes.
‘[I]t’s more efficient 
if you have the client 
knowledge beforehand, 
and…you need it to 
complete an audit…
but not…necessarily to 
commence one.’ 
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[A] manager can pass on the knowledge if you’re new to the job; the 
manager or the [partner] can pass on the knowledge.
[Y]ou talk to the people who were on the job prior to you. If you 
haven’t been on it, you speak to the partner who’s on the job, 
because often they’ll have contact with the guys at the top level, 
so they’ll know the details [of the] work papers. And then talking 
to the client, going out…seeing what they’re doing…If they’re 
listed…there’s quite a bit of information you can get from internet 
places about them.
[In response to the interviewer’s request for examples of what a manager 
might say:] For one of my clients, the manager took last year’s file and 
basically just explained to us what they do, key areas we need to 
focus on and blah, blah. And they went through the files, what needs 
to be done…and some of them…when you’re there…talking to the 
client, that’s when you gain more of your knowledge of the client.
I suppose from working on your previous years.
[T]here are a number of documents we are required to fill out which 
will cover understanding the business and prior issues and issues 
we expect going forward, and all these things that are done at the 
beginning and end of [an] audit…a lot of people [are] encouraged 
to be reading those…[to] understand the risks that have been 
documented in prior years, the build-up of knowledge, to then go 
through, suck what you can out of that for the audit going forward. 
So that’s where people tend to get a lot of that risk, and you have to 
address it because you have to fill out the audit boxes.
It depends who you’re working with. Sometimes, if you’re in a job, 
someone will go out and they’ll spend the first hour saying so this 
is what they do, they’ll walk you through it, and…they’ll take you 
on a site tour, and then…it becomes a lot clearer.
[S]omething that’s more handy than I think a lot of people give 
credit to, with manufacturing firms especially, is simply a site 
tour. Because when you’re thinking about raw materials to a work 
in progress, finished goods, seeing that actually happening at any 
site…makes it so much easier when you come down to describing 
all the controls and quality controls and processes and all the ins 
and outs of the business.
dEvELoPINg bUSINESS ACUMEN ANd CLIENT ANd INdUSTRy KNoWLEdgE
| 231
[W]e’re sectorised…in our groups so a lot of the clients are peer 
clients…there [are] systems and processes you can [access].
No, I don’t think [transferring knowledge of systems and processes 
between clients creates a conflict of interest]…on the flip side…it 
gives you the ability to…add value to your clients…everyone’s so 
similar that there’s not a process out there which one person’s doing 
and everyone else isn’t, but…there [are] certainly small refinements 
and improvements.
[There are] all sorts of knowledge [when pressed on the type of 
knowledge gathered]…one is knowledge of the people who actually 
work there and who’s driving the…process, the financial reporting 
process.
Clients in the same industry are interested in the auditor’s inside knowledge 
of industry developments:
Our clients…prefer it if we have multiple clients in…very much 
the same industry. I work on the [name of client] and I also work 
on [another client in the same industry]…when we got the client 
first this year…[the first-named client] was so interested in what 
everyone else in the industry was doing. We’ve actually set up a 
whole bunch of networking sessions and training sessions for the 
clients for all our [name of industry] teams so that they can meet 
each other and discuss all the things that they…want to…we can 
actually add value as a firm by doing that.
There was, however, consciousness of the potential conflicts of interest: 
[T]here is confidentiality and professional integrity not to be 
providing other companies with information.
Understanding the politics inside the client is often as important as 
understanding the business, as is drawn out in this next quotation:
[I]t’s all of those things [‘competency’, ‘integrity’, prompted by the 
interviewer] you want to know. Whenever you go out to the client 
normally, you’ll [ask] staff: ‘We’re going out here, this is who does 
this, this and this, this is how I think this person performs, this is 
how this person performs.’ So they can manage their dealings with 
them, and so that they know where to look for errors or whether 
they’re likely to make errors as well, so that’s definitely a part of 
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it. But…there’s also understanding the politics of what goes on in 
organisations. [It’s] important to understand what not to say…and 
what to say…to get the information that you need.
The interviewer asks whether it’s harder in the middle market to gain 
client knowledge. Responses included this:
Our clients are that diverse…some of my clients go from [industry] 
to [industry] and that’s how diverse mine gets, so client knowledge 
is recurring.
Recurring engagements with the same client come through as important in 
understanding the client’s business:
[Y]ou need to know that individual client, how it works. That’s the 
most important thing…working on it, you do get…some clients 
[who] are similar. We have a multitude of [types of] companies, for 
example, but the most important thing is definitely [having worked] 
on that client before.
Continuity is pretty key. More continuity is better.
It makes it so much more efficient.
And that’s why staff retention helps, when the people who were 
there last year are there again the next year.
Recurring engagements are important not just to audit personnel, but to 
the client:
[T]he clients demand [the same staffing]. They want…to know who 
they’re dealing with; they don’t want different people going out 
every year.
So they can form relationships as well.
More probing and other comments reveal that documentation does not 
have to be filled out at every staff level; there is a document for each client 
and staff at all levels are encouraged to go through and read it. When 
probed on what happens for a new client, the interviewees respond that 
the document has to be created from scratch:
[I]f you went…for a walk through, you don’t have that knowledge 
of who does what…and you generally just start with your main 
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contact and you work downwards in terms of…process knowledge. 
In terms of overall business…your top management are the ones that 
are going to know the most about the ins and outs of the business.
When asked whether documentation is a substitute for either industry 
knowledge or client knowledge, the responses are mixed. One answers in 
the negative, but another answers:
[D]ocumentation means an experienced auditor can just pick up a 
file without any previous client knowledge [and] can still do [the] 
audit.
The next junior auditor confirms that documentation has improved in 
recent years:
[T]he quality of our audits has improved with the new methodologies 
and the new requirements for work, sample sizes and all that kind 
of stuff…I’ve even picked up an audit file for a client we had three 
years ago, a file from three years ago and a file this year: this year’s 
file will be a lot more comprehensive.
The limitations to documentation as a source of client knowledge and 
input to audit quality, however, are also acknowledged:
[T]hat’s a question of the quality of an audit file compared to [the] 
quality of an audit…documentation is much more important now.
[J]ust because it wasn’t documented doesn’t mean those financials 
are materially misstated.
If it’s not on file, it’s not done.
The interviewer then asked whether the AUASB’s documentation 
requirements had caused difficulty.
[M]aybe to a really small degree but I don’t think documentation…
means that people are working hours later than they otherwise 
would be. It’s just the client base.
[The budgets] are more [realistic] these days.
Responses to the question ‘Do you think there are other ways that you 
can get client knowledge that do not happen to be used by this Big Four 
firm?’ include:
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[W]ith a lot of my clients, there’s a lot of industry knowledge…
For instance, I have a…client, and there [are] certain accounting 
policies that are used, and rules that are not applicable to any other 
jobs I work on…they are having quality sessions going forward…
[to] discuss that with [staff] before an audit begins…these specific 
things that relate to that industry.
But that’s more for young [staff] because as you go up you find them 
out through experience.
[T]he sort of information we use, the client knowledge 
we gain because we get out there and do the work…
that information is ours. We don’t publicly put it 
out there. Say, for instance, you can go look at [a 
company’s] web site and you can figure out that if 
they’re mining…they’re going to have problems…
because they’ve made a mess of the place…But if 
you’re out at a little manufacturing firm, you’re not 
going to know what their problems are until you start speaking 
to them, until you start looking at what’s going on…Oh, they’ve 
made a mess of the ground around their area, or they’re very, very 
good at what they do and everything’s nice and neat and there [are] 
absolutely no problems when you get out there…that knowledge is 
in-house to us, so it’s got to be passed on or documented in our files.
A point made in this next quotation is that more use could be made of 
managers’ and partners’ well of knowledge:
[A] manager…stays on the job and it might be the senior accountant, 
the juniors that come on for the first time. And this is something 
I’ve raised…[that] I don’t think we spend enough time tapping into 
that manager’s and…that partner’s knowledge…that’s a way that 
we could build a bit more client knowledge by really allocating time 
and sitting there and going look, let’s get a two-hour run-down of 
this client…at the beginning, right off the bat, just to get that up 
front.
As to good or bad examples with interactions with clients that have been 
revealing in terms of that client, one response is:
‘[T]hat knowledge 
is in-house to 
us, so it’s got to 
be passed on or 
documented in  
our files.’ 
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[Y]ou work…for a new person who’s employed at that job [in the 
client], you figure out their capabilities and…those people who 
really shouldn’t be doing that job, because they’re just bad at it…
you just learn, you go to someone else. But there are bad experiences, 
when people just can’t do their job.
There is general agreement that the above scenario involving client staff 
is common. The interviewer then asks: ‘Are there any particular examples 
where [at the end] the client told you a profoundly different story to 
where you started from; you walked in and you learnt something and it 
profoundly changed the way you did the audit?’ Responses include:
The client changed their information systems and made a mess of it 
and it very profoundly changed everyone’s job when we were out 
there, because we were out there for a lot longer than we expected 
and…we knew that they were…changing their information 
systems. And we knew that they had already warned us that there 
were problems because they delayed by a week, but when we got 
out there is when we truly found out how much of a mess it was.
For one of my clients…they promised us to be really efficient 
because they were getting a Big Four manager to [head their] finance 
division, so we thought okay, they’ll be really efficient and they had 
a merger during [the] last financial year and everything was just a 
mess, so it changed…because when we were going, we’re confident 
this guy, with his background…they’d be more efficient, but when 
we got there and realised that things were…different…we spent 
more time and we incurred a lot of overrun. 
A further question was: ‘So if you came across in a client an accountant 
that had come out of one of the Big Four, would you immediately assume 
they must be reasonably competent?’ Views were generally in the negative, 
with comments that competence would still need to be assessed.
It depends why they left the firm. I know there’s someone from our 
division who went to one of our clients, and when he was working 
here he used to be super, he used to work so hard, he used to get 
everything done. The people who came back in for the client said: 
‘Oh, he’s hopeless, he’ll work nine to five, won’t bother helping me 
doing anything’, so he’s just like anyone else. So in that kind of 
case, it didn’t really matter.
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When the interviewer responds, ‘So do you think a partner that’s done 
manufacturing…’, the response is:
Could go into a bank? No. I don’t know if that happens. I know  
I couldn’t go into a bank…it depends on the experience and their 
skill set, doesn’t it…I could go [to] manufacturing, to media, with 
no problems. 
Another question about initial audits took the form: ‘Do you think the 
first time you do an audit for a particular client, a new client, the quality 
of that audit is as good as if you were doing it for the fourth time?’ The 
research literature tends to report findings of lower quality on initial audit 
engagements so focus group participant responses are of some interest 
here. Responses are mixed:
No, it’s not…the reason…[is] it doesn’t matter if it’s a new client. 
You’ve still got two weeks and I know it’s wrong to say this, but you 
don’t have all that prior year documentation and the work done to 
roll forward…All those check lists to roll forward, so you’ve got 
to spend more time doing the admin instead of understanding the 
client and doing the work and…it’s hard to fit in everything.
Based on your current knowledge of the client, you would think 
it’s quality work, but on subsequent years, you realise that you can 
still improve on the work you did for the client…It makes it better 
[the second time around]. Not that you didn’t do…quality work the 
first time, but…it’s a process of improvement…because of client 
knowledge.
I would disagree…when I’ve audited clients 
which are new clients to the firm, I found that 
there’s much more focus on understanding the 
business and everyone on the audit team having 
a good understanding of the business and the key 
transactions and the like. And probably less on 
documentation and, we’ll improve the audit file 
next year. But in terms of understanding what’s 
going on and making sure that it’s correct…
there’s much more focus on having an understanding and probably 
it’s better quality because you have to do all the work yourself. You 
can’t just kind of…roll something forward without really thinking 
about it. So, possibly, it could be better quality the first time around.
‘[W]hen I’ve audited 
clients which are new 
clients to the firm, 
I found that there’s 
much more focus on 
understanding the 
business.’ 
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[I]t depends on how you can consider the idea of quality. I wouldn’t 
consider that doing the audit cheaply is a measure of quality…
quality in an audit is whether you’re going to pick up errors and…
we’re providing an audit report to say that a financial statement 
has errors or doesn’t have errors…the quality in work the first time 
around or the quality of that opinion the first time around would be 
equal…maybe other, what I would consider sideline things, such 
as file documentation…can be improved or would be improved in 
future years just because you can lever off work that you performed 
previously. 
The same participant goes on to explain how in his or her experience, 
partners new to engagements, whether or not new to the firm, are 
demanding in terms of their own and others’ work effort:
[I]n terms of the opinion…partners are 
probably more demanding in how much 
work you perform and looking at things more 
completely the first time around on a client…
[but] in future times, partners are able to spend 
less time themselves on an audit because they 
feel that they have an understanding of what’s 
going on. And…I’ve worked on audits which 
are brand new, or audits which we’ve had but 
the partner has changed so the partner’s new 
to it, and each time I find a partner, when it’s new, will spend a lot 
more time themselves—[and] in the second or third year [will then 
spend] less time to look at it.
In the context of a general discussion about the demise of Andersen, the 
following comment is made:
[I]t seems that as we go on, the cases like Enron and HIH and all 
the rest of it…regulatory [processes] become…stricter, and there’s 
a lot more focus on corporate governance as well. It’s almost like 
our job gets harder, and there [are] more things that you need to 
think about all the time, and auditing standards are becoming more 
[complex].
There were negative responses from the interviewees when asked whether 
they thought clients were taking them more seriously now that auditing 
‘[I]n terms of the opinion…
partners are probably more 
demanding in how much 
work you perform and 
looking at things more 
completely the first time 
around on a client.’ 
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standards had the force of law. It was acknowledged, however, that some 
clients, especially the smaller ones, really did appreciate the audit function 
and its capacity to add value. This was acknowledged as especially true of 
client personnel who understood that auditors checked processes rather 
than thinking that their job was being reviewed in a search for mistakes 
they had made. When the interviewer then asks how to approach these 
latter types in a non-threatening way, the following responses are given:
That’s pretty hard. Being an auditor.
[There are] different personalities…and you kind of figure [it] out…
but it changes from person to person.
[I]t can be threatening…because there was a recent client in our 
group, the CEO got asked to go [by the board] then the acting CFO 
got asked to go…because of the issues the audit came up with. There 
were a whole lot of underlying issues, and generally the smaller 
[capitalisation] listed…clients have these problems where they’ve 
gone from less [regulation] up to all these regulations they have to 
meet…so that can happen. And…some people…do feel threatened, 
and occasionally it does come through.
One of the participants, in an exchange that reveals that some client staff 
receive bonuses linked to minimising required audit adjustments, then 
volunteers: 
I’ve got a couple of clients…[whose] bonuses are directly linked to 
[adjustments]. 
This participant is not alone in his or her experience. An observation is 
made by another interviewee: 
[T]hey get quite funny and try and get rid of all of [the adjustments].
From another comes the comment that:
They chase you out the room. 
And from another: 
Usually they do a better job, but at the same time they can get 
quite pig-headed with an adjustment…so if they get seven audit 
adjustments they get X amount of the bonus. 
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Another then comments: 
I’ve got clients whose bonuses are linked to the audit overruns, so if 
there [are] overruns on the job then it comes—directly proportional 
[to their] bonus. 
This scheme applies to the person below the CFO. General discussion then 
follows about how many of their clients’ bonus schemes are linked to 
profit and how lucrative these bonuses can be.
6.1.1 Summary 
The younger audit staff generally believe that having high levels of client 
knowledge is appropriate and necessary for the execution of a high-quality 
audit. How to begin involves reading the previous file, talking with the 
various people who have been involved with the audit previously, whereas 
knowledge of new clients comes from site visits, talking with the people 
and detecting the key drivers within the business. There is also discussion 
about understanding the organisational politics within the client.
Several people comment that the level of staff turnover removes 
understanding of many of the ‘soft issues’ of a client—that is, organisational 
politics and individuals, their temperament, their expertise and the 
interrelationships between key executives. 
In the case of a new client, having previous experience on clients 
in the same industry is seen as a real positive in gaining client-specific 
knowledge. 
Several of the younger people comment that the lead-in to a new 
client is well managed by their firms, with entire teams having ‘initial 
mobilisation time’ to help them understand the client, the issues, the risks 
and the way the audit is expected to be approached. Others report that 
they have little time to understand a new client and it is very much a 
matter of learning on the job. 
One interesting conflict between the expectations of the auditors and 
the clients does arise. There is a very strong view that the ultimate objective 
from the junior auditors’ perspective is ensuring that one understands the 
client at the end of the audit. As will be seen in Chapter 8 (retention of 
staff), however, clients repeatedly comment that they expect the auditors 
to understand their client from the time that they begin on-site visits. This 
schism is understandable and probably exacerbated where a particular 
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audit firm has been in a multiple-year engagement, because the client’s 
expectations are that the same audit firm has been around for some years 
and therefore it should know the client, whereas the individuals working 
on the audit team might be new to the engagement. 
Importantly, junior auditors report that the accounting staffers of at 
least some clients are remunerated with bonuses based on the number of 
audit adjustments required. This poses an important threat to the quality 
of an audit. 
All of the junior staff members report that the audit firms have 
important databases and information sets about industries and sometimes 
even clients. This tends to be the larger listed clients, however, and there 
is something of a dearth of information about the smaller clients, which in 
some cases includes a substantial part of their portfolios. 
6.2 Industry expertise 
The conversations with the peer focus groups of more junior auditors 
encompassed the issue of industry expertise as well as client-specific 
knowledge. What follows is the gist of these conversations.
First, there was general agreement that industry expertise was 
important.
[Industry expertise is] vital—[the] same as client knowledge. You 
can’t fully understand the risks of a client or…of clients in that 
industry if you don’t understand what’s happening in the industry 
and…the key balances. You can’t understand the risks and therefore 
where your potential [risk is] going to be and where to focus your 
time. 
[Industry expertise is] quite important because sometimes auditing 
is all about commonsense. You will know whether it’s reasonable or 
not. If you do not have industry knowledge you wouldn’t know. It’s 
really important.
[Y]ou have different accounting standards for different industries…
which means you would have different auditing techniques for 
different industries. That makes sense.
[It is important to have industry expertise] because when you’re at 
the client they…expect you to know how to account for things. If 
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you’re doing funds for fund managers, they expect you to know the 
related accounting standards for that area and if you’re doing all sorts 
of things, I don’t think you’ll get the same experience or knowledge.
I had [a foreign exchange] guy working on one of my jobs, which 
was a manufacturing firm, and…I had to do his inventory. I gave 
him one of the smaller divisions and I had to do the inventory 
section for him because he just did not have the skills to do it. But…
he said it straight away so it wasn’t an issue, but the fact is that he 
needed that skill to be able to do that section. And if I went to one 
of his clients and tried to do a hedge fund, I’d struggle.
When pressed about the issue of industry expertise and how it is acquired, 
the following comments are made:
The critical issues that our clients come upon are more to do with the 
size of their industry, so that’s why…[they are] grouped [according 
to] size. So it…[is] difficult to [know the] industry…there are a 
lot of documents that we fill out which cover industry knowledge 
and competitors and so there’s basically a quick snapshot of our 
company and where they sit in the business that you basically 
try and pick up as quick[ly] as you can…if you’re spending two 
or three weeks on an audit, which is pretty standard for us, and 
spending two or three days getting your head around the industry 
and knowing everything about it, it’s a pretty inefficient expense of 
time, so it’s a matter of getting it done as quick[ly] as you can.
Often the partners aren’t [knowledgeable] because they’re not 
working so many jobs. They do have a lot of industry knowledge 
specific to that client and…even the senior managers and the 
managers…take a lot of time to read the review so they’re up to date 
with what’s going on.
The more you work on, let’s say…the consumer markets, you start 
to get the general understanding…[that] they are doing a fairly 
similar thing, they’re marketing things to people, they’re selling 
things to people so you know that if they’re selling cosmetics or 
alcohol or bread…[there are] the same sort of drivers…the same 
process is driving what these people do. It just happens to be a 
different product, but if you’re…comparing bread and banking, it’s 
two very basic needs but [it’s] very different in what drives them.
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Another, in response to the above observation, adds that there are ‘very 
different risks and different regulations as well’:
You need to know. It’s not because they expect more from us in 
terms of just applying the audit standards, there are other aspects…
because the bread manufacturer also has to apply health standards 
and…if they don’t apply those quality standards they can…become 
a going concern problem. Then there [are] the banking licences and 
it just goes on.
The interviewer then asks: ‘How is that knowledge getting captured in 
the audit process?’
[B]efore you start, you have a plain reading [document] and every 
person on the job comes in, including the partner, and they’ll discuss 
what key risks they think have come out of industry changes from 
the year before, and they’ll let you know.
The interviewer then asks how long the meeting is that is held at the 
beginning of every audit:
[It] depends on how big and how many people.
Between an hour and a couple of days.
The interviewer then asks whether the firm has a database on industries:
Yeah, it does—not so much a database, but there [are] lots of 
technical releases and industry-specific releases that get sent out.
Then the interviewer asks about who is responsible for making sure the 
industry-specific releases are captured within the audit process:
[T]he whole team, generally. It would normally be the manager or 
senior, but sometimes the partner will grab them and send them 
around to the team as well. 
The interviewer asks whether there are other ways that interviewees 
think they can gain industry expertise:
[I]t’s difficult because we’re all in so many different industries. I have 
three clients and they’re [in] three completely different industries.
One thing that they are introducing just recently is they’re going 
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to have these…seminars on certain industry errors…real estate 
and consumer products and that sort of thing, which is almost 
voluntary, you can go to one if those if you’ve got time.
The interviewer probes more deeply, asking whether being across different 
industries is frustrating:
I find it better. I like…variation. They’re three completely non-
related industries [that I am in]. In any way, shape or form, you 
couldn’t connect the dots between them. So every time I go to a 
new client I have to learn about that industry…it’s difficult to get 
industry knowledge when you have a different industry on every 
client. Because really it’s client knowledge as well that you need, so 
you need to link the two together.
[I]t’s very broad. Financial services is very broad so you’ve got your 
banking, funds management, insurance, treasuries, superannuation, 
so there [are] 10 specific areas within [that].
[W]hen you come in as a graduate, you…have a broad range across 
the different industries and after you’ve been here for about a year 
or two, you’re given a choice to…specialise in [one] industry or 
two.
[I]t’s getting that perspective on different clients which…gives you 
that industry perspective rather than that single-client perspective.
[You] always struggle [with industry expertise in the middle 
market]…you’d hope to have at least a broad understanding. You 
have a higher demand so you should, in the majority of cases, be 
able to get an idea of what the major risks are just by that high level 
of understanding. But…there are some risks that you might miss if 
you don’t have that detailed level of understanding.
[T]he smaller companies are an industry in themselves…so even 
though they’re spread across actual industries in terms of what they 
do…maybe the risks associated with that size of company is why 
there’s a division, which is allocated rather than just picking the 
right thing out.
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There is confirmation of the interviewer’s observation that industry is 
quite narrowly defined:
We have people who specialise in the superannuation industry, for 
example, because there [are] a lot of specific regulations…[from] 
accountants right through [in response to a query about at which 
level this applies].
The interviewer then summarises: ‘So, what they’re saying is just because 
the ASX has a bunch of industry categorisations, it doesn’t make it 
necessarily relevant within the audit market…The differentiation is across 
sides.’ There is some agreement with this:
I never actually thought of it that way…[that] the middle market 
has its own inherent risks and knowing that as its own industry is 
its own benefit.
I’d feel more comfortable if…I could specialise in an industry within 
[the] middle market. 
[W]e have business development groups within our group…I’m in 
resources services and government, so we have about eight different 
industry groups and I’m in the property group because that’s what 
I specialise in and there [are] probably eight or 10 people in a BD 
[business development] group and we meet once a month and we 
talk about potential new clients and stuff. So it’s a way of going out 
and sourcing new clients and servicing the ones that we’ve already 
got, but it’s also [that] we have industry-specific training in those 
times as well. And…the people in the BD group will…receive any 
of the publications that we receive that are industry specific.
The interviewer asks: ‘Are there any other ways of inculcating industry 
knowledge that the firm does not use that you can think of?’
[I]n other offices…they have a lot more specialised industry 
knowledge, like industry training sessions that go for days…but 
they’re not used by all of the offices…each of the offices…tends 
to be quite discrete in terms of the training, industry specific and 
just generalised…there could be potentially more sharing amongst 
different people.
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The interviewer then asks: ‘Are the offices really run almost independently 
of each other? It sounds as if there are quite different practices in different 
offices.’
By the sounds of that, not only offices but divisions.
[T]raining across the board, although good, could be better and 
more timely…sometimes, you’re not receiving the training that you 
required until 12 months or six months down the track. [In response 
to the comment ‘until after you’ve had to use it’:] Yeah, which is just 
the nature of the beast in a sense…[that in] a large organisation, you 
can’t tailor it to everyone and everyone…enters at different times.
The interviewer responds: ‘So there are some industries where industry 
expertise is crucial and there are others where really audit expertise is 
more generic. Is that right? Is that what you’re arguing?’ There is general 
agreement:
Especially in our division…with [state] audit too—we’ve been 
divided up into industrial markets, consumer markets, to travel 
[and so on].
[B]ecause I’m in consumer markets, if I had to go and work in 
[another] job, I don’t think I’d face too many issues in picking up. 
It might take me a day or two to get up to speed with whatever the 
specialisations are…and that’s the same with a…partner, probably 
even less time. But to go from consumer markets to financial services 
would be a completely different kettle of fish. I’d have to get up to 
scratch on whatever standards these guys focus on.
6.2.1 Summary
There is widespread agreement among the more junior staff members 
that industry expertise is a crucial component of the quality of a good 
audit. Observations were made that with different applicable accounting 
standards requiring different audit judgments, knowledge of the industry 
and the regulatory aspect around it was crucial. One of the benefits of 
higher-quality levels of documentation occurs when staff turns over 
and, even with partner rotation, good documentation can assist with 
understanding the client as well as industry expertise.
It is acknowledged that there are wide differentiations in the amount 
and nature of expertise required by certain industries. Clearly, an industry 
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such as financial services is regarded as requiring a high level of industry 
expertise, and there is a view that there are other industries that have 
aspects that are particular to them—for example, industries subject to 
regulation other than conventional business regulation. An example 
is the healthcare industry. Indeed, for this industry, an auditee might 
have critical going concern issues not because of corporate regulation 
but because of health regulation issues. Aside from where there are high 
levels of regulation, there is a general belief that understanding the audit 
process can be transferred from one industry to another.
It is widely acknowledged that firms are providing high levels of 
industry training (perhaps at the cost of further specific technical 
auditing training). This means that people from a number of divisions or 
a number of offices can take part in the same industry training to build 
their expertise on an industry-level basis rather than on a technical basis. 
Most people tend to view it as beneficial to have a portfolio of clients that 
are in one or two industries as it helps build industry expertise. It means 
that one understands the risks of the industry better and indeed helps in 
terms of understanding client knowledge. This view is not seen so much 
in divisions that look at the middle market, where there are large numbers 
of clients across many industries. 
There is a view that much of this training is helpful but it could be 
better. There are several observations about the level of relevance of some 
of the industry training and, in particular, its timeliness. The extent of 
training seems to depend somewhat on the client base with which one is 
working.
There are a small number of people with a wide variety of different 
industries included in their portfolio of clients. While some indicate a 
degree of frustration with this, it is seen as a positive to the individual’s 
working environment because it provides interest through variety.
7.0 issues and implications
One of the major changes in the business of auditing has been the 
development and marketing of industry expertise by both Big Four and 
non-Big Four audit firms and the recognition by some purchasers and 
regulators of the importance of industry expertise, particularly in selected 
industry sectors. With respect to survey data relating to the question 
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about whether external financial statement audits were of value because 
of ‘the specialist industry expertise of the auditor’, the most positive of 
the groups was suppliers, with 50 per cent of them rating this as valuable. 
A similar proportion of users and a more modest proportion of slightly 
less than one-third of purchasers responded affirmatively to this question. 
Among the suppliers, there was a sharp differentiation between Big Four 
and non-Big Four auditors on their level of agreement, with more than 
three-quarters of Big Four auditors believing industry expertise brought 
value compared with less than half of non-Big Four auditors. 
The interview data showed a complex set of circumstances around the 
views of purchasers and suppliers in particular. There was widespread 
acknowledgment that auditors sought to develop and apply a sound 
understanding of the clients’ business (client knowledge) as a part of 
the delivery of a quality audit. Despite the fact that a number of users 
saw industry expertise as adding value, there was scepticism, with some 
users taking the view that for some industry expertise there was less 
underlying substance (and development of knowledge) than marketing of 
such expertise. 
Purchasers recognise that knowledge of a client’s products—that is, 
the products of the industry in which the client is engaged—is crucial to 
the audit because this is where understanding the risks of the business 
will lie. Others see industry expertise as being a crucial factor in the 
selection by a purchaser of an auditor, implying that value is added and 
provides the audit firm with an advantage in that selection process. While 
there were positive comments with respect to audit firms having industry 
expertise, there was also recognition by purchasers that auditors needed 
to rely on industry expertise from those outside the profession and indeed 
that reliance could be substantial. Interestingly, some purchasers see 
specialist expertise from a different perspective. While the audit firms 
portray industry expertise as providing specialist knowledge in terms of 
conducting the audit, this is not necessarily seen as valuable to the client. 
Some clients identified that an audit firm having specialist accounting 
standard expertise was of value, implying that the larger audit firms had 
expertise simply because of the scale of their operations.
Suppliers generally had a more positive attitude towards industry 
expertise with recognition of a hierarchy of expertise including industry 
expertise, client knowledge and knowledge of how the business works 
within the industry. While the positive attitude, particularly among Big 
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Four suppliers, was evident, there was a genuine concern about how the 
substantial overhead cost of developing this expertise was funded by 
client fees. Additionally, there is recognition that much of the ‘lower-end 
work’ is routine and is not necessarily industry specific or indeed even 
engaging. It became apparent that suppliers saw industry expertise as 
more important among upper-level staff involved in an audit.
The presence of industry expertise, the need for it and value of it 
represent challenges for managing the rotation of audit partners.
Standard setters appear to be acutely aware that industry expertise 
is of a much higher value and of more importance in certain industries 
where there is a significant overlay of regulation, such as in banking and 
insurance. There is a much lower level of added value in industries that 
can be audited with more generic skills. 
These individuals also acknowledge that even for an audit partner with 
a high level of industry expertise, the likelihood of that partner having the 
same high-level expertise as a senior person operating within the industry 
is not good. On the other hand, they also recognise that bringing someone 
who works within the industry into the audit firm is not necessarily going 
to add value to the audit, because of the need for auditing expertise as 
well as industry expertise.
Finally, some suppliers were quick to point out that having industry 
expertise was no guarantee that the audit would fulfil all of the users’ 
expectations. For some industries, that expertise might be a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for an audit that is both comprehensive 
and far reaching. Overlying this, they concede the need for open and 
comprehensive communication between the client and the auditor. 
The overarching view is that industry expertise can be an advantage, 
particularly in some industries, but the story is more complex than this 
and purchasers and users, in part, take the view that some of the specialist 
expertise claims have been over-marketed.
Auditing staff possessing client knowledge prompted less discussion 
than industry expertise; however, some important issues were raised. These 
include the mechanisms used to inform audit teams when a new client is 
acquired and how to familiarise new staff with an existing engagement. 
Additionally, it is understood that client knowledge might not exist at 
the start of the engagement but will become a necessary condition of the 
successful conclusion of each year’s audit. 
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The most important implication of all of this is that those audit firms 
that develop abilities to familiarise audit teams with client knowledge 
effectively, efficiently and systematically could give themselves a 
competitive advantage in the market for audit services.
While referred to only in the focus groups, the apparent presence of 
bonuses to client accounting staff based on the frequency and/or severity 
of audit adjustments poses some serious challenges to the environment in 
which the audit is conducted and potentially to the quality of the audit. 
There might be good reason to have such a remuneration scheme—such 
as reduction of errors and opportunistic practices—and it might generally 
induce greater care on the part of the client; however, there could 
be unintended consequences that damage the quality of the audit. A 
remuneration regime such as this could enhance secrecy and obfuscation 
on the part of the client’s management and could circumvent the oversight 
by senior management, the audit committee and those charged with 
governance. This will not add to the efficiency of the capital market.
8.0 Concluding remarks
There are policy implications with respect to several matters raised in this 
chapter. At its outset, this chapter focuses on the development, use and 
value of industry expertise, client knowledge and business acumen. Each 
of these plays a role in the demand for and supply of audit services. What 
emerged also, however, was the extent to which the personal attributes 
and characteristics of staff assigned to an audit engagement play a role. 
These attributes include but are not limited to maturity, tenacity, self-
assertiveness, resilience and integrity—many of which feed into the 
notion of ‘emotional intelligence’. The existence and development of 
such attributes appear to have key policy implications with respect to the 
selection of new employees for audit firms, the training and education 
before their selection and the professional skills development and training 
of the accounting professional bodies.
Throughout the interviews, the supply and the demand side of the 
market for audit services commented on the importance of these various 
personal attributes. There is, however, little evidence from suppliers 
that psychological testing to measure these skills is part of the selection 
process. Additionally, from the authors’ own knowledge, the specific 
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development of nurturing and attainment of educational outcomes for 
these graduate attributes are not uppermost in educators’ minds in the 
construction or delivery of degree programs relevant for the accounting 
profession. Similarly, the principal accounting bodies do not seem to 
have these personal attributes as things that are nurtured or tested in 
professional development courses, at least for those in the early years 
of their membership of their professional bodies. This is the case even 
though it is these junior people who are most exposed to the interface with 
clients. One important policy implication is that the supply side and the 
professional bodies together with the universities need to examine their 
recognition of, enthusiasm for and support of the development of these 
personal attributes. It could be that the inclusion of psychology subjects 
or at least their encouragement as electives to be taken by commerce and 
business students during university degrees should be explored.
The fact that junior staffers are so essential to the supply of audit 
services is a direct function of the business model that the principal and 
some of the smaller audit firms rely on. This business model requires that 
junior auditors with modest levels of life experience and, in some cases, 
self-assurance undertake a large proportion of the work. The sheer size of 
some of the audit firms and the underpinning cost structure make reliance 
on this group of individuals key to the commercial viability of this business 
model and yet reliance on these individuals is clearly a stress point in the 
operation of the current business model. In some smaller audit markets, 
where clients do not have the scale of the client base that has been the 
particular focus of this inquiry, we find that smaller audit firms that have 
adopted a different business model are becoming successful. For example, 
small audit firms with comparatively experienced staff and little reliance 
on junior auditors have often won the audit of local government authorities 
where this has been outsourced. It is the case that the larger audit firms 
are the only ones with the scale to successfully undertake many of the 
audits of Australia’s larger business organisations. This business model 
has been in place for decades and yet many of the interviewees observed 
that the market for audit services and the products and processes in place 
have had to undergo profound change and development in recent years. 
The question is: is the business model still right for the modern market for 
audit services? Is it the case that such heavy reliance on a large proportion 
of junior auditors is still applicable? Is it the case that universities produce 
the optimal type of graduate who has been nurtured and developed in a 
way that suits the current audit environment? 
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Another aspect of the business model of audit firms comes from the 
issue of the acquisition and retention of client knowledge. Finding an 
effective, efficient and systematic way of acquiring client knowledge 
in the first place and then passing it on to new audit teams or new 
members of existing audit teams seem to be crucial and high value-
adding characteristics for audit firms. The firm that finds the mechanism 
for systematically, effectively and efficiently achieving this goal will give 
itself a significant advantage in the market. We have observed anecdotal 
attempts at obtaining it, but conclude that there is a higher degree of 
variability between partners and within firms as to its success.
With respect to industry expertise, there is clear acknowledgment 
that this is very highly value adding, but only for a limited number of 
industries. There is also evidence that purchasers are somewhat sceptical, 
even cynical, that industry expertise is high value adding, seeing it in 
a number of instances as being ‘over-marketed’ by accounting firms 
seeking to argue the existence of a comparative advantage when one does 
not exist. Care needs to be exercised in marketing industry expertise and 
in the way that the industry expertise is structured. Do these structures 
mimic the capital market or are there in fact different structures that can 
be created because of the nature of the risks of business or the nature of 
transactions? 
Another set of policy issues relates to those who are entrusted with 
educating the junior auditors of the future. Australia’s universities 
have for many decades had degrees in accounting normally embedded 
in commerce or business degrees, which have a long history of quality 
education and development of technical expertise. The development of 
industry knowledge as well as personal and analytical skills might need 
to be revisited. For example, it might be possible to develop educational 
programs that are more theme based (the development of analytical skills 
and interpersonal skills such as tenacity, self-assertiveness and the like) 
and these skills might be better brought out in team-based educational 
experiences and the understanding of the business environment. The 
development of business acumen might be better developed through case-
based study rather than through thematic or topic-based education, which 
is at the core of most of Australia’s educational opportunities in business 
and commerce—although there are notable, innovative exceptions. 
The nature and operation of the supply of audit services and the 
increasingly compliance-based approach to audits are also having an effect 
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on those who seek to remain within the profession. This issue is dealt with 
at greater length in a later chapter dealing with retention of staff. One 
area that is specific to the retaining of the interpersonal characteristics 
such as maturity and experience also goes to the business model of the 
audit firms. We see evidence that the firms are unable (or in some limited 
cases unwilling) to provide employment opportunities for those who want 
to break away from the traditional full-time (or in some cases more than 
full-time) employment opportunities. Experience in other professions 
including law and medicine shows that excellent and highly expert 
employees are more likely to be retained where flexibility of employment 
is possible and encouraged.
Finally, there is recognition of the value of client and industry 
information and yet there is no systematic development of industry-wide 
databases designed for the use of the audit profession. The existing data 
tend to be intra-firm rather than Australia wide or generalised. One policy 
implementation that could be undertaken is the development of a database 
across the nation divided by industry groups and also geographical 
distribution, including data that relate to audit, governance and risk 
issues relevant to auditees within the Australian market for audit services. 
This important policy development is within the reach of Australia, 
would give it a structural advantage and provide a comparative advantage 
for suppliers of audit services and purchasers of those services, as well as 
adding to the efficiency of the capital market.
An important policy implication for those charged with governance 
relates to the existence of remuneration schemes that reward the client’s 
accounting staff based on the number or extent of audit adjustments. 
While there might be good reason to have such bonus schemes, there 
can be unintended adverse consequences and, as a minimum, the audit 
committee needs to be aware of the existence of such bonus mechanisms, 
and guidance on best practice in audit committees should include reference 
to such disclosures.
Another educational policy issue relates to the auditing firms’ 
demonstrated unwillingness to systematically attract honours degree 
graduates. As a general principle, some of the most desirable employers 
in other disciplines seek out and pay a premium to honours graduates. 
Honours graduates in these fields are widely seen as having advanced 
attributes including analytical ability, maturity, confidence and self-
assertiveness—characteristics that we understand are desirable in junior 
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auditors. Work that fulfils the higher intellectual capacity of honours 
graduates needs, however, to be available if more recruitment of them 
takes place. As a side benefit, some of those encouraged to remain for 
the honours year might decide to join the ranks of accounting/auditing 
academics—a field with insufficient recruits in an ageing workforce.

| 255
ATTRACTinG AnD sUPPoRTinG sTAFF 7
But that’s [staff turnover] okay in a sense unless they want to 
grow their firm because they don’t actually want everybody to 
come up to partner level…maybe they’d like greater retention, but 
then they’d have to grow their business to satisfy that retention. 
So the model is actually a good model from a talent-flow point of 
view…It’s…still…a fantastic…ground to learn…the job of a young 
professional, particularly up to manager level. They learn about 
companies, they learn about communication, they learn how to 
argue their case, they learn how to document, they learn how to 
think on their feet. Now those are all personal development things, 
but what about value to society? The answer is there is still value 
to society because even though there may be only 1 per cent or 
2 per cent [audit report] qualifications…that level [of learning] is 
always there for the partner. If the partner of the firm is not satisfied 
with the explanations that are given, he or she ends up having to 
put that down on paper. Now firms…are more prepared to support 
their partners in arriving at difficult, contrary decisions because 
their business model is at stake. 
— Purchaser 
1.0 Key issues
The issue of attracting and retaining staff within the public accounting 
profession raises some serious challenges for the profession, including:
•	 is the common perception that the number of accounting major 
graduates available for recruitment is falling factually based or a myth 
•	 what is the position for recruitment of international students who 
graduate with an accounting qualification
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•	 do high university entrance scores for some commerce and business 
degree courses mean that recruits to the profession are not suited to it
•	 are there further alternative entry pathways to the auditing and 
accounting professions
•	 are there better ways of developing personal attributes, including 
communication skills, that might be of use in the supply of audit 
services—both during and after university study
•	 to what extent are the starting salary levels within the auditing and 
accounting professions a deterrent to attraction of staff
•	 has the lure of partnership lost its gloss as an attraction to the 
profession
•	 has growth in the number of chartered accountants through the CA 
in commerce program undermined the traditional entry path through 
public accounting
•	 to what extent is the training provided to new recruits to public 
accounting firms valuable to them
•	 is the performance appraisal system in place once new recruits join 
constructive and seen by them as fair?
2.0 introduction
This chapter deals with the issue of attraction of staff to the public 
accounting profession and to audit in particular and also support for them 
once they have been recruited. It synthesises the views of stakeholders 
expressed during face-to-face interviews and the focus groups with more 
junior auditors. No survey questions directly addressing the issue of 
attracting staff to audit firms were included because the preliminary focus 
groups conducted before design of the questionnaire had made it clear 
that this issue was complex and not susceptible to investigation via broad 
survey techniques. This section starts with the interview comments from 
each of the groups in relation to this important issue for the future of audit 
and then proceeds to the focus group content dealing with attraction and 
support by way of training and the performance appraisal system. 
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3.0 interviews
No users commented about the attraction of staff so this section begins 
with the views of purchasers.
3.1 Purchasers
Among the purchasers—who, at the time of the interviews, were facing 
a skills crisis themselves—there was recognition of the difficulties that 
public accounting firms faced in attracting (and retaining) staff. There are 
mixed views on the continuing attractiveness of the profession for luring 
new graduates:
[I]t must be a concern for them because…the nice thing about it is, 
if they’re trained by the profession then they become very desirable 
out there in…companies…attracting high-quality staff? Given their 
structure…they are right up there. If people are going around the 
universities and looking to grab talent…a lot of people would still 
see…the auditing profession as being a good place to start. 
There is, however, acknowledgment of the quality of the training public 
accounting firm staff receive and the attractiveness of those staff to 
industry and commerce more generally:
[I]t is a bit of a concern…because…it does affect even internal 
audits…because we also have [a] problem try[ing] to retain or 
attract quality staff…especially in the financial service industry, 
it’s just getting more and more concentrated and therefore there’s 
also a little bit of a specialised knowledge required. And they 
are commanding a bit of a premium to start with. So if we want 
someone experienced…then we tend to be actually poaching other 
firms’ experience or auditors…unless we’re prepared to actually 
invest the time to train someone who has no experience, so it’s 
becoming a bit of a catch-22. But then the person, once they acquire 
the knowledge, they’re likely to be walking out of the door to go to 
somewhere else…So where do you invest?
The same purchaser continues, commenting on a perceived image issue 
from which the profession suffers:
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I’m listening to some of the [audit] partners and 
also witnessing the fact that they do have quite 
a bit of staff turnover…to actually retain them 
is probably…the issue. First of all, the external 
audit environment is quite harsh…they expect 
everyone to perform…Some people [who] join 
will probably naturally leave, but then they walk 
out with the knowledge as well…at the same 
time, I do believe both [for] external and internal 
audit to a large extent, the profession suffers a bit of [an] image 
issue and…this…hasn’t changed…now gen Y obviously is the 
generation we’re looking at…and they are the ones who want to be 
out there and be promoted in two years’ time, for example…Work–
life balance is very important on [the] gen Y agenda. Is audit really 
the image they…want to put on themselves? 
The salary levels paid by the public accounting firms are seen as not 
attractive, with financial rewards easily used to lure staff away from the 
profession:
[E]veryone struggles to get good staff. We compete 
for the same staff as the auditors do. But…the 
auditors particularly struggle…because they just 
simply don’t pay enough. They’re not competitive in 
the market…for those more junior staff, and there’s 
three years, three to five years of work experience, 
and a couple of years post[graduate] qualifications. 
There is a perception that less accounting majors are being graduated from 
universities. This perception, however, really has to be challenged when 
universities are graduating more students—many of them international—
from masters and other accounting conversion degrees.
[W]hen you say the auditing profession, I put into that category my 
own risk-management assurance group…I have a hell of a trouble 
staffing that and, unfortunately for them, the source is the Big Four 
firms, but they can’t get them. I can’t get them. So there is a skill gap 
right now. And I don’t know what it’s like in the unis, whether less 
people are doing it, less people are interested in going into chartered 
firms. Whether the [number of] accounting-qualified people that 
are coming out of universities is dropping…But…the staff aren’t 
there—well, all the people interested in the profession are not there.
‘[N]ow gen y obviously 
is the generation we’re 
looking at…and they 
are the ones who want 
to be out there and  
be promoted in two 
years’ time.’ 
‘[T]heir problem 
with staffing is 
pretty much of 
their own making.’ 
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Change in the way the CA program is administered is also cited as a 
reason for the difficulty in accounting firms’ attraction of staff. No longer 
the monopoly province of chartered firms, the CA program can now be 
undertaken within commerce and industry. This and the attractiveness 
of the investment banks and similar organisations as employers of choice 
are seen by purchasers to have detracted from recruitment to the public 
accounting firms.
[Y]ou’ve got a lot of the investment banks taking 
on graduates out of uni, right? So, because you 
can do your CA in commerce, that has removed a 
fundamental barrier to entry because before the 
Big Four or the big six, the big eight or all the 
accounting charter firms had it sewn up. You had 
to get your charter with the firm. And you had to 
spend one or two years after you’d completed your 
exams and then that was the point of peak turnover—supervisor/
manager. Now, where you can get CA in commerce…[it has turned 
some enterprises into] in-source chartered firm[s] and a lot of the 
senior guys would be partners at any one of the Big Four firms and 
they work centrally and they service the business. It’s an excellent 
function. They pay very well. They recruit very well. So they 
are absolutely able to deliver into a training and cadetship-style 
environment for bright young graduates—not only in that finance 
area but now in the wider businesses. 
Perhaps the most insightful comment from a purchaser is taken from a 
longer-term reflection on the quality of partners going forward: 
If you don’t get the right staff initially, you’ll never get the right 
quality people getting through in the profession to become partners 
later on.
3.2.1 Summary
No user comments address the issue of attracting auditing and accounting 
staff. Purchasers understand the problem audit firms have in attracting 
and retaining quality staff because they experience the same difficulty 
within their own firms, especially in relation to generation Y recruits. 
They acknowledge too that they are often the beneficiaries of training 
provided by the audit firms in conjunction with the professional 
‘[b]ecause you 
can do your CA 
in commerce, 
that has removed 
a fundamental 
barrier to entry.’ 
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bodies—particularly the CA program—in that they frequently hire these 
accounting firm alumni. There is observation that the CA program can 
now be done from within industry and commerce too. 
There are mixed views about the attractiveness of the auditing 
profession to new graduates, with some citing an ‘image’ problem or 
lack of attractiveness compared with employment within banking and 
finance, but others see it as a ‘good place to start’. The salaries paid 
by audit firms to new graduates are seen as an issue in attracting and 
retaining staff, with the lure of partnership no longer as attractive since 
partnership is increasingly eventuating on return to the profession after 
a stint in industry anyway—at least that is the perception. There seems 
to be a perception that less accounting graduates are being produced by 
universities at a time when universities probably have never graduated 
more people with accounting degrees.
3.3 Suppliers
Suppliers confirm as an issue the ‘image’ problems of the auditing 
profession raised by the purchasers. Again, the perception comes through 
that the pool of accounting graduates out of universities is shrinking at 
a time of record commerce graduations—many of whom are international 
students who seek permanent residency and employment.
The more fundamental [issue] is about an image 
of what is the profession in public practice, 
and getting university students, because…
if you look at the demand now out of the Big 
Four firms for graduates out of university, and 
you start stripping out and saying, ‘Well, how 
many students are coming out of university with 
financial business degrees?’, you strip away the 
foreign students who are here on a visa that 
[doesn’t] allow them to stay and work, you take out those people 
who are really not interested in going into a Big Four, who want 
to go to merchant banking or to commerce…we’re probably at 
that tipping point with the pool that you’re left with; the Big Four 
will soak [them] up in their entirety…if that situation gets worse 
because the profession is not an attractive place to go and work 
or to seek a career longer term, you are going to have significant 
shortages just in getting the numbers in—forget about retaining 
‘[W]e also have a large 
amount of regulation, 
and a lot of people 
look at the audit 
partners and say,  
“We don’t want to 
 be that.”’
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them…it’s a combination of a lot of things, it’s a combination of 
some of the characteristics in the marketplace, it’s a combination 
of…the fact that we do have full employment, we have shortages 
of accounting professional people, we have fairly sophisticated 
marketers in offering people opportunities in merchant banking…
we also have a large amount of regulation, and a lot of people look 
at the audit partners and say, ‘We don’t want to be that’—because 
it’s not an attractive profession.
There is a belief that prospective accounting students view the audit 
profession as a career in which information is gathered rather than one in 
which doing something with information is required.
[I]f they find that they are interchanging with 
themselves that…whoever can follow a set of 
instructions could perform their role, then they 
become less valuable…. in an environment where it’s 
called a finance or forensics [function], or somewhere 
where you have to exercise a fair degree of judgment 
and you negotiate, and you do rather than you 
get information…that’s how a lot of prospective 
accounting students view the audit profession…I’m not sure, but 
maybe the commerce degrees and business are [not] the degrees of 
choice that they might have been some time ago.
Another supplier believes that fewer undergraduates are undertaking the 
prerequisites to complete the CA program:
[T]he attraction is an issue and, for various reasons…
there are less people doing the prerequisites for their 
CA, so we’ve got less people in our pool of potential 
candidates…the options are broader so fewer people 
[are] doing that. Actually the overseas student numbers, 
because they’ve increased and not all of them have 
residency status…we’re losing out because of that as 
well. So our pool of potential candidates is actually shrinking. The 
unis in Melbourne also…some of them do the audit module in the 
third year…and we recruit in the beginning…some are second 
year, so that candidates haven’t necessarily studied audit when they 
apply and…that’s an issue for some of them.
‘[M]aybe the 
commerce degrees 
and business are 
[not] the degrees 
of choice that they 
might have been 
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The way in which auditing is taught at university is also blamed for reducing 
its attractiveness as a career, as this next supplier’s comments reveal:
Some of them, if they have studied audit, it’s taught in 
a way that’s very old school and it’s purely teaching 
them the auditing standards. It’s not helping them 
see how those standards live and…[does not use] the 
corporate collapses and debate about what might 
have gone wrong and trying to make those auditing 
standards live in the real world, so that the ones that 
have done audit at times think it’s dead boring so 
why would they take that career path? So, [it’s difficult] just to get 
them in the door, and their career options are much broader…when 
I was a graduate, for someone that had done a bachelor of business 
or a bachelor of commerce and was interested in accounting, the 
natural progression would be [to] join one of the Big A’s chartered 
firm…[but] because the opportunities are much more diverse now, 
with being able to do CA in industry for instance, or doing the CPA 
and forgetting the CA, the number of people…going into the big 
firms is probably less, the pool that [is available] is [smaller] as well. 
And there [are] the generational issues…do I want to go to a big 
chartered firm and work long hours? And some still see that if you 
go to a big firm…you must have a passion to be partner.
Suppliers also acknowledge that the myriad other opportunities 
for graduates and trained public accounting staff contribute to the 
attraction issue:
Interestingly enough, we find it very difficult to recruit ex-Big Four 
people because they are just burnt out. So that’s a problem. And…
there [are] so many different opportunities out there now, it’s amazing, 
absolutely amazing. And there are some really good jobs out there…
in industry, and really attractive stuff for them to go to. So…once 
auditing…starts to lose its flavour, they start looking around.
Some suppliers draw attention to the increasingly prescriptive nature of 
a highly regulated audit profession as a deterrent to attraction: 
[T]he grad comes in the front door, which is always the audit door, 
and then goes out the back door, which is business services and tax 
consulting and so on, and then goes into industry and commerce 
‘[T]he ones that 
have done audit 
at times think it’s 
dead boring so 
why would they 
take that career 
path?’ 
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and makes a fortune. Audit’s generally been regarded as being 
very much a training ground and then once you get your CA you 
branch out into the more exciting areas of a practice…audit’s a 
great space to be in and I really enjoy it, but…we’re finding it more 
and more difficult to convince grads that audit [is] a good place to 
be in because they think it’s a training ground…it’s harder to keep 
auditors inspired because of the prescriptive nature of the work—
particularly if they’re not signing off the audit.
[A] general observation would be that clearly all 
of the stakeholders involved would like talented, 
intelligent individuals in the audit firms for…
the quality of [audit], what it means to the 
capital markets [and] reliance on the financial 
information…all stakeholders—be it the 
regulators, the government, the actual companies, 
the shareholders—everybody wants…talented, 
intelligent people doing it…[There is a risk] with 
too much regulation…yes, we’ve got a role to play, but we’re client 
facing, client serving, you’re going to attract different types of 
individuals. And the risk…is that you lose your ability to attract 
talented, intelligent people when all they’re going to be doing is 
filling in check lists and completing [them]. And that…in a holistic 
sense, is one of the biggest issues facing [attraction]—you’ve got to 
have the talented people…you’ve got to attract them and you’re not 
going to attract them if they’re going to be filling in check lists and 
just following rules. 
This issue of the increasingly prescriptive nature of audit and the extent 
to which this issue has implications for attraction of audit personnel are 
explored further in reporting on the focus group interviews held with 
more junior audit staff.
3.3.1 Summary
Several suppliers make pejorative comments about the attractiveness of 
auditing as a profession to enter. The increasingly prescriptive, check 
list-type nature of audit work is cited as one reason for this fading 
attractiveness. Again, as with purchasers, suppliers hold the misinformed 
view that there must be less people with accounting majors emerging 
from universities. The issue of how auditing is taught at university and 
‘[T]he risk…is that 
you lose your ability 
to attract talented, 
intelligent people when 
all they’re going to be 
doing is filling in  
check lists.’ 
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at what stage in their degrees this subject is taken relative to the firms’ 
recruitment cycle emerge as other potential issues in the attraction debate. 
Also raised are generational issues, the potential long hours of work and a 
fall in passion to become a partner.
3.4 Standard setters
The standard setters interviewed raised the interesting issue of university 
entrance scores and whether those students with high scores were 
necessarily the ‘right’ recruits into the accounting profession. Not all 
university accounting courses, however, have high-scoring entrants, so if 
this is an issue for the profession it is a soluble one. This standard setter 
speaks of more lateral entry paths to the profession through bridging 
courses for non-accounting graduates as an alternative:
[I]f we had…a TV show like Chicago Accountant instead of LA Law, 
that might make [the profession] a little bit more glamorous, but…a 
lot of the more senior people in the firms would say…the ability 
to be this trusted advisor doesn’t exist as much now in auditing…
because we’re telling people that auditors can’t have friends. 
They’ve got to be adversarial…That’s relevant to a point. I wouldn’t 
overstate it, but…to…attract good people we’ve got to offer good 
careers and good career prospects otherwise the danger is that…it’s 
a race to the bottom in attracting the lowest common denominator…
[so] something that does make sense…is being able to run 
multidisciplinary firms which offer career choices for people…The 
other thing is the quality issue that…is being discussed with some 
of the unis at the moment and different people would have different 
views…a concern for me is…the determination of [university entry 
scores, which] is effectively being driven by demand. [It] doesn’t 
necessarily mean you’re getting the right people into the right 
courses. 
The same standard setter continues, expanding on what he or she hears in 
the marketplace about the lack of skills found in new graduates:
What…amplifies that as well is the experience of some of the senior 
partners…saying the people that we’re hiring just aren’t good with 
clients. They can’t deal with people. They’re very much…book 
driven…Do they have the people skills…whether it’s emotional 
intelligence [or something else]…we would like to attract some 
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slightly different people with the base skills…
the Big Four firms have got a good name and 
a good reputation in terms of a place to go as 
a graduate, so perhaps we need to be more 
discerning then as to who we seek to get in…
you don’t just want people there who’ve got 
credit greater or distinction averages and 
they’ve got 95. Maybe we need to be more 
discerning. But they’re not coming through 
as rounded [is what]…people would say is 
the other area that’s a concern…one of the solutions to that is…
widening the funnel. You can start the CA program with the institute 
now from a non-accounting background, but you’ve still got to do 
a conversion course and so effectively notwithstanding that you 
followed one line through your university degree, you’ve then got 
to stop, bridge and get into it. But that’s one of the alternatives 
that…we’re following. Whether that’ll be popular, I don’t know, 
but that’s tended to be the way the [United Kingdom] has worked 
for as long as I know that people have done that conversion course.
They could come in from somewhere else. The question then 
becomes, why would they leave what they were doing…and you 
may get people moving from one country to another because of the 
cultural difference and the opportunity, but the upside for them is 
the move to the new country. The question then becomes, how long 
do they stay in the profession [before they]…move on to something 
else and use it as a springboard to another area of the financial 
world? 
You need…bright [people]; they don’t need to be the best; it’s not 
rocket science. You need people with good communication skills…
fairly good thinking skills, but not necessarily high-level academic 
skills. I don’t think you necessarily need those at all.
There is also recognition of the need for systematic research by public 
accounting firms of the outcomes of their selection methods. 
I don’t think we’re particularly good at analysing our selection 
methods and looking back through history…to say, ‘Well, if we 
actually look at how things transpire, does that tell us something 
about what we should be looking for and even when we know 
‘What…amplifies that 
as well is the experience 
of some of the senior 
partners…saying the 
people that we’re hiring 
just aren’t good with 
clients. They can’t deal 
with people. They’re very 
much…book driven.’ 
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what we’re looking for, which we do…are we seeing it [as] the 
real issue?’…quite often, what you’re looking for you think you’re 
seeing and then you’re quite surprised six months to a year later 
when these individuals no longer seem to be demonstrating what 
you thought you saw in your somewhat superficial assessment 
processes.
3.4.1 Summary
Standard setters raise thought-provoking issues related to the skills 
and academic calibre of recruits to the profession. They lament what 
they perceive as the lack of sound communication skills and argue that 
the academic skill level required to work successfully in the profession 
probably could be reduced below the current level implied by university 
entry scores. 
3.5 Regulators
The one regulator commenting on this issue maintains the theme of 
the relative unattractiveness of auditing as a career and perceptions of 
diminishing accounting graduates:
I don’t think they’re going to be attracted to auditing, quite frankly…
They’ll want to be merchant bankers or something like this, or 
managers…a key indicator of that is…the number of accounting 
graduates…versus management graduates in universities.
3.5.1 Summary
Only one regulator commented on the issue of accounting firm staff 
attraction—and the comment reiterated perceptions common to the 
purchaser, supplier and standard setter groups in terms of a denigration of 
the attractiveness of a career in auditing to new graduates and a perceived 
reduction in the pool of graduates available to be recruited.
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4.0 introduction: focus groups with more  
 junior staff
The focus groups of more junior staff were working in the offices of 
the Big Four. For this group, attraction to the auditing profession was 
fresh in their minds while how they entered the profession, why they 
were focused on obtaining useful professional and business experience, 
international experience and credible professional training supported by 
an employer varied. 
4.1 Focus group participants and recruitment to their firms
In terms of recruitment and selection, for the first Big Four firm, most 
had been recruited out of university, but one had started as a temp and 
one had worked overseas for the same firm. Most had started in audit, 
but one had moved from the finance department to audit. All but one 
had come to the firm with accounting degrees; one had a finance major. 
Two of the second Big Four firm focus group interviewees came straight 
from university, but the other five had been recruited between second and 
third year of university into a graduate program. None had joined into a 
cadetship program after Year 12. Of the eight taking part from the third Big 
Four firm, two began after Year 12 through a cadet scheme and undertook 
university part-time for two years and then a third year of study full-time, 
working during vacations. One came from a non-Big Four firm. Four had 
come straight from university—one with experience of three placements 
during the degree, including one with the current employer. Finally, 
one had worked overseas for a Big Four for a year and a half during an 
Australian-based degree and had then returned to Australia. 
Interviewees provided various reasons for their recruitment to their 
Big Four employer:
I applied to most places but [this Big Four firm] was the quickest in 
answering letters and getting you into interviews and giving you 
the job. The rest were still doing the interview process.
[This Big Four firm] was the only one that offered me [a place], so 
that was the only offer I got.
I got a couple of offers, but I chose [this Big Four firm because]  
I didn’t like the attitude of the people down the road.
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I went through the summer clerk program, so I worked, I applied 
for that at all the Big Four [firms] and received a few offers, but 
decided that I liked the people and the clients as well at [this Big 
Four firm] in the area [in which] I wanted to work.
Those present were then asked whether they felt that the Big Four firm for 
which they worked had made the right recruitment choices from among 
them compared with others they knew who had not been recruited.
[G]enerally the calibre of people they recruit is really high…
probably there [are] people who, for whatever reason, have…
slipped through the net, like people they never made an offer to 
who I…was surprised [about] and remain so even having met who 
was recruited.
The interviewees were asked whether there was any defining thing that 
differentiated their chosen firm from other firms or any audit firm from 
other employment choices open to them as graduates.
I wanted an international experience. I’m from [location outside 
Australia] so one of the Big Four was what I felt [was] the easiest 
way for me to get that opportunity and I have been able to [get it]…
That was why I chose a Big Four, but…I always wanted to go into 
accounting.
My Dad was an ex-auditor and he used to work for [name of 
firm] and he recommended me to join the Big Four…The range of 
opportunities in the Big Four office was one of the key drivers why 
I came to [this Big Four firm], plus my brother is an accountant, 
and when I was at uni I was looking forward to working for the 
Big Four…so that was partly the reason why I came here. But 
upon coming to [this Big Four firm], my plans have…changed. I’m 
looking…more overseas…getting overseas experience, which I will 
do here…when [I] finish…[my] CA.
I decided when I was at uni that I wanted to…work…for a 
professional services firm, whether it was a merchant bank or a Big 
Four accounting firm. I didn’t want to go commercial and the reason 
I chose a Big Four was because [of] the opportunities and [this Big 
Four firm] offered also at the time the internal training for CA.
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I was already working [for this Big Four firm] as I finished my uni 
degree, so I thought I’d throw [in] my hat…I thought it would be 
easier to transfer than go through the whole process of applying 
and all that and, as it turns out, they still made me jump through 
all the hoops.
[I joined for] the experience. I thought the experience that you 
would get working with a Big Four accounting firm would be great, 
like the training, [and] the exposure. 
[In response to whether a non-accounting firm job was considered] Well, 
not really…I considered it, but when I was doing vacation work, I 
thought it’s a good place to start, to get a feel[ing] for [it]…I wasn’t 
quite set on what exactly I wanted to do and I thought auditing 
would give you some exposure to a broad range of different things.
[I]n audit you get to see different industries and then in the future 
if you want to move somewhere you can say, okay, I like financial 
services.
[W]hen I was applying for jobs I got offered…work in a mid-tier 
firm and obviously a Big Four firm and I chose [this Big Four firm] 
because I thought it looks good on your resume and because it’s a 
Big Four everyone knows [it]…And then I also got offered [a place] 
at another Big Four, but in tax, and I thought tax would pigeonhole 
me, so I…[chose] audit.
[I]t’s relatively easier to go into [a] Big Four than to go into those 
commercial firms. I’m not saying that Big Four has less demanding 
requirements, but they have huge demand for people…I’m not sure 
about Australia, but back in [location outside Australia], we have 
new graduates—almost 100 to 200 per year—and it’s impossible for 
those commercial firms…You’ve got more opportunities and [the Big 
Four] need people. 
The group was then asked: ‘Why did you join this firm as opposed to 
other Big Four firms? Why did you pick the Big Four versus the others?’
I…picked the Big Four from a training point of view. You probably 
get more opportunities to get training and support there as well 
[as] future travel and that kind of thing. [It was a] bit of a matter 
of elimination with why I ended up with [this Big Four firm]…my 
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dad worked at [another of the Big Four], so I didn’t want to go 
there…I had a couple of mates that were [at another of the Big Four] 
and weren’t overly happy with it, and…you start thinking if you’re 
going to go Big Four, you may as well go big, Big Four. That’s why I 
chose [this firm] initially.
[My decision] was more…that I left applying…[until] very late, 
and [this Big Four firm] was the only one that was still open…So  
I applied and then I got a job, and my sister used to work here, and 
she enjoyed it, so I got feedback from her, and she’s a pretty honest 
person, and I thought it would be a good place to work.
[T]he reason that I stay is—or stayed till now—what I enjoy about 
it, [as] opposed to other accounting career paths, is that there is a 
clear career path set out, and clear progressions set out along the 
way. So you’ve got a defined plan of where you’re actually heading, 
and where you could end up…[as] opposed to [being] in industry, 
where you could just float about at the same level for a while; it’s 
not as clear. And then…the other thing that’s attractive about it is 
the training that’s provided, and the exposure to so many different 
issues.
There is general agreement in response to an interviewer prompt that 
the level of training and support for the CA program is high:
[T]here’s a good structure that you can follow, and there [are] just 
opportunities for anyone and everyone. If you told me that I’d 
be working directly with a partner in my first year, when I first 
started…I wouldn’t have believe[d] it…when I first went through 
this process of selecting, I was in a fortunate position…selecting 
which firm to choose. [This Big Four firm] presented probably the 
best [opportunity] because of the people—I identify with the people. 
And you know you’ve made a good decision when you meet other 
people from…not even in the same division, on a very divisional 
basis…But if you’re out and about, obviously I know [others in the 
group] from the graduate camps that they have. And you hold those 
friendships the whole way through, so it’s the people aspect as well 
that keeps you here. It’s not just the small group of people you’re in 
contact with eight hours a day; it’s outside of that as well.
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Reputation was a very big [issue] for me…It was firm specific rather 
than going straight down the line of wanting to be an auditor. That 
was a big factor as well…For me, coming out of university, it was all 
about getting the best opportunities and…the bigger the firm and 
the better the reputation, there was going to be more opportunities 
from within not just an audit field, but a whole sector and that’s one 
of the main reasons I came.
[W]hat links closely with that too is clients and the client base that 
[this Big Four firm] has [as] opposed to some of the other firms. And 
obviously one of the benefits of being in audit is the ability to see 
a wider range of firms. So if you can see what the best firms are 
doing…that’s certainly a contributing factor.
I’ve…done a double degree in Arts/[Language] and then also 
majored in accounting on the business side and my university set 
up a placement for a year up in [name of company]. But I was more 
an ‘explorologist’—it’s that kind of role, but also working with 
a few chartered accountants and it was from that that I realised 
that probably going into chartered first after my university degree 
would give me some more opportunities to get more technical 
knowledge and understand how other businesses operate. So from 
that I decided that chartered was what I wanted to do.
[W]hen I was in high school…[I] wanted to go into law and that 
had been my plan…since I was about three years old…[I] did 
work experience with [this Big Four firm] when I was in Year 11, 
and I had also done work experience at a couple of law firms as 
well. I originally…only applied for the traineeship for interview 
experience, but when I got in, I thought well, I’ve got three months 
before I start my degree so I’ll give it a go and I found with my 
three months at [this Big Four firm], and the same with the work 
experience that I did, compared with the law firms that I was 
working at, I found it was just a much better environment…It was 
a lot friendlier…there was much more of a team-focused kind of 
environment…I only saw two different law firms, but the focus 
really seemed to be very much individualised and it was more 
competitive against each other rather than working as a team to get 
things done. And I much preferred the kind of environment and 
the culture that I saw at [this Big Four firm] and that’s what made 
me switch focus.
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[I]nitially, the choice was part of my course. I ended up at [name 
of industrial company]…I was working in the general audit there. 
Then I worked at [another of the Big Four firms], where I also ended 
up in audit…and then I ended up in audit here and basically…that 
suited me just fine because…I wanted to…understand how all these 
big businesses work…and then why did I choose [this Big Four 
firm]? I pretty much chose [it] because when I was working here 
as opposed to the other Big Four firm. I just found the team to be 
friendlier and the hours I was working [were] a bit more reasonable, 
and that…was the only point of difference in terms of the work 
you’re doing. It’s fairly similar.
I chose Big Four because I thought that’s where I’d get the best 
experience. I had quite a few different offers, so then it was a 
decision as to which firm I go to. And it came down to pretty much 
attend[ing] the cocktail parties and getting to know people and  
I found that the people at [this Big Four firm] were very friendly 
and were the best fit for me. And I was also very impressed with 
the client base and found that from those clients I’d get a really good 
experience and auditing is definitely an area where, as other people 
touched on, you get to see how different companies operate and 
you get a really good understanding.
When I was at uni I was working part-time at a manufacturing 
company in their accounts department and we had the auditors 
come in and…just speaking to them and the work that they did…
[made me decide] to go into audit just for that whole experience 
and getting to see how other companies work rather than doing the 
same thing day in, day out.
[I]t was a…toss-up between industry and a Big Four accounting/
auditing role. Either I go into industry, I’d do the same thing day 
in, day out for the next year…before I’m promoted to the next 
level and then I do that role for another year or two before I get 
promoted. So…just the challenges that auditing would provide…
the learning curve is very different to what you’d get if you were in 
industry. That’s probably why I joined audit.
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The interviewee who had moved from a mid-tier firm had the following 
to say:
[T]he ease of the graduate recruitment program was a lot easier at 
mid-tiers and it was a lot more friendly so you got to meet a lot of 
partners and managers because they’re the people you’re working 
for. And I looked into maybe one or two top tier but then chose 
[name of mid-tier firm] as my first preference.
4.1.1 Summary
A number of purchasers make the observation that recent changes giving 
more diversity to graduates entering the profession have been good and 
have worked elsewhere in the world for some time. There is no real issue 
with respect to quality control in the profession because of the professional 
examinations, which are seen as the ‘barrier’ to entry. There are a number of 
diverse views about training and the relative attributes of training within 
the Big Four versus commerce. One interesting set of comments relates to 
the widespread belief among purchasers and suppliers that initial training 
within a typical large accounting firm is a highly efficient and effective 
way of attaining a widespread, diverse set of experiences that are useful in 
developing the foundations of a career in accounting and, more broadly, 
in business. The training and experience beyond say, the first five years, 
however, shows a more divergent set of views. For example, some take the 
view that several years in commerce after those initial foundation years are 
preferable because of the deeply embedded industry experience one has. 
Also, the experience of being on the ‘receiving end’ of interactions with 
accountants in professional practice assists in developing certain personal 
attributes for the individuals involved and perhaps their sensitivity to 
needs and wishes of clients. Thus, the relative benefits of training and 
experience at different levels within a career are more complex and the 
quality of that experience is not simply linear. 
In terms of the more junior auditors, various reasons are given for 
their recruitment to the public accounting profession and to the firms for 
which they work in particular. Many of the reasons appear serendipitous 
rather than planned, although sometimes there is a connection to auditing 
through family. There is awareness among participants that their peers are 
ill informed about what auditing is and its role. Opportunities for training, 
international travel and secondments are given as reasons for attraction to 
the profession and to the Big Four in particular. 
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Having decided to join public accounting, credibility and reputation of 
the firm seem to be key drivers in the attraction process. Another key driver 
that arose in the interviews with more junior staff was the importance to 
them of people. Many report that it is the ability to connect with those in 
the recruitment process and those within their working environment that 
is key in both attraction and retention within the accounting profession. 
5.0 issues and implications
Issues that were raised in the context of audit firm attraction of staff 
included the image of the auditing profession, the work/life balance 
preference of generation Y, the fact that the CA program no longer had to 
be completed within a public accounting firm, the attractiveness of other 
employers (especially organisations such as in banking and finance), the 
comparatively low initial salary scale, the increasingly prescriptive and 
regulated nature of auditing, the available pool of graduates from which 
to recruit and questions about the continued attractiveness of achieving 
partnership. 
In all of the interviews with users, no observations were made about 
issues associated with those entering into the accounting profession; 
however, purchasers, suppliers, standard setters and regulators all made 
observations relevant to the issue. 
With respect to purchasers, no acute feelings were evident of the 
existence of a threat to attracting appropriate talent to the profession, 
although they acknowledged it was a competitive employment market. 
A key part of the stability of attraction into the profession is the large 
graduate intake that accounting firms, big and small, undertake each 
year. While the numbers of entering students seem to be sufficient, there 
are questions among some of the participant groups about the quality of 
these graduates. With regard to purchasers, they had reservations about 
whether the pool of graduates had, in relative terms, declined. Counter 
to this, some purchasers observed that members of the Big Four had lost 
their monopoly position as the training ground for membership of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia because of the presence 
of the CA program within industry. As one purchaser observed, the large 
commercial organisations now had such good recruitment, training and 
development processes that they were equal to at least some of the Big Four. 
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From this, one can conclude that even though some accounting graduates 
enter other occupations (banking is by far the most frequently mentioned 
employment alternative), they are not necessarily lost to the accounting 
profession, although the Big Four might have lost their relative position in 
the employment market. A related issue comes from one observer who is a 
purchaser: recruitment into chartered accounting via the CA in commerce 
program now has the added appeal of not having the same level of external 
oversight and inspection as the public practice part of the profession. 
On balance, purchasers believe the market is competitive for entry-
level accountants and that commerce in a relative sense has some 
advantages over traditional public practices as the entrance point. Of 
course, this could change with the conditions in the economy changing 
so profoundly. Repeatedly, the observation was made that accounting 
firms simply did not remunerate adequately, so if they did not get the 
entry-point fundamentals right then significant long-term consequences 
would ensue and the total pool of professional people, including those 
with experience at all levels, would decline and atrophy as time passed. 
With respect to suppliers, more questioning ensued about the total pool 
of graduates available for recruitment. Frequently, observations were made 
that the total pool seemed to be either small or at a ‘tipping point’. Once 
one takes into account international students without the appropriate visa 
to work in Australia and those who choose to go into industry, commerce 
or banking, the pool of students available for audit is too small. 
There was extensive belief that auditing was still seen as a good 
training ground, but there was also a perception that it held less glamour 
and prestige as a long-term career than it once did. Several suppliers 
indicated that one of the attractions of the larger employers was that 
they had multidisciplinary firms that could provide alternative careers 
to ambitious accounting graduates who sought alternative careers and 
diverse employment opportunities. 
Some suppliers made a number of observations about the accounting 
degrees that many of the students undertook. First, there is some question 
about the number of accounting graduates who are completing their 
degrees and are eligible for employment in Australia. Even if the quantity 
is the same, many of the students who suppliers interview are seen to 
have limited knowledge of auditing. Indeed, the way in which auditing is 
taught is lamented, if it represents a type of education that is procedural in 
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nature (following the auditing standards, for example) rather than thematic 
(tracing the history of a major corporate failure). Also, the fact that some 
universities teach auditing in a limited way and very late in the degree 
means that accounting students applying for entry-level positions in 
accounting firms have little or no understanding of the nature of auditing. 
While not directly stated by respondents, one might speculate that the 
reason why auditing is not taught in the manner suggested is because 
universities are struggling to recruit academic staff in the quantity and 
quality necessary for the education process of auditing and its precursor 
subjects. That is, universities are under similar competitive employment 
pressures for their staff as are accounting firms.
Standard setters made the observation that accounting did not have 
the glamorous profile it once had and this in turn was a challenge to 
recruitment into the profession. A related fact is that the profile and 
prestige of accounting are declining, as observed by one standard setter: 
‘It is no longer possible for the auditor to be the trusted advisor.’ This has 
damaged the public perception, profile and professional image of auditing. 
There is also acceptance that many entry-level people of today’s generation 
are seeking multidisciplinary careers that are diverse and challenging. 
Again, there were questions about the degrees that were used as entry 
points to auditing and a direct assertion that consideration could be given 
to selecting not on the basis of Year 12 entry scores but by utilising a 
wider set of criteria. In this connection, attention is drawn to the fact 
that certain other professions, including the medical profession, have 
broadened their set of criteria. Is it time higher education in business does 
the same? Additionally, university entry scores are a function of supply 
and demand. If public accounting firms are more willing to take more 
graduates from universities without such high entry scores, and are more 
willing to recruit international students whose working visas are yet to be 
processed, perceptions of too few willing graduates might dissipate.
While it has been recognised that the existence of conversion courses 
and foundation programs improves the opportunity of recruiting staff 
from outside accounting degrees, there is incomplete evidence about 
whether these programs are sufficiently attractive or of high quality. We 
need to know if the quality of the educational offering is such that it 
delivers educational equivalents to traditional pathways so we can judge 
whether this is a successful way of widening the entry point for those 
seeking to join the auditing profession. 
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One standard setter questioned whether firms within the accounting 
profession tracked their selection choices at entry point to evaluate those 
who survived, prospered and contributed to the auditing profession 
in later years. This would represent a substantial longitudinal research 
study to examine the attributes of those who enter the profession and 
their contribution to the profession in later years. Parallels of this type of 
study have been undertaken in the field of sociology on a wider general 
population basis.
Regulators share the view that accounting is not as glamorous as other 
employment opportunities and suffers as a consequence. They also suggest 
that graduates who might be attracted into the accounting profession—
particularly auditing—are perhaps being induced into other careers, 
including banking and business management. Again, this emphasises the 
need for a substantial longitudinal study beginning in high school and 
continuing through to post-graduation experience and contribution to 
the profession. 
6.0 Focus group participants: the nature of their  
 work and performance appraisal
It was generally agreed that performance appraisal was a useful experience 
and that feedback on performance was received, but comments were also 
made about it being very judgmental and having a few flaws.
[I]f you work with the same person for the majority of the year and 
they give you that one review or two reviews for the whole year, 
you may have a completely different review to someone who works 
with nine or 10 different people…giving you separate feedback.
And it depends on your personality. If you get along with someone 
great guns, and the job’s really good, then you get a good review, 
generally speaking.
And then you’re rated against someone who was rated based on a 
lower expectation.
When pressed on whether a recalibration took place, there was a negative 
response and the following specific comments.
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They discuss issues round the table, so they try and get that 
together.
[P]art of it’s quite perception based as well. If the partner’s reached 
a certain perception of somebody, whether or not it’s actually 
supported by a lot of the work…often the partners don’t see the 
detailed work—then that’s going to be reflected in their rating and 
pay as well.
And if you have a job that has no problems…if you have a job 
where you’ve got a really good client and they give you things and 
you tick them in, and it’s really good, and you get it done quickly 
and you don’t go over budget…it’s easier to get a good review.
[If] things go wrong and they’ve got a lot of errors and there’s a 
lot…more management needing to come in, then often you won’t 
get a good review, not because of your performance, but because 
everybody got a lot more stressed.
The interviewer then asks how the good performers are distinguished 
from the not-so-good performers:
You get appraised for each job and then we have an annual review 
process.
Every job over a week we get appraised for. 
You do your own personal [appraisal] and then whoever you’re 
directly working with will sit down over a coffee and have a chat…
[for] quarter of an hour, half an hour.
But sometimes you don’t get to do that straight away—I’ve got a 
little bit of a backlog.
I’ve had times where I’ve just done five in a row and just got them 
all over and done with.
They’re quite…particularly [in my division]…proactive in doing 
them, and it’s driven from the top down as well so it’s an important 
part of it all.
Our group…has what we call development days. So once a month, 
except during the busy seasons…we have a day where it’s mandatory 
for everyone to come into the office and we have a couple of group 
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meetings…and then there [are] designated times for…probably 
two hours during the day on a Friday…where you have to just do 
appraisals and your business plans and you sit down and have [staff 
development manager] meetings and that sort of thing.
We’re not allowed to do any client work…so they’ve really made…
efforts to try and keep us focused. 
The interviewer then asks whether progression is pretty much automatic:
It seems very structured…I don’t know what happens in other 
divisions, but especially with us…after a certain time period, six 
months, you get up a level, an extra 18 months you go up another 
level and then it’s two and a half years, that sort of thing. It doesn’t 
really deviate at all from that.
[A]t the higher levels…from that point onwards…almost when you 
get to the manager’s level in going up, that’s when it’s a bit more 
[centred] on the person.
The interviewer then asks whether there is satisfaction with the appraisal 
process and whether it is seen as fair and reasonable and helpful for morale 
and in understanding work performance better:
Yeah, it does, but I don’t think it helps morale that much.
I like the appraisal process, but…the fundamental thing that’s 
missing from the process is setting really clear expectations up 
front—not just on individual jobs—but there being a really clear 
communication about what’s expected of each level…what you need 
to be able to do to make it to manager. Just setting expectations…is 
the main thing that I’m missing. 
[S]ome managers do a good job of telling you what they want from 
your job, but I don’t think it’s communicated—just generally as a 
senior accountant [that] this is what you should be doing.
In our division, they…have a guideline that they distribute and it 
says at this level, at an accountant level, you need to start displaying 
these qualities, and when you get to senior accountant, you need 
to be able to show these qualities. So, overall, you get a very good 
picture of what sort of things you need to be looking at.
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[Y]es, we do [get feedback that relates to those guidelines]. A lot of 
the times we use those and we write objectives for jobs based on 
those overall performance requirements, so then we can show that 
we’ve fulfilled them and we can see how well we’ve done it.
[I]t can be [good for morale]. It depends on who’s writing it…a lot 
of the time, especially for us [with] lots of smaller jobs…they do 
tend to focus on the negatives a lot rather than positives and they 
probably don’t write things in a constructive kind of way.
It probably depends on the manager or whoever’s writing it as well. 
Some are better than others.
[In response to a prompt about whether it depends on the client 
portfolio:] I’ve got a few headache clients, which I’m worried about 
how it’s going to reflect [on me].
[Defining a headache client:] I’m up to my eleventh outstanding list 
and the client not being prepared, the actual accountants at the 
firm, at the company, and then you go [to] the director saying they 
still want to meet the…October 31 deadline to ASIC and it’s just like 
making sure…we’ve got everything documented. It’s hard verifying 
numbers when there [are] no [reconciliations].
[In response to whether this will affect the appraisal:] I’m not sure 
yet. I’ll find out.
If I was doing an appraisal for that kind of job…you know that 
the client is a problem client and I had one that was a shocker 
earlier this year. The client was badly prepared and [there were] 
short deadlines and the client was just not really up to the task, but 
it’s more you need to manage it as best you can, to the extent that 
your level can do that. But if I was going to be appraising someone,  
I would definitely keep that in mind. You don’t blame anyone for 
what the client does.
You’d think you’d get appraised on the fact that you’re able to keep 
following up on it and trying to make that deadline…I’ve got a bad 
client like that as well and I didn’t get penalised because of it.
[T]he sign of a good manager or a good senior will be someone who 
gives you informal feedback throughout the audit rather than just 
slinging you with a shocking appraisal at the end of it, which you 
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had no idea of, instead of giving you chances to improve throughout 
the audit. And that’s what I’ve found has happened with most of my 
jobs. I’ve been lucky.
When asked ‘Does your firm do a lot of lateral hiring, or is it mostly in at 
the bottom and gravitate up?’, the following responses were given.
We have a lot of secondments. We have a lot of secondees…and…
that’s how we’re filling in the gaps. We’re not laterally hiring. We’re 
not hiring from another Big Four firm. We’re accepting resources 
from another country and bringing them.
[In response to ‘Are there many people going out the other way?’:] No, 
not that many. Not nearly as many going out as are coming in. 
At my assistant manager level, they’re all secondees. Every single 
one.
Definitely at the manager level as well for us.
A lot of the local resources are leaving by the time they get to 
[assistant managers] and then…in our division, audit too, we have 
more secondee assistant managers and at one stage we had more 
secondee managers than local managers.
[When asked how long secondments generally last:] Two or four years 
usually…There [are] a lot that extend and there might be the slight 
minority that might…stay here permanently, but the majority come 
here for the two years, possibly extend for one and then move on.
[I]t might be that they want to get into the country, [have a] better 
opportunity to maybe get a visa and this is their avenue to get in.
One secondee manager I know told me that the only reason she 
came here was to see Australia, so [this Big Four firm] paid for that, 
[for the] costs of her moving here and…when her [secondment] 
finished she went back.
[I]n my division, financial services, there’s been an increased focus 
on lateral hires. We’ve had people come in from another Big Four 
firm at senior management level…and also they’ve had people come 
permanently from overseas. Quite a lot of people…[at] a senior or an 
assistant manager level move permanently from overseas.
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Comments on any other issues were invited next.
[T]here’s a difficulty at the moment in getting the right people—
at a graduate [level] and whether that’s…a few of the competing 
industries and big organisations are pulling in more people, but…
there’s certainly a bit of a shortage out there.
[A]t the senior level as well, because our division lost quite a few 
and they had to go international to try and recruit some seniors 
because there just wasn’t the demand in Australia…We hired a few 
from India, Europe, Asia.
Pressed more, the interviewees respond that the recruits come from within 
and outside their firm, and from industry too:
Which has its own implications because…a lot of those are here 
for two years, so then they come in for two years and then you lose 
them. So…in the next couple of years there [are] going to be some 
real problems because there’s a lot of…lost continuity and even 
though those people are coming through and going…to manager…
then they go…I’ve lost continuity on clients, lost continuity on 
culture, so that’s…a big problem facing the firm in the next five 
years.
When pressed on why this is so, the interviewees explain that it is the 
nature of the secondment arrangement:
Some people stay, but…we had such a shortage with seniors…just 
on my client alone, we had four seniors come in from the [United 
States] just for the three months and then they went back…so 
obviously we have the same problem for next year.
I know people from uni who are having problems getting [jobs]. It’s 
just that they don’t know what audit does and what is audit…a lot 
of my friends, even when I told them, I’m an auditor, they’re like 
‘What’s that?’ I’m like an accountant and they’re like, ‘Can you do 
my tax return?’ I’m like, ‘I don’t do tax returns. I’m an auditor.’ 
They don’t know what it is, so getting people into a field where 
they’re so unsure is going to be difficult.
[T]he firm’s being really, really proactive with trying to find 
people…I hear…our people partner or whatever you call him, 
who’s on the phone half the day talking about trying to resource 
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staff and finding them from wherever. You can tell they’re making 
an effort; it’s just hard.
We get plenty of new grads, [but] they just…tend to disburse.  
I don’t know where they go.
I’m the only one left out of my grad group now in our division. So 
that’s after three and a half years…people disappear so you don’t 
get that continuity.
It’s happening before they get to senior as well now.
Before you finish CA as well. People have left…to go into industry 
and finish off their CA there.
In response to a question about time off in lieu, one of the interviewees 
responded that the firm used to have it, but ceased doing so about four 
years ago. The interviewer then asked whether the bad clients had an 
effect on the work/life balance. There was broad agreement with this 
proposition:
[I]t’s just because…they’ve got bookings and if these clients go over 
and over forever and ever, you’re often not booked for when the 
deadline is…So you’re trying to do this work in your own time and 
you’ve got a job that you’re doing for another client. [In response 
to a query about whether this time is booked to the client:] Oh, no, 
you charge…but they’ve got a booking schedule. So it might say 
this week you’re out at this client, but when things go over time—
months sometimes—you’re still chasing up on that work whilst 
doing other work. So that’s where the work/life balance…can be 
compromised greatly.
The interviewer then asks: ‘If you were assigned to an audit, would you 
go in with an expectation that what you are expected to do can be done 
in the time allocated?’ 
[I]t depends on the client. You generally know when you’re not 
going to, when something will happen pretty much at the start. 
You know whether the time frame is reasonable…you’ve got that 
historical basis and you also just know how much time things…
take, whereas a manager probably hasn’t done it for a few years and 
they sometimes forget.
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[A] lot of us would be at the point where we’re the ones setting the 
time to do things. And I’m terrible for always underestimating. So 
I’m probably guilty of committing [underestimates] myself, but…
everyone’s fairly realistic.
[In response to a query about whether hours over budget are charged to 
the client:] Of course, you do charge time. [You] charge what you’re 
doing so that next year [the record is there]. That’s certainly the 
attitude which is being pushed out there [but]…a couple of years 
ago, it was, no, you wouldn’t charge that. 
‘So there’s been a cultural shift in recent times?’ asks the interviewer 
in relation to the recording of all hours of client work. There is general 
agreement.
Because it’s not a matter of charging the client, it’s [recording the 
hours]…and then you’d get less recovery…stuff but…[under-
recording] was leading to a lot of people not charging their time and 
then people were saying, well, people aren’t working that many hours 
because they’re looking at the stats and then that’s why we’re still 
working at 3 o’clock in the morning. So now…there’s been more of a 
focus on job margins rather than recovery…so people are starting to 
charge their time a lot more and we get into trouble if we don’t.
[I]t’s shifting. I still think there’s some of that but it’s going…in the 
right direction.
The interviewer asks: ‘But what about working from 7am Saturday until 
3am Monday without going home?’
We do get time off in lieu, but it’s capped. We’re not allowed to take 
more than three weeks a year.
But you have to work a minimum amount before you can start 
accruing.
It’s 100 hours for every six months and then after that it’s hour 
for hour, but you can only take three weeks and most of us would 
accrue at least that for the three months. 
[O]ur department has tried—we can see the effort is there—but 
they’re trying really, really hard to make the work/life balance 
better. They’ve got those development days. They’re trying their 
hearts out, but they really can’t help client delays. 
ATTRACTINg ANd SUPPoRTINg STAFF 
| 285
In response to how many clients would be included in an individual’s 
portfolio at any one time, responses varied between two to 12 in a year. 
The number, the interviewees agreed, was the luck of the draw and a 
matter of which team needed a new member when the graduates were 
recruited.
[S]ome people left in my division recently just because the jobs take 
them away from their families too often…I work on a job which is 
in [a rural town] and I’d spend about a month in [the rural town]… 
I don’t have kids…but if someone did have kids it…wouldn’t work 
for them.
At some point in people’s lives…[family needs become] more 
important than others.
And some people get sent overseas in our division very often…For 
lengthy periods, or they’ll go for three weeks then come back for a 
week and then go again, and you don’t even get your weekends…
you might get a day off while you’re over there, but you’re still with 
your colleagues, you’re not with your family, and other people don’t 
like that.
We’ve probably had a few people leave in the last year or two. 
They’ve gone to do other work, transaction work and that kind 
of stuff…they’ve got a bit of a taste for that and moved away from 
audit, so still within [this Big Four firm] or one of the other Big 
Fours, but it’s been another attraction, just the type of work.
The interviewer then asks whether the interviewees have any control over 
the choice of client portfolios or they are just assigned them?
There’s some control. You can preference what you do and what you 
want to be on and what you don’t. It’s all pretty much dependent on 
whether you’re a high performer…as to how much flexibility you 
get on your portfolio.
I don’t think that I’ve got much flexibility with mine. Given that 
some of the clients are a bit larger and…you’re resourced onto only 
that one client. And it’s very hard to get off that one client once 
you’ve been on that and then they recognise that you’ve got the 
knowledge and the continuity to keep going with that job, so it’s 
just a cycle that goes on…I have voiced up and tried to get a change 
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but nothing’s happened…in the future, that might be something 
that I consider as being a reason why I’d leave because…I can’t see 
anything outside the boundaries of that client that I’m currently 
working on.
The interviewer asks: ‘So is that cutting away from your previous statement 
about training and the opportunity of developing and learning?’
I’ve been given opportunities to work—there are things that I can 
do—but…diversity is something that I haven’t been given.
Next the interviewer asks how many clients each of the interviewees has. 
Responses range from three to 15 for the middle-market tier.
Returning to the issue of what factors besides the work/life balance 
have driven colleagues away, responses include:
Challenges. I know a number of people in the audit space specifically 
who have just got bored and it…[becomes monotonous] doing the 
same thing over and over again and…they’ve just got over it.
[When pressed about where movement has been to:] A lot have moved 
into more transaction jobs…having that…audit knowledge behind 
them…Some have moved within [the firm]. Some have moved 
external to [the firm]. Some have moved into more advisory roles, 
but [boredom] was a major factor.
[When pressed on what type of opportunities—overseas, clients, other 
firms:] Opportunities which draw people…[A] bit of everything, 
but probably…more money, less hours and different roles. 
When pressed, several interviewees state that a lot of colleagues go to 
work for clients:
[T]he opportunities come to you. You’ve always got someone asking 
what you’re up to, whether you’d like a change…This year, I’ve had 
a lot of recruiters [contact me]…So you’re always getting thrown 
something anyway. So whether you’re at that point in your career and 
you go ‘Maybe I’m ready for a change’. That could be a big factor.
[I]t’s also the circle that you’re in, so if other people have changed 
jobs that you know. I don’t know how your name gets out there but 
somehow it does.
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[The work/life balance is] the main [reason], particularly when— 
I don’t want to be sexist—but particularly with females who are in 
their late twenties when they want to go and start a family. They 
will go to industry for less hours where they can potentially work 
part-time because…I don’t know if you can do it or not, but there’s 
just the consensus that you can’t really do that at [this Big Four 
firm], or it’s hard to anyway.
Next the interviewer asks whether there is an expectation that the 
interviewees do not report the hours worked on the above ‘messy’ sorts 
of clients:
No comment.
Generally, for the very messy ones, you’re in a position where you 
will just bill the client whatever it takes, because it’s their fault. 
But it’s where you’ve got the in-betweener—they’re not a brilliant 
client, but they’re not a messy client, but there’s this tight budget 
because they want to reduce fees. And you have this pressure to 
keep your hours to the efficient ones and keep it at that.
You know how long it took you though.
You know how long it took you, how long it should have taken you.
I don’t understand divisions…and I don’t think there’s as big a push 
in our division to not report hours as in some of the other divisions.
I charge all my hours. Because the thing is that if the managers…
do well in budget, they’ll get a bonus. So it’s in their best interest 
for their staff to charge seven and a half hours a day so their job 
doesn’t go over-budget and then they get a bonus. And it works 
the other way…if you have a job that goes completely over-budget, 
often they’re financially impacted, like higher up…But I just charge 
my hours…If I want to get up a job, I just charge all my hours…
Because it’s very discretionary. One job is different to another, and 
one manager’s different to another.
You’re also being rated by these people, too.
It’s very much a balancing act.
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When asked about when they are able to take annual leave, the responses are:
Whenever you can squeeze it in.
Two weeks over Christmas.
[I]f you’ve got good clients, you’re more willing to stay…a friend of 
mine, who started the year before I started, and he was the reason, 
or one of the reasons why I came…he left before I even started. 
Within a year, he’d been on that many bad clients, he [had had 
enough].
[Responding to the interviewer’s request to define a bad client:] 
Difficult, difficult, the work’s not prepared, it’s not ready, so you’re 
always following them up, and that just increases your workload. 
And because you’ve got other jobs running at the same time, you’re 
chasing up on jobs that are outstanding [as well as] the job at hand.
The interviewer then asks whether the interviewees think they’re going 
to make partner. For one firm, the interviewee responses are all negative. 
For a second firm, two raise their hands:
[A]t this stage, it’s just too hard to tell, and there’s so much that you 
want to experience between now and the time when you [might] 
make partner
It’s a lot of work as well.
[The work/life balance] doesn’t work, but there are enough benefits 
that I can live in spite of [that].
I’m going to New York [for] opportunities for secondment…I’m 
enjoying the work that I’m doing at the moment, [it] is challenging 
and I can see that I’ll progress.
[T]he work/life balance might be the one thing that may result in 
me not wanting to be [a partner].
[A] lot of people wouldn’t want to go overseas with their families to 
live there, so you’ve got to take that. But a partnership is a good idea, 
or even an executive director. But I’m not going to be a partner.
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Discussion then turns to partners’ salaries; estimates range between 
$200  000 and $350 000. General discussion then takes place about 
positions with high salary levels inside and outside public accounting 
and the comparative length of tenure of partners and CEOs:
Interviewees were next asked whether people could have a honourable 
position at the Big Four firms other than partner:
If you’re manager or senior manager…obviously I’m not in that 
position, but it just seems that you could go to something with much 
less pressure and time and stress and more money.…It seems like 
those positions are for people who are looking to move to something 
else, not to sit and stay.
We are paid less than commercial because there is that potential 
increase every year and you will get more if you stay, so why stay 
for that lower salary if you’re not actually going for more. 
The interviewer comments that ‘one issue that’s arisen in some of our 
discussion is for someone who doesn’t want to be partner, is there a 
honourable position you can stop at?’. The response comes, naming the 
executive director, the level below partner. Other comments follow:
Some people come in and make partner, some people are advised to 
get up to partner.
I’d take their pay to do what they do.
No, I wouldn’t.
And there [are] people who you know aren’t going to make partner, 
but they do the same work.
There [are] not that many jobs that are above the executive director 
in the industry in Australia, to get more pay.
[A]n executive director starts on 140 [thousand].
No, the lifetime one’s about 200, isn’t it?
And there wouldn’t be many jobs, many industries where you can 
earn…much more than that.
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[A] lot of the directors, if you stay at directors’ [level], you have…
expertise. So you’re there as an expert…you’re not there as an overall 
partner who’s got a bit of expertise, but got a lot of relationships 
and brings in the work and things like that. So your directors are 
more—they’ll come in and sort out specific problems and they’ll be 
known for those.
The interviewer makes the comment: ‘And they tend to be back room? 
You know, they tend to be technical in a particular area rather than 
interfacing with clients or selling services or whatever?’
For that reason as well, we’ve had a few directors that have…been 
known to say that they don’t want to become partners. They’re 
quite happy being directors so it’s just not on their agenda.
[In response to questioning about whether directors exit to work for 
clients:] They still work in the same clients, they’re just not pushing 
that step further.
6.1 Summary
More junior auditors convey some inconsistencies in their performance 
appraisal systems, where a great deal can depend on the clients to which 
they are attached and some managers will take this into account while 
others will not. There appears to be variation in the skills of managers to 
conduct these appraisals. Interestingly, there is little to no evidence of 
pressure to not record real hours worked. There is, however, evidence of 
compromise to the work/life balance with a system that does not compensate 
adequately in less busy times for hours worked above standard during 
busy times. The ‘audit readiness’ of clients, who are arbitrarily allocated 
and then appear hard to move on from, is not factored into time budgets 
and often these junior staffers are coping with a new client simultaneously 
with a tardy one. The heavy use of secondees from overseas and the lack 
of continuity in staffing that accompanies that is discussed, as are mixed 
views about ambitions to become a partner.
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7.0 issues and implications
The appraisal system, which is normally part of the mechanism to retain 
people and provide them with a clear pathway to the future, received very 
mixed ratings. While there was praise for the attempt to undertake an 
appraisal, there was concern that it did not exhibit the signs of objectivity 
that would be expected within the auditing profession; it was arbitrary, 
it might not be supported by fact and, in particular, it was very client 
dependent. For example, if you had continuingly problematic clients who 
caused overruns and were unable to keep to time schedules that then gave 
rise to or at least the perception of an unreasonable appraisal. It was noted 
that some managers and seniors gave continuing clear feedback about 
progress while others did not. There was a more generalised concern that 
the statement of expectations and the clarity of that communication were 
key messages for development in the appraisal system. 
8.0 Concluding remarks
The central focus of this chapter is on recruitment of people into public 
accounting and particularly into the practice of auditing. A key driver is 
the ability to attract the ‘right’ people into the profession because people 
are the key resource in the practice of auditing. An important part of 
the recruitment process lies in the attractiveness of the profession. The 
practice of auditing, reputation, esteem and desirability of employment 
in this part of the economy feed off a whole range of issues. In this 
connection, recruitment into the profession of auditing is not a closed 
system because, in part, the ability to recruit depends on the quality of 
the work experience of those who are already in this line of employment. 
The experiences of these people feed back into the ability to recruit and 
with generation Y the desirability of work and the nature of that work is, 
relative to the value set of older generations, disproportionately important. 
Also, the information flows between those who have been recruited and 
those the firm is seeking to recruit are much more active than in previous 
generations with the advent of active and substantial social networking, 
which is contributed to by the technology surrounding it. 
The ability to recruit has also been influenced by the fact that Australia’s 
universities have broadened their commerce and business degrees. Where 
once a commerce degree in one of the sandstone universities was seen to 
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be dominated by those majoring in accounting, the options available to 
business and commerce are now many and varied, ranging from those 
who major in actuarial science to those who undertake one of the multiple 
majors in zoology. Australia’s universities therefore no longer shepherd 
people into public accounting firms, as they might have done a generation 
ago. 
The structure of the funnel into the profession has changed and, so it 
would seem, has the work of auditors. The relatively recent advent of high 
levels of prescription and regulation has had an effect on the type of work 
that is done, particularly by more junior auditors. There is also seen to be 
less variety, with public practices being required to separate some of the 
types of practice into other firms and independence requirements forcing 
auditors to have less diverse careers with less choice about options during 
their career path.
The changes to options within university degrees and to the nature 
of the work are just two of the significant changes that have occurred 
in the profession. As some would argue, however, the nature of the 
recruitment process has not changed to reflect these differences. In some 
other professions—for example, medicine—very different strategies 
have been adopted. Once, to undertake medical education one aspired to 
extraordinarily high university entrance standards and was educated in 
an elite environment with elite levels of employment options at the end. 
Entrance to the medical profession has, however, undergone profound 
change with graduate entry (as opposed to undergraduate degrees in 
medicine) now common and selection into medical training being based 
less on elite scores at high school level and much more on core knowledge 
and psychological suitability for the profession. The policy questions for 
the auditing profession are: should auditors also be selected on different 
grounds? Should selection be ‘fit for purpose’? Is the nature of auditing 
now such that a different pool of recruits is required? Is it now the case 
where there are high levels of prescription that we need recruits who 
are more capable of undertaking highly detailed, repetitive but highly 
prescribed work? Is the level of independent thinking that is no doubt 
needed at some levels within the firm, such as partner, now a prerequisite 
for all employment within the firms, particularly at more junior levels?
Recruitment strategies might adopt more diverse pathways targeting 
those who do not come from a commerce or business degree—those who 
might be mature age or who have taken a more selective educational 
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pathway (such as honours) or who might come from an international 
background. The key question is: does recruitment still match the task of 
the auditor?
If there is a mismatch between the current contemporary work of an 
auditor and the recruitment strategies, is it the recruitment strategies that 
need to change or is it the nature of the work? Either option might be 
possible.
The acute recruitment crisis that occurred in the years before the 
global financial crisis has now passed, but lower levels of competition in 
recruitment of new staff might only mask an underlying challenge for the 
auditing profession and, once competition starts again, the challenges in 
recruitment might simply resurface. 
If the profession continues to recruit the intellectually gifted, strong, 
independent thinkers and those who seek intellectual challenge and 
require diversity of employment then consideration needs to be given 
to providing work that is of that type and that fits the generation Y 
work philosophy, as well as a substantial shift in the image profile of the 
accounting profession. The gloss of possibly becoming partner in 12 or 
15 years might not be what it once was and the need for generation Y to 
have a passion and an interest must be fulfilled. An image enhancement or 
possibly an image makeover is needed.
The mechanisms used to attract staff into public accounting and, in 
particular, auditing appear to be many and varied. There are various 
mechanisms used to recruit and select individuals, including ‘accessing’ 
potential staff before graduation. The rationale used by individuals to 
select audit as a career also vary while there is widespread appreciation of 
the available training and support once in the profession. The one common 
theme seems to be mechanisms for recruitment and obtaining some degree 
of traction and bonding with other people within the firm. The use of 
cocktail parties, leadership seminars, information sessions, syndicate 
participation opportunities and the like are perceived as mechanisms for 
attaining interaction at a people level rather than specifically about the 
work or career opportunities within the profession. Many individuals 
interviewed indicated that they joined the profession for any number 
of reasons and it would appear serendipitous, but all were linked with 
interacting and obtaining traction with people within the profession 
rather than any perceptions about the general status or prestige of the 
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profession, perceptions about income derived from employment or other 
aspects of auditing that were not ‘delivered’ via personal interactions.
Two important policy issues—one relating to the accounting firms 
and the other to the profession more broadly—were also common themes 
among suppliers. First, the nature of a career in a major accounting firm is 
no longer the lure that it might once have been. For example, an individual 
might enter one of the accounting firms, qualify with a professional 
designation and then exit the profession into a relevant industry. This 
person likely will continue to make a name as a competent and hard-
working individual with relevant industry expertise, but is now perceived 
to be just as employable as if he or she had stayed in the employment 
of the firm throughout their career. The fact that the individual left an 
accounting firm at some point makes the possibility that this individual 
will not return to professional practice and auditing a real likelihood.
The second issue is a common policy statement voiced in various ways, 
but which in essence can be distilled to the point that if the profession 
does not acquire the right quantity and quality of those interested in 
auditing into the profession at the start, it will not have the right pool of 
people to draw on for more experienced positions in the future. This has 
implications not just for suppliers of audit services but for the purchasers 
of those services and indeed the regulators of that market. If our economy 
simply does not have the talented people with the right experience in 
sufficient quantity then the market for audit services will not be able to 
match community expectations with regard to the quantity and quality of 
services undertaken. Standard setters also enunciated similar comments.
Many comments made elsewhere in this report go to the whole issue 
and ethos of training and experience and there are various specific 
observations made by purchasers that support this view. While there was 
considerable welcoming of the opportunity of a wider set of university 
graduates into the profession, there was still the public policy question of 
the effect this would have on the traditional university accounting degree 
program. Would the presence of alternative pathways have a negative 
effect on entrance standards and the quantity of accounting graduates 
entering or exiting universities in Australia? If there are alterative 
pathways then what will be the consequences? This could be the basis for 
another potential long-term study on the effect of the training and labour 
market in accounting, which might be of benefit to the profession going 
forward.
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There’s always going to be a retention problem at Big Four accounting 
firms…and you just hope that you retain the best; the ones who 
want to stay. You just hope that they’re the…good ones…who want 
to be directors and/or partners…they can’t have them all going to 
manager, a senior manager or director either—unless the business 
is growing that much that they need another 30 managers this year, 
or whatever the number comes in [at]. So this whole thing about 
retention is, sometimes they actually don’t want to have 100 per cent 
retention, because the business isn’t growing big enough for them 
to…promote everybody that year, which is another reason why 
people leave. Because you might have missed out on a promotion, 
you don’t want to wait another 12 months to get your manager, 
and even in 12 months’ time, then you’ve got the next lot of people 
coming up through, so not only are you competing with your peer 
group, you’re now competing with the peer group that was behind 
you. And who’s to say the business has grown enough in the next  
12 months to warrant more managers or more senior managers?
— Purchaser
1.0 Key issues
The audit firm business model and its association with staff retention 
present some challenging issues for the audit profession going forward. 
The challenges raised by interviewees included: 
•	 to what extent is an increasingly regulated auditing profession and 
prescriptive audit task hindering the retention of staff
•	 how best can the nature of the work and the workload model within 
the auditing profession be adapted to enhance continuing variety  
and challenge
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•	 what adaptations, if any, are necessary to retain generation Y within 
the profession 
•	 how can the work/life balance be enhanced within the profession
•	 if the lure of partnership is losing its gloss as a factor in retention, 
how can this issue be best addressed
•	 if completion of the CA program is a ‘trigger’ for separation, what 
mechanism can be developed to assist in staff retention
•	 if promotion to and then success at the manager level are triggers for 
separation, how can further progression along the audit professional 
career path be better managed?
2.0 introduction
Elsewhere in this report, we have discussed the need for auditors to have 
certain expertise. Given the importance of business acumen and client and 
industry knowledge to the profession of auditing, it is clear that retaining 
expertise, once it has been developed, is crucial. This makes retention 
of professional staff within the audit firms a key resourcing issue and an 
important protection of quality. This chapter explores perceptions of the 
factors behind the level of staff turnover that exists within the profession.
There are no survey questions directly on the issue of retention 
of professional staff with audit suppliers. Given the complexity and 
sensitivity of the issues around staff retention, these matters were best 
dealt with in face-to-face interviews and focus groups.
2.1 Users
Among the users, there was recognition of the array of work opportunities 
open to junior auditors:
[I]t’s not very exciting…people just want to get out of it as soon 
as they can and do other things—[go to] investment banks or…
corporate [work].
The next user perceives a problem with public practice employers who 




[I]t’s a big concern…because high-quality people want 
to be challenged and rewarded, and they know there 
[are] plenty of opportunities for them outside; high-
quality people don’t have a problem getting a job…even 
today…audit firms aren’t very good at [staff retention]. 
I joined a group of 30, fresh out of university, and 
three years later not one of us was in the firm, because 
audit firms are, or certainly were, conservative, and no-one said 
to you after three years, ‘You’ve just qualified, we’re going to fast-
track you to partnership, we think you’re a star.’ You were just 
sent out on the next audit. And the world’s full of opportunity…
the big firms are better at it today in terms of giving people the 
opportunity to work overseas, but investing in good people is the 
smartest thing you can do…If you think someone’s a star, you’ve 
got to pay them more than you pay someone who…is…what I call 
a good tradesman.
2.1.1 Summary
From the few users who provided comment on the issue of audit firm 
staff retention, it is clear that the audit role is seen as unexciting and that 
the audit firms are seen as deficient in strategies to encourage retention 
of staff.
2.2 Purchasers
Among purchasers, too, there was high recognition of the audit firm 
business model.
[R]etaining high-level staff is an ironical point really, because a 
lot of the…qualified people who get into the firms, who leave the 
firms, are leaving them for career progressions…In other words, 
they’re getting a chance to be a junior partner or partner in a 
smaller firm or they’re getting into industry…they’re getting into 
banking or they’re getting into manufacturing, et cetera…not 
wanting to continue to work in the auditing field but to…work in 
real business.
The next purchaser sees the pyramidal structure at the heart of the public 




good at [staff 
retention].’ 
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[P]eople tend to go for job satisfaction and for pay generally and…
it’s a pyramid structure within the audit profession, so there’s just 
a senior partner, a couple of senior managers and quite often the 
reason people turnover is because there’s not enough room to move; 
that’s why they leave.
 The next purchaser feels that the Big Four firms have an advantage in 
retention because of a perceived capability to transfer staff between 
departments:
There is more scope in the Big Four…to retain because of the 
various departments that they can push them off to and give them 
challenges, et cetera.
This next purchaser observes that it might have been counterproductive 
for the profession to recruit to partner level straight out of industry:
And they still rely on the lure of the career ladder within the firm to 
become partner. And you do your time, you work really hard…and 
there’s this lure of making $500–$800 000 a year as a partner. But…
they’ve shot themselves in the foot a little with that because, more 
and more often, you see people go out of industry straight into a 
partnership level at the audit firms…so I don’t find it surprising 
that their junior staff is…saying, ‘Well, I can earn 25 per cent more 
if I go into industry today. And if I build a name for myself in the 
market in a particular niche, a particular area, it doesn’t preclude 
me from going back into an audit firm and becoming a partner in 
the future.’ So…their problem with staffing is pretty much of their 
own making.
The next purchaser observes that ‘really they have exactly the amount 
of retention that they need’:
[T]hey do work people really hard. They work 
their people harder than we work our people. They 
probably pay them 25 per cent less than we pay 
our people. They probably can offer a better career 
path than we can offer some of our accounting 
staff. But…in a job market where there’s 4 per cent 
unemployment, people maybe aren’t prepared to 
look 20 years ahead and make sacrifices now for the 
future…that’s why they struggle…There [are] just 
‘[T]he hours that 
they make the 
juniors work for 





too many other options in the market now for instant pay increases. 
I’m not surprised people don’t look years and years ahead…the 
hours that they make the juniors work for what they get paid—
the balance is wrong…Gen X, gen Y, whatever preferences…all 
these different generations [have]…I see their staff working on our 
job doing weekends and getting emails at 1 o’clock on a Sunday 
morning. They’ve worked all Saturday and Saturday night…that’s 
for a twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-four year olds—that’s 
not interesting if you’re also being underpaid. And maybe they 
complain about retention, but really they have exactly the amount 
of retention that they need, which is: we’ve worked out the cost of 
training them is X, and the cost of giving everyone a pay rise is Y, 
and we’re at an equilibrium where we’re happy to bring them in, 
keep the good ones, get rid of the average ones and train them some 
more.
This next purchaser does not see how a program of having more junior 
auditors work in industry and then return to public practice could work 
to provide deep and widespread skills, and sees audit work itself as a 
source of extensive exposure to industry.
[Junior auditors working in industry and coming 
back to the profession has] been talked about 
for a long time, but I don’t know that it actually 
would work…because if you take junior people 
and put them into junior positions in industry 
you’re not necessarily going to develop industry 
expertise. The typical accountant who does this 
stuff…they’re not going to get an oversight of an 
industry. They’re going to go and do a particular 
job for a particular period…So it’s actually very hard to construct 
a program where you can build up wide experience. In fact, one 
of the best ways of doing it is through the auditing profession 
because you see different clients and you move around and you see 
different experiences. And that’s why the profession for years has 
been regarded as a very good training ground for people to move 
from there into commerce…The best way of getting someone who 
was grounded and of wide knowledge was…to go and get someone 
out of the profession that had four years, five years experience in…
the accounting profession.
‘[I]f you take junior 
people and put them 
into junior positions 
in industry you’re 
not necessarily going 
to develop industry 
expertise.’ 
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Those in the purchaser group did not necessarily see the high staff 
turnover rate in audit firms as unhealthy. These next two quotations note 
how important it is for young people not to do ‘menial’ work for too long 
and how other industry benefits from the training these personnel have 
received.
In a full economy, it’s what we all have, but…in the accountancy 
practice there’s always been a breeding ground for people. They 
take in a lot of graduates, it’s their model that they have…[they] 
take on a lot of people and then lose quite a lot during the process…
it just means you get a good turnover of young people…And the 
jobs they do are menial jobs right through the audit process, so…
high staff turnover is a good thing for auditing.
[Is attracting and retaining staff a problem?] No, because…as 
long as the intake is there, you’re always going to have that…
level of movement from the industry and vice versa. And that’s 
healthy because that means you’re getting people account trained. 
Accountants are then going into industry…where else is industry 
going to get them from? Obviously, they need the finance people in 
the companies and that’s where they’re getting them from.
The next purchaser points out the benefit of a defined career path, albeit 
at lower salaries in the initial stages than other careers:
I’d gone out of the [auditing] profession and 
then gone back into the profession, and one of 
the things I said to our recruitment guys a few 
years ago was ‘You don’t realise—until you go 
out into industry—you might initially make 
that extra 20 or 30 000 a year, when you first 
jump out…for that similar sort of job, but I’m 
not going to be giving you 10, 12 per cent pay 
rises each year.’ And…your bonus structure 
may not be that great at those…lower levels. 
And the Big Four firm…[offers] a definite career path…there’s 
a definite structure. You’re a consultant, then you’re a senior 
consultant, then you’re a manager, then you’re a senior manager, 
then a director, and you know that if you work hard, you don’t stuff 
up, you’re well respected, all that sort of thing…you will go up, and 
you know you’ll go to those next levels…Whereas you come out 
‘[T]he big Four firm…
[offers] a definite career 
path…there’s a definite 
structure. you’re a 
consultant, then you’re 
a senior consultant, then 
you’re a manager, then 
you’re a senior manager, 
then a director.’ 
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into industry and you may not be looked after as much as you…are 
in that career path…in the Big Four…We did a…retention drive…
around the senior consultant level and put some of those graphs up, 
because they were the most profitable grade to be at, but they’re 
also the guys who have probably just finished their PY or their 
CPA. They’re also the guys who have just finished that and want 
to take their six months off to go and do their overseas travelling 
and they’re a very vulnerable employee, because they’re very 
valuable. They’ve got five years experience, they’re now chartered 
accountants, they’ve got all sorts of recruitment firms knocking on 
their door promising them the world. 
The next purchaser points out that retaining staff is not a problem specific 
to accounting firms:
In terms of how to attract people…it’s a cyclical 
thing. The accounting firms have always and will 
always be an attractive employer to staff. Where 
we’re at right now in the economic cycle is such 
that accounting firms are struggling to retain staff, 
but so are law firms, so are banks, so is everybody. 
It’s not anything…that’s peculiar to the accounting 
profession, so I don’t think it’s a crisis in terms of 
looking at the accounting profession in isolation. But it’s a crisis for 
the community generally…in terms of attracting and retaining the 
right people. So that’s something…that every firm has to address in 
as innovative a way as they can in order to differentiate themselves, 
not just from their direct competitors, but also other alternative 
opportunities for graduates and for people in the market…different 
firms come up with different, really good and sensible ways of 
approaching that.
That purchasers understand the problem of retention of audit personnel 
is made clear in this next quotation:
[W]hat’s happening [is] they’re going into these firms, doing their 
CA program and then after five years they’re leaving. And [the 
firms] need to offer something, don’t they? They need to reinvent 
the perception of what it’s like…I’ve got friends who are exactly 
the same—they’ll tell me now they’re just…there to get their 
qualification and then they’re out. 
‘[A]ccounting firms 
are struggling to 
retain staff, but 
so are law firms, 
so are banks, so is 
everybody.’ 
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2.2.1 Summary
Purchasers express little surprise about the extent of the problem of staff 
retention for audit firms. For a start, they too are experiencing difficulties 
in a full employment market. In fact, several openly acknowledge that 
they are only too happy to lure staff trained by the accounting firms into 
industries hungry for skilled workers and to use pay incentives to do this. 
Some are highly critical of the accounting firms for not providing attractive 
pay and conditions conducive to retention, especially for generation Y 
employees seeking a work–life balance. In their comments, it is clear that 
the pyramidal nature of the structure of audit firms is well understood 
and, with that, the limited scope to progress through the ranks to the top 
echelons.
2.3 Suppliers
The comparatively uncompetitive salaries within the accounting firms, 
despite the long hours, coupled with constrained audit fees, mean that 
other mechanisms need to be found to create conditions conducive to 
longevity in the profession. The following quotations reveal the state of 
the tangible and intangible rewards within the profession. 
[S]taff retention is a major, major issue for the profession as much 
as for the firms. And our level of documentation has never been 
higher. But we’re still under fairly significant fee constraints and, as 
a profession, we’re not doing much about that. While it’s becoming 
a greater risk, it’s becoming harder to get staff—you have to pay 
them a lot more. The increase in audit fees is barely [keeping pace 
with] inflation. So I don’t think we’re helping ourselves.
The cost pressures when audit is seen as a commodity and the remuneration 
restrictions that creates is alluded to by this next supplier:
[Y]ou’ll get someone who’s…say third year and they might be on 
60 grand or whatever…They’ll go out to the market and they can get 
a job for 120 [thousand]…[that] does not fit into our cost structure. 
Because the product is a commodity, we’re viewed as a commodity. 
We can’t push any costs on…we just can’t compete. And that is the 
other big fear: the amount of extra hours that need to go into a file 
under the new regulatory check list…It’s hard to manage that with 
a workforce that’s constantly turning over and constantly leaving. 
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A non-Big Four supplier suggests that the Big Four’s perceived heavy 
workload requirements lead to churn for that sector:
[M]oney is not always the issue. We don’t have a lot 
of people who leave for money. They will generally 
leave because they want to go and do something else, 
or they’ve had enough of audit…We run on a different 
model than the Big Four. The Big Four certainly work 
their people very hard…that’s something that we try 
[to recognise]…we have…times of the year where 
things are quite busy, or very busy, but you’ve got 
to appreciate that. And also when we’re not as busy, then they get 
the opportunity to just relax and make sure they’re leaving at the 
right time and things like that. I don’t necessarily know that that’s 
the same sort of culture at a Big Four…so they tend to have…quite 
significant churn rates in relation to that.
Several suppliers mention the need that auditing firm employees have to 
experience challenge and variety in their work, and the consequences 
for staff turnover when those features are lacking. The following extracts 
from the interviews reveal the importance of employers providing these 
job satisfaction in order to maintain the continuing engagement of their 
staff.
[A] lot of them just…want the time with us on their CV and want 
the skills that we can teach them for a few years and then they 
want to move on. I talk to people at length and say, ‘Look, I’ve been 
here for years and I’ve been able to keep reinventing myself and 
do new things and get involved in new things…and at very senior 
levels…I keep learning and growing…so why are you bored after 
three years?’…Their learning curve actually slows down and they 
just don’t seem to be able to accept that. So they want to race off 
and do something completely different rather than explore those 
incremental things; so it really is quite tough.
The next supplier suggests the vast number of alternative opportunities 
available creates a lure if interest or engagement within the current 
position is lost: 
‘We run on a 
different model 
than the big Four. 
The big Four 
certainly work their 
people very hard.’ 
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[T]he pressures that we’re getting…from the 
market, as far as keeping auditors is concerned, 
[means] that the biggest thing you can do is give 
them variety and give them career development. 
If you can give them those two things, they will 
continue to be engaged. And once they start 
to lose that engagement…they’ve got so many 
opportunities open to them, they’ll just go like 
that; it won’t take long. So you’ve got to keep 
them engaged and you’ve got to keep the variety up and…have  
a career plan for them and make sure that they’re…progressing.
The next supplier suggests that those with good communication skills 
might feel most keenly any restrictions on the variety of tasks they 
undertake and leave because of that:
[T]hat skill set [good communication skills] is the one that’s probably 
least appreciated, but it’s probably one of the most important and 
that differentiates people…those that are good, or better than good, 
are the ones that have got the ability to deal in it. And they’re the 
ones that are the most vulnerable in saying, ‘Well, if you’re going 
to limit me and what I can do here, then I’ll have to go elsewhere to 
get that challenge.’
As far as this next supplier is concerned, the perception that there are 
fewer to no opportunities for secondments to clients is one of the reasons 
behind issues with staff retention:
The retention thing is a real issue…Part of it is 
generational and it’s an attitude about what an 
employee’s role should be versus employer and 
almost what an employer owes their employees. So 
there’s…certainly a huge change in mind-set from 
when I was a graduate and coming up through 
the ranks. And it is this…getting the diversity of 
experience. They don’t want to—and nor should 
they—do audits year after year, potentially on the same client base, 
without significant opportunities. So how do we manage so that…
they do get that diversity of experience? And it’s been restricted 
because of the independence requirements. We used to cross-sell 
far more significantly to our client base than we can now, so that’s 
‘[T]he biggest thing 
you can do is give them 
variety and give them 
career development. 
If you can give them 
those two things, they 
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had an impact with things. Examples would be secondments to 
clients. There used to be the ability with the auditor…for some sort 
of accounting assistance…or other assistance, and we could manage 
that. So there are opportunities that no longer exist because of the 
independence requirements. But we still very actively try and 
manage the diversity of their experience and send them offshore 
and do various things.
The same person continues, explaining the remuneration structure if a 
longer-term perspective is taken:
One of the issues with retention…is how our remuneration sits 
compared to industry. At that CA level and…just prior to being 
a manager, if they leave…they could get a very significant pay 
increase if they moved to the corporate world and then potentially 
have it remain fairly static for quite a period after that. They don’t 
appreciate the leap in the income stream if they do progress through 
the managerial ranks and into the partner group. So we’ve become 
more transparent in explaining to them what it means. If it’s financial 
reward that does it to them, [we explain] what that actually means 
and what their future might look like if they stay.
Remuneration rates early in careers are also an issue as far as this next 
supplier is concerned:
[A]t the moment, you get very few people 
coming back in [from industry] to become audit 
partners. They really have to have gone right 
up through the ranks…the biggest problem we 
have here is not so much at the graduate stage, 
but you go probably two and a half to three 
years after that where they’ve qualified. They’re 
relatively underpaid compared to commerce and 
industry…and they leave in droves. So you lose 
that heavy senior experience, or the junior experienced auditor, 
the ones in the middle, the ones who actually do a lot of the work. 
And they’re as rare as hens’ teeth in terms of keeping them in the 
profession. If they stay they can go [to partner]…but it looks like a 
long road for them there. And a lot of them are at a stage in their life 
where they might’ve just got married or just had kids…and they…
want a higher disposable income…one guy went out for twice the 
‘[y]ou lose that heavy 
senior experience, or 
the junior experienced 
auditor, the ones in  
the middle, the ones 
who actually do a lot  
of the work.’ 
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money recently…what do you say to a twenty-five, twenty-six 
year old who’s just [been] offered twice their salary? ‘Thank you 
for your contribution,’ is what you normally say, and, ‘we hope you 
remember us later.’ That’s a problem. To some degree, it’s always 
been there…To some degree, it’s part of life. In [other divisions]…
we have a much better degree of staff retention. And the main reason 
for that, despite what people may allege…is because we can give 
them a diverse and interesting work experience. There are other 
subsidiary reasons, but that’s the main reason…You can’t do that in 
audit and that’s a problem.
Additionally, the lure of partnership is no longer as attractive as it once 
was—apparently as a means to maintain interest, engagement or incentive:
[T]he attractiveness for our people to become a partner is significantly 
less than what it used to be. When I started my career, getting to 
a partner was an aspiration…if I surveyed most of my staff now, 
I’d probably get maybe 10 to 15 per cent who want to become a 
partner. So that’s a problem for us because what that means is that 
they’re not necessarily in here for the long haul. Therefore they can 
differ as to what they want to get out of their experience working 
in audit. They might be just getting knowledge and then they’re 
off…they’ve got so many opportunities. And…investment banks in 
particular—the money they can throw around is quite phenomenal.
Some interviewees allude to the impact on clients and audit quality, as the 
next two quotes reveal: 
[W]hat we…have to do is pretty much tier our clients and say at the 
top end of town you want to have the highest level of continuity…at 
the lower end…maybe that’s where you do have a lot of the turnover 
because you don’t have these bigger teams, apart from the partner 
[who] stays on. He’s a little bit closer to a smaller client anyway, so 
that’s where your continuity of knowledge remains intact. 
[T]hat’s the Y generation. We’re not getting people staying with us 
for as long, and that makes it harder to keep the continuity, the 
audit quality. 
This next supplier mentions limitations on the variety of work available 
due to independence concerns and the tendency to specialise early in 
their careers as reasons for the difficulty of retaining personnel:
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[T]he other thing that also is an issue for 
us with retention in the audit field is the 
independence issue, and the fact that it has…
limited the variety of work that the individuals 
can do. In the past, you used to be able to do 
a wider range of jobs for clients. And this is 
not a comment on whether independence 
is right or wrong, but the fact that it’s more 
constrained; that with a channel-one client 
there’s not a lot more than audit you can do in 
many situations, apart perhaps from tax compliance and so forth…
coupled with the fact that you have to be very knowledgeable 
about the audit process and the requirements means that people are 
specialising earlier. So…when you’re coming in you are choosing to 
lead a potentially professional life as an auditor. 
The same supplier continues, expanding on his or her point about early 
career specialisation:
[P]reviously people would come in and they’d get a flavour of a 
variety of different things and that of itself would keep the interest 
going…the reason people leave us is more around the ability they 
have to learn, rather than the boredom of the work they’re doing. 
They’re perhaps opposite sides of the same coin. But…it’s drawing 
quite a long bow [to say that our retention problem is because of]…
the fact that we’ve got some very prescriptive check lists…there are 
some other things that come into the pot. That check-list mentality…
is there, but…sometimes even before the prescriptive standards, we 
as professionals, or as firms, went through different phases…it’s a 
little bit more prescriptive but sometimes it helps people to have a 
bit of a check list, because that’s the way in which…you execute. 
Does it stop an airline pilot flying an aeroplane because he or she 
has that check list they go through? 
Suppliers repeatedly raised prescription, check lists and intrusive reviews 
as motivations for accounting firm personnel to question their continued 
involvement in the profession. Invasive file reviews and prescription to 
the level that the interest evaporates are the concern of the next supplier:
‘[S]ometimes it helps 
people to have a bit of a 
check list, because that’s 
the way in which…you 
execute. does it stop 
an airline pilot flying an 
aeroplane because he or 
she has that check list they 
go through?’ 
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[I]t’s not so much attracting [staff]…it’s the 
retention that’s the problem…there are lots 
of reasons why, even if you look at…gen  Y 
and what they want and what they don’t 
want and how demanding they are…being in 
a Big Four firm in an audit, it sounds pretty 
attractive if you’re coming out of uni…Yes, 
you’re an accountant but you’re at a different 
client every week or every month. You’ve 
got all that sort of thing that they want: a 
constant change and interest and growth and learning, and you’ve 
got all the travel. So…attracting them is still reasonably okay…
there [are] other professions throwing too much money at them, 
which is a problem. 
The same supplier continues, explaining why it is that he or she sees 
retention as the issue:
[M]oney aside…attracting is not particularly the problem but 
retaining is a problem…I worry…[about] two things: 1) going more 
prescriptive and taking all of the interest out; and 2) anyone who’s 
been through a file review—it’s not a pleasant experience, and…
it will put people off. Those kind of invasive reviews that feel like 
a witchhunt and feel like they’re not looking to see if you’ve got 
your audit opinion right; they’re looking to see if they can trip you 
up—that kind of mentality from outside regulators. If staff see that 
and are touched by it…they’ll find it quite off-putting and quite 
threatening…retention has long been a problem for us. We’re doing 
all sorts of things with work–life balance and flexible hours…to try 
and keep people longer, and some of it’s working. But it’s becoming 
a less attractive long-term career opportunity for people. 
The weight of regulatory scrutiny is the theme of this next supplier’s 
comments, too:
[I]t’s a great environment because you’re dealing with a whole lot of 
different companies and the challenges that that gives. But, yes…
for the risk you take and where you put yourself, the rewards are 
not where you’d be saying that it would be good to be…therefore 
why would I want to stay in the profession…why would I want to 
have someone looking over my shoulder from a regulatory point of 
‘I worry…[about] two 
things: 1) going more 
prescriptive and taking all 
of the interest out; and 2) 
anyone who’s been through 
a file review—it’s not a 
pleasant experience, and…
it will put people off. Those 
kind of invasive reviews 
that feel like a witchhunt.’ 
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view and crucifying me if I didn’t tick every box? 
That’s not an environment conducive to having 
people really operating at the top level. And…
if they want us to do that then our fees have got 
to go up a lot…And I’ve got to be able to work 
with the regulator in such a way that I’m not 
feeling that I’ve been picked on, that…everyone’s 
looking over my shoulder and that’s creating an 
environment that is not as pleasant as it used to 
be. And therefore the staff are saying, ‘No, I don’t want that.’ So…
there’s a combination of factors, but certainly the regulator coming 
down hard doesn’t help at all. 
The next supplier points to the constant pressure of scrutiny and 
monitoring and risk of errors in judgment as creating a disincentive to 
remain in the profession:
[T]here are significant adverse and long-term consequences for the 
profession in retaining key people. In effect, not even in retaining; 
people look at the audit partners now and go, ‘Why do I want to 
work in an industry where I’m constantly being reviewed, where 
everything I do…potentially could be a breach of the Corporations 
Act [and is] subject to sanction; when I could be publicly hung out 
[to dry]…not because my audit client failed, but because I made 
a judgment decision that was wrong…why do I want to live in an 
environment like that?’…therefore they make a choice to move 
out [to] where commerce—the merchant banks—are offering them 
careers with share options. They’re offering them opportunities to 
work in dynamic capital markets, with very little regulation, very 
little oversight and no restrictions on holding shares…longer term, 
how does the profession compete? And if you can’t keep the right 
people, that has to have an impact on quality…do you then start 
moving towards a model where it becomes a second-tier career and 
you actually contract the right level of graduates?
To some extent, the problem of staff retention did not come across as so 
pressing among the non-Big Four firms. An impression of the creation of a 
‘sense of community’ within the non-Big Four compared with the situation 
in the Big Four, and the ability for these employers to vary the client base 
and work for their employees, appeared to be the reasons for this.
‘[W]hy would I want to 
have someone looking 
over my shoulder from 
a regulatory point of 
view and crucifying 
 me if I didn’t tick  
every box?’ 
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[T]he smaller…second tier probably didn’t have the same level of 
turnover; you’re working with a smaller base. Maybe you don’t 
have the…volume of staff that some of the other firms have. It’s 
probably a little bit more working together, maybe a little bit of…
variety, where you can perform more than one function without 
having to transfer to another division or transfer out of a firm. 
The next supplier refers to a perception that Big Four staffers who have 
recently completed their CA are more marketable than non-Big Four staff 
in the same situation:
[A]nyone that’s had a Big Four experience—and generally they do 
their CA and that’s the key point [at which] we could lose them—
they’ve got an unbelievable level of experience and training that 
makes them incredibly marketable out there…Maybe if they’d…
grown up in a much smaller practice, their marketability is somewhat 
less and therefore maybe the retention side could be [better]. Maybe 
they’re better managed when it’s a small practice too and they don’t 
feel like they’re lost. 
Another supplier speaks to the additional challenges—apart from sought-
after clients—that might be presented to staff who have recently completed 
their CA to interest and motivate them:
[W]hat the big accounting firms struggle with is 
that, whilst you’re doing your CA program, you’re 
kind of all but locked in. Once you finish that 
CA program, it’s ‘What’s the next challenge?’…
There’s a little bit of a void there and…the 
challenge for us is, what do we provide outside of 
the career that will keep somebody there? What 
do we invest in that period after CA in training 
and the non-client basic activities that will keep 
those individuals with you for another three years? Because then—
and obviously we don’t necessarily want everybody to stay—the 
attrition rates from time to time run over what you ideally want them 
[to be]…to have that continuity…so we’re starting to think a little 
bit more cleverly around what can you do…and it’s not just saying 
to somebody, ‘I’ve got this great challenge. I’ll put you on XYZ Co. 
for the next two years’…that’s great and it gives me a career so I can 
work towards manager, but what else? What else? Well, I’ll put you 
‘What do we invest in 
that period after CA in 
training and the non-
client basic activities 
that will keep those 
individuals with you for 
another three years?’ 
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on that and you participate in this training program. In a year’s time, 
we’ll support you through an MBA or we will get [you] involved 
in other non-client-facing work, some community…work…which 
allows you to network…it’s for your personal development outside 
of just your technical development. What other things can we do? 
And that’s where the thinking is now.
2.3.1 Summary
No supplier feels there is a problem with attracting graduates. Many, 
however, acknowledge the problem of retaining them—not necessarily 
because of salary levels, although that issue is present, but rather for a 
variety of reasons to do with job satisfaction. These reasons include long 
hours, the ‘career levelling’ routine of form-filling the check lists induced 
by the new auditing standards and internal and regulatory scrutiny, and 
the lack of opportunity for secondments, for provision of little if any 
service outside audit to audit clients, for challenges that maintain the 
interest in a career in an accounting practice. Suppliers are left to find 
creative ways to maintain interest and engagement. The more innovative 
use the prospect of client rotations, overseas postings, more postgraduate 
training, community networking and personal development opportunities 
to induce engagement, especially at the times known to be most vulnerable 
for exit. It is, however, much harder to find mechanisms to retain partners 
who are exiting the profession in increasing numbers, according to some 
suppliers. 
2.4 Standard setters
The standard setter interview group reinforces the suppliers’ comments 
about the need to keep the auditing role varied and challenging in order 
to retain staff. The first standard setter looks to the implications of the 
high turnover of staff within accounting firms for the issue of knowledge 
management by those firms:
[Y]ou need a culture that’s attractive. And one of their 
problems is that they have a culture that requires a 
work/life balance that’s not attractive: the hours that 
are required to be worked by each individual within 
the profession to maintain the margins and the profits 
and the business model. They’re not something 
that’s sustainable for a lot of young people. They can 
‘[o]ne of their 
problems is 
that they have 
a culture that 
requires a work/life 
balance that’s not 
attractive.’ 
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do it for a limited…time and then people are going to move for 
lifestyle reasons…These are the high potentials that are going for 
lifestyle reasons and that’s the issue about [the audit firms] retaining 
the right people…they’ve got to think carefully about skills and 
knowledge retention…I don’t know that they’re very good at 
knowledge management, so they don’t…say, ‘Well…we’ve got a 
body of knowledge within the organisation, in the people, not just 
in the database or whatever. How do we optimise and maintain that 
body of knowledge within the organisation? So these are key people 
for us in terms of their skills and experience, which are specialist 
skills and experience, therefore we want to keep them.’ 
The same standard setter continues, emphasising the importance of 
leadership and having partner role models whom others aspire to be 
emulate: 
[T]he other problem is that people just go in there to get the 
qualification and you’re never going to change that. So even if 
they’re good, it doesn’t mean that that’s what they want to do for 
the rest of their life; and it’s a leadership thing as much as anything 
else. If people in there see the leaders that they…aspire to be then 
there’s more chance of retaining them…a lot of the problem is that 
people look at the partnership and say I don’t want to be like them…
And the partners are pretty focused…on profit share and, as long as 
that’s their key driver, then the people will always come second…
But it’s just an indication of this conflict between—or the balance 
you’ve got to get right between—business imperatives and looking 
after the people…the people are their money-making machine and 
that’s why the more hours they work and the more productivity 
they get out of one person, the bigger [is] the profit share growth. 
And that’s what drives people away…that’s what drives behaviour 
in the partners and their decision-making processes that turns 
people off…being a partner.
The next standard setter’s comments go to the heart of the business model 
used by accounting firms and its dependence on attracting many people in 
to the firm who will stay to go on and build up knowledge and expertise:
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Retaining them becomes more problematic…because 
people may say, ‘Well, what have I got to do to have 
a rewarding career?’ And part of that is being able to 
give them choice…[This is] why…multidisciplinary 
firms are still a way forward to give people…
different paths…[to] follow. They might finish up 
coming back to where they started from, and that’s 
fine, but how do we retain them…being able to go 
and do a [piece of] work on an investigating accountant’s report, 
to do a piece of risk-management work as opposed to doing a piece 
of audit work—that’s what I mean by that…we’ve found retaining 
people tougher, but…that’s part of the market. And…everyone 
half jokes, is half serious, about gen X and gen Y…in particular…
but people have a different perspective on their career generally…
people coming to firms and staying with them for 20, 30 years is 
not the norm anymore…and that’s the case for any employer. But 
the problem with audits and the way the audit business model is 
set up is it is dependent on getting a lot of people to come in. Yes, 
we can cope with attrition, but we’ve tended to build the expertise 
and the knowledge and to get well-grounded, solid, registered 
company auditors by keeping people. Where we are going to find a 
real difficulty is retaining the registered company auditors.
Another standard setter says that if a person is suited to assurance and 
auditing, they will thrive no matter what the changes to the environment are: 
I wouldn’t have thought the variation in the audit, the way it will 
be undertaken, will necessarily mean that an individual won’t be 
challenged on an audit. If you’re a person who is suited to assurance 
and auditing…you’ll thrive in that environment no matter what 
the changes. What it may do is for those who get by and who are, 
long term, probably not in the [right] industry might find out a 
bit quicker…I’ve found it quite exciting and quite a challenging 
role so…there will always be individuals who are like that. You can 
come across some quite interesting and challenging assignments 
whereas some other ones are quite [routine], very simple and 
sometimes those have a danger of…[posing the problem of] how 
does an individual remain focused, whereas [with] the other one…
you’ve got to make sure you’re on top of everything. So in each 
situation in an audit it can vary. 
‘Where we are 
going to find 
a real difficulty 
is retaining the 
registered company 
auditors.’ 
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The increasing trend for partners to depart the profession early is 
highlighted again and the issue of prescription and regulatory scrutiny is 
alluded to as one of the reasons behind this relatively new phenomenon:
I get partners who are five years into their careers as partners 
saying, ‘Well, what do I do next?’ Maybe I want to move and, 
unlike other businesses where people or businesses recruit at every 
level within the organisation [and] from outside the organisation, 
it’s not as easy to recruit a registered company auditor at that level. 
So retaining people, not just to get them to partner—because I don’t 
think we have that issue—but keeping them through their careers 
as partners [is the issue]…we would expect that when people are 
made partners, they’ve got at least a 20-year working life ahead of 
them. It’s becoming increasingly common for partners to leave, so 
how do we [stop] that? How do we keep them? And part of that is 
that the changes disenfranchise people. 
The same standard setter continues, discussing what he or she sees as 
‘leakage’ from the profession rather than movement within in it as the 
most troubling aspect:
When I talk about the changes in some of the rules and people 
becoming disenfranchised, it’s been at the more senior levels, 
saying, ‘Well, where’s my career going to go, what am I going to 
do?’ I know people have moved from one firm to the next because 
the firms have had a need, but…what I see happening overall is…
leakage out of the profession at an increasing rate at the senior levels. 
And we need to work out how we manage that…For example…if 
we were to lose two or three of the approved auditors that APRA 
consider can do the audits of insurance companies…[you] can’t 
go and manufacture one of those people inside five years…[They 
need] to have worked as partners on engagements like that without 
signing those audits. And if we lose those people to other audit 
firms, that’s less of a concern—if the people are just moving around 
within the firms for whatever reason…But if we lose those people 
[from] the profession, then that’s a problem and…that is what we’re 
starting to see. 
Another of the standard setters speaks of ‘leakage’ from the profession 
and what he or she perceives as the tendency for this leakage to come 
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from the higher levels within firms. This standard setter sees ‘regimented 
processes’ as part of the problem:
I don’t think it’ll just be the junior levels…you’ll 
start seeing the leakage coming [from] higher up…
and potentially all the way to the top, because…
you’ll find that if…we’re going down processes 
that are so regimented that it’s like doing the 
milk run every day, the only thing that happens 
is someone tells you that the house up the street 
needs four bottles today, not three, and that’s 
the only change that happens in your life—well, 
I don’t see a lot of people staying in it. And then your issue becomes 
one of…you need people to be able to do complex valuations…
we have to integrate our audit approach by bringing in corporate 
finance specialists, capital market specialists, IT specialists—those 
sorts of people will be involved, but they will be involved because 
they can do other projects outside of audit, not with audit clients 
but with non-audit clients. Your typical auditor…will do work in 
those areas as well, until it becomes too complex for them. So they 
can’t get involved in that. They’ll come in, probably get the basic 
training and move on, and all that means is that the upper levels 
will [suffer] because there’ll be nothing left to come through.
The sentiment expressed by the next standard setter is that, ultimately, 
the quality of auditors will decline because they are limited to audits: 
[W]hat are the costs and benefits of auditors being, [and] companies 
being, prohibited from buying out the services…when I looked at 
that, I said, ‘Well, to me the fundamental costs…will be [that] the 
quality of the person doing the audit will diminish ultimately.’ If 
it continues the way it’s going, that will diminish and the…level 
of service will diminish. Presumably, the level of reliability may 
diminish. 
Finally, one standard setter points to the business model used by the 
accounting firm and focuses the dilemma not on retention of personnel, 
but on retention of the ‘right personnel’:
It’s a dilemma that [the accounting firms have] had for a long time 
and…they’ve probably improved but…they weren’t known as being 
‘If we’re going down 
processes that are so 
regimented that it’s 
like doing the milk run 
every day…I don’t  
see a lot of people 
staying in it.’ 
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great people managers, being great people organisations. And there 
was always a lot of lip service to ‘our people are our biggest asset’, 
but the behaviour never…[reflected] that…so they’re expected to 
have high turnover of staff. It tends to be the model they work 
on because once people…get their qualification and then get to a 
certain level, there has to be a certain amount of fall-out because 
of limited opportunities higher up…they need to keep moving 
graduates through to maintain their business model, their cost base. 
They can’t train all these people and retain them all, otherwise their 
cost base would increase, so they’ve got to keep replacing…if you 
look at any big firm in town, you might have 2000 staff in the office; 
they don’t want to grow [the] overall head count, but they want to 
maintain the proportion of partners to senior managers to managers 
to trainees and whatever. So as you bring in a new graduate intake, 
you’ve got to shed the other levels to maintain the proportion. So 
their key is retaining the right people.
2.4.1 Summary
The standard setter interviewees, who themselves often are also suppliers, 
make comments reminiscent of those of suppliers. Comments about 
accounting firms as less than optimal at making their personnel feel valued 
can be seen again. Similarly, comments about the need to provide variety 
and challenge in the work tasks are present. What is new is the insight 
that perhaps partners do not always portray the role-modelling that leads 
to aspirants seeking to emulate them. What emerges also is the cost to the 
profession in terms of industry-specialist expertise when highly skilled 
audit staffers exit, especially if they are expert in the highly regulated 
industries that APRA monitors and approves auditors for.
2.5 Regulators
The few regulators who commented on this issue repeated the stereotype 
of auditing as an unexciting activity, but also commented on the quality 
implications of the loss of personnel from the profession.
[T]here are exterior perceptions that going into a firm, or going 
particularly into auditing just isn’t exciting.
[Retention is] always going to be a concern. If you don’t have high-
quality staff…given the size of audit teams that go in, it’s going to 




Regulators reveal a concern with audit quality if retention issues mean 
insufficient high-quality staff to undertake audits.
3.0 Focus group interviews with junior auditors
Given the importance of the retention issue, extensive conversations were 
held within the peer focus groups of more junior auditors about this issue. 
With no other firm personnel in the room, conversations flowed freely 
and with candour about individuals’ own turnover intentions and those 
of others they knew.
Focus group participants were asked about factors that kept them 
with their firms. The clearly defined path to progression within the 
firm featured prominently in responses, as can be seen in the following 
illustrative comments.
[One factor is] knowing that there are a number of sideway[s] 
opportunities. Whether that’s out of audit into another division 
or whether that’s overseas or secondments to clients. So…they 
are certainly appealing factors to stay. [In response to a comment 
that it is diversity in work opportunities that keeps you at the firm:] 
Yeah, definitely and…also too…the clear path of promotion. [In 
response to a comment that a clear structure in terms of employment 
exists:] Yeah, you don’t have to wait five years for someone to keel 
over…before you can move to the next level. There [are] always 
opportunities and there’s a lot of movement.
Everyone’s going to get to the point of our level or around about 
where you finish your CA and then it’s ‘the stay or move away’ 
[question] and…the thing that kept me here was…you get to see 
an industry and there was actually a trainee who started in my year 
and who is now working at the client who I spend most of my time 
at. I see that she’s still in the same role and she just doesn’t get a 
chance to do anything else because the people above her are not 
going anywhere either. It’s just like a giant backlog whereas…I can 
almost map out my future for the next years where I just stay here. 
There’s just a defined progression path so that was it for me.
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I like it because you have a clear career path. In a commercial firm, 
you can’t get promoted until your boss has left or something else…
for the first 10 years you know where you are…After the first 
10 years, maybe you can consider whether you want to stay here 
or not.
The opportunity to continue to learn and the challenges that presents also 
featured in responses.
[I]t’s the challenges that are always presented to you. I feel that after 
each job I’ve learnt something new so I’m never bored. That’s pretty 
much what it comes down to and…[there are] still a lot of things to 
learn so that’s definitely something that keeps me [here].
Firm and cohort support in undertaking the CA program was a common 
thread in responses too.
[T]he learning environment definitely [is a factor]. I’m doing CA at 
the moment so the experience that I’m getting…I can put into use 
with the studying.
They support you [with CA] much more so here than they do in 
industry. We get leave, we get…external study assistance.
[In response to a query about whether CA fees are paid:] Yep, all that 
sort of stuff and from what I understand again, the girl that moved 
to industry…they give her textbooks and stuff. She’s actually 
doing her CPA even though she wanted to do her CA, so they don’t 
actually give her a choice. They just don’t get the same amount of 
support and one of the guys who was halfway through his CA at 
the client actually called up and asked if he could join our…study 
group because he had no-one to learn with.
[T]hat’s one of the factors as well—in our division alone…we’ve got 
five or six people studying the same subject at the same time, so 
you’ve always got that support group.
The interviewer establishes that it is not a requirement to pay back a bond 
to the Big Four firm.
[S]ome of the other Big Four [firms]…actually [go] so far as to, every 
time that someone passes a CA subject, they get $1000 up front and 




Once within the profession, considerable effort either intentionally or 
otherwise is spent on the bonding of people. Social events are a common 
mechanism used to help bond people, often with the use of alcohol (which 
has intended or unintended consequences for those people who do not 
imbibe or those with religious views about the consumption of alcohol). 
The fact that there is a high turnover of staff is one of the reasons this 
bonding mechanism requires so much effort. The mere churn that exists 
at lower levels in the firm breaks these bonds and indeed it has been 
expressly stated that one of the triggers for leaving is if one of your close 
colleagues decides to leave.
3.1 What triggers for separation exist?
Interviewees were asked whether any of them or any others they knew 
were thinking about leaving the employ of the firm:
The reasons I came was the people…and, trying to put a different 
spin on it, one of the reasons I’m not considering staying…is that 
those people change…so that is something that I’m considering…
The people that I did initially enjoy working with have now all left 
the firm and there’s a very different dynamic here. 
[I]f the people I started with at [name of mid-tier firm] were still 
there, it might have let me stay a bit longer but the fact that they’d 
all gone was the real last straw—there was no connection to stay 
with them…We actually had so many resign…not enough people 
were being replaced. And when I was working seven days a week 
for six months…I burnt out. But the fact that my friends or the 
people I had started with, the graduates, had left also played a big 
part in me being able to let go a lot more easily.
I don’t think…I’d go [to another public accounting firm]…if you 
want to stay in accounting, I wouldn’t go to another firm…that 
certainly wouldn’t be in my thinking at all.
I’m thinking of…leaving. Not so much because of the admin,  
I just think…out of the last two and a half, three years…in terms 
of building up a technical base that will sustain my career…I’ve 
done that to some extent but I’m looking for more experience…I’m 
looking to change the area I work in. I want to try and move into 
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more of a merchant bank kind of situation. I want to try something 
else…I don’t know if I’ll get pigeonholed after three years, but  
I want to try something else before I really dig in hard at something.
[I]t will be when I feel I’ve had enough of audit. [In response to 
the interviewer’s quip about the excitement and passion of audit:] 
It does die…we cannot go on forever, so whenever the different 
experiences, secondment and all of that…will be the time I’ll 
probably consider is the time to move on and do something else.
[T]he thought did cross my mind, but…I’ll probably leave only 
when I start getting really bored with audit or when/if I find a 
position that I like in the market and the salary’s attractive.
I probably will stay—at least until I’m promoted to manager. I want 
to see whether I can be a manager or not.
Several mentioned the search for a work–life balance as a motivating 
factor for leaving.
[M]any of my colleagues left because they want a more stable life. 
As auditor, you have to travel around quite often and sometimes…
there are tight deadlines. After [you] get married and have children, 
you want a more stable life. They just want to settle down and 
share more time with their family. [When pressed on whether that 
observation was gender specific:] [It’s] more applicable to female[s].
I know some people who felt that they were being taken advantage 
of. Like they’re in there working long hours a lot of the time and 
then when they needed some sort of flexibility it might not have 
been forthcoming or when there was down time and they potentially 
could have…eased off more and maybe turned up a bit late or left a 
bit early when it wouldn’t affect it, people were still driving them 
to…turn up at 8.45 and work til 5.15 and sit there doing nothing…
So it’s kind of all take and no give in the work hours. [In response to 
a question about how common this is:] [I]t’s quite common.
[W]here they feel they’re getting worked pretty hard and maybe not 
appreciated for it or maybe not getting what they would perceive 
as the flipside of working the long hours when you’re busy…When 
you’re quiet you should be able to take the foot off the accelerator 
and even up the score. 
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[W]ork/life balance has got to be a big one in that…you can burn 
out if you’re doing very long hours and there [are] only so many 
busy seasons that some people can take. And obviously different 
things make different people leave, but…work/life balance is 
definitely [one reason].
[O]ne of the key [reasons why people leave]…is the work hours…
they just get sick of the constant work weekends, work nights…
whatever you do you get the work done, and no, [there is] not 
necessarily any additional recognition for it at all. 
[A]lso your client base can determine if you will stay late. 
It’s the same here [having to work nights, weekends and so on if 
called in], but you just don’t get the time off in lieu.
It’s voluntary.
You can decide not to do it, but…
[The number of hours worked in a week] can depend on…which 
clients you’re on, and how…big the workload can get.
With us, [the number of hours worked in a week is] very seasonal, 
so July to end of September is very busy, but then once we get 
October, November, December…you’ll be working nine to five 
again, and then January to March is busy again.
When pushed on the number of hours worked in a day, responses range 
from eight to 12, and below are some of the elaborations on this point:
It depends on the situation. We had a particularly tough one this 
year, but…some busy seasons are going to be super flat out because 
you’ve got big technical issues, for example, so you’ve got to put 
more time into it; then others may not be quite as bad.
[A]lthough it is still seasonal…the season’s flattening a little bit, so 
it almost still seems like it’s busy 12 months of the year instead of 
that three or four months.
[In response to a query about whether that is harder to take:] It 
probably is. It’s a bit of a luck of the draw with your clients whether 
you’ve got 30 June then 30 September then a 31 December, so it’s 
individual by individual.
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Others mention the nature of the work itself and a lack of variety:
I know of two people that left and…they didn’t leave because of the 
money. They…left because of the work. They weren’t enjoying the 
work…I work in audit too so we get consumer/industrial markets, 
[and] it can all depend on the client mix you have. Some people are 
lucky; some people aren’t as lucky. I know the people that left were 
just working long hours, working weekends [and] weren’t enjoying it.
[It was the] same client, day in, day out and it was a grind and they 
were over it.
[In response to a question about how long it took to be ‘over it’:] Some 
people: six months. Some people: two and a half years.
The interviewees were then asked what it was that kept them with their 
current Big Four employer.
I feel that I’m still learning and I’ve got a lot to learn and…this is…
as good a place as any to continue learning the tools of the trade. 
Also…I enjoy working with the people. The people in my division, 
my teams, they keep me in touch with the job.
[I]t’s a number of things. The people are good, the opportunities are 
good, the training’s good and…I’ve never seen a job at a clients’ that 
I would want to do. They’re doing the same reconciliation every 
month…[Here] you’re not at the same desk, which has its downfalls, 
but it’s also good in the way you work with different people. You’re 
not pigeonholed; you can move around.
[I]n our job, we have the ability to manage our own responsibilities, 
which is something I enjoy…if you’ve got to come in late one day, 
no-one’s really going to kick up a storm as long as you get your work 
done. If you have to stay back that night, well so be it…I haven’t 
had a set timetable of hours I have to work. As long as you get the 
work done then everyone’s happy, which is something I enjoy.
[When pressed on whether 10 years is the time horizon for most people:] 
[T]here’s a mixture between three [years]…After the CA a lot of 
people leave and then…A lot of them take career breaks…There [are] 
quite a few people in my division that have just left to travel…And 
they…never seem to come back…the firm will give them leave, like 
a career break, for a year, but I haven’t seen anyone come back yet.
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[I’m carried] development-wise because the firm pays for your 
CA, which is really great. And at the same time you get a taste of 
different industries because you have a property client, a banking 
client, an insurance client. So it gives you a feel[ing] of what they 
do and what they’re about…it develops you, develops your skills 
and, in the future, if you want to move elsewhere—definitely this is 
what I want—and this is how I’m going to get there.
[H]ere, you look at the average age in those divisions…and there 
[are] a lot of young people your age to work with…it’s just a benefit 
[in response to whether this represents a benefit or a threat]. You’re 
working with people who are [at] about the same point in their lives 
as you and have the same issues and go through the same jobs.
It seems to be a historical trend of about three years.
Generally…after you finish your CA you start thinking about it and 
then, if you don’t do it then, you’ll probably do it just after you 
become manager.
Historically…in our group, it’s been because people say it’s career 
suicide if you leave before [becoming] manager, because you don’t 
get as many opportunities with senior accountants on your resume 
as you do with ‘manager’ on your resume.
[I]t’s a combination of travel, money, different things to do…A lot 
of people leave the employment and do their own thing overseas.
It’s a bit of a trend. Those that go to the UK leave the firm. Those 
that go elsewhere stay with the firm initially, and then venture out.
Usually the lower levels…step across as an accountant or a senior 
accountant into industry, earning a bit more.
[T]hat element of finishing the CA and your obligation of your three 
years with the firm can quite often go [with a sense] that you’re free 
from the firm and that could be a trigger point for a lot of people…
it was for our division about two years ago.
[CA] opens all these other doors that were…not quite there before. 
You also have an obligation to repay monies that you owe to the firm 
for the training of the CAs…So people generally leave one year after 
completing their CA, because they’ve paid back their time of service.
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Yeah. The pyramid just relies on people exiting in that time.
You…learn a great deal when you’re here, but…people are under 
the impression that the longer they stay, the more highly qualified 
they become, and the more valuable they are outside of the firm. 
So…people hang on for…certain levels and trigger points, be it CA 
or senior or manager, so they can then step back at the height of 
them.
It doesn’t involve you to sit down and go well…this is what I 
want…you still can fasttrack yourself, but it’s pretty much laid out 
on the table as…if you meet these points, and you’re performing 
how you’re expected to, then you get [this].
I don’t know if [the career path is] more [desirable than in industry]; 
it’s more desirable the longer you stay. If you don’t stay as long, the 
industry’s more desirable once you get to a certain level, so at that 
three-year point with the CA, someone’s offering you more money 
than what you can get here, and better hours…or more…reasonable 
hours throughout the year.
[I]t depends where you go in the industry. If you go to a small…
company, then you cannot progress until someone quits half 
the time. If you go somewhere like [a large corporation], they’ve 
probably got the same kind of structure as we do, and you have a 
career path there as well.
[T]he day that…I rock up to work and I don’t really learn anything 
anymore, or…there [are] no opportunities…if I’m sitting at my 
desk punching out the same stuff as I was doing the same time last 
year, I’m going to look at myself and go well, am I actually gaining 
anything by doing this? I mean, you’re doing it eight hours a day, 
and if you talk the hours that we do, sometimes 10, 11 hours a 
day, if [at] that point I sit there and I say to myself, ‘Am I actually 
learning anything here anymore—no’, then that’s when I’ll say, 
‘Yep, time to go.’
It goes back to the structure of how the firm’s set up, in that every 
year you do something different, just by how the structure works 
and you keep moving up, and someone keeps coming in below you.
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I’m in the…division [that] deals with small business, so…we do a 
mixture of businesses, so I like dealing with different companies 
and different sizes and different natures…And the people and 
that kind of thing, which is obviously the HR [human resources] 
recruitment line, but it…tends to be true.
Quality people that can support the learning because…if there 
[are] no role models or people you want to aspire to be like or learn 
from…you’re [not] going to stick around for very long at all.
[T]he key thing as well is just opportunities to…change it up—like 
a secondment, maybe overseas for six months or a secondment into 
another division. 
[In response to a query about whether secondments are common:] Yeah, 
they’re very common in our group. I don’t know about other groups.
Several interviewees then said that they were off to locations in the United 
Kingdom or the United States.
[F]or now, it’s the international experience, but after that it will 
probably just be as long as I could tolerate it, just that I wouldn’t 
want to look for something else…because I don’t know what else 
I want to do. I don’t know if that is what I want to do, but there’s 
nothing else either.
In saying that I want to try something else, what will keep me here is 
if [this Big Four firm] offer me a short-term secondment—to be able 
to have that opportunity [of] trying something else. [When asked 
whether they want a secondment to a client:] To another division…
within another division, so out of audit…first of all…[this firm is] 
a good [firm] to work for…there’s no point in leaving [this firm] 
unless you try something else…[This firm] has a lot to offer, like all 
the other Big Four firms. They have a lot to offer before you jump 
ship, so if they give me the opportunity to try other things while 
I’m here, they’ll definitely keep me at the firm longer.
[J]ob stability [is also]…one of the…retaining factors. I don’t know 
what’s out there. 
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In many of the comments above and throughout the remaining responses, 
the importance of friendships and networks of people to these groups of 
junior auditors comes through—as it does when they are asked what are 
some of the things they find attractive about the profession. 
Some of the little things they do like audit dinners or opportunities 
to catch up with the guys you have worked with in the past. That 
does…count for a lot for some people. 
[E]veryone mentioned that one of the things that they were here for 
is because of the people and…in our division [community activities 
are] one thing they haven’t been doing as much and that’s a reason 
why people have left.
[B]eing interested in what you’re doing…the day that it becomes…a 
real hard, boring grind is the day that I don’t want to do it anymore. 
If it’s something slightly different or new, or a new place or a new 
client…it’s just got to be different and interesting at some level…[so 
you can] use your brain.
[I]f you feel appreciated and valued in the firm, it will help you stay.
The interviewer then asks whether anyone is staying because they really 
want to be an auditor:
I don’t think anyone’s proud to be an auditor.
[In response to a prompt about career progression:] [Y]ou would just 
wait and see…the work does get better as you go along further, 
definitely, so that’s a plus…also, the longer you stay, the better 
opportunities you’ll get…if you go elsewhere.
That was my number-one choice of what I wanted to do [promote 
other opportunities]. It was initially a training ground as such to 
come in for three years around about that sort of time and get the 
knowledge and experience of what we’ve all talked about and have 
that behind me and then be able to move sideways or go overseas or 
do something like that.




[T]he people that I know who have left, they left because the salary’s 
more attractive on the promotion side…including bonuses.
Yeah, I’ve heard of 20–30 per cent more.
I suppose a promotion, secondment, salary.
One of the issues the interviewer prompted comments about was whether 
the Big Four firm for which the focus group participants worked had 
recruited people to retain them or whether there was an inbuilt ‘we don’t 
actually want everyone to stay’ mentality.
I agree…they take in a big group of people and they hope that out 
of that 20 or so that they [take] into a division, there [are] going to 
be five there that are keepers to manager and then…they’ll weed 
out the rest and hopefully every couple of years they get a partner 
out of the recruitment.
I don’t know if that’s what they hope but that’s what happens…it’s 
a natural attrition; people leave.
From their perspective, I don’t know. I couldn’t say what they think 
[in response to ‘So is your perspective that every person they recruit is 
a potential partner?].
I don’t see them recruiting people thinking, ‘I hope these three 
leave and these four stay.’ I just think they recruit a whole bunch of 
good people knowing people are going to leave.
Does the firm seek to retain all its employees?
They’d like to think that they do.
There are generally negative responses when the interviewer asks 
whether interviewees think their employer intentionally sets out to retain 
everyone:
I don’t think…they do…if they identify someone who’s at manager 
level, and they say…realistically, they don’t have a huge future 
with this firm, or don’t think they’d be partner material, I wouldn’t 
say they actively try to retain them.
Is it managed so that there are no gaps when people leave?
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No, I wouldn’t say so…there’s still a shortage.
They like to keep the best people they can, and they can’t always 
keep those people.
It’s the rate of pay.
Some interesting comments about the issue of partnership occurred during 
the discussion about triggers for separation.
[T]here was one guy that…didn’t see himself as a partner so he got 
to assistant manager and then he said, ‘I don’t have the personality 
to become a partner so there is no point for me to stay here.’ So 
he just decided to go somewhere else. So personality sometimes 
[is an issue]…He went to…[an] investment bank…he said that 
sometimes to be a partner you have to be a little bit mean and…on 
the presentations [you need to] have a kind of charisma.
A bit of charisma doesn’t hurt.
Partners are definitely charismatic.
And motivational as well.
4.0 Prescription, documentation and junior   
 auditors
One of the most interesting aspects of the conversations in the peer focus 
groups revolved around the perceptions of these more junior auditors about 
the regimented nature of much of the work in which they were engaged 
as a result of increasing prescription. Below are some of the most revealing 
of the comments. The cohesiveness within these firm-specific focus groups 
is manifest with the participants often finishing one another’s sentences. 
For this reason, the authors have added few of their own comments in this 
section.
[The work is] just ticking off the boxes. Definitely, if the admin 
work keeps on going up it could be enough to make me go ‘stuff 
this’, because if I’m just going to be ticking boxes to say that I 
might have thought about something, it’s kind of really pointless. 
There’s no…value in that.
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[As a] senior accountant…you’re kind of stuck in the middle. There’s 
a lot admin stuff and…the way audit’s going, there just seems to be 
more and more and more admin and less and less and less audit 
work being done. [In response to ‘What is meant by admin?’:] [T]
here [are] check lists for check lists. There…are silly amounts of 
documentation…and…that’s a contributing factor. They weren’t 
enjoying what they were doing…even sometimes I find myself 
doing a check list and I’m like, ‘Well, how is this value adding to 
that client? What purpose is this serving? Is anyone actually going 
to look at this check list ever?’
And some of [the check lists] are so big that it is a temptation to just 
sit there and just to click all the way through them, because you…
know that 90 per cent of it’s just not going to apply to what you’ve 
done because these check lists cover every[thing].
[The check lists are] comprehensive, but they’re too comprehensive. 
It just feels like the numbers aren’t important anymore. 
It’s about having a file there that’s going to protect you, more so 
than having a file that’s proving…
[Completing the previous interviewee’s sentence:] …all the aim and 
the methodology.
It certainly increases the frustration levels.
It makes it feel quite useless—like what’s the point?
[This can impact on one’s own motivation] because certainly when 
you’re planning a job, it doesn’t always get the attention in terms 
of [the] time it needs, which means that you’ve got to cram [the 
documentation] in somewhere.
[M]y perception of it a lot of the time is that the partner or the 
manager want to see if there’s a check list on file, but they’re 
not going to look at it or think about it. They’re just going to be 
concerned about the numbers.
Yeah and whether it’s been done correctly or not is not important 
because they don’t really value the contents of the check list. They 
just know that they have to have it there in case someone else looks 
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in over their shoulder.
I feel…there’s an attitude [of] well, whether I’ve looked at the check 
list or not…from managers and partners, I’ll pick up whether there’s 
an error when I’m reviewing whatever I’m reviewing…I’ll pick up 
whether they’re meeting the requirements or not and the check list 
is just something that has to be done that does not yield any further 
benefit.
[In response to ‘Does it mean that someone can retrace your steps 
better?’] Theoretically, possibly. 
Some commented on a generational problem in that the more senior people 
had never had to go through the current documentation requirement 
regime.
[I]n the last three or four years there’s been a generation gap in terms 
of the documentation requirements—more so [with] the partners 
and the managers, maybe even senior managers. They never had 
to deal with all this documentation. They see a check list and they 
think, ‘Oh, this should take 40 minutes to do, half an hour to do 
but’…
[Finishing the previous interviewee’s sentence:] It can take a day.
[I]n practice…they were never exposed to these kind of 
documentation requirements.
When it comes to some of the admin…doing the technical work 
obviously, not but just in regards to admin and putting together an 
audit file that has …
[In response to the comment, ‘That sounds like really quite important 
in terms of your working lives’:] Yeah, it’s called breaking it.
4.1 Summary
The most junior auditors, within focus groups, expressed frustration 
with the level of documentation and check lists with which they were 
involved. They could see no value added to the audit and the time it takes 
is insufficiently budgeted for, with partners trained in a different era 
having little appreciation for the time impost.
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5.0 stakeholders’ comments on the impact  
 of prescription on retention
In asking about perceptions of the level of prescription as a distraction 
for auditors, several stakeholders made comments that touched on the 
potential impact of prescription on staff retention. Users did not make 
such comments, so this section begins with the words of purchasers.
5.1 Purchasers
One purchaser comments on the attractiveness of the profession in light 
of check lists:
[T]here are issues that have come into the profession that—you 
reference the share one. But there are others that have made it less 
attractive. You feel like you are in a box, let alone ticking the box. 
5.2 Suppliers
A supplier observes, more in the context of ASIC inspections than 
documentation or check lists:
[I]f I can give you an example [of] where…the 
regulator doesn’t think. When they went and 
did the review of the independence issues at 
the Big Four, what did they do? They looked at 
process. Well…blind Freddie would’ve said that 
the process would’ve been reasonable. Why didn’t 
you go and select a whole range of listed company 
accounts where they had to delineate their 
services, and pick a few of those and go back and 
say, ‘Well, how did you think that you were independent when you 
did that service?’ But they didn’t do that. This is where…it’s driving 
the compliance, and that’s why…they should be talking more. They 
seem to have a very closed mind…they’ve moved a little bit because 
there’s been such a significant backlash to their approach. But they’ve 
got a way to go too…[to] really achieve what they’re looking for. 
And…the approach of seeing how many auditors you can ban from 
signing in a year is not going to really lift the standard. It’s going to 
drive people…out of the profession. So if you’re going to go [after] 
people on those sorts of things, why would [anyone] be part of this? 
‘[T]he approach of 
seeing how many 
auditors you can ban 
from signing in a year 
is not going to really lift 
the standard. It’s going 
to drive people out…of 
the profession.’ 
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Several suppliers made comments about the attraction and retention of 
staff as being negatively associated with the increasingly prescriptive 
nature of auditing. 
But if that’s the perception, you know, perception equals reality, 
so…the question is if ASIC are coming in and doing reviews and 
doing it to get a true and fair view, to plagiarise from somewhere 
else, people accept that. But if they’re coming in and they’re 
picking up the minor points that actually don’t drive to the heart 
of the integrity of the audit of those financial statements…that’s 
problematic and they’ve got a genuine complaint. And it threatens 
where…you haven’t got enough evidence, how did you get there? 
That’s fair game. That’s what they’re doing. But if it’s stuff that 
they’re criticising that actually doesn’t really impact the thing…
that’s an issue. And…you come back to this retention question: 
retention, entrance to the profession and retention. A lot of it is 
around the interest, the independence, and what’s watching…why 
would people now come into it when it’s that tough to get to grips 
[with] and understand that you can’t…do a lot of the stuff you might 
want to do? And even when you’ve done it, someone independent 
is going to come along and say, ‘Well, actually you haven’t done 
it quite right, I’m going to penalise you’…all this helps swing a 
pendulum away from the attractiveness of audit. 
The same person goes on to emphasise the same point about the 
attractiveness of the profession:
[I]f the principle of audit is to underpin the capital markets 
and have good, competent people doing that, there’s a difficult 
discussion around are you then turning off some able people who 
would come in…there’s a risk that you begin to drive at the heart 
of the attractiveness of the profession in getting people into it and 
therefore it loses something in the translation.
The same person concludes, expressing misgivings that generation Y staff 
will necessarily stay with auditing until the perceived upheaval of the 




[W]e’re going through an interesting period, 
having got the legal, enforceable auditing 
standards, the new accounting standards, the 
questions around independence…But it is 
tricky…We need to see it professionally strong 
and attractive to people who are doing the right 
job…we’ll get there, but…there’s also a risk that 
you can lose some of that on the way through, 
and we’d lose our way. And whilst the intent 
was noble, you lose some of that. Interestingly, I suspect the baby 
boomer who’s into status and security would probably get through 
that and get to the right point of work…Gen Y maybe, who are 
more intellectually agile, less patient with some things…they may 
think, ‘Well, I don’t like the look of that and I’m going to wait till it 
settles down.’ So…we’ve got some interesting times coming ahead.
Another supplier reiterates the same point about what it is that generation 
Y wants from a career:
I haven’t been subject to the AQRB personally, 
so I can’t really comment on the other regulatory 
forms…there is now too much checking up on 
the checkers and all of that will just lead to…
young people leaving because it takes any free 
thought out of doing the audit, any commonsense 
out of the audit and it just drives a tick-the-box 
mentality and that’s not what gen Y people want 
to do. They’re creative, they think for themselves, 
they want to do that and we ought to be creating a framework where 
we work in a team with appropriate direction from the partner to 
use judgment to cover the risk properly, not tick the box.
This next supplier looks to the future and who might be left in a profession 
that is increasingly compliance driven.
[I]t’s increasingly difficult to retain staff who are increasingly going 
mad as they fill out ever longer check lists and tick boxes, and that’s 
a serious threat to the future of the auditing profession in that you 
don’t want only dunderheads to stay in it, or people who have just 
got the physical and emotional strength to survive, banging their 
head against a brick wall for the rest of their lives. 
‘gen y maybe, who 
are more intellectually 
agile, less patient with 
some things…they may 
think, “Well, I don’t 
like the look of that 
and I’m going to wait 
till it settles down.”’ 
‘[W]e ought to be 
creating a framework 
where we work in a 
team with appropriate 
direction from the 
partner to use judgment 
to cover the risk properly, 
not tick the box.’ 
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5.2.1 Summary
Several suppliers make pejorative comments about the impact of increased 
prescription and the use of check lists in the conduct of the audit on the 
attractiveness of audit as a profession and on staff retention. The constant 
scrutiny and reviews from multiple sources, internal and external, are 
perceived to be turning able people away from the profession—potential 
newcomers and existing professionals. Generation Y is perceived to be 
particularly put off by recent developments. 
5.3 Standard setters
One standard setter emphasises the need for audits to be productive and 
efficient, suggesting that form filling is not the best way to achieve this.
[T]here’s a required level of balance and…where we could find 
ourselves with the reviews of audit firms and areas like that is 
that the focus could become too much on ticking the box, writing 
down certain things that…may not be material to the conduct 
of the audit…the problem is that until something goes wrong, 
everything’s fine and…‘all is well until it’s not’. And…where we’re 
at is we’ve got to have a framework…that enables sufficient interest 
in the work, rather than form filling, for audits to be productive 
and by that I mean efficient. 
The same standard setter goes on to elucidate the essence of the issue as he 
or she sees it; growing staff capable of dealing with complex issues when 
they come from a training ground in which compliance with what it is 
that regulators look for is the norm.
For audits to be relevant…that means focus[ing] on the real issues, 
and for audits to add value to the business, which should come 
from the first two, and if we go down the path of saying well the 
only way we’re ever going to really satisfy a regulator is to have 
such detailed programs for every aspect of the audit that we would 
need to have and need to complete because if we didn’t do them we 
will always run the risk of breaching an auditing standard black-
letter requirement or some other requirement, albeit it may not be 
material to the audit. The question then becomes one [of] well, are 
you going to encourage people who want to be innovative, deal 
with complex issues, work through them, grow and learn by having 
them go through a process that requires that? I don’t know the 
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answer to that but my gut feel[ing] is probably not, to a large extent, 
because they’ll go somewhere where they can do that. And then 
what you start doing is, you start lowering the bar on the quality 
of individual that you’re asking to come and evaluate risk, design 
relevant approaches to those risks, deal with senior management 
who are explaining those situations, identify risks that management 
haven’t seen and then apply what are becoming far more complex 
accounting standards on fair value, financial instruments and so 
on, to those situations. Asset impairment, the judgments, what’s a 
cash-generating unit? Do I tick the box…that’s where I see the risk.
5.3.1 Summary
One standard setter notes the difficulty of encouraging innovative people 
with high-level skills to deal with complex issues to enter and stay in the 
profession and the danger that the quality of individuals will drop as a 
result.
6.0 issues and implications
There were certain trigger points for public accounting staff leaving such 
as completion of their CA and having fulfilled undertakings with respect 
to repayment of time relating to fee reimbursement or when they were 
promoted to manager. When it came to other opportunities, however, 
there seemed to be extensive headhunting activity within the firms—
possibly triggered in part by the departure of close colleagues for other 
employment. There was some reference to short-term pay benefits by 
leaving the firm, but by and large, remuneration was not a key driver 
in the decision to leave. Perhaps most important after the interpersonal 
connectedness issue was the work–life balance and in particular the 
changing nature of the work, which was repeatedly described as either 
‘documentation’ or ‘admin’.
Some reasons why staff remained with their existing audit firm 
included the possibility of international experience and/or secondment to 
other divisions within the firm or other locations within the firm. Also, the 
clarity of job security was attractive if they felt valued and appreciated by 
those who supervised their work. Remuneration was indicated as a reason 
to stay, as was the clarity of a career path. The three points indicating 
real interest in staying were: 1) having someone who played a key role 
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model for them; 2) the quality of people and colleagues working around 
them and the level of friendliness and the functionality of that group; and 
3) having good-quality clients. 
Users do not see audit firms as premium employers. For some of the 
users who might have been employed with the accounting profession, 
this view could have been coloured by their own experiences as a former 
employee of a supplier.
Comments by purchasers reveal sophisticated questioning of the 
traditional business model for staffing an audit firm and, by virtue of 
being more flexible in their recruitment strategies, they undermine one of 
their core tenets: the hallowed route to partner. Another level of criticism 
by purchasers of the audit firm business model is the relatively low pay, 
high hours of work and a disconnection with lifestyle for younger staff.
While purchasers can be somewhat cynical of the accounting firm 
employment model, they do see, relative to themselves, enhanced 
opportunities for understanding by accounting firm personnel of not just 
the transactional, but the operational activities of business. At the same 
time, purchasers acknowledge and understand that much of the work 
undertaken by junior staff is ‘menial’ and that this provides industry with 
the opportunity to recruit people who are experienced in business.
Although some purchasers are critical of the quality of the work of 
audit firms, they see the work within the Big Four as very well managed, 
well defined and that there is an unambiguous career path. In contrast, 
industry employment holds more uncertainty and possibly a less well-
managed career process. While there might be a short-term monetary gain 
for an audit firm employee to move to industry, there is less clarity about 
the long-term financial rewards.
Purchasers also recognise and, in a way, are grateful for the key point in 
accounting practice careers at which staff is both valuable and vulnerable. 
They see the employment situation of accounting firms as being not 
in crisis in relation to other professional areas and that innovation will 




Among suppliers, there is a general perception that the recruitment 
process is stable and in a healthy state—albeit with some concerns about 
salary levels in a competitive market. The real challenge they see is around 
retention—having in mind generational expectations and structural 
changes in the nature of the work brought about by regulatory reform and 
the perceived lessening of professional judgment as a key part of the job.
Within the supplier group, there is a perception of a lack of empathy 
with generation Y’s expectations in regard to the desired rate of change in 
their working environment. Perhaps it is the case that the audit business 
model cannot facilitate this desired variety of tasks, but then it comes to the 
point of recruiting the appropriate staff and managing their expectations.
Some suppliers seem overtly envious of other careers, seeing them as 
less invaded by regulators and accountability. They believe that if the 
quality of the work no longer has the capacity for professional judgment 
then practice becomes more of a compliance career. If graduates who are ‘fit 
for purpose’ for a compliance-oriented career are recruited, their particular 
comparative skills in the management of detail and the ability to undertake 
routine and competitive tasks leave open a gap as to where the leadership 
of the profession will come from, as the comparative skill set for this group 
of graduates is not necessarily overlapping with the ‘leadership class’.
From a ‘where to from here’ perspective, some suppliers recognise the 
need for constant change and innovation in the working lives of junior 
auditors—in particular, generation Y—and, importantly, recognise that 
they need to feel engaged in their occupation. 
The key role played by the need for engagement will drive the search 
for innovative solutions. Some suppliers recognise that the traditional 
incentive structures—in particular, the prized goal of partnership—are 
no longer the attractions they once were. There is also a sophisticated 
recognition that different staff will have different incentives and 
motivations in their jobs at various stages in their lives, which has a 
consequence for managing and motivating staff performance. Employers 
recognise that the employment model itself is not at the higher end of 
remuneration for staff.
Among suppliers not in the Big Four, there seems to be acute awareness 
of the differential employment opportunity they can provide. There is 
recognition that they can use that differential to their own advantage in 
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staff retention by using ‘variety’ in work tasks and the nurturing of a 
‘sense of community’. There is recognition among the Big Four that this 
sense of community is not as evident in their own firms as is the case for 
the non-Big Four. 
Suppliers lament that the nature of oversight of the profession 
has degraded it, with the high level of regulation and scrutiny having 
consequences for job satisfaction, employment and retention. 
Some suppliers are seeking innovative ways of adjusting employment 
practices by managing staff turnover between different categories of lower 
and higher importance clients. Firms are creatively innovating and re-
engineering employment practices for staff at high risk of dissatisfaction. 
There is very sophisticated recognition by some that client-based 
opportunities that can provide challenges exist, but there are also changes 
that go to formal and informal innovations to create the components 
necessary for staff retention.
Standard setters are somewhat cynical that what is happening is 
anything but a desired outcome and question whether accounting firms 
are at the leading edge of building a community based on people. There is 
cynicism about the efficacy of a business model that places far too much 
emphasis on relatively superficial financial mechanisms and not enough 
on qualitative, community characteristics. In a people-driven business, 
if the right people leave, the business will ultimately suffer. There were 
very penetrating comments from a standard setter that even at partner 
level, there was a serious threat posed by attrition, which had system-
wide implications, especially for highly specialised industry groups. 
With respect to documentation, the view of the more junior staff was 
that the requirements to document hours worked, which historically 
were a problem, were no longer causing the generalised problems they 
once did, as firms had in general adjusted audit time budgets to be more 
realistic. The general view is that in recent years all firms have moved 
towards a process whereby the real hours of the engagement are recorded 
and there might be a decision not to then recover those hours, but that 
the number of hours consumed in undertaking the audit is now a true and 
fair reflection of the work undertaken. That is, the phenomenon known as 
‘eating hours’ is part of history. 
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There was an observation (possibly only by a minority) that some 
partners and managers belonged to a ‘previous generation’ and were not 
empathetic with generation Y. For these individuals, documentation and 
the time constraints they caused were less important. As a consequence, 
time budgets—at least with respect to these partners and managers—
are not realistic and do not reflect the amount of time necessary to 
fulfil documentary requirements. While some of the participants of the 
focus groups suggested that documentation was one reason to leave the 
profession, there were also some positive advantages to documentation. In 
particular, it meant that the quality of the audit file was better and, with 
the possibility of staff turnover, more information was routinely available 
to incoming staff on an audit, thus providing continuity. On balance, 
however, there were very mixed messages about documentation. On the 
one hand, there was a belief that it limited the amount of time available 
to execute the audit and, on the other hand, it was seen as a positive 
because it meant there was more continuity and more detailed information 
provided about the client in the file. One person even suggested that the 
quality of the audit was better because the documentation forced people 
to contemplate aspects of the audit more thoroughly.
7.0 Concluding remarks
While extensive interviews were held with users, purchasers, suppliers, 
standard setters and regulators, the level of innovation over alternative 
solutions to the challenges facing audit suppliers with respect to 
employment and retention of staff at all levels was relatively unexceptional. 
There is, however, some innovative thinking and the following synthesises 
the various views.
Users and purchasers provided a number of insights. There was 
repeated reference to the differences between generation X and generation 
Y and that much more care needed to be given to understanding these 
differences and the consequences for employment. Additionally, several 
better-informed users were assertive with respect to the issue of audit 
firms learning from some of the practices within law firms, which in the 
view of one interviewee, were better able to differentiate between ‘star’ 
performers and those who were perfectly adequate in the task. He cited 
the case of a young lawyer in a major law firm who was promoted to 
partner by his twenty-fifth birthday. Other observations from the user and 
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purchaser groups were that audit firms needed to do more to encourage 
women—particularly those women who were star performers—to remain 
in the profession even if on a fractional basis. It is preferable to have 
25 per cent of a star performer than nothing. Similarly, purchasers of 
substantial audit services made the observation that reward systems in 
audit firms seemed to be strictly bound by periods of service rather than 
merit. It is important to separate out particularly meritorious employees 
and promote, recognise and reward them in ways different to others. The 
implication is that accounting service providers need to have high-quality 
human resource systems that can differentiate between adequate and 
above-adequate performance levels by staff. 
Related to this is the fact that audit firms at least, as perceived by 
purchasers, are shy about recognising stars even if they are able to observe 
them. The need to celebrate differential performance and support those 
genuine high performers is a necessary condition for a change in culture. 
Purchasers were also quick to point out that audit firms must be able to 
recognise staff as individuals and work with them as individuals not just as 
people employed at particular levels. Audit firms can no longer rely on the 
prestige of the auditing profession of the past. The role of the honourable 
auditor and business advisor is now in conflict with the public policy 
position of the role of auditors and the previous reliance on this notion of 
prestige is not an option. In terms of positive suggestions and as part of the 
recognition of generation X and generation Y, purchasers suggested more 
extensive utilisation of travel and training, careful use of secondments, 
particularly to commerce, and recognition that interchanges between 
commerce/industry and the profession, particularly at senior levels, 
could happen and needed to be given a more honourable place. While the 
notion of secondments and exchanges has traction among purchasers, it 
is acknowledged that the building of expertise in commerce tends to be 
rather narrow and that secondments must be carefully selected, especially 
at levels of seniority. Additionally, there was recognition by purchasers 
of secondments into and from regulators. Another observation was that 
lawyers seemed to have particular traction with corporate regulators in a 
way that accountants had yet to achieve.
Two observations that warrant special attention are that accounting 
firms might do well to inform their staff not just about employment 
opportunities and career development that exist within their firm but give 
benchmarked objective comparators to other alternative employment.
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Additionally, purchasers took the view that accounting firms needed to 
interact more frequently with alumni. One solution would be to actively 
build alumni contacts not just as people who might be potential purchasers 
of services from large and small accounting firms, but as potential recruits 
for positions within these firms. 
Suppliers also recognised the need to interact more with the alumni 
networks and that alumni relations within the Big Four were sometimes 
fragile and might not be as well focused as they could be. Alumni 
operations within some audit firms are fragile because they rely on a few 
individuals and are not always focused on the alumni as individuals who 
can be recruited, but more importantly as potential purchasers of their 
services. Many interviewees recognised the change in the work culture of 
numerous employees of audit firms. Among the bigger employers, there 
was recognition of an increased need for flexibility and work–life balance. 
Many also observed, however, that their business model and the cutting 
of margins limited the capacity to deliver on this increased flexibility 
and the ability to fully and appropriately make the most of the work–
life balance. An example is where a particularly able ‘in-charge’ might be 
present, this usually results in several managers seeking the services of 
this ‘in-charge’ person. Ultimately, this person left the firm because of the 
pressure of work from so many different directions. Subsequently, that 
particular firm missed out on this rising star altogether. The implication 
here is that audit firms have to understand their working practices and 
their structure ought to attend to the fact that the work–life balance is a 
key determining factor in the employment of younger auditors. 
Generally, there is recognition that audit firms could be more people-
driven businesses and that employees need to be treated as individuals and 
recognised for their unique abilities. Further, more flexibility is required 
in the working environment and diversity in the work undertaken. 
Mainstays that should not be forgotten are overseas secondments and a 
strong culture and brand name for the organisation. None of these is a new 
solution, but their re-emphasis warrants consideration. An overarching 
issue among suppliers was that auditing needed to be something beyond 
‘ticking the box’, and the importance of judgment, decision making and 
expertise development were key to ensuring that jobs were interesting, 
useful and engaging for people. There is genuine concern that these 
important requirements are increasingly being lost because of policy 
decisions within the Australian jurisdiction.
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One of the challenges is that certain individuals in senior positions 
within audit firms do not necessarily empathise well with more junior 
staff. An example given was that senior managers who aspired to become 
a partner could actually look, feel and behave more like a partner than a 
partner and did not empathise and interact well with more junior staff, 
which was crucial to the continuing performance of the supplier.
In terms of specific solutions, some suppliers believe that a better 
relationship with the regulator is needed and there ought to be positive 
engagement with regulators to ensure they do not feel that there is 
a separation or large division of views between audit suppliers and 
the regulator. Similarly, careful management of clients and possibly 
management of those clients with preferential treatment are needed, so 
that in effect there is the creation of two products within the same brand 
name. 
Again, among standard setters, there was broad recognition that 
audit firms should acknowledge the work–life balance and the fact that 
increasingly auditors were leaving the Big Four rather than the Big Four 
seeking to remove employees. The consequence is that the quality of 
people leaving the Big Four is seen to be of a very high level, which is good 
for the broader business community but potentially reduces the quality of 
individuals among audit suppliers. Interestingly, among standard setters, 
there was a belief that the most important marketing tool for employment 
was word of mouth. There is, however, a perception that the Big Four do 
not come out well in this regard.
Another observation from standard setters, which warrants further 
consideration, is that there are various levels of work within an audit 
and an audit firm’s business model is to move people up the value chain 
by transferring them from one client to another. So, from an audit firm’s 
perspective, they are developing the employee and providing a broader 
expertise with a diversity of clients. Of course, this same strategy viewed 
from the auditee company’s perspective represents ‘churn’, with a series 
of fresh faces at short intervals. Within some employment markets, this 
degree of ‘churn’ is overcome by enhancing job specifications and the 
diversity of the skills required. In the Public Service, sometimes it is 
referred to as ‘broad banding’ and involves moving an employee up in 
their career rather than moving the employee away from a particular 
employment location. Naturally, this produces tensions because one of 
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the values of moving an employee from one client to another is to provide 
diversity of employment experience and, as documented elsewhere, 
generation Y audit firm employees appear to crave diversity of work.
Perhaps overall, user, purchaser, supplier and standard setter groups 
recognise that auditing is under significant challenge due to the change in 
the nature of the work, fee pressures and pressure to perform, which have 
occurred simultaneously and are viewed very differently by generation 
X and generation Y employees. The mix has put considerable pressure on 
quality and the future. Staff lost to the profession now will, by and large, 
be less likely to become available to hold senior positions in the profession 
in the future.
One of the potential policy implications is that audit firms could 
be intentionally or unintentionally dividing their portfolio of clients 
according to those from whom they see a positive advantage in minimising 
employee turnover because of particular complex issues or because that 
client requires or has been provided with particularly high-quality 
service. This high-quality service might be more easily or more effectively 
delivered by a stable team. These premium clients might exist because of 
the complex or controversial accounting issues within them or because 
the client is prepared to pay a premium not so much for industry expertise 
per se but for the stable employment force that knows their client issues 
very well. If the market is dividing between these premium clients and 
other clients, the policy implications for regulators will be significant.
It can be concluded that overall, even before the recognition of the global 
financial crisis, those already in the system had keenly felt a shock to the 
system—played out in terms of overfull employment, scarcity of human 
talent and the presence of high staff turnover. At that time, equilibrium 
in work expectations and capacity to adapt to change were not reached. It 
will not be possible for those who find this change disagreeable to transfer 
out of the profession immediately and it will take some time for these forces 
to work through and for the system to adapt. Now we have a second shock 
to the system in the form of the global financial crisis, which is likely to 
lower the demand for the talent pool. This crisis, however, is likely to 
mask a continuing underlying trend; it might provide an opportunity for 
structural change that will place the accounting profession on a better 
footing for the future of audit.
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The question must be asked, however, where the employment model 
is heading. Suppliers recognise that they have been under price pressure, 
which leads to pushing down staffing costs, which in turn means higher 
staff turnover, which in turn means higher costs and, potentially and more 
importantly, a lower-quality product. This business model is unsustainable 
in the long term and a solution needs to be found. Could a radical change 
to business processes, such as that which XBRL8 or some other technology 
might induce, create a further shock that assists in remedying what 
appears to be a system near to crisis?
As noted above, we have heard some penetrating comments that, at all 
levels, including that of partner, the audit business model faces a serious 
threat from the attrition rates of professionals, which has implications 
for the entire market for audit services and even touches on the much 
discussed creation of specialist industry groups. The threats to a high-
quality audit product as a consequence are foreseeable. For some levels of 
expertise, the question of attrition is highly costly, not just in monetary 
terms but in terms of the time lag before remedy. While this penetrating 
view has resonance, there is no obvious solution to what is a profoundly 
important question for the future of audit. While there might be some 
diversity of work for audit staff across clients, for the majority, it is at 
relatively low levels of expertise and is not going to solve this aspect of 
the problem.
It cannot be emphasised enough that care needs to be taken with the 
effects of the global financial crisis on the employment regime, particularly 
among more junior auditors. While the employment market might be less 
competitive, underlying trends are unlikely to change and the global 
financial crisis is likely to simply mask underlying challenges. The global 
financial crisis could in fact be an opportunity that can be seized to change 
employment practices and business models so that when full employment 
returns, the auditing business model as it pertains to employment can 
emerge with greater effectiveness and efficiency.






[T]here are synergies when an audit firm goes through a company 
and performs the audit. They develop a great deal of knowledge 
about the way the company works and who the people are in the 
company and…there is an integration of knowledge when those 
firms also do the tax work and perhaps corporate services consulting 
work. But on the other hand, …the audit’s fee is generally a lesser 
percentage, a more minor percentage, of the total fee when a firm does 
all the other corporate-type work as well and…there are dangers 
with that. I can see there would be a loss; I see there would be an 
increased cost, but rather than prejudice or taint the performance 
of the audit, I would prescribe to the view that auditors should be 
prohibited from offering other services.
— Regulator
1.0 Key issues
The issue of auditor independence has many facets. This study focuses 
principally on two key facets: auditor-provided non-audit services and 
audit partner rotation. Auditor-provided non-audit services is one of the 
most debated aspects in the maintenance of auditor independence. Audit 
partner rotation is tied inextricably to the continuity of audit teams and 
client and industry knowledge dealt with in Chapter 6. Challenges for the 
profession and regulators in these areas include:
•	 are the majority of participants in the market for audit services aware 
of changes to the auditor independence requirements as a result of 
the CLERP 9 and related reforms
•	 is the focus on maintenance of independence confused with 
maintenance of objectivity
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•	 can rules or guidelines be invoked to ensure maintenance of 
independence and objectivity, to the extent that they differ 
•	 where does the balance lie in the trade-off between the potential 
for knowledge ‘spill-overs’, compromised independence and public 
cynicism as a consequence of auditor-provided non-audit services
•	 can the auditing profession learn from other professions in which 
similar potential independence conflicts arise
•	 is the management of separation of personnel successful in 
maintaining audit as independent from non-audit services
•	 to what extent can reliance on the personal integrity of the personnel 
involved in the provision of audit and non-audit services be relied on 
and how can that personal integrity be supported and evidenced
•	 are the requirements for independence in terms of clients and 
financial interests disproportionately harsh on audit personnel 
compared with other public accounting firm personnel and, if so, 
what are the potential consequences of this
•	 to what extent is avoidance by personnel of public accounting firm 
requirements and quality controls regarding independence an issue
•	 where does the balance lie between initial audit engagement quality 
and creating sought-after challenges for partners when they rotate to 
a new client, hence assisting in their retention
•	 where does the balance lie between enhancing independence and the 
potential for loss of clients and perhaps industry knowledge when 
partners rotate off an engagement
•	 are partner rotation requirements making it crucial to have a critical 
mass of partners and hence discouraging smaller firms from auditing 
listed entities, and does this give rise to changes in the level of 
competition in the market for audit services
•	 is the potential cost to personal career aspirations too high for those 
skilled in audits of highly complex entities where few industry 
participants exist
•	 is five years appropriate for the duration of audit partner tenure in all 
industry categories or is it too costly in terms of creating inefficiencies 
in some instances
•	 how do firms manage the partner rotation requirements while 




The issue of auditor independence is examined in this study through 
specific questions asked in the survey and the interviews. The survey 
involved a general question in relation to whether stakeholders were 
aware of reforms pertaining to auditor independence. For the interviews, 
stakeholders were asked specifically about their perceptions in relation to 
auditor-provided non-audit services (APNAS) and audit partner rotation; 
both issues were affected by the CLERP 9 and related reforms.
3.0 survey
Participants in the mail and telephone surveys were asked about their 
awareness of certain changes to the regulation of audit services in 
Australia. One component of this was about changes relating to auditor 
independence. Their responses are reported in Table 9.1.

















































































Are you aware of the following specific changes that have occurred in the regulation 





57 69 53 45 79 79 76 86 92 96 91
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
As one might expect, those who are most active in the market for audit 
services are the most aware that there have been regulatory changes with 
regard to auditor independence. Allowing for minor errors in responses, 
one can reasonably conclude that the population of suppliers of audit 
services is aware of these changes and that the majority of purchasers in 
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that market are also aware of these changes. Again, as might be expected, 
the empirical evidence is that private investors are the least well informed, 
with less than half responding to an awareness of these changes.
4.0 introduction: auditor-provided non-audit  
 services
Users, purchasers, suppliers, standard setters and regulators were asked 
during the face-to-face interviews about their attitude to APNAS. 
Prompt questions revolved around the relative costs and benefits of 
companies being prohibited from buying other services—such as tax 
services and management consulting—from auditors and whether, if 
they were prohibited, that would be a concern or there might be a risk 
of a loss of synergies. 
4.1 Users
Users are mixed in their views about whether prohibition of APNAS 
purchase is a concern. These first quotes reveal users who approve of the 
separation and have no concerns about potentially lost synergies.
I don’t see any scope between that…they can start providing tax 
and consulting and…that’s probably been a good thing.
I don’t know, but then I’m quite comfortable having that separation 
of duties…that’s probably a push by some of these larger accounting 
firms…[which] are missing out on huge business, because, for 
example, at the auditor of Telstra, and they can’t do various 
corporate work for Telstra…that’s fine. I don’t see any issues with 
having that separation of duties at all.
The same person goes on to fully support regulation that maintains 
separation, arguing that there are many skilled people who can conduct 
the other services:
[There are] enough people around these days…sure, it’s going to be 
probably a little bit more expensive and [there will be a] loss of…
having internal knowledge of things, but…if you’ve got external 
advisors that know what an annual report is and know how to read 
it, they can pick up from where the auditors have left off…it’s a 
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great thing…it’s probably a push from maybe some of the major 
accounting firms—because they’re obviously missing out on a lot 
of business—to try and dull some of those laws down a bit. But…
they’re probably the most necessary laws there are, because it shows 
independence.
A similar theme is evident in the words of another two users:
[I]n that particular case…even if you’re a small company, I don’t 
think it’s difficult to quickly brief and get someone else…to actually 
understand your operation in terms of what they would need to 
know to assist you in that decision making, even if you’re a small 
company…We’re in that situation here and I would certainly not go 
to our auditors.
No [to prohibition on auditor-provided other services]. Maybe on 
the surface. The ones…that have gone broke, the organisations…
you might argue there’s some conflict of interest.
The same person responds specifically in relation to APNAS relating to tax:
Maybe [having shared audit and tax services]…works well. But 
it’s the cases that go bad that you can see that maybe those things 
weren’t being taken to the proper degree…for example, if you had a 
different analyst working on your company, theoretically, when you 
value your company, you’d have more information from all different 
sources. But if that’s not passed with the auditor, for example, or to 
the end user, then maybe you’re only getting half the information. 
So it works both ways, doesn’t it?
Several users comment on how their audit firm manages the potential 
conflict by maintaining strict separation of the personnel involved.
We do that. We do buy tax services from the same company but it’s 
generally a different group. And they obviously say if you’re buying 
tax services you’re talking to the tax department within that firm, 
which is [a] completely different group of people that come to do 
the audit and they don’t talk to each other, and they probably don’t 
even know each other. So, yes, we do buy those services from the 
same auditing company.
[T]he firms obviously have to manage that issue…as long as it’s not 
one kind or one audit firm, or one accounting firm…that’s totally 
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reliant on where all their services are coming from…as long as they 
don’t take it too far. There’s a logic to…providing tax services and 
some of the related services. I’m not stressed about that…it’s more 
with some of the chunkier fees, things in terms of advisory-type 
roles where there is obvious conflict between making, for instance, 
a transaction successful as opposed to the guardian[ship role] of 
ensuring that that transaction…complies with accounting rules 
and that people understand what’s going on there…it has to be 
carefully managed.
It depends on the size of the firm. For example, with [name of a Big Four 
firm], we get the tax services from the tax guys and the audit services 
from the audit guys. The only time they ever discuss the account is 
when the audit needs tax sign-off for the financial statements, and 
often that’s the only involvement they’ll have with each other.
[T]hey have been managing the conflict of interest very well…we’ve 
appointed a foreign auditor, for instance, for one of our foreign 
accounts, and each year they will write to me and get me to confirm 
who our external auditors are so that we don’t have conflict…so 
long as they manage it in that way, I can’t see an issue with them 
continuing to provide other services. But there’s definitely got to be 
that split between the different business units, and those Chinese 
walls, and they have to operate efficiently. And there are definite 
benefits that come to a firm with having access to that knowledge, 
probably more from an internal-audit perspective. To get a sign-
off on changes to tax regulations or whatever it is, you wouldn’t 
be able to just go to a generalist; you need to have that expert tax 
advice. So it’s good for the internal auditor to be able to refer back 
to an expert in the area…there [are] probably more positives than 
there are negatives.
This next user explains that it is not an issue that causes concern to him 
or her, but the capital market focuses on it:
[I]t doesn’t concern me…because I know how it works in the real 
world. They’re such big firms and the people are so different, [and] 
separated…that there is a level of independence. But having said that, 
it is something that the markets do focus on a little bit…you [have] 
just got to be a bit careful about how it looks…Although [there] was 
a big focus post-Enron and it’s probably, over time, faded a bit.
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Another user, an analyst, points to similar types of independence conflicts 
in his or her industry:
There are perceived conflicts…you’re providing tax advice and 
wanting to make money on this, and then you’re going to audit the 
outcome of that…there is an inherent conflict unless you can prove 
that internally you’ve got these fantastic Chinese walls…I work 
in a business that’s constantly dealing with these issues, and you 
get a very cynical public out there if we float a company that our 
corporate team has floated, and then write research on it; there’s a 
perceived conflict.
The same person goes on to point out the cost of cynicism, if APNAS 
encourages that reaction from the public:
We deal with it by full disclosure…which I know the accounting 
profession does, but does it benefit the company…and its cost of 
capital, and how it’s viewed…People just get cynical. And there’s a 
cost to cynicism, isn’t there?
This next user would be happy to see more paid for audits by companies 
in which he or she is a shareholder if that is necessary to maintain a 
prohibition on APNAS:
I’m more in favour of prohibition of the other services. I’d like the 
auditor really to—now this would probably mean that you’d have 
to pay more for the audit, but I’m prepared to live with that as 
a shareholder, because for me the independence of the auditor is 
supreme. I want as few…potential conflicts of interest between the 
auditor and the company as possible because…the prime function 
of the auditor is to…make sure that the company isn’t telling me 
too many porkies, to put it bluntly. And anything that compromises 
the interests of the auditors—if we, a nudge and a wink if we don’t 
do this, don’t say this, will we have a better chance of getting other 
services—to me is fraught with dangers. Conflicts of interest are 
rife and…it’s better that those other services are provided by other 
firms.
The same user continues, reiterating other users’ comments that other 
providers can be found for consulting-type engagements:
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The risk of the auditor not being aware of all the details [of] the 
company—for example, of the tax arrangements…is relatively small 
because, particularly if you’re talking [about] the big auditors, they 
would all know…what innovations the other ones are coming up 
with…it’s like in research: imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. 
If somebody comes up with a good idea, we all adopt it, and so it 
would be in terms of those type of services. So I doubt that there’s 
too much knowledge that would be lost, and it certainly wouldn’t…
outweigh the risk of a potential compromise of the independence. 
Other users, however, have no problem with APNAS, do not want to 
see any prohibitions on it and can see the benefits of having an auditor 
provide these services.
I can’t see why they shouldn’t be allowed to offer those other 
services…you’ve got someone that spends a week or two weeks, or 
however long it takes, inside your business, so they’re going to get 
a pretty good handle on it. And so they’re probably one of the best 
people to be able to offer the management consulting-type service…
they should be allowed to do it. And you know they’re professional 
so they’re going to do it in a professional manner. I can’t really see 
a conflict of interest.
The same user goes on to conclude: 
And I don’t know how to fix [the independence conflict], but they 
would be the best people to give you advice on your business 
because they know it backwards. So I don’t know how we get 
around that, but…the benefits potentially outweigh the costs.
This next user has great respect for the integrity of the profession and 
feels there is no need for further prohibitions:
[T]his really falls to the integrity of the 
auditor. Independence…is a state of mind, it’s 
not a state of prescription. You can’t prescribe 
independence. I’m a chartered accountant, 
I’ve been one for 30 years…the auditing 
profession in Australia has got a very high 
level of integrity…they are capable of being 
independent…the issues are, if the auditors 
[are] getting $200 000 in tax work as well as 
‘[T]here are benefits in 
having the same firm 
that does your accounts 
doing your tax…and 
often doing other things 
like secondments and a 
whole host of different 
things. There are synergistic 
benefits for the business, 
and for the auditor.’
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$500 000 for doing the accounts, as well as $50 000 for advising 
on something else, that client is a very important part of their 
business…so if your ability to be impartial when you’re doing a 
job—because you’re worried about losing that client—gets in the 
way of [how] you do your job, that becomes a problem and it’s 
really…hard to measure that…the auditing profession in Australia 
is as good as anywhere else in the world and the right level of 
independence and integrity rests with the partners of the firm and 
the people that work with them. And there are benefits in having 
the same firm that does your accounts doing your tax…and often 
doing other things like secondments and a whole host of different 
things. There are synergistic benefits for the business, and for the 
auditor for that matter, in doing that, and it’s a shame to lose those 
things. But I do understand why some people would think you can’t 
let the auditor get too close to the company. That’s the whole issue 
about rotating and all that sort of stuff as well…there’s probably  
a fine balance there between the two.
The interviewer asks: ‘What are the benefits of being able to share 
the business knowledge, like the tax people being able to share their 
knowledge with the auditor/audit teams?’ The user responds: 
[I]t’s just simpler, really. Just logistically simpler.
The next quotation shows a similar logic:
[I]t’s useful in that you would get at least the same answers. For 
example, when you buy a service from [say] PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
are you getting the same answers, the same results as if you would’ve 
bought that service from [say] Ernst & Young, who are your 
auditors, who then audit…that service or that paper…it would be 
handy because we would only have one service provider, or one 
consultant…so we wouldn’t have to get whatever paper we asked to 
be prepared…audited by a different firm. And so then there’s a risk 
of coming [up] with different answers, which we’ve seen happen 
with the last firm.
4.1.1 Summary
Users are mixed in their views of whether a higher level of prohibition of 
APNAS brings desired benefits in independence. One user, an investor, 
is prepared to pay more for audits if that is the consequence of greater 
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prohibition. For other users, however, the simplicity of having a single 
provider for audit and non-audit services is compelling. The lower risk 
of receiving differential advice, their superior knowledge of the business 
and the professionalism of the public accounting firms are offered as 
justification for APNAS. The perception that many other providers could 
service the need, the difficulty in managing separation of personnel, the 
expectations of the markets and public cynicism if auditors are seen as 
self-serving are the arguments raised by those who feel there needs to be 
more rather than less prohibition of joint provision.
4.2 Purchasers
Taking first those who are comfortable with the current situation and do 
not want greater prohibitions placed on APNAS, these next few quotations 
provide the purchasers’ reasoning for their views.
[T]here is a big potential loss to companies of synergies if you were 
to make it a complete blanket ban.
One purchaser reminisces about a time when even legal services could be 
provided by the audit firm and the benefits he or she perceived to have 
flowed from that:
I’ll give an example…which…certainly 
in these days…would [be] very, very 
unfashionable. In one of my roles…arguably 
even unfashionably…back in a ’99, 2000, 
2001 kind of world, I saw a definite synergy, 
even in getting legal services from [one of the 
Big Four]. They had some good lawyers who 
I knew had come in from good firms. So they 
had not an enormous law firm, but a quite 
talented firm of good people. And I…saw 
some advantages—particularly for small acquisition work, where 
often the auditor will work on an acquisition—to have people 
who knew and understood the audit function, as well as the legal 
function. And so that’s one example—probably a rare example…
that’s certainly one of the things that’s the deadest of all out of the 
non-audit services audit. The lawyers, of course, typically left the 
accounting firms…And the liquidations people is [sic] one that we 
probably took a bit of a de facto view the other way. Our loans 
‘I really saw some 
advantages—particularly 
for small acquisition work, 
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work on an acquisition—to 
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management guys were relatively careful not to use [one of the Big 
Four]…there might be certain reasons why you did, but generally 
it was not a reason, whereas…the lawyers could see some definitive 
advantages.
The same purchaser continues, emphasising the importance of personal 
integrity on the part of service providers, whether audit or non-audit: 
[T]hen you go the other side. Was it changing our auditors’ 
independence and robustness in telling the board that there was 
a problem, and I’m very confident, and obviously the example of 
one, I rely on the personalities of those auditors—not a chance in 
the world. I mean [Person X] would have told the audit committee 
any time, and did, his concerns no matter what was coming on the 
other side. 
Another purchaser sees tax work as inextricably linked to auditing, 
so that it might indeed be seen as part of the audit, and is concerned that 
wider prohibitions to include tax might be implemented.
I am concerned about it. I understand the reasons for the reporting 
and I certainly agree that auditors can’t audit their own work or…
get themselves into conflictive positions. But…the provision of 
taxation advice is so integral to the operation of the preparation 
of the accounts and, from a purely cost-effective point of view, it 
seems…that’s one area which is often classed as a separate service 
that could be…treated more appropriately, as linked to the audit 
itself. That would be my preferred position.
Another purchaser provides a tax dispute as an example of where having 
auditor-provided tax consulting would be helpful:
I’m quite agnostic as to the rules on non-audit services…a lot of the 
non-audit services, particularly…tax…helped the auditor to know 
more about you…[I]n our…fortunately small list of issues, we have 
a…tax dispute, and…five years ago [name of Big Four firm] would’ve 
had a bigger role in that matter and…they obviously know as much 
as they need to know as an auditor, where they would probably 
have known factually more about it prior to some of the non-audit 
service requirements. 
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The same person goes on to speak of another potential independence 
problem: having an ex-audit partner as a board member.
[T]he downside risk…was [that] the auditor is too much in your 
pocket…for example, the HIH one that I found a bit freaky was 
that the guy on the board was an ex-audit partner of the place…
that was obvious and I found that quite problematic from a genuine 
audit independence point of view. 
The same person continues with the theme of the independence of board 
members.
[In response to the question: ‘But it does depend on personalities. An 
ex-partner can have little sway or pull with the current audit team, but 
there are exceptions:’] Yes…it’s interesting you put it that way and of 
course that’s absolutely 50 per cent of the risk, but the other 50 per 
cent is that he’s…defending his old brand, his old reputation, given 
some of his old work…So we haven’t even gone to the pension fund, 
you’re articulating to levels of the complexity that I don’t usually 
think about…the first risk, just sitting around board tables, is that 
there will be an emotional bond from that director for the old mob.
An insight into a purchaser’s policy in relation to commissioning 
of APNAS is provided by this next quotation:
[I]f you consider the full spectrum between a total 
ban on the auditors doing anything other than 
the audit…at one end and the total ability to do 
whatever they want on the other, on all my boards, 
we have pitched it somewhere in the middle. 
We haven’t gone down the path of having rigid 
multiples of audit fees or just…a total ban…either. 
We’ve actually come up with policies that say the 
external auditor will only be selected to do other 
services in the following instances and we’ve listed a series of dot 
points that talk about where they’re the best person to the do the 
job and taking into account a whole lot of factors and where it won’t 
impair their independence and where it’s not a service that’s been 
banned. And so we will usually ban probably 10 or so services and 
then in the rest of the cases, we’d say to management well you prove 
to us why you think they’re the best one for the job and how it won’t 
impair their independence. If you can do that then you can use them.
‘[o]n all my boards, 
we have pitched it 
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One purchaser enunciates a view on the requirement to report non-audit 
services. He or she points out that auditors might, in their attempts to 
be independent to regulators, minimise amounts classified as audit work, 
which increases the value of the apparent non-audit service work and the 
eternal appearance of the threat to independence. 
[A]s a result of all of these organisations like [name of Big Four firm], 
for example, take all of the taxation advice and classify it as being 
other services. And they’re just following that classic line. If it’s 
going to be regulated, let’s be absolutely safe about it and make sure 
there can’t be an argument…so the effect of that is to increase the 
amount of other services, which then in turn promotes justification 
for reporting all of this stuff. 
The interviewer then asks: ‘Do you think there’s a role for audit-only 
firms? There are one or two niche audit-only firms arising in some markets 
across the world…There are a few pension scheme audit firms that have 
arisen, and all they do is auditing, and all they do is pension schemes, 
so they’re really good at doing that, but nothing beyond that.’
[A]t first blush, [audit-only firms] seems attractive to me because 
it solves the problem of the Chinese wall, doesn’t it? Because 
everybody’s cynical about [Chinese walls] there [are] bound to be 
some problems with it, presumably perhaps in recruiting people or 
retention of people…But it has a certain attraction. It is an attractive 
proposal because it’s very tempting under the current structure for 
other services to try to piggyback onto the audit process, which is 
fundamentally wrong. 
4.2.1 Summary
Most purchasers do not feel there is a need for extensive prohibition of 
APNAS. Reminisces to a past era when even legal services were provided 
by the audit firm, and the benefits of that, are given, plus an insight into 
how the purchasing approval for APNAS is sometimes handled. Another 
purchaser reminds us—with the example of an ex-audit partner as a board 
member—of independence issues associated with other than the APNAS 
question. Another purchaser alludes to the importance of the personal 
integrity of those providing any service. 
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4.3 Suppliers
Suppliers show no appetite for increased restrictions on APNAS. The first 
supplier’s comments indicate his or her certainty that clients prefer the 
current situation regarding APNAS and do not seek greater prohibitions.
[A]nything with turnover of one million to 200 million…like a one-
stop shop, and they like to know that their auditing is speaking 
to the tax professional and that they’re coordinating their work 
in terms of the tax-effective accounting in the external financial 
report. Now it’s an absolute reality that these organisations don’t 
have the skills to produce an external financial report in accordance 
with the accounting standards because it’s too…hard.
The same person continues, expanding on why clients prefer a one-stop 
shop for audit and other services: 
[The client relies] on their auditors. They provide the numbers, 
they say, ‘Here’s our trial balance, here’s all the information that 
needs to be disclosed, now can you just assemble that into a 
financial report structure?’ And that’s been done by the Big Four, 
mid-tiers…since day dot because they tend to have management 
experience and management accounting experience, and they have 
various financial skills, but they don’t necessarily have the external 
financial reporting knowledge. So it makes a lot of sense for us to 
be able to just go in there and deliver a seamless service, which says 
here’s your external financial report; here’s your tax return; here’s 
the tax planning matters; here’s your auditor opinion…our clients 
are demanding it. We see it from start-up companies; start-up 
companies in particular prefer—and I’m talking [about] companies 
here which might need capital raising as well—they love the idea of 
just having one firm that can do the whole lot for them. 
One supplier enunciates, quite passionately, an example of the financial 
cost to him of having to comply with discarding personal financial 
interests when there is a potential conflict in terms of independence from 
a client of the firm:
The whole independence issue as currently regulated globally is 
a complete farce. It doesn’t achieve what it set out to do. I’ve only 
recently become a partner and I’ve spent most of my life bumming 
around and having a wife and kids and doing things. So I’m one of 
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these wealthy people who’s come all the way up. So fairly recently… 
I went to my bank and I invested in some particular investment. 
After six months, I am forced to dispose of that investment within 
five days because someone I’ve never met, and will never meet, 
and don’t know, and don’t influence…is also…[the person who] 
won the compliance plan of that audit in wherever in the world. 
How does that affect their independence? How does it affect my 
independence? All it does is penalise people…It is utterly stupid. 
There are any number of examples of this…the deceitful people 
will do things to get around these rules, and do. 
The same supplier continues, explaining how deceitful audit personnel 
can evade the spirit of the rules regarding financial interests:
I don’t have any family over here, but people with big a family, they 
can say they’re [their] brother-in-law’s shares. No-one would ever 
know who put the money up, until the family falls out and then 
everyone dobs everyone else in. But deceitful people will find ways 
around it. It is complete crap and it hasn’t been thought through at 
all. You also have the problem of global differences in legislation…
So the restrictive services under Sarbanes-Oxley, and there’s a 
whole list them, that doesn’t apply in other places. 
The same person continues:
There are some things that…should be prohibited—for instance,  
I remember standing up at [one of the Big Four firms] in the late ’90s 
and making myself extremely unpopular with the main partner…
when he said, ‘Look boys, you’re talking about a total assurance 
solution of external needs…auditing’, and I can tell you now having 
been an internal, where the external went off the rails, that this is 
an actual conflict of interest, and we should not be…[providing] 
the external and internal audits of this [client]. 
The same person continues, arguing that prescriptive rules penalise 
everyone when not all need to be penalised:
In other cases, the auditor…despite people’s comments about their 
lack of knowledge of the business, is actually well placed to do that 
work. [An example is given where both services are jointly provided 
without an apparent problem.] But I don’t see a problem with that. So 
it does very much vary. But the problem with putting in prescriptive 
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rules is that you take away people’s judgment and you just end up 
making a rule that penalises everyone, when in fact you’re only 
trying to stop the two boys at the back from fighting, and in fact 
the whole class has to stay in…It’s counterproductive and it…does 
not preserve audit independence. I can think of situations where 
people in other parts of the firm, not in auditing, have gone into 
clients and sold their shares immediately when they see how those 
clients work, or bought more shares. Now…that is [a] far greater…
conflict…And obviously at the extreme of things if the Arthur 
Andersen partner of Enron is getting $50 million through the door 
in one year and only a small proportion of that is audit, that is 
ridiculous…But that’s arguing from the extreme. If you argue from 
the general, I can’t support it.
The same person implies that there is enough non-audit work available 
from the clients of other audit firms to keep fee growth alive: 
[Y]ou need to completely rethink all of that. It’s just [not a] working 
practice…people out there think it is working. And as with any 
of these things, we just get used to that, we work around it…not 
being in the audit division it’s great for me, I can go to any of the 
other big firms’ audit clients and get decent fees…out of it. So we 
all find a way of coexisting and living and it’s okay. And the pie 
[grows] ever larger. Well, to put it another way, the cost of business 
grows ever larger. Would there be great synergies by the audit firm 
doing it? Probably not much; maybe a little. So [that’s] a bit of a 
problem.
The interviewer, pursuing this theme of potential wealth impacts on 
individual auditors forced to comply with rules in relation to financial 
interests, elicits another anecdotal example from a supplier:
I heard a story—and forget which firm it may have been…where a 
partner totally innocently went to Disneyland with his child. And 
you can buy a share in Disneyland…Walt Disney with a picture of 
Mickey Mouse at the kiosk and so on. Without thinking, he bought 
it for his kid’s wall…And that was…deemed to be a breach of 
independence. And that’s just ridiculous. And the Americans, bless 
them, many good things come out of America, but some stupidity 
comes out in very much the form rather than the substance. 
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The same person continues, arguing that form rather than substance 
characterises compliance with independence requirements.
[W]here you get into independence, it is form rather than 
substance…I hasten to add I don’t—but if I had a credit card 
with [one of the banks], which is one of our audit clients, does 
that distort the independence, does that breach our independence, 
where I have no involvement in the audit and no way of impacting 
it? It’s difficult. But maybe it’s one of those things. You’ve got to 
draw the line somewhere. The question is where do you draw it?  
I find this question of divesting—one sells the shares and all that 
sort of thing—is a problematic one. 
Another two suppliers in the next and subsequent quotation provide 
insight into just how frequent are requests to disclose within the firm any 
potential conflicts that arise in the case of potential clients. 
[I]t should be up to the auditor to determine their 
own independence…the guidelines that are out 
there now are sufficient. The rotational aspect of 
auditors is probably okay…in my context, the 
independence requirements are contained in the 
codes of professional conduct and the regulators 
are relying on those codes for the auditors to 
ensure that they are independent. If an external 
regulatory audit discovers that the auditor is not 
independent…they should be slammed down like a tonne of bricks, 
and…that’s happening…I’m happy with that. As a matter of course, 
if we’re tendering on a large audit or any audit we circulate amongst, 
not just this practice but the other…practices in our group…We go 
through the full routine of ‘are there any conflicts of interest’, et 
cetera…Probably at least once a day all of the principals in this 
organisation would get an email asking [about] conflicts of interest.
[I]t’s probably not as much of an issue from a non-Big Four scenario 
because our brief doesn’t go quite as far as what theirs do. But 
also the companies that we deal in tend to be more of the small to 
medium cap in particular. So the likelihood that someone in our 
Brisbane office, for example, has got shares in a company that we’re 
auditing is less likely. But having said that, what we do from an 
independence point of view now is vastly different to what we did…
‘Probably at least 
once a day all of 
the principals in this 
organisation would get 
an email asking [about] 
conflicts of interest.’
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
364 |
[a few] years ago. And it’s an extremely serious thing that’s taken 
across our whole group across Australia. I’m getting independence 
checks almost every couple of days. 
Another supplier speaks about the complex task involved in firms’ 
maintenance of systems and procedures ensuring their independence from 
clients, and requests stability in the rules governing auditor independence: 
Our independence list is frightening in its length and complexity…
the other thing that concerns me is that sometimes with the 
independence…it’s a little bit like complying with the auditing 
standards. It’s almost impossible to do the perfect file. It’s almost 
impossible therefore if a regulator comes in says, ‘Oh, you haven’t 
done that.’ Is that helpful, does that damage the form? The same 
with independence: it’s almost impossible to keep everything up to 
date in terms of independence, it’s so complicated, therefore you’ve 
only got to slip here and the whole framework comes crashing 
down. And that focuses people’s mind and people are concerned 
[about] that. Therefore…it’s right that there is independence. And 
perhaps it’s right there should be prescription. But…it’s difficult 
where you draw the barriers…the trouble is if you keep changing 
the rules then people don’t quite know where they are.
In this next quotation, another supplier enunciates the complexity of the 
independence management task:
I’ve got no problem with it and think that it’s all good from 
our perspective. But…what it does do is it drags things into a 
scenario where you’ve got to…assess [those] that perhaps you 
wouldn’t necessarily think you would have to. We get a number 
of queries. And most of the independence for our network is run 
out of Melbourne…there’s no issue there, but it’s got that person 
thinking. They’ve asked the query because they know that ‘well, 
I’d better make sure that there’s not an independence issue’. So…
our sensitivity towards independence has heightened significantly. 
And…it takes…up administrative time…that’s the problem with 
it. But I certainly think for where there are genuine independence 
issues then absolutely we need to have a process in place to make 
sure that they’re prevented from happening.
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The same supplier continues, expanding on the management of compliance 
with independence requirements:
It’s still a burden, don’t get me wrong…because of…the client base 
more than anything else, it’s not as much of an issue, put it that 
way…with the Big Four and particularly because they’re so vast 
and they have client bases that are dealing in let’s say ASX 200 or 
all of those sort of companies, and they’ve got so many people as 
well…it’s more of a task for them to…make sure that independence 
is monitored. So from a resource point of view, it doesn’t take us [as] 
much as what [it does] the Big Four…But it doesn’t mean that we 
don’t need to have those processes in place, because we do.
This next supplier approves of the current independence regime, but 
concedes that his or her consultant colleagues likely do not agree:
We do segregate…and there’s money with consulting. There’s tax 
work we can do, [and we] still do quite a bit of tax work around 
compliance. Tax advising—okay you can’t, but tax compliance you 
can. So…as an auditor, I’m looking at it solely from an auditor’s 
point of view…it costs the firm money. But it would be worse if we 
were put into a position to sign something that came undone later 
on and cost us more…if you speak to a consultant, they’ll totally 
disagree with me, but from an auditor’s point of view, I’m glad that 
there is that independence line and it doesn’t get crossed.
4.3.1 Summary
Several suppliers speak of the complexity and cost to their firms of 
monitoring potential independence conflicts. Other suppliers speak of 
the personal cost of forced, hasty divestiture of securities necessitated 
by a firm’s acceptance of clients who create a potential independence 
conflict. Another issue raised is that some use deceitful practices to 
evade firms’ policies. For suppliers servicing the smaller audit clients, 
anecdotal evidence is presented that a one-stop shop for service provision 
is preferred. Overall, there is little evidence of a pushback against the 
existing regime, but there is also no taste for extending it to prohibitions 
greater than those that currently exist.
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4.4 Standard setters
Some interesting insights are brought to the issue of APNAS by standard 
setters. In particular, the distinction between ‘auditor independence’ and 
‘auditor objectivity’ is raised, as the next quotation reveals.
[T]he real question there is does the auditor doing other work 
inhibit their independence? Sorry, inhibit their objectivity…
‘independence’ is a word that’s been somewhat hijacked…in all 
my experiences, the answer to that is absolutely no. [in regard 
to the purchase of APNAS] [This is] a bit like…risk-based versus 
prescription…There [are] clearly some things that the auditor 
should not do. So anything which gets you in a position of auditing 
your own work as a concept…you should not do.
Attempting to ‘mandate objectivity’ is how this same standard setter sees 
many of the independence rules:
[C]learly, you can’t do anything which involves 
management of the company. So there [are] 
clearly some buckets of things that absolutely…
[you cannot do]. But once you take those things 
out, which are relatively few in number…the real 
issue is does it inhibit the auditor’s objectivity? 
And my experience has always been that it 
hasn’t. Instead…it’s been that the rules that have 
been put in place are a prescriptive attempt to 
mandate objectivity, which…is the real issue. But the thing is, you 
can’t mandate objectivity, so…that’s why I say independence has 
always been hijacked…this attention and focus and concerns about 
breaching independence rules…have no impact whatsoever on the 
real issue, which is objectivity…it’s been a whole lot of hoo-ha 
and carry-on and effort and cost for all sorts of people that was 
just [avoidable]…[also] it doesn’t even go close to achieving what’s 
being desired, which is quite laudable…it’s this whole thing about 
the difficulty of auditing, and…it isn’t particularly precise. There’s 
a lot around mind-set and understanding what’s going on…This 
is a good example of what happens when you try and mandate 
something in the audit space: you end up creating a whole set of 
rules that…don’t go to the real issue.
‘[T]he rules that have 
been put in place are 
a prescriptive attempt 
to mandate objectivity, 
which…is the real 
issue. but the thing 




Continuing, the same standard setter reinforces the point that the concept 
of independence has been hijacked:
[I]ndependence has got hijacked. Objectivity of the auditor is 
paramount…it’s an absolutely fundamental part of a robust 
assurance process…I absolutely agree with what I think is the 
concept behind this, which was trying to strengthen objectivity.  
I just think [that] in trying to do that, because objectivity is about 
a state of mind to a very large extent…so trying to create rules that 
mandate that, you end up with a set of rules which don’t…achieve 
what you set out to achieve. 
The same standard setter continues after the interviewer mentions the issue 
of perceptions in relation to auditors and financial interests in the client:
Absolutely there is that. And I agree with financial interests, 
this perception issue. And so I actually support the concept that 
financial interests are out…also the other good thing that that 
does is it takes away…mostly a perception issue, but it takes away 
insider trading…for a number of different reasons…a blanket ban 
on financial interests is a good thing…some of this other stuff 
around…services is missed. 
The same person continues, putting forward the notion that incremental 
involvement in an organisation can assist the audit process:
[There are] synergies in the sense of their cost, but also there’s a 
knowledge loss for the auditor. And we go to what a good audit is…
it understands the risks and what’s going on. And so some broader 
involvement though the organisation can actually help the audit 
process.
Another standard setter enunciates the complexity of the arguments for 
and against APNAS:
[S]ome of the costs are…[related to] having to get another firm in that 
doesn’t have the background knowledge about the organisation. So 
at times the auditors will be best placed to provide advice. Clearly, 
if you go too far that way you’ve got the risks of auditing their 
own work or becoming too close to management and not being 
sufficiently objective…that’s the nuts and bolts of it. And they’re 
both real issues. 
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The same standard setter continues, lamenting an overly prescriptive 
approach to APNAS:
I worry about…completely slavish rules that the auditors can only 
do an audit for example and no other services, but…there should 
be proper processes around audit committees oversighting what 
sort of non-audit services the auditors are able to provide and 
having a framework in which to judge that. So some things will 
be ‘no-go’ areas, but others might be [related to] judgment, which 
either needs to be reported to the audit committee, or some things 
would need to be…approved by the audit committee in advance…
At a higher level perhaps there is some place for the regulator too, 
or for there to be some rules. But I worry about that all being too 
prescriptive. Because otherwise you’re implying that effectively the 
boards aren’t…competent. 
4.4.1 Summary
The distinction between independence and objectivity dominates the 
comments of one standard setter, who argues that the independence issue 
has been hijacked and that objectivity cannot be mandated. Another of 
the standard setters is wary of an overly prescriptive approach to APNAS, 
preferring that audit committees and boards make the judgment calls in 
this context. The benefits for risk assessment in an auditing context of an 
auditor being involved in an organisation in an additional service capacity 
are discussed as well as the risk of becoming too close to management.
4.5 Regulators
One regulator expresses scepticism about the potential synergies of 
APNAS, as revealed in the following quotation:
I’d just be a bit wary about the synergies, because the reality of this 
is that you’re talking about very large service providers providing 
services, and…a good example is…an IT consultant. Well, the 
reality there is that the fact that…some [part] of your empire is 
working on an IT consulting contract probably isn’t going to add a 
lot of synergies to the audit. But a very aggressive audit approach 
can stuff up all sorts of relationships across your business…if you’re 
going to do your job as an auditor properly, you’re probably not 
going to be the most popular people, and I can see how, even in a 
very subtle way…being in that position doesn’t tend to encourage 
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you to be very independent and aggressive if you think there are 
very large chunks of business being done in other parts of the 
organisation, or the organisation that you work for. 
The same regulator expands on the point, arguing how difficult it is for 
auditors to ‘serve two masters’:
[F]rom a commercial perspective, that’s what people think. If you 
work in a company and you think to yourself, ‘Well, we’re giving 
[one of the Big Four] or whoever it is a lot of work in one part or 
other of their business and why is this guy giving us such a hard 
time?’…it’s very difficult to serve two masters like that.
4.5.1 Summary
The initial quotation by a regulator at the beginning of this chapter, 
together with the comments of a second regulator in this section, reveals 
strong opposition to APNAS.
5.0 issues and implications
When survey respondents were asked about their level of awareness 
of changes to the regulatory environment with regard to auditor 
independence, the majority of users, purchasers and suppliers indicated 
that they were aware. One of the issues is the supply of non-audit 
services—specifically, auditor-provided non-audit services (APNAS). 
Detailed interviews with users, purchasers, suppliers, standard setters 
and regulators were conducted. There were as many positive observations 
from users as there were negative observations with respect to the current 
amended rules to APNAS. Some were not comfortable with the current 
provisions; a number of users wanted to see a higher level of limitation 
on APNAS, while others wanted a more flexible and less-restrictive 
environment.
By and large, users as well as purchasers and suppliers saw a balance 
between the costs of limitations and prohibitions, which were simply in 
the form of the cost of getting audit and non-audit services delivered 
to the company in addition to the limitation or loss of knowledge from 
the joint supply of several services. Counterbalancing these costs was 
the advantage of independence—real and as perceived by the market. 
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Those comfortable with the current level of limitation suggested that the 
market contained much cynicism and there was a very clear need to be 
independent and to be seen to be independent. These sentiments were 
echoed by those wanting to see further limitations and even a prohibition 
of joint supply. 
Of the purchasers, again, there was a mixture of those who believed the 
current regulatory environment was favourably received and those who 
did not. Those believing that the current regulatory level of limitation 
was right spoke of scepticism about the ‘Chinese walls’ that are often used 
as a control device in audit firms, while also speaking about the potential 
loss if there was a blanket ban on any form of joint supply of services. 
Purchasers who believed there were still some enhancements to be made 
to the current regulations spoke of the need for boards of directors and 
audit committees to potentially have more power to pick and choose 
among the possible services supplied by the incumbent auditor. There 
were, however, also perceptions of the need for a framework or systems in 
order to make those choices.
Of the suppliers interviewed, there was acceptance of the current rules 
as being the environment in which they had to operate, but there was 
considerable questioning of whether it was optimal. The concerns raised 
were varied and were in some respects much like the balance referred 
to earlier between the costs of provision and the loss of knowledge as 
opposed to real and perceived independence. A number of suppliers—
particularly those with small to medium-range clients—spoke of the 
advantages and efficiencies of joint supply as being substantial but lost 
in the current environment. It was not uncommon for suppliers to discuss 
the fact that they brought considerable expertise that did not previously 
exist within the client and that efficient and cost-effective joint delivery 
was in the best interest of all. This also includes start-up companies with a 
preference for a ‘one-stop shop’, including capital raising, tax advice and 
financial reporting expertise to be supplied from the one source. 
Certain suppliers perceived that the market believed the current 
regulatory structure was going well, but others gave a less favourable 
response. One of the suppliers indicated a growing issue within a firm 
in which there were both audit and non-audit staff, which related to 
behaviour that was acceptable and tolerated but varied significantly 
between the two types of staff. While audit staff members can learn much 
about the client from being the auditor, they are prohibited from holding 
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investments, while consultants from other divisions within the firm who 
might similarly gain knowledge about the client may buy, sell or hold 
shares based on that knowledge.
Standard setters also varied in their beliefs about whether the current 
regulatory system was tuned optimally. They believed there was a clear 
set of guidelines relating to those functions that should not be jointly 
supplied and, in particular, aspects that involved the potential review 
of their own work and the elimination of any possible financial interests 
in their activity with clients. There was, however, also acceptance that 
work undertaken by other parts of the firm would not pose a threat to 
independence. 
One standard setter took a particularly subtle view of the independence 
debate and argued strongly that the ultimate goal was objectivity rather 
than independence and that rules should be set in place to keep objectivity 
as the key outcome. He or she raised concerns that the independence 
debate had been hijacked.
There is also a quite sophisticated set of observations around the fact 
that auditors develop knowledge of the business and so do non-audit 
service providers, who may deliver tax or consulting services. In fact, in 
the eyes of some, the tax services delivered are so integral to the audit 
that the distinction between the two can be artificial. There is a genuine 
yearning by audit suppliers to know as much about the business as 
possible and some feel that the loss of this alternative view of the firm is 
a genuine concern. One standard setter also puts forward the proposition 
of providing audit committees with strong frameworks to choose for 
themselves and then disclosing what has and has not been provided by the 
audit firm as a potential way of proceeding. This would provide efficiencies 
and advantages for the audit client without robbing shareholders in the 
market generally of knowledge of potential threats to independence.
More generally in all of this debate, there is a conundrum. On the one 
hand, it is common for purchasers and suppliers to state that there is a 
loss of knowledge, efficiency and logistical simplicity by dividing the 
provision of audit and non-audit services between multiple suppliers. 
On the other hand, there are those who are unhappy with the current 
regulatory environment, arguing that those who supply consulting 
and tax services often have little interaction with the auditor. These 
two perspectives appear inconsistent. Once again, they might go to the 
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differential size of audit clients and the differential size and number of 
audit firms (refer also to Chapter 13, which deals with competition) and 
the consequential effect this has on the relationship between auditor, non-
audit service supplier, the board of directors and the management of the 
company. This issue of joint supply of non-audit services by an auditor 
is a classic example of where public policy and personal interest conflict. 
Regulators and regulations are there to protect business from the potential 
negative outcomes of possible independence threats, whereas individual 
boards of directors and auditors are there to provide an efficient and 
effective supply of relevant services to enhance the financial and business 
outcomes of clients. 
There is one consequence that is evident within interviews at this point 
and elsewhere in this document: the effect of this issue on the attraction 
and retention of staff in the audit divisions. As observed above, the 
potential investment behaviour of audit division staff and staff from other 
parts of the firm can be different. They may invest differently, trade on 
those investments differently and undertake varied work over a range of 
clients. These actions all have a consequence for the audit divisions of the 
firms and their ability to attract and retain highly competent, motivated 
and effective auditors.
6.0 Concluding remarks: APnAs
With respect to issues that could or perhaps should be acted on, there 
are several that come from the issue of independence. As acknowledged 
a number of times throughout discussions with stakeholders, there is 
no doubt that there is ‘knowledge spill-over’ between audit and non-
audit services provided either now or in the past to an individual client. 
These knowledge spill-overs provide economic benefits to the auditee 
and indirectly to its shareholders. To the extent that there is prohibition 
of joint supply, there is a loss of this economic benefit. Arguably, the 
knowledge spill-over is not linear across all sizes of companies and could be 
proportionally less at the upper end. In these circumstances, the benefits 
of the prohibition of certain joint supply could outweigh the benefits of 
knowledge spill-over. In small to medium enterprises (SMEs), however, 
including listed SMEs, it could be the case that the knowledge spill-over 
outweighs any costs—and potentially significantly outweighs these costs. 
If there was to be a reduction in the prohibition of joint supply, it could be 
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substituted by a policy position that dictates that audit committees and/or 
boards of directors have the discretion to permit joint supply of currently 
prohibited types of auditor-provided non-audit services (APNAS), where 
this would be also disclosed in a timely fashion to shareholders. This 
would be a change in the policy settings but one that would give rise to 
efficiencies for the Australian economy. 
Somewhat related, as certain stakeholders have strongly noted, is that 
certain APNAS—specifically, certain forms of taxation services—are so 
integral to the audit as to be indistinguishable. The argument is that these 
forms of taxation services might be inappropriately labelled as APNAS 
when in fact they are an integrated part of the audit. Interestingly, their 
classification as APNAS could in fact add to the misguided perceptions of 
there being a threat to independence in circumstances where this does not 
exist. This therefore leads to the policy position of clarification of where 
these types of services end and audit begins. By extension, it leads to an 
important policy position on the absence of guidance of the definition of 
classifications of APNAS. At present, Australian companies are required 
to provide disclosures of APNAS across certain classifications. Because of 
the absence of classification guidance, the disclosures made by companies 
vary widely and make the use of this information much more limited to 
the market for audit services than is or perhaps should be the case. One 
policy outcome of this is that the Auditing Assurance Standards Board 
(AUASB) should be directed to provide clear guidance on the classifications 
of APNAS so that the market is better informed. 
While several stakeholders commented on the presence of audit-
only firms in the market for audit services, there is no prospect of any 
recommendation that would give rise to the creation of such firms. This 
needs to be a market-driven outcome. It is the case, however, that the 
barriers to entry have been enlarged by the presence of CLERP 9, and the 
prospect of audit-only firms seems remote.
This is a cost that has been created by the current regulatory framework; 
however, it is not the only cost. Indeed, the present cost of the regulatory 
framework is not easily or directly observable by examining aspects of 
the market for audit services and the presence or absence of demand and 
supply within that market. The cost of the current regulatory settings 
is in fact borne by increased costs for audit and other services provided 
by accounting firms and these costs are borne directly by Australian 
companies and indirectly by the shareholders of those companies.
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One aspect of independence that operates internally within the 
audit firms is the effect on the attraction and retention of staff and their 
remuneration. It would appear that the staff in accounting firms who 
happen to be employed in the audit divisions have significantly less 
investment opportunities compared with their peers in other divisions. It 
seems probable that this has consequences on the attractiveness of those 
divisions. An investigation into what the effect might be and how it is 
compensated is perhaps overdue. Perhaps higher salaries within audit 
divisions offset the absence of these opportunities or perhaps they are 
compensated for by way of the stability of employment; this is unknown 
but researchable.
Finally, it has become evident from this examination that there is an 
important but subtle distinction between objectivity and independence. 
Objectivity is a state of mind and cannot be subjected to mandated 
regulation. In the minds of some, however, this seems to be possible. 
Somewhat related to this is the fact there is also an interaction between 
the notions of objectivity and independence and the ethical standards as 
practiced by auditors. It is the case that the ethical standards that apply 
to auditors in Australia at present do not have legal backing since they 
are issued by the APESB. It seems that this is a serious oversight. It is 
our recommendation that the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) expressly 
and in a timely fashion provides direction to the AUASB to include the 
development and promulgation of ethical standards. It is the case that the 
AUASB has in fact withdrawn from providing ethical standards with the 
withdrawal of AUP32 Independence. This matter is actionable and would 
provide a clear framework so that we can overcome the present situation 
of auditors not being bound—other than through optional professional 
body memberships—by any legally backed ethical standards. 
7.0 introduction: audit partner rotation
One impact of the reforms to the auditing regime after the HIH collapse 
in Australia was to reduce the period in which, in most circumstances, 
an engagement partner could serve on an engagement—from seven years 
under previous professional requirements to five years. The issue of audit 
partner rotation was raised by stakeholders, often in the context of the 
stability of audit teams and retention of staff generally (refer to Chapter 8), 




The two users who commented on the issue of partner rotation clearly 
had little regard for its efficacy. The first is speaking in the context of the 
stability of audit teams and in response to the interviewer’s question: 
[G]etting rid of these silly rules about audit partner rotation, would 
help [the stability of audit teams]…audit partner rotation just kills 
it…The guy’s just starting to get on top of your business…he’s seen 
something five years ago start, he’s seen how it’s developed, and 
then he’s got to go…it’s all this prescriptive answers to problems. 
Yes, there can be independence problems, but writing a rule that 
applies to every company and every auditor is never the answer. 
Another user implies that rotation can lead to lower understanding of 
the business and more susceptibility to management manipulation of the 
accounting numbers: 
It seems like a good thing on the surface, the rotation, but…in practice, 
it’s another one of those situations where you’re having practice 
and…theory…[I]n practice…[there are] a lot of negatives about it…
and I can understand why, but at the same time…in practice, it leads 
to other issues…very definitely…unless you do have that grounded 
experience in the industry sectors and understand the operations 
of what’s really going on then to do the audit is really more of a 
calculating exercise at a very high level and…a good management 
team can manipulate that process very easily.
7.1.1 Summary
Users are not enamoured of the requirement for audit partner rotation. 
Their comments indicate that they see it as unhelpful to the effectiveness 
of the audit process.
7.2 Purchasers
Purchasers are mixed in their views of audit partner rotation, which is 
discussed in the context of the stability of audit teams mainly, but also in 
other contexts. These first few quotations are positive about it. The first 
purchaser’s comment raises the issue of having sufficient ‘depth’ within 
the accounting firms to cope with rotation.
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[Rotation is] the right thing to do…If you think about the principle 
of independence and how you execute against it…the principle 
is right for partner rotation. The consequences are that if the 
accounting firms don’t have enough depth…it all comes down to 
cost…because are they really recruiting…the expertise that they 
need in order to service the requirements of the market?
Another purchaser raises the benefit of bringing in ‘fresh ideas’.
I can understand why [rotation is] there because…we’ve seen 
a number of bad examples where there’s too close a relationship 
between a CEO and an audit partner…And…if the CEO moves 
to another company, the partner shouldn’t be allowed to move as 
well…because we’ve [had] some very bad practice in the past…
what tends to happen is that senior partners will just swap around 
and they’ll give some examples of where that’s happened. I think it 
brings a fresh idea. Most of the big firms are big enough now to be 
on the big companies to be able to swap partners and have enough.
Another purchaser thinks it is a positive thing that a new partner might 
be able to provide insights from other companies or industries:
I’m actually quite okay with the need to rotate partners. First of 
all, we don’t replace [a] partner every year, so…some seven years is 
[a] pretty long…time to make sure that it’s a fresh mind…besides, 
as I understand, the more senior you [are, you] actually do not 
participate in…detailed work anyway. They are more there to make 
sure that everything’s okay, give the advice, present to the board 
and they make the decisions. They’re not the one doing the audit. 
So in that sense…rotation is a healthy thing because they’re not too 
close, they’re not seeing the same people all the time. They may be 
able to bring in some fresh idea that is seen in [an]other company, 
[an]other industry, whatever…it is actually a healthy thing.
The danger of impaired objectivity when too close to the organisation is 
brought out in the next quotation:
[Rotation] certainly hasn’t caused any sort of disruption, but… 
I can’t think of anything where it’s made it improved either. Maybe 
at the operational level, it’s had an impact…I don’t necessarily think 
it would be a bad idea…if you audit the same firm for a lot of years 
then you can become very close to the organisation, and even…
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[the] perception could be [that you are] close to the organisation, 
and maybe some of your objectivity might be impaired, and as a 
partner, you’d probably want to get off and do some other things 
and maybe come back in a couple of years.
The fresh pair of eyes that comes with rotation is the subject of another 
purchaser’s comments:
That’s really a governance issue, isn’t it…to make sure that there’s 
a fresh set of eyes and things…that’s better…because if there were 
mistakes made, that would be caught out. You could have a diversity 
of view…you don’t have the same person looking at the same thing 
and glossing over the same thing again. 
According to another purchaser, an auditor who stays too long ‘practically 
becomes the accountant for the company’:
[T]he organisational knowledge is always there…if it’s from partner 
to partner, I won’t say there’s an issue because there’ll always be audit 
files, audit papers and all the rest of it in the company…so the facts 
and figures would be easily obtained, but the overall assessment…
it’s done by a second person or a different person that really just 
adds to the…independence and the external part of it. In other 
words, it’s done by an external party. So…if you’ve been doing the 
same audit for the last 10 years…you’re no longer really an external 
party because you’re so close to it…rather than an auditor, you’ve 
practically become the accountant for the company…because your 
relationship has grown and grown and grown, so you’ve lost that 
objectivity and you don’t have that independence.
In the context of the stability of the audit team, the two next purchasers’ 
comments reveal how seamless a change of audit partner can be.
[T]he experience we’ve had with our previous auditor and the partner 
rotation worked well…they’re not so much succession planning, but 
the way they planned that it did work well, and we didn’t find that 
had an impact [on] the overall knowledge. Obviously, [there is a new] 
relationship and the new style and culture that comes with the change, 
but apart from that we didn’t find that an issue. I’m…a believer of 
certainly putting out to tender your audit services on a regular basis. 
Now if that was the culture, would you be needing this partner 
rotation…that’s up to individual companies and where they’re heading.
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What we’ve had is a situation where we had a manager for a number 
of years and then he became a partner and he was on the job for a 
number of years…he became a consulting kind of regional partner 
and not responsible for the job. Then they brought someone else in. 
But he was providing that continuity, probably in the background 
in their offices explaining things. So the questions didn’t necessarily 
always come through to [us]…in that case, they’ve managed that 
rotation process really well.
Another purchaser alludes to the fact that a partner formerly on the job is 
available for advice if necessary:
Generally speaking, they have different levels of people involved 
anyway. So when they rotate off it’s not a big loss…because 
everybody has somebody in training…I can understand the reason 
for it because you don’t want something like HIH again where people 
become too embedded in the company. It’s good to understand the 
company without being too sympathetic; [you need] balance. And 
that partner’s always available anyway if they haven’t left the firm.
Another purchaser speaks about the positive experience of a ‘good’ audit 
partner being replaced by another ‘good’ audit partner: 
[W]e were quite fortunate. We just had our audit rotation for the 
first year last year, and we were quite fortunate that we had an 
extremely good auditor replaced by what, on every indication 
after his first year, is also a very good auditor. However, you could 
imagine that must work in the reverse, that as an auditee…you 
could have a fairly good audit partner and [they are replaced by] 
someone…[with whom] there’s too much of a ruction, or [who is] 
too potentially disruptive, even as a visibility thing, to try and 
move on. But you can breathe a sigh of relief once the five years 
have come up and you get someone better. 
Another supportive purchaser discusses audit partner versus audit firm 
rotation:
On balance…I’m probably for mandatory audit rotation…a new set 
of eyes as a principle must be quite a good thing, and also must 
militate against the risk of getting too cosy with each other, which 
I felt was the essence of the HIH problem. Now, of course, there’s 
not mandatory rotation of firms, which was that whole discussion, 
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but I didn’t feel that was necessary…people of that integrity and 
reputation mean that they’re going be willing to take a pretty strong 
look in their first year for anything that their predecessor might 
have missed…whether or not it’s the same firm. So I don’t…see that 
as poor regulation.
Other purchasers, however, disagree with the idea that audit partner 
rotation has merit. In the first quotation, attention is drawn to the potential 
for other senior people involved in an audit to be able to remain on the 
engagement without interruption.
[E]ffectively, you might have your signing partner or your 
engagement partner who rotates off, but your tax partner and your 
IT audit partner, they might be sitting on there for 10 years…
because they’re not the…lead partner per se.
The difficulty for highly industry-specific partners when the firm has no 
other clients in the same industry is eloquently expressed in this next 
quotation.
Yeah, it is a bit of a problem…[when] the partner has to go. Our last 
audit partner…is leaving [our industry]—his time’s up, he’s had to 
leave. To stay in the sector and for the firm to utilise his knowledge 
and capability, he’s gone to the UK, he’s had to rotate off this. He 
doesn’t get to stay here, there is no job here he can do…because 
the firm doesn’t have any other audits [in the same industry]—
as they shouldn’t—and so he’s had to leave the country…is that 
really smart? If Australia has let a good auditor skill go because of 
some rules then I don’t think it [is] appropriate really. And what 
we’ve actually got back as the audit partner is the audit partner 
of [several] years ago. And that’s okay. He’s been out into…other 
industries, and so at least he knows us. But it’s [several] years-old 
knowledge, right? And that’s one of the reasons why, when we 
got him back, we asked for some more up-to-date skills…as part 
of our engagement, instructional or directional guidance. So it is 
a problem. It’s creating a problem for…the Big Four firms. But I’m 
just giving you a preparer’s experience; we’ve lost a good audit 
partner, and [he’s] not in the country now and can’t be because he’s 
[industry] specific. 
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The next purchaser also alludes to this problem of not having a critical 
mass of clients in the same industry:
It has an impact because you don’t get the longer-
term relationships out of things and it’s still a learning 
curve for people and how to handle it because it 
hasn’t been applying for all that long, so it’s making 
it difficult at times. Five years sounds [like] a long 
time but in a large company it’s not such a long time. 
[With the] top-50 companies in Australia, arguably 
it takes a couple of audits for someone to fully 
understand all the ins and outs of the business, so you then get the 
situation if you’re only there for five years, it’s taken you two years 
before you learn it and it doesn’t give you much time to…be in 
the saddle fully operational…in the large companies, it’s probably 
helpful. It’s predicated on the basis that you’ve got to have turnover 
so that people can be independent and not get consumed…by the 
client. I don’t subscribe to that view…Seven years would make 
it operationally a lot easier to manage. But…you get to a problem 
where you say, well, you want expertise but…if you’ve got a client 
in a particular industry, the only way you can get expertise in 
industry is by working on similar companies. So it’s almost as long 
as you have three companies in the same industry, you won’t be able 
to develop the rotation of people to build that expertise.
This next purchaser, who feels the requirement is ‘artificial’ and has 
no impact, brings up the loss of understanding and continuity when 
a partner has to rotate off.
[T]he whole thing with…partner rotation is…
artificial and this idea that after four years or 
five years or whatever the number is you have 
to change…is totally artificial. And I understand 
it means you can demonstrate something, but…
it makes no impact at all…it’s a shame that you 
lose some of that knowledge…some things are 
complicated and having that continuity and that 
understanding is important and then you have to 
go through this whole education process all over again and even 
very capable people who can deal with that level of ambiguity 
and complexity and moving things, it takes a year or so just to 
‘Five years sounds 
[like] a long time, 
but in a large 
company it’s not 
such a long time.’
‘[I]t’s a shame that 
you lose some of that 
knowledge…some 
things are complicated 
and having that 





immerse, so you’ve constantly got this one or two years catching up 
in that period…they do a good job of it, but I don’t think it adds 
a darn thing, this rotating…my experience with auditors is that, 
there’s that 99.9 per cent of them [who] are ethical, are extremely 
professional and the fact that they are on a job for six years rather 
than five years is not going to change one jot how they view that 
company.
7.2.1 Summary
The purchasers express a diversity of views about the issue of audit partner 
rotation. Often the issue arose in the context of conversations about audit 
team continuity and knowledge of the client. Several purchasers could 
see the benefit of a ‘fresh pair’ of eyes and the dangers of becoming ‘too 
close to management’. Other purchasers provide insight into the seamless 
way in which their audit firm manages the rotation situation. Negative 
views of rotation are, however, also forthcoming. One purchaser sees the 
rotation as ‘artificial’ and as having no real impact. Another points to the 
potential for inefficiency and ineffectiveness of audits because of the time 
it takes to get to know some clients. Also raised as an issue is the difficulty 
for rotated audit personnel when their firms do not have a critical mass of 
clients in industries that require a high degree of knowledge specificity.
7.3 Suppliers
Like purchasers, suppliers express diverse views on the merits or otherwise 
of audit partner rotation. These first few quotes are supportive of the 
requirement to rotate, with later quotations expressing more negative 
views. The first supplier expresses the idea that rotation can contain 
boredom that might arise from familiarity with a client.
[For] small clients, five years is fine…10 years on a small client would 
be really boring, so it’s…nice to have the excuse to get off them…
most people have actually liked rotation from a client perspective, 
if it’s properly managed…it’s not so much a nuisance in that we go 
and do something else…it’s quite attractive that after five years I go 
on and have a new challenge.
‘Removal of familiarity’ with the client and adding ‘fresh eyes’ are pointed 
out as benefits of auditor rotation in the next three quotations:
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It certainly does remove, or has the ability to remove, familiarity 
and things like that, which I agree with. I can understand that.
[R]otation’s quite good; you get fresh eyes, new thinking, all of that.
It has some impact but it’s offset by the benefits of a fresh set of eyes 
looking at things from a different angle…partner rotation is a good 
thing. What is the best time frame? Five years is probably reasonable. 
Speaking from a client’s perspective, this next supplier points to the 
complexity of business and the need to ‘retrain’ the new partner in the 
two years after rotation.
[T]he five-year period, while I can understand it 
in principle…[it] doesn’t help. I can understand 
why it’s done in terms of familiarity and stuff like 
that, but whether it’s five years, whether it’s seven 
years, I don’t know…if you’re really looking at 
it from a better audit process, I’m not sure the 
drive is right, because what they’re saying is that 
I get too familiar and therefore I overlook, I don’t 
challenge them enough, and therefore it has to 
go to someone else, who’s going to have a fresh 
eye and look at everything. That’s fine, but then there’s an issue 
from the partner, [and] the client point of view…that they’re now 
going to go and retrain that person for the next two years…while 
the audit process is the same, the…complexities of businesses…are 
quite different and it takes time to get on top of it…I don’t have a 
solution, but, yes, I can imagine that would be quite frustrating for 
clients. And it’s starting to manifest itself into people going out to 
tender more often too.
Another supplier raises the issue that audit partner rotation is not a 
new requirement, given that the period of partner engagement has been 
reduced from seven to five years.
The Big Four also had…a type of rotation in place, before it became 
mandatory, and you always had your engagement partner…the 
terminology might change, but there was always the engagement 
partner or the signing partner, and there was always a review 
partner or a quality-control partner, whatever you wanted to call 
them…generally, even on the smaller clients, the firm’s internal 
‘[T]here’s an issue from 
the partner [and] the 
client point of view…
that they’re now going 
to go and retrain that 




risk-management process was such that, if I wasn’t a partner, I was 
a director, but…before I signed off on anything as a partner on a set 
of accounts, you’d have to have that review discussion with another 
partner in the firm. And that’s probably where it’s made it easier for 
the Big Four to do the rotations, because they always had a couple 
of partners who were involved in most of the audits.
The next supplier provides insights into managing the rotation situation 
so that clients are not affected adversely.
[I]t hasn’t [had] a huge impact from how we manage it as a firm. 
When we rotate partners, it’s never just a cut-off…there’s a period 
of transition so that the partner rotating on has had sufficient 
experience with the client before that rotation [for it] not to be an 
issue. More rotation…used to happen when partners retired and 
it’s now…standard practice that it happens, so that the individual 
that’s rotated off is, if ever there were an issue, they’re there as a 
resource, as a sounding board…in jobs that are complex, the partner 
rotating on would have had comfortable experience generally in the 
industry, but certainly in regards to the accounting issues, it’s a big 
deal for a rotation to occur. But as far as it creating an issue from an 
ability to provide service to the client or provide an audit opinion 
that is robust, it shouldn’t be a problem.
This next supplier’s comments also address managing the rotation, with 
shadow partnering necessary in order for the new partner to come to grips 
with the complexity, global reach and sheer size of a big client.
Five years isn’t very long. [Company X] is my 
biggest client and they’ve got operations in 
50 countries around the world and I came on 
to the audit the year before I rotated and just 
shadowed the partner. And we’ve had to do 
the same thing on all those really big clients, 
otherwise…you’re not that exposed compared 
to changing auditors in the first year…[In] my 
first year at [Company X], if I hadn’t done that 
year of shadowing…I can’t come up to speed 
with operations in 50 countries round the world all in one go. So…
most people wish it was seven years, not five. And I find it odd that 
most companies would say, and most processes [would] say, [that] 
‘I find it odd that most 
companies would say,  
and most processes [would] 
say, [that] after 10 years 
you should think about 
whether you should come 
off as a non-exec. director, 
but after five years, you’re 
not independent as  
the auditor.’
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after 10 years you should think about whether you should come off 
as a non-exec. director but after five years, you’re not independent 
as the auditor. I find that disconnect wrong. I would have thought 
we could do seven or 10 years on a big client.
The same supplier continues, stating that, from a personal view, rotation 
has attraction because it creates new challenges: 
They do think that they see a benefit from fresh eyes [and] that…
five years is too quick and, from our point of view, it’s frankly a 
nuisance.…it’s a nuisance from the firm’s point of view—for two 
reasons: 1) just managing people’s partner careers and…managing 
client expectations…[Company Y] comes up for rotation. They 
will have a view that they can have whoever they want out of our 
partners. And the same would be true for any top company in the 
top 50 so you’re…having someone who’s got the flexibility to take 
on a client of that size…a very senior experienced partner, [which] 
is quite hard for us to manage in a partner capacity. 
This supplier admits, however, the extent to which rotation is ‘stretching’ 
partners who are in high demand across multiple clients. He or she also 
feels that partners might be lost to the firm at these points of rotation. 
What we’re tending to find is that we’ve got 
partners who are in high demand who are 
stretched across multiple clients and have a team 
of people underneath them and other partners 
are getting very frustrated because they can’t get 
their first step into a big role and…it’s going to 
become quite an issue for all Big Four firms—just 
managing their pool of partners coming through 
on the cusp of being okay to take a senior position, 
whereas in the past, before rotation, they’d have come through as 
the junior partner and become the senior partner [and that gave 
them] a board that knew and trusted them…It’s quite hard to make 
that step up now for…the young guns. And…the other thing that 
will become quite hard for us to manage as a firm with partner 
rotation is that…it’s actually refreshing to stop and think, ‘Okay, 
do I want to stay on and do another five years as an auditor on 
another client or should I go and do something else?’ And we will 
lose partners who will do that.
‘[o]ther partners are 
getting very frustrated 
because they can’t get 
their first step into a 
big role and…it’s going 
to become quite an 




The next quotation highlights the difficulty of managing rotation in 
highly regulated, complex industries with few players, such as authorised 
deposit-taking institutions.
‘[I]f you are the audit partner on [Bank 1], [Bank 1 understands] at 
the end of five years you’ve got to go, but will they let you go and 
be the audit partner on [Bank 2]? Well, over their dead body…so it 
becomes incredibly hard to manage the senior partners, sustaining 
the position in the industry that they see themselves in. The clients 
[have] the opportunity to select the best partners, but also protect 
their views and their understanding and knowledge of the business 
they’ve shared. Protecting all of those things does become quite 
hard.
Several suppliers express their preference for seven-year rather than five-
year rotations, as exemplified by the next quotation. The view is that it can 
take two years to really gain a sound understanding of a highly complex 
client, which leaves too few years before rotation to take advantage of that 
learning. 
Seven years is certainly better. If you take an ASX top-100 or an 
ASX top-50 client, these are very, very big businesses, they are 
very complex businesses, they have multiple processes, multiple 
operations, they generally operate in more than one geographic 
location. Whether it be in Australasia, they’re generally operations 
in [a] foreign jurisdiction. It probably takes two to three years for an 
audit partner really to get up to speed, and…you’re through your 
three-year mark and you really hit your straps in year four and year 
five and then you’ve got to rotate. And you start the process again in 
year five of re-educating the next person…there is definitely some 
learning and some handover of knowledge, [but] it takes a couple 
of years for them to get up to speed, they really get in their straps 
and you change again. Where at least if you had seven years you’ve 
got three years to get things, you then get three or four really good 
years, and…that’s the time when your audit quality’s at its peak.
Another supplier voices similar views and is clear that, in his or her 
opinion, the disadvantages of partner rotation outweigh the advantages: 
What it’s meant to do is, you plan succession a lot earlier and in 
a more formalised way. It’s unlikely that what you’re going to do 
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is bring a partner on after the rotation period and say well, here 
it is. You’re more likely to introduce a partner in the last year of 
somebody’s rotation program, in the last year as partner before 
they rotate off to familiarise themselves with the key issues of the 
business, the industry, the style of reporting, because otherwise 
it’s very difficult to pick it up in a short…time and…having come 
off two of my large public companies this year, I think five years is 
too short…And the disadvantages outweigh the advantages and the 
advantage is that they’re not getting too close…the disadvantages 
are that it doesn’t matter how good your succession program is 
and your knowledge transfer…there’s a lot to be said…of building 
of the knowledge. It usually takes you a couple of years to build 
it up…and then as soon as you’ve got there you’re starting your 
succession plan…it’s just too quick…something like seven years 
would probably be more reasonable. Seven years is nothing and a 
more realistic period. Five years is…very short and what does it 
achieve? 
The same supplier continues, explaining how a firm’s view becomes 
intertwined with a partner’s view.
[W]hat tends to happen with particularly the 
large clients is not just the view of that individual 
partner that’s being expressed; it’s usually the 
view of the firm, because the way that you’ve got a 
quality-assurance partner on major engagements, 
you might have more than one partner, you’ll 
have a lead audit partner and another partner. 
You’ll have your technical partner [work with] 
somebody on your national technical group, 
you’ll have PSR, which is our professional standards review process, 
so by the time you’ve signed an opinion, it’s less likely [to be a 
partner] by himself and having reviewed the work of his staff, it’s 
usually representative of the collective view of the firm because 
of the process that you’ve undergone to get there. Now, I have to 
make judgment calls on all the things that I do, but ultimately I’m 
doing it within a context of the way the firm operates, so could you 
interchange me and somebody will come to the same conclusion 
they would? The only thing with interchanging is the knowledge: 
you can’t just create it overnight, that knowledge is valuable; it does 
‘The only thing with 
interchanging is the 
knowledge: you can’t 
just create it overnight, 
that knowledge is 




mean something. And in some industries, it’s the knowledge of the 
industry; you can’t sit down and read it in a book…in a day or even 
a month. You have to deliver, you have to understand it, you have 
to go to [the] site, you have to look at these things…I understand 
if you’re making that kind of investment…the period over which 
you want to use that…could be longer than five [years]…five is an 
arbitrary period that really doesn’t mean anything.
Another three suppliers lament the loss of client knowledge that occurs 
with rotation:
[I]t doesn’t really help your client business side of things because 
once a partner rotates off, the knowledge—whilst we obviously talk 
as partners and we’ll pass on knowledge. That part of the partner 
rotation doesn’t help because all of your knowledge goes off with 
the job…from a knowledge perspective…I don’t think it helps…
Having knowledge of a client’s business is very critical…I’ve got 
clients—not in a listed environment—that I’ve been doing for 14, 15 
years and I know exactly where their issues are, and I communicate 
those to my team on a regular basis. So it’s absolutely critical.
I understand where the partner rotation comes from, but…over 
time, you do build up a fairly significant knowledge base of the 
organisation and how it operates, and then you just walk away. 
And then effectively your partner has to go through build[ing] 
up [the] process again, because it just comes from interacting with 
the people and relating that to the numbers and the systems and 
the industry…the five-year period, while I can understand it in 
principle…[it] doesn’t help…there’s definitely an educational 
process that goes on for…the first 18 months. So you’ve gone from a 
very experienced—sorry, a quite experienced—person to helping 
to develop another partner. And…that doesn’t help. 
…there is a critical shortage of qualified, highly talented people 
within the industry at the moment and all of the Big Four—and…
probably…the second-tier firms as well—are struggling to hold on 
to their young qualified accountants, particularly where you have 
demand in the US and UK markets for your young chartereds, and 
your young CPAs to head over there. 
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The same supplier goes on to discuss the frustration that clients experience 
when an audit partner with whom rapport has been developed is changed:
I can understand why it’s done in terms of 
familiarity and stuff like that, but whether it’s 
five years, whether it’s seven years, I don’t know. 
I can imagine that some of the clients would get 
quite frustrated because every five years you’re 
going to be looking at a new face. And just the 
chemistry that operates between people [is] not 
always able to be replicated, because each partner 
is different. And while you try to pick the partner 
that’s going to work well with that client, there’s still an element of 
training. So…it must be a bit frustrating, because as an experienced 
person, I can have a conversation and get a comment, and I can 
understand why, that’s because I know that over here they’re doing 
that and then that. A new person, they make the same comment 
and…it has no meaning because they don’t understand all of the 
elements of the business. 
The same supplier raises the personal career considerations that rotation 
among a small number of players in a single industry might necessitate. 
In such circumstances, where the client is not comfortable about a partner 
moving to a competitor’s audit, the only way to continue to utilise expert 
knowledge might be to move interstate or overseas.
Sometimes the thing…about the question 
of specialisation is, if you’re working on a 
large organisation, it’s very, very unlikely 
that you’re going to be working for another 
large organisation that competes with that 
organisation. So your specialist knowledge 
is dedicated to that entity. When you come 
to the end of your period, the stars have 
to align or the planets have to align for 
you then to transfer onto a job or another 
engagement in that same industry, where 
you can use that same knowledge, which previously you couldn’t 
work on because it was going to provide a conflict issue. And even if 
the stars align and you can work on that job, sometimes that creates 
a conflict in itself because your client who you’re just coming off 
‘When you come to the end 
of your period, the stars 
have to align or the planets 
have to align for you then to 
transfer onto a job or another 
engagement in that same 
industry, where you can use 
that same knowledge, which 
previously you couldn’t work on 
because it was going to provide 
a conflict issue.’
‘[T]he chemistry that 
operates between 
people [is] not always 
able to be replicated, 




doesn’t want you to go onto their main competitor in the year that 
you finish…so it’s taken out of your hands. You’re now in a position 
where, okay, if I really wanted [to stay in the industry] and it’s [a] 
small market anyway, it’s a niche, I might have to go overseas—
that’s the only way that I can really go to the next level without…
from a career point of view, going backwards. And…that gets lost 
at times, and what tends to happen, at the end of the day, if you’re 
a partner, you’re obviously trying to progress, and you’re trying to 
get to the next level. If you’re coming off public companies, they 
don’t always line up the way that you want to, you might end up 
having to take a backwards step because at that particular point 
in time the next available job wasn’t there. You might go back and 
just do…a set of referral clients out of subsidiaries out of the UK 
where the complexity is not as margined and all this billable skill 
that you’ve developed in dealing at the top end of town and dealing 
with boards and dealing with difficult issues and public company 
reporting gets lost, because you can’t easily take that type of a 
company.
The same supplier does provide insight into the type of strategic thinking 
his or her firm engages in to maximise skill utilisation: 
[W]e’re a little bit better than that at doing it; we’re strategic. You’ve 
got a team of partners that do work at the top end of town and we 
tend to think in advance as to how we’re going to shuffle things 
around [and] where people…sit, but obviously it’s a lot of effort 
for little gain…I don’t think it was really thought through that this 
perceived benefit of the rotation was going to be delivered—and  
I just don’t know that there’d be any difference at all if you went to 
seven [years] or even longer.
7.3.1 Summary
Some suppliers consider that rotation is worthwhile in bringing that 
‘fresh pair of eyes’ and upheaval in what might otherwise be a growing 
familiarity. Several suppliers, however, reinforce one another’s quite 
independent comments in arguing that five-year rotations are too 
short, and that seven-year rotations would retain the advantages while 
minimising the disadvantages of too frequent rotations. For complex, 
global clients, a view is frequently expressed that 18 months to two years 
is needed to ensure a new auditor is ‘on top of things’, leaving only two 
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years before the next partner needs to be trained—perhaps through a 
‘shadowing’ process. Several suppliers allude to the manifest frustration 
for clients having to build a new rapport with a partner and ‘train’ the 
new partner. One supplier speaks eloquently of the potential personal 
difficulty in terms of continuing an upward career trajectory and utilising 
and extending specific industry specialist skills, especially in a complex, 
regulated industry with few participants.
7.4 Standard setters
One of the standard setters would like to have seen some research into 
whether partner engagement length was a problem before the reduced 
rotation period was introduced.
[There were] probably other ways of doing it…that was a legislative 
answer to a situation which was perceived to happen with the HIHs, 
so…in reality…it may well have been able to be done in other ways. 
In certain areas where you’ve got expertise…you’ve got to replicate 
that out, and is the period appropriate or could you do it and still 
achieve it another way? So…that would have been a good thing to 
do some research on and then come up with some ideas in seeing 
whether in fact it is a problem—to the extent it’s been there. But…
we’re there now so we’ve got to live with it, but it was a legislative 
change, so it probably didn’t go through the rigour as to what our 
processes have done. 
The same standard setter continues, expressing his or her view that seven 
years would be more appropriate than five for rotation:
[S]even years…would be a far more appropriate period for a 
rotation…without a doubt and certainly I would support that…it 
would allow a…better period…for a person to be on an assignment, 
to have the learning bit at the start, the bit in the middle where they 
knew all about the job and then you have the transition bit at the 
end to the next period, to the next partner coming on, and…that 
would be a more manageable process to use that period.
Following inappropriate rules at the expense of quality is the danger with 
the current situation, according to this next standard setter:
[T]he area of independence…is really not a regulator issue; it’s a 
policy decision and a government decision. But I have heard people 
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say that mandating a five-year rotation, for example, would mandate 
that 40 per cent of audits were ineffective because it takes two years 
to get up to speed and to acknowledge things…corporate knowledge 
is important as well, so we need to make sure—that’s not a regulator 
issue but it’s a law and a policy issue—that we don’t put ourselves 
in a space where we sacrifice quality for following inappropriate 
rules…it’s not an issue that…we have with the regulator, but in 
the Australian market, something that…needs to be focused on is 
the size of the market for listed companies or the number of listed 
companies and the pool of audit resources that we have. 
The same standard setter explains why, in his or her opinion, seven-year 
rotations would be more effective than five-year rotations:
[E]ven though I’m in a very large firm, five-year rotation for lead 
and review partners will really start to bite into the available talent 
pool to effectively conduct audits across the pool of entities for 
which rotation is mandated, which is the listed entities. But also the 
principle in following the ethical principles around independence 
is there and so therefore rotations [are] inherent in any audit done 
under the Corporations Act…how do you deal with the familiarity 
threat? So…something that we’re certainly watching closely is, if 
five years isn’t any good for our market, what is a better measure 
given that we need to be independent—which I still think is 
absolutely important, I’m not downplaying it. But would perhaps 
seven be a better answer for the Australian market than five?
The next standard setter alludes to the implications of rotation for 
competition in the market for audit services, and the need for a critical 
mass of partners:
[I]n terms of [the] size of a practice, in terms of doing listed entities, 
you need to be a minimum size. You need to have a minimum number 
of partners to allow rotation to take place…the minimum you [could] 
get by with [is] three, but…it’s better to have four or above. So it 
means that audit practices which do listed work need…to grow to a 
minimum level…[There are] advantages in that because as firms get 
bigger, the quality—that’s not to say that when they’re smaller they 
don’t have quality—but…it helps with the quality aspects of both 
the firm itself for the quality control it needs to put in place and also 
the audit quality, so in that respect it’s a good thing.
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7.4.1 Summary
Standard setters, many of whom are also suppliers, reiterate the view that 
five-year rotations are too frequent, with consequential dangers for audit 
quality. One standard setter speaks about the implications for competition 
of needing a critical mass of partners if auditing listed entities.
7.5 Regulators 
Regulators, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, reveal some ambivalence 
about the merits of audit partner rotation. While supporting rotation, this 
regulator’s comments reveal doubts about its effectiveness because of the 
countervailing issue of the time it can take to get to know a complex client 
such as a bank:
Partner rotation is a good thing but…I don’t know if it’s really 
been that effective because the more they rotate the partners, the 
more the problems you create. It takes a partner two years to learn 
a bank, for instance, over a five-year term. So where’s the value 
add in the rotation…I don’t have a problem with independence…
independence is not the right question. The issue is more about 
compromise of professional judgment. If someone’s judgment gets 
impaired—like a partner could do the same client for 20 years and 
he could always be seen as someone who is a straight-up-and-down 
guy. He produces a good-quality product because he’s a thorough 
professional, year in and year out. The other partners will get 
sloppy as the years go by.
The next regulator, asking a question of the interviewer, points to a 
potential way of evading the rotation requirements:
What’s the ruling in respect of if partner A is partner of the client, 
that’s a Big Four, number-one client, partner A goes to Big Four 
number two, the client magically has tender six months later, and 
oops—they go to Big Four number two? 
The next regulator alludes to the difficulty of maintaining audit quality 
with initial audit engagements:
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Inexperienced in terms of coming to grips with the industry and 
coming to grips with the entity for the first year, most of the firms 
will say to you, or an experienced practitioner will say, ‘[The] 
greatest risk of me getting something wrong is probably in the first 
year or two.’
A differential approach by the audit firms to the issue of rotation is the 
concern of another regulator:
[W]e’ve gone onto the public record around rotation, because 
we could see parts of the profession responding to it in a more 
assiduous way than others who are just going, ‘Oh, what does all 
this mean?’ Tough. 
7.5.1 Summary
Somewhat surprisingly, the comments by regulators reveal that not all 
are unquestioningly convinced about the merit of audit partner rotation. 
Regulators, like purchasers and suppliers, raise the fact that it can take up 
to two years to effectively understand, for instance, a banking client. One 
regulator observes that not all firms approach the issue of rotation with 
the same seriousness.
8.0 issues and implications
While there was no specific questionnaire information about auditor 
rotation, this was an issue that arose frequently in response to prompts 
and was volunteered in the interviews with purchasers and suppliers and, 
to a lesser extent, with users, regulators and standard setters. 
There were mixed views with respect to the desirability of the 
amended mechanisms used for auditor rotation, with many interviewees 
indicating that they agreed with auditor rotation in principle but there 
had been unintended consequences with respect to the implementation of 
the amended regime. Among those who raised concerns about the current 
requirements, many spoke of the fact that the five-year time horizon was 
an insufficient period in which to build up knowledge of the client and 
to obtain a reasonable return for the investment in that knowledge before 
mandatory rotation occurred. 
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Those who spoke in favour of rotation included a large number of 
purchasers and suppliers as well as a number of users, regulators and 
standard setters. They articulated the desirability of having a ‘fresh pair 
of eyes’, a ‘diversity of views’ and for rotations to ensure a reasonably 
frequently refreshed relationship between the client and the audit firm. 
More than once, interviewees made reference to the damage that an 
inappropriately close relationship could create and cited the case of HIH. 
Purchasers raised the fact that rotation was in place in many audit firms 
well before the current regulatory framework, but noted the period was 
typically longer than the current five-year period for other than exceptional 
circumstances. Purchasers also expressed some degree of anxiety about 
the existence of a formal rotation process and that there was always some 
degree of uncertainty about the quality of any partner rotating in. 
Among the purchasers representing companies within the top 50 or 
so companies listed on the ASX, there was deep-rooted concern about the 
speed of rotation. There are instances in which a new partner in a large 
complex client, which might have branches in many jurisdictions across 
the world, undertakes the formidable task of understanding the nature 
of the business and its risks and then has to assimilate this knowledge, 
build up expertise quickly and acquire a pay-off from that expertise 
before the rotation of the next partner. Purchasers also express concern 
that when such a senior partner rotates off, the next logical client might 
be a major competitor in the same industry. They typically see the logic 
in such movement of a partner, but discomfort exists about the potential 
unintentional transmission of client-specific knowledge to the new client. 
Suppliers also agree with the principle of rotation but have concerns. 
Several suppliers, particularly within the Big Four, comment that rotation 
is a trigger point for some clients to consider, if not implement, a tender 
process. Suppliers also note that there is a significant trade-off between 
the notion of independence—real and perceived—and the erosion of the 
knowledge of the client. Again, it was common to suggest that a five-
year period was too short—particularly for large and complex companies. 
In some cases, complexity is linked to the regulatory framework within 
which certain companies operate. 
One supplier inquired whether there should be a counterbalancing 
requirement that executive directors rotate off after, say, 10 years because 
they too could become stale in their view of the company and require a 
refreshed outlook and new challenges.
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Suppliers to larger clients also make the observation that the large 
clients feel they have the power to demand a partner of their choice. As 
a consequence, there is increased pressure exerted on the most expert 
partners in the larger firms and somewhat less ability to train up more 
junior partners to be the senior partners of the future. 
While some suppliers noted that the five-year rotation was a ‘tipping 
point’ for clients, it was also a tipping point for some of the individual 
partners and firms that we interviewed. Some of these partners used a 
five-year cycle to reconsider their own careers and whether in fact they 
wished to undertake another cycle. The notion of staying one or two years 
in a client is now seen by many as unacceptable so that their entire careers 
now consist of a series of five-year cycles.
Firms spend a good deal of time and energy managing the process 
of rotation, with partners coming on to an engagement as either senior 
managers or directors and in some cases even secondary partners a 
year or two ahead of the process of handing over to a new partner. The 
downside to this process is that it can sometimes be a very lengthy period 
of apprenticeship. There was one instance in which the same person 
was involved with a firm in the order of a decade before rotating off as 
engagement partner. This cuts across the notion of a fresh pair of eyes 
every five years. 
It seems, however, that firms that have developed or are developing high-
quality processes to ensure that the handover from one partner to another 
will have a significant structural advantage going forward. There is clearly 
diversity in the level of sophistication of the handover from one partner to 
another among those client representatives with whom we spoke. 
Regulators, standard setters and users all agreed, by and large, that 
rotation was good in principle, but also acknowledged that there was a 
substantial trade-off between knowledge of the client and independence. 
Suppliers and standard setters recognised that, as a generalisation, the 
quality of an audit in the first year or two was at a lower level than the 
quality of an audit after the partner had been engaged with the client for 
three or more years. There was therefore near-universal agreement that 
rotation had consequences for the knowledge base and quality of the 
audit as well as the real and perceived independence of the relationship 
between the supplier and purchaser of audit services. 
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We would also note that it was difficult for the authors to unpick this 
repeated request for a longer period from the genuine concern about 
the loss of knowledge and therefore a lower-quality audit due to the 
inherent normal human behaviour of resisting change. Every one of the 
interviewees who mentioned a longer period referred to a seven-year rather 
than a five-year period. This reflects the previous regime that most of the 
interviewees operated within. There was, however, the authors believe, a 
genuine desire to find the right balance. This balance between time and 
perceived independence might need to be crafted conditionally on the size, 
complexity or regulatory framework within which the auditee operates.
9.0 Concluding remarks
With respect to auditor rotation, various stakeholders have well-
constructed and thoughtful arguments for and against partner rotation 
for longer or shorter periods. One way of systematically adding some 
structure to this is to consider what might explain, rationally, why a 
longer period might benefit the efficiency of the capital market compared 
with a shorter period. 
On balance, by examining the arguments for and against, it would 
seem that organisations that are large in size or are particularly complex 
or operate in a highly regulated and therefore complex industry are 
those that might command longer periods of audit tenure compared with 
other organisations. Essentially, the argument driving this is that the 
nature, complexity and rigour of those audits require the opportunity 
to have critical members of the audit team working on the audit for a 
longer period. It is also the case that in these instances there are questions 
about the critical mass of the supply of partners and other senior staff in 
sufficient numbers to be able to handle the rotations that will occur. We 
saw instances of partners leaving either the profession or the jurisdiction 
simply to obtain appropriate work after rotating off large, complex clients. 
This practice will dissipate the pool of talent available to undertake large, 
complex audits in Australia. 
Related to this is the concern that at present the regulatory structure 
of the operation of registered company auditors means that there is no-one 
with the responsibility for public oversight of the quantity or nature of 
those who are registered company auditors. We have few data and no policy 
AUdIToR INdEPENdENCE
| 397
position about the supply of registered company auditors, the quality of 
their expertise or their ability to undertake expert audits in particular 
industries in particularly complex clients. This is in stark contrast with the 
clear policy oversight of the supply of medical practitioners, for example. 
Additionally and not unrelated, there are insufficient publicly available 
data to undertake any research of any depth on the effect on the careers of 
individuals who rotate off auditing engagements. Does it indeed become a 






REGUlAToRy REFoRMs To AUDiT 
THEIR IMPACTS 10
I’m not too informed about what the regulator has…done. For 
example…I didn’t know that they’re now legally enforceable auditing 
standards, rather than self-regulation by the industry. My general 
experience with the regulators is that, if anything, it creates…more 
work for the lawyers and…a more inhibited view about statements 
that are made by anybody, including auditors…What happens 
if…something becomes legally enforceable that was…[previously] 
regulated by a professional standards’ body is that the first thing 
you do when you make that kind of statement is [to]…check it with 
your lawyers because of the potential legal liability that’s attached 
to it. And, let’s face it…when a company…collapses, if we take 
the extreme case, the first thing that any litigation funder looks 
[for is]…‘[Is] there an auditor with good professional indemnity 
insurance that we can go after?’ And so the more prescriptive the 
regulatory response is…in some ways…it’s counterproductive.  
It works against what’s supposed to be achieved.
— User
1.0 Key issues
This study explored in depth the impacts created by the regulatory 
reforms of the audit function put in place in the period after the corporate 
collapses of the early part of this decade. Some of the issues surrounding 
these impacts include:
•	 what are the costs and benefits of legal backing for auditing standards 
•	 have the reforms after the corporate collapses earlier this decade 
reduced the likelihood of unexpected future collapses
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•	 have these reforms improved the general public’s confidence in the 
capital market
•	 have these reforms enhanced the credibility of financial statements
•	 have these reforms enhanced audit quality
•	 have these reforms added value to a company’s business operations?
2.0 introduction
The period after the high-profile corporate collapses of earlier this 
decade—internationally and nationally—saw major legislative reform 
through the ninth instalment of the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program: the Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 2004, effective 
from 1 July 2004. Under that act, among other things, the responsibility 
for the setting of auditing standards was moved from the profession to 
the Financial Reporting Council and the standards became statutory 
instruments with legal backing under the Corporations Act 2001. 
The issue of reforms to the regulation of the audit market elicited many 
lengthy comments from stakeholders, especially from suppliers, and many 
of the comments could fit within multiple subsections of this and the 
next chapter. The structure of this division is that this chapter examines 
survey and interview responses related to questions about the legally 
backed auditing standards and the reforms more generally and takes a 
primarily demand-side perspective. The next chapter deals with the 
impact of the reforms and the regulatory process primarily on the supply 
side of audits and the third deals with the conduct of the regulators and 
quasi-regulators in monitoring compliance with the auditing standards. 
The interconnectedness of the themes and contexts that arise around 
regulation makes it necessary to read all chapters in this division with 
this in mind. 
3.0 introduction: legal backing for auditing  
 standards
Under the CLERP 9 Act (2004), a reconstituted Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (AUASB) was created and charged with revising the 
existing auditing standards such that they could be enforced legally. 
A two-year grace period was given from the effective date of the act until 
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the revised standards became operative for reporting periods beginning 
1 July 2006. All of the data that we report on were gathered after this 
operative date. The AUASB, in revising the standards, elevated much of 
the guidance material, which contained implied obligations, to mandated 
essential procedures and also downgraded some previous ‘black-letter’ 
paragraphs to guidance material. During the grace period and for some 
time before, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) continued to update and issue its standards, on which the 
Australian auditing standards are based. Changes in the newly issued 
AUASB standards were therefore a combination of Australian revisions 
and IAASB amendments. The survey and the interviews with stakeholders 
addressed the issue of legally backed auditing standards. Discussion of 
each source of responses follows.
4.0 survey
Responses to the survey question ‘Are you aware of the following specific 
changes that have occurred in the regulation of audit services in Australia?’ 
are reported in Table 10.1.
As might be expected, suppliers of audit services are near-universally 
aware of the standards. Approximately three-quarters of all purchasers 
and just more than half of all users are aware of these changes.
Table 10.1 Responses on awareness of the introduction of legally enforceable 

















































































Are you aware of the following specific changes that have occurred in the regulation 
of audit services in Australia?
The introduction of 
legally enforceable 
auditing standards
54 68 52 38 77 79 76 77 90 93 90
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
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5.0 interviews
Interviews with stakeholders revealed their various perceptions of the 
impact of legal backing for auditing standards.
5.1 Users
Generally, comments from users were favourable about the advent of legal 
backing for auditing standards. Users felt that with legal backing came 
a perception that things had been done correctly. Illustrative comments 
follow.
[T]o a degree…having an outsider arbitrate or adjudicate on doubtful 
situations where the question is whether the professional standard 
has been met or not can be a positive…If the professional bodies 
[are] too lax on their members then outside legal enforceability is 
some progress.
I would imagine it’s increased costs to a point. But it probably 
also allows litigation…to be a lot more effective and enforceable. 
There’s a threat there…for people to be in compliance with these 
accounting standards.
It’s probably going to improve the credibility of financial statements.
There was, however, recognition of some pitfalls of legal backing among 
the users. For instance: 
[I]t also…means that you run the risk that somebody who really 
knows the details of the ins and outs of the profession will make a 
judgment that, in almost unanimous opinion of the practitioners, 
is unrealistic given what the practices were, and potentially sets 
through the legal process a new standard that again goes into that 
prescriptive regulation by the courts that inhibits the auditing 
process rather than provides more insurance…Too many times have 
we seen that if something goes wrong the response from regulators, 
lawyers, the courts is to set new standards without considering 
the wider implications. And that kind of ad hoc legislation…[is] 
dangerous and it creates a maze of things that are inefficient.
Some comments from users, however, conveyed scepticism that legal 
backing should make any difference.
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I just can’t see where [it has made any difference] in terms of the 
market generally. Certainly, if people were expecting…on day one…
that…everyone…[would] go ‘Oh, yeah, that means the financial 
statement’s credible’—I can’t see that…just because they’re legally 
enforceable now…the market continues to expect and believe that 
the auditors are doing what they need to do behind the scenes, 
irrespective of whether it’s legally enforced or not to get the right 
outcome.
Would it resolve concerns of the credibility of financial statements? 
I can’t answer that question. It really is a question of whether those 
enforceable auditing standards go beyond what was previously in 
the professional standard—one. And two, whether we get examples 
in the future where the enforcement of those standards is better 
than it was in the past through the professional bodies. There are 
certainly examples where you would say professional bodies are too 
lenient on their members. 
[H]ave they improved what’s out there and available? They’d 
probably catch a few that otherwise wouldn’t have got caught—but 
broadly, no.
[I]f we did have any concerns in the past then having a legally 
enforceable standard that everyone follows would, should, reduce 
those fears of them not being credible.
I don’t think it’s hurt the credibility of financial statements, but  
I don’t think it’s done a…necessarily huge [thing].
It wasn’t as if we didn’t feel assured prior, I wouldn’t have thought, 
from our perspective. [I don’t know] whether we feel more assured.
[I]f the expectations gap is what an auditor should intuitively do 
versus what they’re prescribed to do…[legal backing has] widened 
it because a good auditor would probably do both: they would 
follow the prescriptive rules and then they’d apply their own 
auditing skills.
One person feels that it should reduce the audit expectations gap: 
[I]f we’ve got a legally enforceable law that says that an audit must 
tick off these…points then there should not be an expectations gap 
over time as we’re educated.
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Another user is somewhat disparaging of what is involved in audit 
judgment, as revealed by the following quotation:
I don’t know how much judgment auditors have 
or need. There [are] only four accounts—asset, 
liability, income and expense—and the only 
debate…ever seems to be as to whether the debit 
goes in the P&L or the debit goes in the balance 
sheet. And then on the other side, whether you 
really should be recognising the income or not. 
And the majority of companies are not overly 
aggressive with those two issues: capitalising 
expenses and bringing forward income. I don’t think anyone—any 
shareholder—ever got too upset. And…when I talk shareholder,  
I mean someone who is the mythical shareholder, who’s there for the 
long time, not some guy who just buys and sells within a month—
that’s not what we’re running the company for. I’m running a 
company to try and optimise returns for someone who’s there 
for the long haul. And if a company were a little conservative—
even far too conservative in terms of expensing too much and not 
recognising income fast enough—in the long term, no-one’s going 
to be upset about that. Whereas people do get upset when you’re 
not expensing things and you’re capitalising expenses and when 
you’re bringing income forward that’s really not income.’
The same person enunciates the conflict implicit in saying ‘no’ to those 
who pay the audit fee: 
[T]hat’s where auditors need to be tougher: to be saying to clients—
and remember, these are people who are paying their bills—‘Look, 
I’m sorry, you shouldn’t be capitalising that expense, and you 
shouldn’t be recognising that income.’ Because on the other side…if 
you’re being too conservative, no-one’s going to get upset, because 
the income will eventually come through and if you’ve understated 
the expenses, in the next period, you won’t have the expenses. Or if 
they’re exploration costs, five years down the track you won’t have 
a big write-off to clear it out, because you haven’t found the ore. 
But it’s tough to—I haven’t had to do it myself—but to sit down 
someone who’s paying your bills and say ‘sorry’.
‘[T]hat’s where auditors 
need to be tougher: to 
be saying to clients—
and remember, these 
are people who are 
paying their bills—
“Look, I’m sorry”.’
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5.1.1 Summary
Responses from users vary from no knowledge that auditing standards 
have become legally enforceable to a sound understanding of this reform. 
Similarly, responses vary between those who are enthusiastic about this 
change and those who can see little merit in the idea. Two comments 
relate to perceived laxity on the part of professional accounting bodies 
and legal backing being an improvement. The notion of having a ‘threat’ 
to encourage compliance is attractive to at least one user. There were, 
however, also comments foreseeing problems—for instance, with the 
law and lawyers becoming involved in a way that created unintended 
consequences. There is even a suggestion that legal enforceability might 
increase the expectations gap since prescriptive rules might militate 
against the application of auditors’ skills. Notably, responses by users refer 
to the audit explicitly as ‘insurance’ and to the importance of professional 
indemnity insurance in ‘going after’ auditors. Scepticism is expressed that 
legal backing will result in increased credibility for financial statements 
or any difference in the conduct of audits, since legal enforcement should 
not influence the auditor’s behaviour and it is not as though major doubts 
exist about the work of auditors. 
5.2 Purchaser
Among the purchasers, there was little support for legally backed auditing 
standards, with comments relating to potential detriments to the auditor–
client relationship and increased costs, as seen in the following quotes.
[T]he auditing standards were already existing 
and auditors are professional people so there’s 
already an expectation that they’ll be doing 
the appropriate bits from those standards. As 
I understand it, all of the legally enforceable 
aspect of it is going to do is to require more 
documentation…and laying a paper trail for 
what you’ve done, and I just see that as an 
increase in costs.
[I]t’s not so much that I’m concerned if they have the force of law. 
Well…the long answer to it is, yes, and the reason why is because…
we’re moving away from a process in which the auditor and the 
client work up a relationship where they’re receiving advice 
‘[W]e’re moving away from 
a process in which the 
auditor and the client work 
up a relationship…to one 
in which the auditors are 
very conscious of the fact 
that they must comply with 
legislation otherwise they 
leave themselves and their 
firm exposed.’
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based on their opinions and assessments that they’ve made and 
the judgments that they’ve made, to one in which the auditors are 
very conscious of the fact that they must comply with legislation 
otherwise they leave themselves and their firm exposed…so…
it’s shifting the priority away from what…was the essential 
relationship between client and auditor. That’s the danger I see. 
I notice that on audit committees that I have now…quite often 
when a query comes up, I’ll be informed by the auditor that that’s 
required under the legislation. It’s kind of become…the priority; 
you’ve got to comply…the danger is that in that process we might 
lose what would be…an opinion which would otherwise be given, 
but there’s reluctance there because of this new requirement…
In other words, we’re starting [to] see the disempowerment of 
sovereign governments in the process, and business direction being 
dictated by these regulations…this is a little off the track, but it’s 
kind of related because it’s becoming a pervasive force…in the way 
in which the administration of these processes take place. So it’s a 
concern I have that we’re going to lose something that…is really 
quite essential to the process. Inadvertently, I mean—everything 
has been done with the best of intentions.
The same person goes on to comment on the loss of intellectual property 
in terms of the accounting and auditing standards that has occurred with 
the move to statutory regimes for each:
[I]n that decision that the accounting profession took to handover…
it’s in the first instance [that] the accounting standards had 
lost intellectual property rights and…the same thing has now 
happened with the auditing. But it’s because it was an initiative 
taken by government, because it was perceived that this was what 
was necessary to fix the problem. So it’s a shame because…it’s a step 
backwards…[Legal backing] makes no difference at all…there’s a 
hidden problem here for government in that if there is another 
failure then who does the government look to as a scapegoat? It’s 
responsible now.
Further, concern was expressed about the increased prescription brought 
about by legal backing for auditing standards, as illustrated in the 
following quote:
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[T]he way in which the US approaches everything is by 
prescription—that is, they operate by rule. Whereas everything 
that is done basically under the British-related systems, in which 
we’re part, aren’t based on principles. And so our whole legislative 
base is supposed to be based on principles, but here what is now 
happening is that our regulatory agencies are then interpreting 
those principles and putting out guidance, which effectively is 
regulation. And so we’re moving…more and more towards that 
rules-based approach. And my difficulty with rules is that no 
matter how well they’re formulated…circumstances change and the 
rules become out of date, and they’re very hard to fix because they 
tend to get set in stone once they’re made. But also…people then 
use them as a substitute for judgment.
5.2.1 Summary
Purchasers’ views range from perceptions that legal backing for standards 
should make no difference to auditors’ conduct to perceptions that it 
will interfere with the auditor–client relationship. The former view is 
justified by the stance that auditors, as professionals, are assumed to be in 
compliance with the auditing standards—with or without legal backing. 
The latter view is justified by the perception that the auditors’ opinions, 
assessments and judgments are likely to be coloured by the legislation. 
One purchaser sees this, taken to its extreme, as potentially affecting even 
the direction of business. Another purchaser observes that legal backing 
for the standards means that the government has to take responsibility 
for future corporate failures, which are seen as inevitable. A purchaser 
laments the loss of the accounting profession’s intellectual property rights, 
which occurred in the transition to a new statutory standard-setting body. 
The merit of principles versus rules-based standards is raised with an 
observation that Australia has moved closer to the US approach and not 
only does this cause a risk of the rules dating, it risks replacement of 
judgment with rules. The potential impact on costs is mentioned in some 
quotations from the interviews in this section, but a dedicated section on 
costs appears later in this chapter.
5.3 Suppliers 
Among the suppliers, no-one expressed the view that legal backing for the 
auditing standards would make a difference. Typical comments included:
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[I]f an audit is supposed to focus on the risks then having to do a lot 
of other stuff around other areas that are no risk doesn’t make the 
audit any better. It might mean it’s a more pretty file…but I don’t 
necessarily think it’s going to mean that you’re going to identify 
problems any sooner, any better, anymore frequently than you 
would’ve under the old system, where you used your judgment.
No. I don’t think it changes [things]…from the external perspective, 
I don’t think it changes [things]. 
It’s done nothing for that because the public don’t read the auditing 
standards. So, no, from their point of view, they would have no 
idea…it’s done nothing for the expectation gap.
I don’t think the general public would know any different…I don’t 
know if you asked the general public whether they would be…
aware that there’s actually been a change…Even [with] a lot of our 
clients that we talk to, it’s an interesting discussion to have. You go 
in and you say that there’s been a change in the auditing standards 
and they’re, ‘Oh, really?’ So I don’t know whether that’s [their] area. 
So whether it’s changed the perception, I don’t think it has, because 
people aren’t really aware.
Again, among the suppliers, the divide between the Big Four and non-Big 
Four can be seen:
I’m looking at it from a Big Four point of view, because we see a lot 
of clients in a lot of industries. So you do gain a lot of experience 
and you have [a] bigger, broader base to have that professional 
judgment. Maybe when you’re talking [about] a small firm who 
don’t have the breadth of experience or the depth then it might be 
a totally different issue. But from a Big Four point of view, I don’t 
think that making them law has helped us particularly.
5.3.1 Summary
There is scepticism among suppliers of the degree of awareness among the 
general public and even by their clients of the change to legal enforceability 
of the auditing standards. There is even greater scepticism evident of this 
change being associated with higher-quality audits; at best, it is seen as 
potentially creating a marginal difference.
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5.4 Standard setters
One standard setter, in a comment pertinent to competition in the market 
for audit services, noted that legal backing for auditing standards had 
heightened the barriers to entry and he or she alluded to the difficulty of 
having auditing standards—whether legally backed or not—capture the 
essential skill that creates a good auditor.
[T]he concept behind [the legal backing of standards] is that it’s 
improved the quality…so that has a flow-on effect to the companies, 
but more importantly…to the ultimate users…that takes you back 
to the debate about what is a good audit.
When pressed further, the same person continues in response to the 
observation that ‘the politicians…would say that we wouldn’t have done 
this unless this added value to the market. Why have a law unless it does 
some good?’ 
[T]his is a difficult area because the difficulty here is you’re trying to 
put a level of precision over something which can’t be measured…
the really difficult thing is that…really high-quality auditing is 
about really understanding the issues and the risks and being able 
to…take indicators in places and join them together to actually 
understand the implications of something before it gets…too far 
down the road. 
5.4.1 Summary
Doubt about the ability of auditing standards, whether backed by 
legislation or not, to encapsulate the essence of a high-quality audit 
is expressed eloquently by a standard setter in this section.
5.5 Regulators 
Unsurprisingly, the regulators defended legal backing for the auditing 
standards.
The only difference is if an auditor gets it wrong, it’s more visible 
that you can penalise them for that…That’s the only difference, 
but you [could] penalise an auditor previously anyway…under 
negligence or duty of care because there’ve been so many legal cases 
with auditors.
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The same regulator argues that the legally enforceable standards require 
no more audit work than had already been the case:
[W]hat’s changed? Nothing. The only thing is one’s been quantified 
as a legal instrument and then the other case is that was not as 
enforceable, right, we’ll add another legal path to make them 
accountable. I don’t think it’s such a big change…What worries me 
is that when the auditor runs the argument [and] thinks the force-
of-law standards make [them] do more work. Now if that means it 
focuses their minds…prior to that they should have been doing it 
anyway.
5.5.1 Summary
The potential to hold auditors more accountable for the conduct of audits 
as a consequence of legally backed auditing standards compared with 
previously, comes through in the comments of a regulator.
6.0 issues and implications
Users, purchasers, suppliers and standard setters were all interviewed 
on the issue of legally backed auditing standards. A number of helpful 
insights were gained from these discussions. Some users took the view 
that as soon as a crisis emerged in what would otherwise be a free market, 
the political response was to increase regulation. While this is a natural 
response, there is concern about the unintended consequences, which 
could in fact damage what would otherwise be appropriate public policy 
settings. Additionally, some users take the view that this set of legally 
enforceable auditing standards might catch one or two undesirable 
incidents that previous processes did not, but that broadly the market will 
not be well served by these changes to the status of auditing standards. 
Purchasers were split between whether or not this was a positive 
initiative for the Australian economy. Some purchasers suggest that if it 
results in a better outcome for the capital market then this is worthwhile, 
while others are concerned that the legal enforceability involved will result 
in auditors essentially withdrawing from offering opinions and judgments 
and moving to fulfil compliance requirements. This, it is argued, will 
reduce the value of the relationship between auditor and client. One 
purchaser laments the loss of the setting of professional accounting 
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standards as a loss of intellectual property rights for the profession and 
the same is true for auditing standards. He also observed that there could 
be an unintended consequence for government in these shifts and that the 
government had no-one to blame but itself and its own processes if and 
when there was another round of corporate failure. 
While there were remarkably few positive views on the general issue 
of legally enforceable auditing standards offered by the users interviewed, 
standard setters took the view that this initiative was good because it 
would give rise to improved quality. This is important to companies and 
the ultimate users of financial statements: the shareholders.
There were diverging views about the motivation that gave rise to 
legally enforceable auditing standards. One regulator indicates this is 
something the accounting profession wishes to have in order to give 
substance and support and a more clarified approach than was previously 
the case.
In conclusion, while there is a high level of appreciation of the legal 
enforceability of auditing standards, there are mixed views about its 
benefits and, indeed, some scepticism. It would be reasonable to say, 
however, that it is difficult to systematically observe the effects on the 
capital market in a practical sense of the benefits of legal enforceability. 
Therefore, some interviewees are guarded about concluding one way or 
the other on the value of legally enforceable auditing standards. 
7.0 introduction: quality consequences of the  
 reforms
Specific questions about the impact of the reforms on the auditing regime 
were asked in the survey and the interviews. Given the inevitable cost of 
implementing the reforms, the responses make interesting reading.
8.0 survey
Recipients of the survey were asked five questions pertaining to the impacts 
of the reforms on financial reporting and audit quality after the corporate 
collapses of earlier this decade. One question asked for perceptions of 
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whether there would subsequently be less corporate failure. The second 
question related to whether there would be an improvement in the capital 
market. The third question asked whether the reforms would improve 
the credibility of financial statements. The fourth question concerned 
expected improvements in audit quality and the fifth asked about value 
added to companies’ business operations. The tabular reporting of results 
is given in Table 10.2, followed by analysis.
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confidence in the 
capital market





25 29 22 22 21 23 21 33 22 34 20
Enhancing the 
quality of an audit
33 34 31 34 34 29 34 40 42 52 39
Adding value to a 
company’s business 
operations
37 34 38 41 18 20 18 17 20 21 20
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
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Responses to the survey with respect to the question about whether the 
present regulatory requirements would reduce the number of corporate 
failures occurring in Australia showed considerable scepticism. They 
ranged from a peak of approximately one-third of those among private 
investors agreeing to this statement to a low of 7 per cent among Big 
Four suppliers. There is also scepticism about whether the regulatory 
and market responses to corporate collapses would improve the general 
public’s confidence in the capital market. Again, responses typically were 
about one-quarter of all respondents indicating that they agreed with 
the proposition. Similar responses were received from each of the user, 
purchaser and supplier groups with respect to the capacity of the recent 
regulatory and market responses to enhance the credibility of financial 
statements. 
With respect to the capacity of those regulatory and market responses 
to enhance audit quality, there was a more positive response, with 
approximately half of the Big Four supplier group respondents agreeing 
with the proposition and typically about one-third of all other respondents 
agreeing. There was scepticism about whether these responses would add 
value to a company’s operations among suppliers and purchasers, with a 
somewhat more optimistic response from user groups. 
On balance—and with a rare exception—user, purchaser and supplier 
groups were sceptical about the positive contribution these regulatory 
and market responses would have with respect to the issue of corporate 
failure. It can be said, however, that there is at least some belief by several 
in the market of a more positive outcome from these responses. 
9.0 interviews
In the interviews with stakeholders, the discussion about regulation 
elicited many lengthy responses, especially from suppliers. The issues that 
arise under the theme of ‘regulation’ are extremely intertwined and difficult 
to separate. Many of the comments in the next chapter (Chapter 11) are 
also pertinent to audit quality and hence to financial statement credibility.
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9.1 Users
In their comments, users tended not to differentiate between the impact 
of the reforms to audit and the reforms to accounting through adoption 
of IFRS, so their comments need to be interpreted in that light. In 
general, users’ comments reveal their scepticism of the general public or 
shareholders being aware of the reforms. Users showed a lack of confidence 
that the number of corporate failures would be reduced as a result of 
increased regulation of the market for audit services. This section begins, 
however, with the few more positive comments we received. 
Not all users were sceptical, as the following comments reveal, 
with responses affirmative about the enhanced credibility of financial 
statements.
Yes [there is greater credibility than before]…as an investor in 
companies…I tend to rely on them and we’ve had a couple of big-
name collapses…and it’s probably going to happen again, but…
[with] the…amount of regulation that there is around now…they’re 
going to be fewer and fewer as time goes on. So yeah, I rely on them 
and…others could too, more so than in the past.
[Y]es [there is greater credibility than before]. But the general 
feeling…is that it was always assumed that the auditors were doing 
their jobs and…largely that…was assumed and is still assumed 
now, and that sometimes there is and will always be errors. But…
it doesn’t ever come up really in my discussions with the capital 
markets that the audit…information may be incorrect. It just doesn’t 
come up; it’s assumed to be right. No-one knows what’s going on 
behind the scenes, but they just assume it’s right…So I’m saying…
that people did assume it was right before anyway.
[There is greater credibility than before]…in some senses, creating 
more complexity or more regulation can be counterproductive. 
So these things go in swings…you do have a period of perhaps 
excessive tension when the companies post these sorts of collapses, 
but inevitably these sorts of situations will come back. So it’s very, 
very hard, in my experience, to guard against outright fraud or 
distortion of the truth because those sort of companies invariably 
will find a way to present their statements in a way that’s not 
accurate. 
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The same person goes on to recall how blunt an instrument regulation can 
be in attempting to make dishonest people honest: 
[I]n a sense…and…we’ve seen this from 
the US, adding to the complexity can be…
counterproductive in a lot of ways. You have 
to rely to a certain extent on the honesty of 
directors and no amount of regulation necessarily 
is going to ensure that dishonest people are 
going to be honest. But to the extent that more 
onerous financial information can be useful, 
that’s probably right. But…domestically…most 
analysts are struggling with the international accounting standards. 
And in fact they’ve said previously that that information has…
made it harder to understand a lot of accounts as opposed to easier. 
So that’s talking to a lot of CFOs and even CEOs, and a lot of those 
people struggle with the presentation of their company accounts, 
so what hope does an ordinary person reading those accounts have? 
So…that’s overshadowed some of the…moves to greater disclosure.
Another user, obviously thinking more of international financial reporting 
standards than reforms, states:
The ordinary shareholder with international standards and greater 
comparability and just more and more disclosures, they probably 
assume that they do have a greater degree of credibility. But I have 
the opposite view with the analysts, because the more sophisticated 
the rules get, the more unintelligible that they become and they 
become a bit ‘What does it all mean?’
Turning now to the more negative comments, this first quotation points 
to the perceived lack of knowledge among ordinary shareholders of the 
legislative and other reforms in response to the corporate collapses of 
earlier this decade:
No, I don’t think they’d have a clue about those changes and  
I certainly don’t think that they perceive any [difference in 
credibility than before]. Maybe in the US, with Sarbanes-Oxley and 
all that kind of stuff, but I wouldn’t think so in Australia.
‘you have to rely to a 
certain extent on the 
honesty of directors 
and no amount of 
regulation necessarily 
is going to ensure that 
dishonest people are 
going to be honest.’ 
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The same person goes on to question whether the general public cares:
[D]oes the general public care…they have an expectation of what 
the financial statements are and I don’t think that that will have 
changed. Maybe there was a bigger gap before in that expectation 
and maybe the gap has closed a little now…I don’t think the general 
public would perceive any difference in the accounts these days 
than previously, other than they’d probably find them harder to 
understand.
Another user expresses a similar view about ordinary shareholders’ 
indifference to the changes:
[T]hey’re indifferent [to whether financial statements have more 
credibility than before]…if you’re working in the industry, and with 
my limited experience, companies are much better and certainly 
providing better-quality reports. So…that standard’s gone up.  
At the financial statements level, you might argue most investors 
are indifferent—certainly from our experiences. 
Commenting in the context of accounting standards, another user observes 
their complexity, before moving on to the implications for the credibility 
of financial statements brought about by the reforms:
I don’t think that a lot of small shareholders—a lot of shareholders—
have a real issue with how things are reported…a lot of them do 
struggle to grasp on to the reporting…they struggle as a result of 
the different changes, especially in Australia. I don’t know whether 
there’s another country in the world that changes accounting 
standards as much as Australia do[es], or have as many onerous 
accounting standards as what Australia does…it becomes rather 
complex for individual shareholders to actually make head or tail of 
what’s going on in the reporting. 
Continuing with the theme, the same user goes on:
[I]t basically just passes everyone by…the reporting…shareholders 
rely much more heavily on analysts’ reports from broking houses on 
the current state of play in a company, the reports and how they’ve 
been reported in terms of results, and what the analysts think in 
terms of the forecast going forward that the company’s got over the 
next 12, 18 months. 
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The same user implies that the financial statements are the least-read 
section of annual reports:
[I]n my experience, a lot of clients will draw a lot from the annual 
reports of a company, basically from the chairman’s address or the 
CEO’s address, and from AGMs, as opposed to the reporting of the 
accounts…there’s such a big focus on the reporting of numbers by 
the accounting firms, but in reality when you…go to an AGM, or 
whether you have a company presentation, the finances are really 
at the end of the presentation, and they’re brushed through fairly 
quickly, and no-one really understands…exactly what’s being 
reported and why it’s being reported.
The same user anticipates that an economy that is less buoyant will 
again reveal concerns and questions about the quality of accounting and 
auditing:
[W]hen the economy turns the other way, and companies start going 
broke, that’s when people start looking at [auditing and auditing 
standards] and start questioning why something was done and why 
it wasn’t done.
The same person goes on to say something that is quoted in Chapter 3 
dealing with the expectations gap, but which is worth repeating here:
[I]n terms of what is debated as the audit expectation gap, if 
anything, those collapses have lowered the public’s perception a 
little bit and thereby closed the gap in terms of lowering their 
expectations. But I don’t think that they’ve got more confidence in 
the auditing standards than they had before. And…I don’t think 
the broad public is that aware of the regulatory responses, the 
tightening of regulations, and rather would…if you mentioned 
to them an Enron or an HIH, they would mainly see that as a 
failure of the audit profession, and it would undermine their 
confidence rather than say, ‘Okay, this has led to a regulatory 
response and a tightening up of standards that now…makes us 
actually more secure than we were before. We just didn’t know 
how unsecure [sic] we were.’ But in terms of perception, I don’t 
think it’s improved really.
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One interviewee sees the check-list approach as auditors ‘protecting their 
own backs’ and clearly sees little role for reliance on auditors as an early 
warning mechanism for problems:
[I]t limits the ability of auditors to provide 
information that’s really going to be critical of the 
company…in a lot of ways…auditors are protecting 
their own backs, just like a lot of other professions, in 
the sense that they can meet a certain standard, but 
in terms of material issues…from time to time they 
do have to use their judgment and…alert investors 
to certain issues. So if it’s just a narrow approach to 
information they present then the information’s not that useful. Not 
many people rely on auditors as the first point of identifying issues 
within a company; they’re normally relying on something else. So 
to that extent, you’ve got to say that maybe auditors have failed in 
the sense that they’re just not relied on as the early warning signals 
of problems within companies.
The same person goes on to explain why he or she thinks shareholders are 
not assuming the financial statements have greater credibility after the 
reforms:
Firstly…the ordinary shareholders are confused by…the extra 
reporting that’s come with all those things, particularly in the US. 
It’s worse there obviously than here, but financial statements are 
getting bigger and thicker and harder to read, so they’d be confused 
with that…and that’s what happens in markets: for a short time, 
shareholders got sceptical about what they were given and that…
just gradually dies away, new regulation comes in, usually the 
crooks still aren’t very honest and the good people who were always 
honest are still honest and the world moves on and you wait for the 
next cycle…I’ve been in this game for 20-odd years and I’ve seen it 
about five times. So no, I don’t think they would…naturally assume 
that the financial statements are more credible today than they were 
five years ago.
No, I don’t think people would feel as if [financial statements] had 
greater [credibility]. I don’t think that most shareholders would be 
aware of the legislative change. They wouldn’t understand what 
impact it has…there’d still be a certain degree of distrust out there 
‘[M]aybe auditors 
have failed in the 
sense that they’re 
just not relied on as 
the early warning 
signals of problems 
within companies.’ 
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in the community…Perhaps it’s waned a bit now, but…I don’t think 
people would be surprised when things get uncovered. So I don’t 
think they’re aware of the legislation…that’s true for any legislative 
change in the community. The government doesn’t communicate 
these things very well at all.
The same person elaborates in response to the question ‘Do you think it’s 
possible to communicate them well?’:
Yes, I do…I don’t think they make an attempt at 
all, so any attempt would [be better]. What have 
we got now? We’ve got about 10 ads every night 
on terrorism. They’ve resurrected terrorism, 
resurrected the super changes, which actually 
came in last year, over a year ago, so any ad at 
all on explaining what action they’ve taken for 
the community to rectify some of those sort of 
issues…is one way of doing that. They’re certainly 
willing to spend the money on promoting what they believe they’ve 
done for the community, so why not [spend] on something like that?
[A]n Enron or a WorldCom can happen again. You can regulate until 
you’re blue in the face, but if somebody wants to…commit fraud 
on that scale, there will be others…I’m not sure [that] increasing 
the regulation, increasing the disclosure and all the rest of it [will 
work]…it’s just added cost to the system. 
The same person goes on to explain his or her view that the increased 
regulation makes it easier, not more difficult, for problems to arise:
[A]ll the things I’ve seen ASIC do in the Australian market, and all 
the rest of it, it’s resulted in policies, guidelines, not regulations, 
to a large extent, and…they’ve found that the market here is 
relatively robust anyway, with all our existing checks and balances. 
So are our investors any safer? No, I wouldn’t have thought so…
unfortunately…increased regulation makes it easier for people to 
get duped, because you probably become too reliant on [the fact] 
that the boxes are ticked, rather than going, ‘Is this a fundamentally 
sound investment proposition?’ And you can’t take that away from 
an investor or an investor’s advisor on working that out…it would 
probably make it easier for more problems to…arise.
‘They’re certainly 
willing to spend the 
money on promoting 
what they believe 
they’ve done for the 
community, so why not 
[spend] on something 
like that?’ 
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9.1.1 Summary
Few among the users express a view that, for ordinary shareholders, 
financial statement credibility has increased as a result of the legislative 
and other reforms that followed the collapses of earlier this decade. 
Several users respond more from the perspective of changes to accounting 
standards (that is, the adoption of IFRS) than from the perspective of 
reforms to the auditing regime. These comments are relevant, however, in 
that, generally, they claim that the complexity of financial statements adds 
to the difficulty of increasing investor confidence and of having the public 
in general and users of financial statements in particular know about and 
have an understanding of reforms—to either accounting or auditing. 
More than one user is of the view that, from a broad perspective, the 
reforms could be counterproductive. One user sees negative media reports 
and high executive salaries as contributing to a generally pejorative view 
of business among the public. 
The next chapter, dealing in depth with stakeholders’ perceptions of 
the operationalisation of the reforms specific to audit, and regulators’ and 
quasi-regulators’ conduct in monitoring audit quality, needs to be borne 
in mind as being of relevance to the material in this chapter.
9.2 Purchasers
There was little support among purchasers for the notion that regulation 
of the market for audit services would reduce the number of corporate 
failures occurring in Australia. Remembering that the interviews were 
conducted before the global financial crisis or even the full extent of the 
sub-prime credit problems became known, some of the comments are 
ominously prescient, as this first quotation demonstrates.
[L]et’s say that we take the [sub-prime] market…that’s collapsing 
right now. Well, 12 months ago, I bet you all the guys who 
were…auditing them were saying the financial statements are 
fine but if there’s a rising…reliance upon sub-prime lending for 
that organisation that’s changing its risk profile considerably. So 
they’ve basically got a much higher sensitivity to a decline in…or 
an increase in credit spreads on that kind of lending then that’s not 
very transparent when it comes to the way the financial statements 
are put together. That should be the kind of thing that organisations 
are highlighting in their risk management and limits of their broader 
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sustainability-type reporting…which emphasises the risk to the 
organisation and how it’s being managed and contained and what 
the profile is, et cetera. But that piece, that ain’t audited right and if 
I was a regulator…what I’m more concerned about is what’s there.
[In general,] the auditing firms, their standing is reasonably good… 
I don’t have that feeling that there’s a huge amount of criticism over 
the accuracy or the professionalism of auditing work.
A theme common among the purchasers is the view that more corporate 
failures are inevitable as part of the risk of business:
[W]e’ve encouraged this view that failure is not permitted to happen, 
whereas in fact failure is a normal part of business…when we talk 
about expectations, the public has been either encouraged or lulled 
or whatever, unrealistically, into the view that [an] audit [is carried] 
out wall-to-wall and picks up all errors, and well it’s supposed to, 
and the businesses aren’t allowed to fail, which is wrong.
One purchaser, however, is more optimistic that the reforms have added to 
confidence in greater financial statement credibility:
[I]t’s probably a reasonable assumption that the market thinks that 
all these feathers up in the air must’ve ended up with improvements 
[in financial statement credibility]. 
The same person goes on, alluding to the changes to the independence 
rules, which are discussed in the preceding chapter, to infer that retail 
investors are more aware than they are perhaps generally given credit for 
of events in the marketplace:
[T]he granularity would not be well known, no. It’s very clear 
that…it’s well known from just attending AGMs…the mums and 
dads certainly know about non-audit services and quite regularly 
will ask questions about non-audit services. And at one stage, going 
back three or four years ago, we used to have some quite big non-
audit ratios…And that stuff was getting called out and it wasn’t 
getting called out necessarily because the market or the analysts 
were calling it out; it was getting called out because people were 
reading it…the mums and dads were going to the trouble of reading 
the accounts. So…that is well known…some of the other CLERP 
changes are probably less well known…the Sarbanes-Oxley stuff 
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to Australians…is almost a black art. Yes, I suspect the public 
knowledge and understanding of why every now and then…
someone gets in terrible trouble…with an audited client deriving 
out of Sarbanes-Oxley is…non-existent…However…the HIH Royal 
Commission, in an Australian context, would come absolutely at 
top of mind and they’d know that the relevant judge made a lot 
of recommendations, many of which were taken up. And…the 
corporate governance guidelines would be quite well known as 
well. That’s obviously a bit broader than auditing but…it’s probably 
seen as [being in] the same strand.
The same purchaser continues on this theme, but moves to those internal 
to the company—board and audit committee members—in terms of their 
awareness of changes in the audit regime:
[T]here is also [a] more sophisticated thought process about auditing. 
Even talking about it as a niche part of the capital markets—as the 
assurance market of listed companies…in our questionnaires now, we 
provide quite a lengthy section regarding our own audit committee, 
the independence of the audit committee, the qualifications of the 
board members, the details of the audit relationship with the external 
auditor, detail of the internal auditor…that’s quite an interesting 
example…that there is a broader knowledge and reliance on audit 
principles than there were prior to those collapses.
The following comment from a user, an accountant, reveals his or her 
perception of how the complexity of the financial statements is militating 
against regaining a sense of confidence in the financial statements:
[T]he media’s sensational reporting and…constant 
criticism of the ‘big end of town’…[have inflicted] 
significant damage to the credibility of the business 
sector. And the difficulty is that financial statements 
at the same time, in an attempt to try to provide 
more information, have grown enormously, along 
with general corporate governance statements…it’s 
reached the stage where the complexity of the report 
is not assisting people in regaining that sense of confidence. So…
it’s…a good example of how regulation and direction and more and 
more of this information has…actually made the situation slightly 
worse, because it’s become so complex that if you wanted to hide 
‘Even I have trouble 
with financial 
statements and 
I’m a trained 
accountant.’
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anything, firstly a board could easily do it. And secondly…[for] 
most people, it’s beyond their capacity to be able to absorb it all. 
Even I have trouble with financial statements and I’m a trained 
accountant. 
The same person continues, referring to media reporting of business, high 
executive salaries and some spectacular failures as factors that keep the 
public on edge, contributing to discomfort, not comfort, with the financial 
statements:
[W]e’re in a bit bind here, this is between a rock and a hard place. 
And there is this innate criticism, supported by some spectacular 
failures…the Enron-type situation and HIH have all left this feeling 
that big business is able to take out the small investor and…
the media keep it going. And with high salaries that are paid at 
the moment to CEOs…I don’t see any progress towards a feeling 
of comfort and feeling that all of this is now leading to a greater 
credibility.
The next two comments from purchasers illustrate again the connection 
between this and the next chapter in that they deal with the perceived 
direct impacts of the reforms, which in turn influence audit quality. They 
appear here to remind the reader to view Chapters 11, 12 and 13 as having 
a common theme. The first points to pressure on fee margins and potential 
audit-quality implications.
[B]ecause they’ve got budgets on each job and they’ve only got a 
certain amount of time for each job, it’s how much time is going 
towards [it]…and that’s always a danger of where the industry may 
head. Does it go to a point where it gets so tight with margins and 
these sort of things…does the quality drop off really in the objective 
of the audit? Does it get to a point where it’s quite dangerous? 
The second sees a check-list approach as a bad practice leading to bad 
outcomes:
[O]ne of my views over a long time is that the more you develop a 
check list-type approach, the danger is that someone says if you can 
actually tick all the boxes on the check list then you are deemed to 
have complied even though you get to a wrong answer…So when 
you get to a situation where check lists drive behaviour and…where 
people just get concerned about what the answer on the check list 
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is then…that’s bad practice and it leads to bad outcomes. And the 
best example of all that is…if you look back to the governance 
requirements that applied and you look at Enron. Enron could tick 
all the boxes for good corporate governance because everybody just 
focused on what was [on] the check list as opposed to what was the 
substance of what was happening.
9.2.1 Summary
With one exception, purchasers do not express optimistic views of 
the likelihood of the ability of the reforms surrounding audit since the 
corporate collapses of earlier part of this decade to enhance confidence in 
the credibility of financial statements. Mention is made of the perceived 
inevitability of future corporate collapses associated with business risk. 
One purchaser, however, is more positive about the interest and knowledge 
of retail investors in general aspects of financial reporting and audit, 
albeit with little knowledge of the detail. This same purchaser comments 
positively on the knowledge level of board and audit committee members 
about matters surrounding the audit function. Once again, examples are 
provided of responses that deal with the impact of the reforms on audit 
processes and the implications of that impact on audit quality, which in 
turn influences financial statement credibility, to remind the reader of the 
link between this chapter and the next.
9.3 Suppliers
Among the suppliers, there was no perception that the level of regulation 
of audit services would prevent future collapses. Two suppliers mentioned 
that a focus by regulators on documentation and especially that of a 
check-list nature was an ineffective approach to regulation that would not 
prevent corporate collapses: 
I’m not sure that just handing out check lists and stuff to say that 
we have to fill them out will…reduce the amount of corporate 
collapses anyway.
The same supplier goes on to allude to the inappropriateness of the content 
of the check lists if the prevention of corporate collapse is the aim:
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[Y]ou do…waste a lot of time in the wrong places 
because a regulator is going to come in and they’re 
not necessarily going to know the client. All they’re 
going to be able to do is look at the form. So you 
might’ve filled out all the forms and totally missed 
the key risks and issues in a client…they’re not 
going to know that. They’re going to see you did 
your form. They’re going to say, ‘Yes, well done, 
the file is great.’ Then three years down the track, when the whole 
thing falls to pieces, it’s not going to be because of the form. It’ll 
probably be because someone missed one of those key risks…Or 
the technicality around one of those accounting issues was dealt 
with wrongly, or whatever it will be at that level. The company 
is not going to collapse because someone didn’t tick a box…It’ll 
collapse because of some very high-level absolutely fundamental, 
all consuming-type event, like an Enron. The revenue just wasn’t 
there or whatever. They’re the things that will bring you down, not 
some of the things that these regulatory check lists focus on.
Another supplier believes that the reforms could create a marginal 
difference in terms of belief in the credibility of financial statements:
[W]ould it resolve concerns over the credibility of financial 
statements? I don’t think it will resolve them, but it will help a 
little in that all sides are aware that you have the legal enforceability 
angle to it…in each case…it’s a marginal difference rather than a 
quantum leap.
One supplier alludes to the difference between audit failure and corporate 
failure:
Is the current approach giving greater guarantee that there won’t 
be audit mistakes? [It’s] hard to say, but it would be a case, and  
I don’t think that’s the case of whether the standard of the individual 
was always right or wrong…I don’t think the odds have changed 
probably as much. You’ll always get entities failing…on pure 
financial grounds. Now that doesn’t necessarily mean that there’s 
been an audit failure.
‘The company 
is not going to 
collapse because 
someone didn’t 
tick a box.’ 
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One supplier believes ordinary shareholders derive comfort from the 
reforms, but then goes on to question the understanding by investors of 
the emphasis of matter paragraph in the auditor’s report:
[Shareholders] probably do [believe financial statements have more 
credibility], but…they’re all still pretty sceptical…people worry 
enormously when they see something as large as Enron go under…
who would’ve thought HIH [would go under?]…I remember 
clearly when you got the stock market reports on the radio…and 
they [would say], ‘HIH is up 23 cents today’…it was a very large 
organisation. And then when they bought FAI, which had a very 
high profile in the insurance market, which was probably punching 
above its weight in terms of profile compared to how big it really 
was, but it was a very well-known, very large enterprise. And we’ve 
seen an enormous level of mismanagement there, and we think, well 
how could they not have known? 
I remember at the time…speaking to a manager at Arthur Andersen 
about it, and he was very defensive about the whole thing and said, 
‘Oh, we’ve done everything that we should’ve done’…but he said 
to me at the time they had an inherent uncertainty [about] going 
concern[s]. Well, I don’t recall that. But even if AAs had put that 
opinion on HIH’s financial statements, I don’t think the investor 
would’ve understood exactly what that meant. And we’ve got 
this strange situation with the standards whereby if you think 
that an entity is not a going concern, if you think that there are 
serious difficulties with it, you…have to give a clean opinion. It’s 
an unqualified…an unmodified opinion, but with an emphasis of 
matter.
Another supplier expresses belief that ordinary shareholders do assume 
more credibility, but he or she goes on to allude to perceived inconsistency 
by regulators shaking that faith:
Yes…they would assume that there’s more credibility. And…
part of me says…there’s definitely been a tightening up in the 
environment…the expectations now are a lot more stringent, yet 
you have events [an example is provided of what the interviewee 
perceives to be an inconsistency]…that sort of inconsistency would 
put doubt into the shareholder’s mind. But…overall, they would 
expect that with all the disasters that have happened that someone 
REgULAToRy REFoRMS To AUdIT: THEIR IMPACTS
| 429
is now more accountable. That someone typically tends to be—
they tend to look towards the auditors a lot more…that’s the wrong 
place to look because…managers and directors have the ultimate 
responsibility for the financial statements, and notwithstanding 
that we’re obviously attesting of them, so there is responsibility on 
our part too. But…inconsistent behaviour of the regulators would 
put some doubt into their mind…they’d like to think that they can 
rely on them more.
Several suppliers differentiate between ordinary and more sophisticated 
investors in terms of the likely level of credibility they attach to financial 
statements:
[T]here would be a split between…people who are more involved 
in looking at financials closer to companies that would understand 
that it probably isn’t [more credible] verus maybe the general 
public out there that would have the perception that because of all 
of this the rules have been tightened…The top end of the capital 
markets, people that are dealing with companies all the time and 
[are] involved with them, I don’t think they really see that there’s 
any difference.
Several suppliers, however, see little to no likelihood of the regulatory 
reforms giving rise to enhanced belief in the credibility of financial 
statements.
I don’t necessarily think [shareholders assume financial statements 
have greater credibility]…the perception probably is that things 
have been shaken up a bit…we’ve had the collapse [of] Andersen’s, 
which has obviously been quite a high-profile thing. And… 
a large number of the public, and therefore your readers of financial 
statements, have understood what happened in that instance at a 
high level…things like that have probably created the prominence 
that therefore there are things being done to rectify it. Obviously, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley [issue]—it depends on who’s aware of it—but it 
certainly has been given a bit of profile. So how does that feed into 
whether they think they’re getting anything different from what 
they were [getting] previously? I don’t necessarily think…things 
have…changed from what I saw. 
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The same person goes on to say that directors and audit committees have 
changed in their approach to the audit, but not the ‘average reader’:
[W]hat you’re finding is it’s more about directors in particular, and 
audit committees. I’ve certainly seen a significant change in their 
attitudes and their level of diligence in the way that they deal with 
us and what they’re expecting out of us. Absolutely, there’s been 
a change there. But as to the average reader of financials, I don’t 
believe there’s been a significant change. But I have certainly seen, 
particularly from non-executive directors, a very different change 
in attitude over the last three or four years. 
The next supplier states that stakeholders and the general public think 
that the auditor is a regulator. Regulators themselves have referred to the 
audit as delegated regulation (for example, Knott 2002).
I…don’t believe the shareholders have [belief 
in greater credibility of financial statements]. 
I don’t think that they have any real feeling 
of credibility in the processes at all…a lot of 
people have been shocked by the regulators 
with the perception of not effectively 
regulating places like HIH and the crowd in 
Western Australia…Westpoint, and One.Tel. 
And there’s a whole raft of companies come 
and go and fall on their sword and the regulator 
tends to run for cover and then strengthens the regulations after 
the collapse. The Enron affair was a perfect affair. And the auditor 
is in there, and even though the auditor might not be to be blame 
for any of this, because the auditor is looking at things after the 
horse has bolted (the auditor might not be to blame in all cases, or 
very few cases), [but they] would…be blamed. The stakeholders 
and the general public think that the auditor is a regulator, so…
we’re losing credibility all of the time, but it’s really the regulator 
that needs beefing up and more money spent [on it]. And the ACCC 
is another—I know that’s not a regulator—but just the fact that 
they’ve got their hand tied with trying to regulate petrol prices. 
They can’t, so the general public thinks that the ACCC is a toothless 
tiger.
‘The stakeholders and the 
general public think that 
the auditor is a regulator, 
so…we’re losing credibility 
all of the time, but it’s 
really the regulator that 
needs beefing up and more 
money spent [on it].’ 
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Another supplier points to the trade-off between the reforms raising belief 
in financial statement credibility and the raised cynicism created by the 
collapses themselves:
I don’t know [whether shareholders now assume financial statements 
have greater credibility]…it will be patchy…some people will…
assume they have greater credibility…there will be many people 
whose levels of cynicism have been raised by the experience and 
not necessarily assuaged by what happened since those experiences. 
So I really don’t know. The only way I could find an answer to that 
question would be to get some empirical data by survey…I meet a 
range of people who have a range of different views, and I just don’t 
know.
Another supplier speaks about the fact that there will always be collapses: 
[S]ome of the collapses will unfortunately continue to happen…
But there’s always going to be that small one that for some reason 
something goes wrong—the collapses this week in property 
development schemes; the water gets muddied with that. There’s, 
‘Oh, well, the auditor should’ve picked it up.’ ‘The regulator should 
have picked up’—whatever. 
The same person goes on to allude to the relationship between the quality 
of audit and the quality of information in the context of the transition 
to Australian Equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards 
(AIFRS) that occurred in a similar period to the reforms:
[T]here’ll always be that scepticism around it. If people believe 
there were problems previously…they’ll still think that happens 
because things go on. I don’t think that perception has been helped 
by the AIFRS, the new accounting standards…people, particularly 
firms…they’re bruised from the experience of bringing those in…
it’s a mute point as to whether that improves the overall credibility 
of financial statements on that. So…people would have difficulty 
separating quality of audit from quality of information…people 
are still struggling until that settles down and that’ll be a way to 
go. And…those people who thought that audits were pretty good 
anyway will probably continue to think that there will be collapses, 
but they’re the exception to the rule.
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The same person continues, expounding on how the wider public has 
little understanding of the difference between an audit that is poorly 
executed and one where the auditors could not have been expected to 
detect the problem:
I’m not sure that the fact that these standards are legally 
enforceable [will make] people…think [that things have changed], 
until effectively a firm is hauled over the coals for not doing it, 
and that’s in the public arena…it’s behind the scenes. Analysts…
believe the financial statements have less credibility, not through 
the audit process, but through what’s disclosed in there. Ordinary 
shareholders—it’s a difficult one…[With] the HIH…[and] each of 
these, when you pick apart the bones of it, you can see that it was 
an audit generally that wasn’t properly executed, or the problem 
was something that the auditors would not have been expected 
to pick up. So there’s always a reason for it, but I’m not sure that 
reason necessarily gets seen by the wider public and understood. 
The same person continues, going to the issue of public trust and the 
auditor:
It’s difficult. I don’t know what the general public’s view of what 
an auditor does or doesn’t do is…if anything, it’s reduced because 
of those collapses and people are suspicious. They probably don’t 
know what’s going on behind the scenes. So…a big agenda for 
us is this whole question of trust…some auditors haven’t covered 
themselves in glory, but it’s a little bit like the umpire: you only 
ever see the umpire when he’s made a bad decision. Sometimes a 
guy can…make terrific decisions and he doesn’t get much credit for 
it. Regulators…are the same. 
Continuing on this theme, the same supplier alludes to the publicity 
received by ‘colourful’ corporate characters:
[M]anagement are always the bad guys…particularly in Australia… 
I notice coming from the UK, where corporates have somewhat faced 
much bigger [issues] and so on…the Australian interest, or cult of 
celebrity, extends well into the corporate arena, so there are some 
fairly colourful characters. And…the more you have those people 
paraded through in the context of HIH—the sort of people who are 
put on trial and so forth…people tend to extrapolate that and just 
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have their views, and an element of talk probably comes in. But  
I don’t believe the financial statements have greater credibility. It’s 
either unchanged or people are suspicious. 
9.3.1 Summary
Suppliers are in the main sceptical that the reforms will enhance the 
credibility of financial statements, although one or two believe that the 
general public, but not sophisticated investors, could be of this view. 
Suppliers have no belief that corporate collapses will be reduced as a 
consequence of the reforms, and allude to the fact that the regulators 
and check lists do not focus on audit issues pertinent to this issue. The 
suppliers tend to see collapses as a business risk, not an audit risk, and 
hence view a corporate collapse as not being an audit failure. There is 
questioning of the public’s understanding of the meaning of an emphasis 
of matter section in an audit report. An observation that the public sees 
the auditor as a regulator is interesting in that at least one regulator is on 
record as labelling audit as delegated regulation (Knott 2002). Some of the 
suppliers’ discussions reveal beliefs about the harm that the collapse of 
HIH has done to the trust that the public places in auditors, which has 
been exacerbated by the publicity given to colourful corporate characters. 
9.4 Standard setters
Standard setters are realistic about how much of the reforms to the 
auditing regime is known to retail investors and how legal backing for 
auditing standards is but one aspect of the reforms. The first standard 
setter’s comment illustrates both of these points:
[T]he average off-the-street investor probably doesn’t know [about 
the regulatory changes]. In fact, they probably didn’t even know 
that there were auditing standards before that, [which is] somewhat 
unbelievable, but if they don’t read audit reports, it’s probably  
a reasonable conclusion. 
The same standard setter continues, explaining that if more confidence has 
resulted it is in association with the sweeping nature of reforms beyond 
the mere legal status of auditing standards:
[I]t’s likely that they do have more confidence [in the credibility 
of the financial statements]…the issue becomes one of what’s the 
confidence built on? It’s probably not just built on the changes in 
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the auditing standards; it’s probably more a fraction of the whole 
change in the regulatory framework: the ASIC’s rules have changed, 
you’ve got your continuous disclosure…auditors have got to go 
to the AGM and answer questions relevant to the conduct of the 
audit—probably more feel-good factors than tangible factors. But 
the real test will be [whether] there will be more corporate collapses 
and there have to be because people make decisions that don’t 
always turn out the way they think they will—and that doesn’t 
mean someone signed a report and it’s fallen over. What it means is 
[that] business couldn’t operate with the cost structure it had with 
the changes that are occurring in the global economy. 
Continuing, the same standard setter makes a most prescient comment 
about how confidence is a function of not only the regulatory regime, but 
the economic fundamentals and expectations regarding the future.
Perhaps one of the more fundamental questions becomes one of, if 
things tighten up, it may not be…the financials; what happens if 
the pressure goes back into the financial statement process because 
people are then trying to get to the forecast? And that’s when your 
whole integrity issue comes back in and maybe some businesses 
have had it easy, and auditors, because the results are there. They 
don’t have to work harder to deliver, but as we go forward, if things 
tighten up, interest rates rise, exchange rates move…books aren’t 
necessarily as effective as people thought they would be, then we 
might see a different outcome. And then you might see a change to 
that answer, because…the confidence probably comes from forecast 
versus actual.
Another standard setter comments on any enhanced credibility of the 
financial statements in the following way:
[I]t’s very, very difficult for ordinary shareholders…to have any real 
understanding of what happens [in relation to regulation activity]. 
And how would they? If you haven’t had any exposure to it, how 
would you have any real understanding of what goes on? 
The same person goes on to imply that although ordinary shareholders 
might have a low level of understanding of what goes on in the auditing 
space, directors’ understanding has improved markedly in recent years:
REgULAToRy REFoRMS To AUdIT: THEIR IMPACTS
| 435
[T]rying to get the directors to understand it…is extremely 
important…the directors’ attention and…desire to understand and 
depth of understanding, has probably increased quite a lot in the 
last few years…it’s still got some way to go. And it obviously varies 
very much by individuals…But…it is much better than it was, say, 
10 years ago…the broader understanding of the process and how 
far it can really go, how much assurance has really been given…
that’s come up some notches.
The next standard setter also alludes to the issue of just how much 
knowledge of the changes in the auditing regime exists among less-
sophisticated shareholders:
I wonder even how much the less-sophisticated shareholders 
would even be aware that there’s been a whole lot of change in the 
regulatory environment, and therefore would necessarily think that 
there’s a greater level of assurance. The more sophisticated investors 
would be somewhere between aware and vaguely aware of there 
having been change without necessarily perhaps understanding it 
a lot. 
Another of the standard setters comments on research conducted by the 
AUASB with small practitioners that shows less than optimal awareness 
even among this group of the auditing standards.
We’ve done a little bit of market-based awareness, an awareness 
survey where a worrying level of knowledge, awareness and let 
alone understanding of the new audit standards [were seen] at the 
smaller end. But that was the very small end of the practitioner 
market. Less than 10 is where we pitched it, down to much smaller 
ones. And a number of the practitioners surveyed were only 
spending 20 per cent of their time on audits, which is an issue in 
itself…And is that a bad thing?
The same standard setter continues, explaining his or her view that audit 
quality is not necessarily improved by creating an auditing regime that is 
easier to regulate:
Those things…are the real core of really quality auditing. So it 
really is about understanding the risks; it really is about being able 
to stop and [identify] them. And a lot of what we have in auditing 
standards doesn’t really go to those sorts of issues. It’s more around 
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saying you need to do particular things in different circumstances. 
And it’s now much more around explaining what you’re going to do 
and explaining what you have done, and documenting what you 
have done, which creates trails of what work has been done, which 
makes it easier to regulate what’s been done, or review what’s been 
done. But it doesn’t necessarily improve the quality.
9.4.1 Summary
Standard setters are at pains to differentiate between the various levels 
of investor sophistication in the marketplace, which in turn influences 
knowledge of the reforms to the regulatory regime in an auditing context, 
especially of their extent and nature, which extends to more than legal 
backing for auditing standards. In the context of whether the reforms 
are likely to have enhanced the credibility of financial statements, some 
positive views are expressed, but these views are qualified. One standard 
setter notes the importance of the economic fundamentals to public 
confidence, no matter what the regulatory regime, and the global financial 
crisis reminds us of how relevant such a comment is. Another standard 
setter reminds us that changes that create a regime that is more conducive 
to regulation do not necessarily translate to enhanced audit quality.
9.5 Regulators
Regulators’ responses convey a lack of conviction in any belief that reforms 
to the regulatory regime have resulted in enhanced confidence in financial 
statement credibility or in the confidence of the share market.
I don’t really know [whether shareholders assume there is greater 
credibility in financial statements]…I’m not sure how much…
ordinary people would be reading financial statements…So…a lot 
of the information about…listed companies is coming out through 
annuals and journals and they’re probably better able to assess 
documents…I’m not sure whether ordinary people really pay a 
lot of attention to a lot of the documents which are produced by 
companies in the sense that…[they] really rely upon the analysis 
of experts.
The same person continues, emphasising how the analysts on whom 
this reliance occurs receive much of their information from company 
presentations:
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[T]hey’re probably not aware of the detail of them…because you 
see a much heavier level of disclosure and comments about all of 
these things in annual reports, but whether or not they’re across 
the [detail]…of it is another thing…what I mean about analysts 
is that one…of the key things analysts are getting information 
from is company presentations and things like that, when they’re 
actually questioning the executives of the company, even there in a 
live environment and that’s probably where the information which 
people perhaps put the most credence on comes from. But others 
say the audited accounts are a fairly important starting point.
My sense of the situation is that the market tends to be reactive 
rather than proactive so that investors really haven’t got any further 
comfort from what they’ve seen as a result of Enron and HIH.
9.5.1 Summary
Regulators are sceptical that the reforms have added to confidence in the 
capital market and doubt that ‘ordinary people’ read financial statements, 
relying instead on analysts who attend corporate briefings. Of course, 
under the continuous disclosure regime, briefings to analysts are made 
public through the Australian Securities Exchange Announcements, but 
the implication is that ‘ordinary people’ don’t read these either.
10.0 issues and implications
Responses from users, purchasers and suppliers all suggested that there 
were very modest levels of agreement with the proposition of enhanced 
confidence in the capital market as a consequence of reforms after Enron 
and HIH. Indeed, of each of these three groups approximately 20 per cent 
gave a positive response and 80 per cent did not agree. 
There were widely differing views with respect to responses to the 
question about the value-adding capacity to a business’s operations, with 
users much more positive compared with purchasers and suppliers, who 
were very sceptical. Interestingly, about 80 per cent of purchasers and 
suppliers responded negatively to this question and those responses were 
reasonably uniform between different types of purchasers and different 
groups of suppliers.
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The interviews conducted with these three stakeholder groups 
supported the overall conclusion from the survey. Users suggest that 
the market will continue to believe that auditors will undertake what 
they need to do to form their audit opinion. Others support a belief 
that the market will not see much impact from the changes. One more 
sophisticated set of responses suggests there could be a change, but only 
if two conditions are met: 1) that current auditing standards really are 
different from their predecessors; and 2) that enforcement will be better. 
This particular respondent is somewhat critical of the profession’s ability 
to enforce standards, implying that a high level of regulated enforcement 
will give rise to a higher-quality outcome.
With respect to purchasers, few observations suggested there was a 
clear increase in confidence in the capital market and suppliers too shared 
the scepticism that the market would be any different to what preceded it. 
Users, purchasers, suppliers, standard setters and regulators were all 
interviewed, with one of the questions in relation to enhanced credibility 
of financial statements as a consequence of the reforms. In general, all of 
the groups had members who either agreed or disagreed with the premise 
within this question, with surprisingly little insights or innovations 
produced by the question. One of the most intriguing results from the 
interviews was that users believed they had quite a sophisticated and 
complex understanding of the work of an auditor and what the current 
regulatory requirements entailed, as well as past practices. 
Some users praised the current regulatory requirements, suggesting 
that they provided a floor level of quality. Various users described the 
present regulatory system as giving rise to audits that were ‘standardised’, 
‘consistent’, ‘unbiased’, ‘objective’, ‘comprehensive’ and ‘methodical’. 
There seemed to be an implication in the minds of some that these 
requirements would give rise to higher-quality auditing and they took 
the view that this would mean that the auditors would be better able to 
comment on the credibility of financial statements. A few users suggested 
that the auditor needed to go beyond this and be inquiring and innovative 
in their understanding of a business and the risks that business faced. 
Some purchasers feel that while the audit might not change much 
of what is done, the current regulatory requirements add considerable 
robustness to the audit, which might not have been present before. 
A number of purchasers suggest that, fundamentally, the audit they 
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observe has not changed with recent amendments to regulatory 
requirements; however, it has driven up costs. Few purchasers were able 
to identify how the audit had been changed or whether the auditors 
provided new and valuable insights into the business. Those who were 
able to make direct comparisons between Australia’s current position and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the United States spoke favourably of 
the Australian position and somewhat harshly of the more prescriptive 
and compliance-driven US position.
Various purchasers discuss their need for a balance and the fact that 
the ‘check-list approach’ is really just a minimum floor level, which 
returns to the point that audits that fulfil all the regulatory requirements 
are a floor level and there needs to be innovation and insight beyond 
this to achieve a high-value audit. One purchaser suggests that auditors 
have an obligation for and on behalf of their clients to push back against 
regulatory requirements if they think there is a better way for the audit 
to be achieved and for the outcome of the audit to be better delivered to 
the capital markets.
11.0 introduction: cost consequences of reforms
The survey and the interviews canvassed the issue of the cost consequences 
of the regulatory reforms brought in after the corporate collapses in the 
earlier part of this decade. This section examines responses directed 
specifically to cost, but, as with previous sections in this chapter, several of 
the comments could be placed under multiple headings. It is important to 
bear in mind that this and the next chapter should be read in conjunction 
with each other.
12.0  survey
User, purchaser and supplier groups were surveyed about their perceptions 
of the additional audit procedures required as part of the revised, legally 
enforceable auditing standards in terms of increasing costs and adding value 
to the company’s business operations. Results are reported in Table 10.3.
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One can observe from the responses to the surveys that users, purchasers 
and suppliers all share the view that costs have increased, with 81 per cent 
of users, 90 per cent of purchasers and 92 per cent of suppliers agreeing 
with the proposition that costs have increased. 
Table 10.3 Responses on the cost impact of regulatory reforms to audit 

















































































In response to high-profile corporate collapses, regulation now requires auditors to comply 
with additional mandatory audit procedures. In your opinion, complying with the additional 
mandatory procedures will:
Increase the costs 
of conducting an 
audit
81 85 80 76 90 86 93 87 92 96 91
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
13.0 interviews
Users, purchasers, suppliers, standard setters and regulators were asked to 
express their views about the cost implications of the enhanced regulatory 
regime surrounding audit. Quotations from their responses follow.
13.1 Users
All of the users’ comments reveal that an increase in costs is expected 
to accompany the increase in regulation of audits, and mostly there is 
unhappiness about this eventuality, as the following quotations reveal. 
[T]hat’s often the hard sell for the auditors: to demonstrate to us that 
there is an increase in the service provided, or an increase in our 
ability to rely on the service that is being provided to compensate 
for the increase in costs, and it’s hard to see…[T]he auditors try and 
sell it as a value add to our organisation, but their perception of 
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how they’re adding value to us is quite different to our perception 
of where the value has been added. So they’re kind of saying, ‘Yes, 
but we were able to do this for you’, and we’re thinking, ‘Well, 
hang on, did we want that done or do we really think that they have 
done what it is they say they’ve done?’ So…it’s hard for us to see 
the additional costs as any value added to us.
[L]egal enforceability…increases costs because there’s now…that 
legal opinion attached to it. So, if anything, the auditor is forced 
basically to check that they are within the limits, or that they work 
within a template that’s been provided by their legal counsel.
It’d probably increase costs…I’m not sure how much is involved 
with the old system, but for a smaller company to have to go 
through that 150-page check list, the cost as a percentage of their 
revenue would be a lot greater than BHP or someone like that, so it 
probably does increase costs.
[I]t has definitely increased costs. People are complaining about it.
Two users, however, do not see increased costs as necessarily a negative 
thing, as long as the quality of financial statements improves too: 
[I]t’s all very well and good worrying about costs, but if it results 
in a better outcome and you have to pay a slightly higher cost then 
that’s not an unreasonable outcome; that’s a win-win situation…the 
aim should always be to get the best set of financial statements, the 
most reliable…set of financial statements that gives you the best 
indication as to where a particular company is positioned at that 
point in time.
I…feel for the auditors there. It’s probably 
hindering a more lateral approach and…deeper 
exploratory think[ing]…the regulations probably 
also put more…walls around what they’re doing. 
Whereas if an auditor fronts up and they’re 
wanting to explore it more, but it might increase 
the cost of the audit and all the rest of it, it gives 
the board more things to say, ‘Well, you’ve done 
what you have to do.’ ‘We’ve ticked all the boxes, 
why do you want to go and do that? We’re not going to spend that 
money’…there are obviously issues around that…it’s always what 
‘It’s probably hindering 




probably also put 
more…walls around 
what they’re doing.’ 
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regulation does, which is trying to react to things that happened 
where people lost lots of money, but, equally, it’s [a question of] 
what do investors expect of an audit…that’s probably been lost a 
bit. And it is [a] comfort that the numbers are accurate and the 
auditors should be able to explore that as much as they need to.
I don’t know that it’s hindering the efficiency of the capital market. 
It may well be making the audit a more costly exercise than it should 
be. But the capital market is so far in the future that the reporting 
of historical information is, whilst important, the efficiency of 
a capital market is its ability to digest information that occurred 
today and price it. That’s what makes a capital market efficient…
the regulators and auditors would do well to…make the whole 
process as efficient as possible, and that’s not just the procedures, 
that’s also the reporting, but I don’t know that it’s hindering the 
efficiency of the capital markets…I’m a bit out [of] the loop on what 
happened with the regulatory processes, but I don’t have any issue 
with [it]…by and large, irrespective of the regulatory requirements 
that now…exist…the auditors were doing behind the scenes what 
they needed to do to get the right outcome, and if they could add 
value in other ways then good on them.
13.1.1 Summary
Users’ comments reveal some scepticism of value adding when auditors’ 
fees increase, and recognition of a disproportionate impact for smaller 
companies. One user, however, expresses the sentiment that auditors 
should explore as much as is necessary—regardless of cost—and another 
seeks to balance increased costs against improved quality of financial 
statements.
13.2 Purchasers
Purchasers are aware that auditors are being requested by the standards and 
regulator to undertake additional procedures in terms of documentation. 
Their comments reveal that some are prepared to pay for the incremental 
time involved, but some are not.
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[I]t just means things are a little bit…tighter…or, 
their costs have gone up to allow for it, so we’ve 
had that discussion over the last few years…they’re 
presumably hiring more people to allow for it 
because it means more people on each audit team. 
So in other words…they’ve compensated for it…
What we’re really talking about is that it…either eats 
into the margin that the audit firms make—so they 
have to absorb the extra cost of now adding an extra 10 per cent 
on to every auditor’s times that probably document—or to some 
extent they’d defray the costs…most organisations wouldn’t allow 
an absorption of an extra 10 per cent pass-on…surely the key thing 
for a partner is to make sure the substantive work is done because 
they’re signing the bottom line. So it’s a bit like [a] plane, isn’t it? 
You’ve got to do the maintenance otherwise you’ve probably lost 
your business if one of them comes out of the air.
[T]hey cannot…officially charge clients just because their internal 
documentation now is much better than before, because, to the 
clients, it’s not…that value add from a direct marketing perspective.
Every document that is prepared costs money…it costs money not 
for the client but for the auditor because someone has to review 
it, someone has to check it, someone has to reference it and tick…
the box. And it’s every single document because, in the end, that 
document could be hauled up in front of a court.
[T]he process that is forced by the regulator, and this check-box 
approach that we’re talking about, really just drives [up] costs for us.
[O]ur audit costs have gone up and it is because there is a requirement 
to do more work. My expectation of the auditor is the longer you’re 
here, the more you know about us and that should result in some 
productivity, and they say they factor that in…I went back to ASIC, 
[the] government’s requirements, IFRS requirements, the more you 
have to do and disclose, the more audit work you’re going to get. 
But it’s just one follows the other…So what’s driving audit activity, 
and therefore costs up, is the amount of disclosures that are being 
required by those two elements…well, three, I suppose: corporate 
law, the ASX, the governance…and again IFRS.
‘[M]ost 
organisations 
wouldn’t allow an 
absorption of an 
extra 10 per cent 
pass-on.’
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[F]rom a customer’s point of view, we see that as coming through 
discussions with the auditors about why the fee’s gone up this 
year, purely because there’s paperwork to be filled out and things 
to be documented. When they haven’t been done in the past, it’s 
not really a good reason for doing it, but they’re being forced 
down this path by the expectations of the regulator. And…the 
PCAOB in the US, which…apparently…you can call them up at 
any time and send someone out to examine the audit work papers 
they’ve done on our business and haul them over the coals for 
weaknesses or inconsistencies in those. So…that’s the biggest 
expectation gap.
[T]hat’s a worry overall with all these things, but invariably the 
way it’s being played out is that because of the regulatory approach 
being adopted…the general response of the auditing firms [is that] 
they are saying to the clients: ‘We have to do more work to meet 
the requirements of the regulator.’ So therefore the client has to pay 
more money and that doesn’t mean that they’re not doing other 
things…They’re doing more time in…filling out the check list-type 
thing and the clients are having to pay for it.
[S]itting where we are, thinking all right, we’ve got to shell out large 
amounts of money for their supported process, it’d be pretty good if 
it was valuable towards our organisation and provided a framework 
going forward or provided a lot of handy tips or incentives or 
whatever…a different set of eyes looking at things. But with this 
new check-list approach that’s less likely to happen…they’re more 
focused on ticking the boxes and making sure that they’re covering 
all the bases and providing useful information.
[I]t’s stuff that they tell us they have to [document], but [for] me as 
a client, why would I pay for it? They’re asking me to pay for work 
that I’ve not asked them to do and whose benefit I don’t see, so…
when it comes to fee negotiations, we always just knock that out as 
a legitimate factor. 
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Very rarely do they tell us something that we 
didn’t already know or we weren’t already 
aware of. They try to, because they try to make 
themselves valuable to us, but…the process that 
is forced by the regulator, and this check-box 
approach that we’re talking about, really just 
drives costs [up] for us. In our specific example, 
I don’t think we’d lose much. But I…stand back 
and try to imagine a broader industry type of 
approach. I could see how people could come to that conclusion, 
how this check-box approach would mean that the auditors have 
got X amount of time to spend on this because they’ve got a capped 
fee. They go through the check-box approach and don’t look at 
anything else. In our case, I don’t think it matters that much. I don’t 
think we’d lose much because of that, but I can…see a situation 
where other companies would.
I don’t see a risk as long as the partner’s still on the hook. It’s just 
a time waster. It just adds to cost and inefficiency. And…it has the 
potential to distract from the main game, because the check list’s 
filled in, the pat questions are answered and all of a sudden, no, 
there’s no budget left. Oh, well, we can’t look into this area, which 
is a bit of an issue.
13.2.1 Summary
Purchasers’ comments reveal their reluctance to pay extra for additional 
audit procedures around documentation that they perceive as not 
adding value to them. Some purchasers do not hide their refusal to pay 
extra in this situation, making their auditors absorb the increased time 
requirements without charge. Purchasers reveal some concern that the 
auditor’s focus moves from what can add value to them to ticking boxes, 
which is perceived as being of no value to them.
13.3 Suppliers
Suppliers concede that an increase in costs has accompanied the revised 
auditing standards—whether or not those costs are capable of being 
passed on.
‘[T]hey try to make 
themselves valuable to 
us, but…the process 
that is forced by the 
regulator…really just 
drives costs [up] for us.
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[W]e have had some change in our methodology, but fundamentally, 
what we do hasn’t really changed that much. It’s just that we’ve got to 
put a lot more—whether it be paper or whether it be documents on 
an electric file—significantly more time…for example, when we’re 
doing our quotes for audits going forward, not for maybe existing 
clients, but certainly for prospective clients, the section it takes up 
in our budget document for administration, what I would consider 
to be administration-type tasks, is almost more than…the section 
that deals with the actual guts of the audit. It surprised me in going 
through our budgets now and plotting time and how long do we 
think it’s going to take how much time is in that administration 
area. It’s just amazing. 
[T]he cost varies depending upon the type of 
client and the types of things you’re having 
to do and whether you could spread it across 
a client…I do a lot of audits of funds and 
quite often some of the prescriptive measures 
are in the set-up, the planning phase and 
the completion phase. But a lot of the work 
you’re doing at the individual fund level 
hasn’t changed greatly. So you know those 
costs would be heavy if you were just doing 
one fund, but if you were doing 60 funds, it’s spread across those. 
So it might be a relatively modest increase. On a corporate it can 
be a significant increase, it could be 10 or 15 per cent. And that’s 
difficult…I have some clients who understand and are willing to 
bear part of that cost, if not all. And I have other clients who say, 
‘Well, tough, that’s the market you’re operating in, we assumed you 
were always doing a quality audit.’ If something changes, you’ve 
got to absorb the cost, but it’s certainly a cost. To what extent this 
year and last year—it’s a cost of the fact that…our files should have 
been tighter, but weren’t as tight as they should be, so it’s costs we 
should always have been incurring to have tight files…My guess 
is that cost is…anywhere between 5 and 15 per cent of an audit 
depending on quite how it’s done, which is a pain.
From the point of view of costs…making those standards black-
letter law [means that] a lot of it’s become a lot more prescriptive of 
yourself, so a lot of areas that were like you should do this or you 
‘I have some clients who 
understand and are willing 
to bear part of that cost, 
if not all. And I have other 
clients who say, “Well, 
tough, that’s the market 
you’re operating in, we 
assumed you were always 
doing a quality audit.”’
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should do that have now become you must do this, you must do 
that. So, yes…It does add another layer of costs, because ordinarily 
you’d use your judgment to focus on areas of risk and potentially 
areas that didn’t have any risk you could tone down or cut back 
on the level of work…it’s fairly standard, you could probably get 
through it pretty quickly…Now, you can’t. The minimum level of 
document[ation] requirement is higher than what it was because…
you used to be able to use your judgment to decide whether you 
should do something. Now, irrespective of your judgment, you 
must do things. So…the costs will go up.
[Costs have gone up]…there are some things that we probably 
would’ve done, but on some engagements may…not have done, 
because it was a ‘may’. ‘The audit may use its judgment to do this’, 
whereas now it’s the auditor should. And so a lot of our internal 
work programs, check lists, et cetera, are now you can’t put a ‘not 
applicable’ or say ‘partners’ judgment’; we don’t need to do this, 
you have to do it. So the second you have to do something then 
there’s an extra, whether it’s a half an hour or an hour or whatever it 
needs, then you do have an increase in costs. And it still doesn’t take 
away from any of the other bits of the audit that you were doing; it 
just means that some of things that you may have determined that 
weren’t applicable now are. So, yes, [there is a change] cost-wise.
I’d like to think that ultimately it doesn’t distract the auditors from 
the objective of the audit…you do end up with assurance on the 
credibility of the financial statements…the objective is there and 
the auditors get there. Do they get there by the most perfect critical 
path? Probably not. Does it add to the cost? Obviously, it must. Is 
it a massive issue? To listen to my audit colleagues, it’s getting more 
annoying, so that the weight of extra cost and burden is higher. 
13.3.1 Summary
Suppliers’ comments reveal that some of their clients are more prepared 
than others to pay increased costs as a result of increased documentation 
and regulatory requirements, confirming some of the purchasers’ 
revelations. The increased time for ‘administration’ is clearly sizeable 
given the comments of some suppliers. Comments reveal that at least some 
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of the increased cost is performing tasks that were previously considered 
unnecessary given the risks, but which have now become mandatory 
regardless of the risk.
13.4 Standard setters
Standard setters provide a broader perspective of the increase in audit 
costs than the other stakeholders tend to do. Their comments follow.
[T]here’s no doubt that it heightens the barriers to entry. Yes, the 
cost of getting the fundamentals in place has gone up.
[T]here can be no denying that to deliver what the capital markets 
today consider to be a quality audit costs more money than it did 
before we had the changes in regulation and auditing standards in 
law and regulator oversight. For a whole variety of reasons, we’ve 
had IFRS as well in that space. There [are] a lot more disclosures. 
There’s a lot more fair valuing involved, so skill sets needed to have 
changed. So there are lots of reasons driving cost [and] it is costing 
more, but I’m not blaming that on the regulatory process.
The commercial issues…press down on that…because if you 
increase the underlying cost base by additional documentation-
type work, process work, then your clients are unwilling to [pay]. 
If the total cost of doing the documentation plus the other risk—
the real risk-thinking piece—blows out a bit then there’s pressure 
to squeeze it. So if you can’t squeeze a documentation piece then 
it’s the other piece that gets squeezed…that’s the commercial reality 
that happens a bit. But that’s…one of the quirks of the auditing 
world, isn’t it: the pressure that the audit is put under to minimise 
the amount of work that’s being done. 
Yes, the audit inspections by the regulator, and all the costs that 
that imposes…the regulator view of the need for documentation 
and, at the same time…the tightening of audit standards coming 
internationally anyway, versus the firms having a somewhat more 
pragmatic [view], or wanting more flexibility perhaps than…the 
regulator was giving. 
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[The] standards were amended to make them 
enforceable, but at the same time there’d been 
two or three fairly key updates to the underlying 
ISA and particularly around documentation. 
So that…happened at the same time…It was 
the increased requirements which had come 
out of updates to the ISA which were going to 
come through anyway, and particularly around 
documentation. That would’ve in itself lifted 
the scope of work. On top of that, [the standards being] legally 
enforceable pushes you…down the road of being even more careful 
about documentation and doing more documentation. So it’s a bit of 
a combination of those things. But a lot…of the additional cost is…
around documentation and process, rather than additional work, 
because the standards didn’t really change. The fundamentals of 
it didn’t change…there’s no doubt that it heightens the barriers to 
entry. Yes, the cost of getting the fundamentals in place has gone 
up.
Yes, there is a paradox there that isn’t admitted. And I don’t 
think directors necessarily have too much of a view about this. 
The discussion you have with other directors is more around 
the auditors are coming here saying the standards have changed 
therefore they’ve got to put the fees up by 20 per cent. Tough, that’s 
their problem. [I] don’t want to know about it. [It’s] not our issue…
that their administrative costs have gone up because of regulation. 
Join the rest of the world with everything; that’s what’s happening 
to everybody. In every sense, we don’t want to know about it. 
13.4.1 Summary
Standard setters point out that some of the changes to auditing standards 
that have added costs are attributable to changes in the underlying 
International Standards on Auditing, which occurred before the release of 
legally enforceable standards and were incorporated into those standards. 
One standard setter makes the interesting observation that barriers to 
entry to the carrying on of an auditing service have been raised, which 
has implications for competition. Another supplier points to factors 
besides the changes to auditing that have added to costs (for instance, 
IFRS adoption). Another points to the constant pressure to minimise the 
amount of work that is done in an audit in order to contain costs.
‘[A] lot…of the 
additional cost is…
around documentation 
and process, rather 
than additional work, 
because the standards 
didn’t really change.’
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13.5 Regulators
Regulators, as might be expected, are unrepentant about required 
additional procedures and costs.
[L]eaving it in the hands of the auditors, you’ve got this commercial 
approach where…they’re constrained by costs and they can only 
charge so much in fees, and I wouldn’t want it to be left totally to 
the auditors to decide how much work to do.
The same regulator goes on to say:
I’m not sure that the…mums and dads in the market are all [aware 
that] there [are] legally enforceable standards around…there has 
been a lot of publicity about it and a lot of training, which of course 
I would have received unpublished notification about. I’d say, on 
balance…it has made no difference in the expectation gap…it has 
increased costs.
Even without [the legal backing for auditing standards], they’re 
still liable under negligence and duty of care…if they don’t do an 
audit properly. This whole idea of force-of-law standards increasing 
the cost of an audit, it’s just a fee-grabbing exercise.
13.5.1 Summary
Regulators have mixed views on the justification for legally enforceable 
auditing standards increasing costs. 
14.0 issues and implications
With respect to the individual interviews, users, purchasers and suppliers 
all acknowledge that costs have risen as a consequence of these changes. For 
users who are somewhat sceptical of the value-adding capacities of an audit, 
these added costs only intensify the irritation. Purchasers also acknowledge 
that costs have risen, but there appears to be some acceptance of these costs 
being passed on—at least in part. Suppliers have acknowledged increased 
costs and in some instances margins have been squeezed.
One purchaser makes the interesting and insightful comment that 
auditors are acting like any private-sector supplier providing a service 
to a market: they seek to provide that service in the most efficient means 
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possible, whereas regulators have a different imperative—the delivery of 
a certain quality of service in a particular way. The clash between these 
two is an obvious and not uncommon difference between regulators and 
participants in a competitive market. 
The changes in costs because of these regulatory changes reinforce 
the views of those in the market who are cynical about the value-adding 
capacities of an audit. None of the interviews reveals great insight into the 
public policy value of having an effective and efficient audit process. This 
is an issue that we will return to elsewhere in this report. 
So, while users, purchasers and suppliers are generally of the same 
view—that costs have moved up as a consequence of the introduction of 
various regulatory changes—some of the regulators interviewed are less 
sympathetic to the increased underlying costs for auditors. 
A number of standard setters were interviewed with respect to this 
question and their responses were interesting and insightful. Some 
standard setters appreciated that, while there was going to be a gravitation 
upwards with respect to legally backed auditing standards, several of 
the costs associated with increased documentation came not from the 
changes to the Australian regulatory environment or legally backed 
auditing standards; they in fact came about because of changes in the 
international standards, which called for higher levels of documentation. 
Because of the policy position of the standards board in Australia to hold 
back the introduction of these international standards until such time as 
legally backed auditing standards were introduced, the legal backing and 
changes to the international standards were introduced simultaneously in 
Australia. This would have exacerbated the increase in costs and likely 
resulted in the market concluding that the regulatory regime was the root 
cause of these elevated costs, when in fact it was a more complex situation. 
One standard setter also made the observation that the change to legally 
enforceable auditing standards could in fact substantially increase the 
threshold costs of becoming an auditor to the corporate sector—thereby 
limiting competition. He or she observes that this could be an unintended 
consequence of this shift in the status of auditing standards.
Related to but not directly connected with the increase to operating 
costs of conducting an audit under the new regulatory environment 
is the issue of the costs or potential costs to auditors with respect to 
litigation risk.
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One observer speaks eloquently about what is referred to in the auditing 
literature as the ‘insurance hypothesis’. The insurance hypothesis states 
that a significant component of the value of an audit is the fact that when 
something goes wrong and a company fails or goes into liquidation those 
who sustain an economic loss because of this will seek to recoup some or 
all of that cost through litigation against the auditor, whether an audit 
failure has occurred or not. The observation made by this particular user 
is the fact that the change in regulatory environment will exacerbate 
this potential cost to audit firms. If this is true, it will add to the cost 
of conducting an audit, albeit in an indirect way, without necessarily 
adding any legitimate value to the audit process, and it will perhaps not 
be observable until the professional indemnity insurance premium is 
affected. 
A second observation with respect to litigation came from a regulator 
who took the view that the presence of legally backed auditing standards 
would change the environment in only a relatively minor way. One specific 
way it will change the environment is to add another legal pathway to 
enhance auditor accountability.
15.0 Concluding remarks
In each of the chapters thus far, the concluding remarks have focused on 
the policy implications—in particular the implementation of policy—and 
the accountability for potential future action to some authority or person. 
This chapter documents in considerable detail the consequences of the legal 
backing of auditing standards and the effect on the quality and the costs of the 
audit of companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, among others. 
While the description of the present state is detailed, the potential 
policy actions of participants in the market for audit services are limited 
to one single issue. Whereas some users accept that the present regulatory 
framework and its additional impositions mainly on the suppliers of audit 
services are beneficial in terms of the standardisation and development 
of a minimum quality, it is a fact that there is no evidence from suppliers, 
purchasers, regulators or standard setters that the change in the regulatory 
regime and, in particular, the legal backing of auditing standards, has 
enhanced the quality of the audit product and specifically enhanced the 
efficiency of the capital market.
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One policy outcome and action could be that the relevant public policy 
institution, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), be mandated and 
perhaps even required to systematically gather evidence that demonstrates 
that capital market efficiency has been enhanced by the requirement to 
legal back auditing standards. That is, rather than assuming this public 
policy enhancement has given rise to added benefit to the economy, 
we should gather empirical data that demonstrate or indeed refute that 
these changes to the regulatory regime have had a consequence on the 
Australian economy. We note there is a direct parallel with the legislation 
in the United States (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002), which requires a number 
of evidence-gathering processes to demonstrate this public policy position 
has been of benefit to the US economy.
While it seems apparent to the authors that the FRC has the overarching 
responsibility for this process, it is an issue that could also be relevant to 
those in the Treasury in the Federal Government and to those responsible 




inCREAsinGly PREsCRiPTivE AUDiTs 
A dISTRACTIoN FoR AUdIToRS? 11
[D]oes it distract? Look, it’s like people driving cars with mobile 
phones. I’d like to say that everybody is sensible enough not to 
use their mobile phone when they’re driving, but some people get 
distracted by mobile phones. So…it’s brought an element of risk 
into it, and you have to make sure you don’t get lost in the detail 
and ignore the issues…the really good professionals will make 
sure they get the issues right, and if that means that for some 
reason something gets missed on the documentation…they’ll feel 
more comfortable in that than being absolutely watertight on the 
documentation and having missed the issue. But there will be 
a number that go the other way because they’re that worried…
we’ve had it drilled into us for a while now that ASIC will come in 




The regulatory reforms to the auditing regime of earlier this decade were 
pervasive, once the revised, legally backed auditing standards were 
included. This chapter explores the impact of the changes in terms of the 
auditors’ work conduct. 
•	 Is the increasingly prescriptive nature of auditing a distraction to  
the auditor?
•	 To what extent, if any, has the increasingly prescriptive nature of 
auditing, including increased documentation, resulted in a check-
list mentality that is to the detriment of auditors’ judgment and the 
quality outcome of the audit?
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•	 Given the additional audit procedures now required, do audit 
budgets give less scope to: a) understand the client; and b) delve  
into issues that arise?
•	 Will the additional audit procedures encourage over-auditing?
2.0 introduction
A common question across the surveys and the interviews related to 
whether or not the increasingly prescriptive nature of audit acted as a 
distraction for auditors, so interfering with their task. Survey responses 
appear below and interviewees’ responses in the section after. While the 
increased audit documentation requirements arose separately from the 
creation of legal backing, owing to concurrent changes in International 
Auditing Standards, the complexity of this has been heightened by the 
presence of legal backing. This means that there is an inexorable link 
between legal enforceability on the one hand and documentation on the 
other. This section examines some of the comments devoted specifically to 
the issue of the impact of additional procedures as a result of the reforms 
on the audit. The next chapter examines stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
way in which regulators handle their oversight responsibilities.
3.0 survey
The survey question was framed in the context of the additional 
mandatory audit procedures imposed in response to the high-profile 
corporate collapses of earlier this decade. It read: ‘In response to high-
profile corporate collapses, regulation now requires auditors to comply 
with additional mandatory audit procedures. In your opinion (on a scale 
of 1 = Strongly agree to 5 = Strongly disagree), complying with the 
additional mandatory procedures will distract auditors from the objective 
of a financial statement audit, which is to give assurance on the credibility 
of financial statements.’
Interestingly, a majority of respondents, including those closest to 
the production of audit opinions, do not believe that the new regulatory 
requirements cause a distraction from the major objective of the audit, 
as can be seen in Table 11.1. Importantly, however, there is a noticeable 
differentiation between the typical responses of those who might be 
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seen as less technically expert and those who have a greater level of 
expertise. Users, whether they are seen as professional or retail users, are 
the least likely to believe that there is a distraction arising from these 
new regulations. Of the two groups of producers of audit opinions, it was 
those from non-Big Four firms who viewed the new regulatory regime as 
most distracting. One might speculate that this is a consequence of the 
documentary requirements, which could impact more on firms outside 
the Big Four.

















































































In response to high-profile corporate collapses, regulation now requires auditors to 
comply with additional mandatory audit procedures. In your opinion, complying with 
the additional mandatory procedures will:
Distract auditors 
from the objective 
of a financial 
statement audit, 





19 24 15 14 27 28 38 23 37 33 38
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
4.0 interviews
Most interviewees were asked to respond to a question similar to 
that posed in the survey protocol explained above. That is, did the 
stakeholder perceive the increasingly prescriptive nature of auditing to 
be a distraction? Responses from users, purchasers, suppliers, standard 
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
458 |
setters and regulators to this question are canvassed below, together 
with discussion of these responses. Parts of the responses that touch on 
observations about the regulatory process and regulators themselves 
appear in the next chapter.
4.1 Users
There was a frequent perception among users that there had to be 
procedures in place for an audit, otherwise things would be missed, and 
that check lists assisted with this process in providing a minimum base 
for requirements. The following four quotations demonstrate this theme. 
I don’t know whether they’re becoming any more or any less 
[prescriptive]…to a certain extent, there’s always going to be that 
check list. 
[I]t’s not having a huge influence on this organisation as an 
investor…Regulators don’t always achieve the desired outcome and 
prescribing rules and approaches is often limiting the scope that 
might be applied. 
[T]here is a minimum [needed]…[For] the current…required 
regulatory processes and procedures, you need something as a 
necessary minimum, because…not every audit firm is [one of the 
Big Four firms]…I can be reasonably confident that…all those Big 
Four firms, in 99 per cent of the times, have got it covered, [and] 
are doing the right amount of work. But I’m certain that a lot of 
the small firms are not. When you’ve got a one-partner firm doing 
an audit, the level of documentation that he might…have could be 
very different to what [one of the Big Four firms] would need. 
No, I don’t see them coming around…but they probably have check 
lists that we never see, but I don’t see them coming around with 
check lists wanting this and that. They’ll be coming around, they’ll 
be taking your documents, your emails or your working papers 
and…that’s what I see of it and testing and checking those.
Two users looked at check lists as providing consistency and standardisation 
in the audit ‘product’ and so, by implication, adding to audit quality, as 
the following two quotations reveal.
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[T]hey’ve probably given you a different answer, especially if they 
love their job or they’ve been around for a while…[In] the old 
days…they might’ve been able to do what they wanted to…but… 
a check list and a standard way of doing things is good, and as long 
as it covers that area of credibility then it shouldn’t really distract… 
I’d rather see them be consistent…I don’t have much to do with this, 
but…I’d rather see them have that consistent approach with the 
check list. Now, the auditors may be able to provide an additional 
service to their client by providing advice that’s paid for separately, 
but…in terms of the audit, then [with] that check list…you know 
that you’re getting the same quality of audit across the board.
[There are] benefits of having a common approach across the 
auditing fraternity because it gives us as investors some comfort 
that the quality of audit is consistent and of a certain level, 
otherwise you get the chance where you’ve got some rogue auditing 
firm who might think they’ve got the latest whiz-bang concepts, 
and they really aren’t providing a very good level of service at all. 
But, by the same token, if they’ve got ideas and if they are clearly 
of the view that the current standards are far below where they 
should be then…they have an obligation to the rest of the investing 
community to do something about that and to lead the way, and 
to try and push changes through with the regulator. So…there’s  
a need to be proactive.
[T]here is the real fear…from the auditor’s perspective, that they’re 
being asked to provide assurances to the validity of the statements—
and they are. There’s no doubt that they are being asked to do that…
there’s no value at all having an audit statement that’s just a general 
tick-off. But that is what the expectation is…from the professional 
community, and I don’t think it’s unreasonable for companies to 
have to pay for that.
Others view a check-list approach in a more sinister light, with one user 
finding similarities with the financial services regulatory reforms in a very 
negative way.
The check-list approach…makes it easier for companies that 
perhaps people are going to lose money on to exist. We’ve certainly 
found that in financial advising, with the FSR [financial services 
regulation] reforms, because now there [are] such huge compliance 
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requirements…the poor advisors can sit there and say tick, tick, tick, 
tick, tick, tick, tick, we’ve done everything. The advice is still poor.
There was, however, acknowledgment among users that a check-list 
approach exacerbated by reforms could inhibit ‘innovation’ and ‘that 
inquisitive investigative attribute’, resulting in ‘narrow-minded’ or 
blinkered thinking. This next quotation discusses the potential for 
inhibited innovation:
[T]hat is one of the dangers [of] the check-
list approach versus inhibiting innovation…
there will always be…that legal opinion that 
will say if you go outside the check list, you’re 
exposing yourself, and some people will 
eventually do it, but more than likely you’re 
going to get people just staying within the 
scope of what they need to do to meet the 
requirements, rather than be[ing] innovative 
and go[ing] beyond that…that’s the inherent 
danger of too prescriptive regulation…there is a real risk that a 
‘tick-the-box’ approach and requirement does detract from that 
main objective and…as a user of financial accounts, my overriding 
aim is to have as much assurance as is possible that I can rely on 
these numbers, that they are a fair representation…If you’re forced 
to choose always the prescriptive approach then we’re probably 
missing too much. And this [is] where, if anything, a commentary 
would come in useful. But there is…a real risk that too prescriptive 
an approach takes the eye off the main game, so you’re fulfilling the 
legal requirements but the rest gets left behind.
The person in the next quotation speaks of check lists as discouraging the 
exploration of issues:
[T]here might be certain things that you might’ve been more biased 
[about] because of your personal experiences, whereas a check list 
can avoid it. But, by the same token, if they meet that requirement, 
and you as a person or professional feel that may be not the true 
indication, but they’ve met that requirement, then it’s away from 
that level, isn’t it? You won’t get somebody sticking out their neck 
or saying, ‘Look, I think, based on experience, that they meet these 
boxes but maybe down [further] they’ve got some other issues.’…
‘[M]ore than likely, you’re 
going to get people just 
staying within the scope 
of what they need to do 
to meet the requirements, 
rather than be[ing] 
innovative and go[ing] 
beyond that.’
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And going back—maybe these organisations that we saw going 
bust—maybe they met the boxes at that time, but deep down 
people involved know that that’s not the right way to go.
Another user comments on the danger of a check list impeding on the time 
spent gaining an understanding of the client:
You’ve been here for three weeks and you’re asking questions that 
indicate that you don’t really know what we do and this is the 
problem, because they don’t have the time. In an ideal world…
week one would’ve been spent [finding out], okay, what…these 
guys do, what is their business about, because the auditors have 
never been there before. But that doesn’t happen because they’ve 
got to get straight into it and start…ticking the boxes. So when 
we’re reviewing the process at the end, we’re thinking, ‘Well, how 
much credence can we put on the non-financial assurances that 
these guys are giving if they don’t fully understand the business?’
Users did not comment on documentation specifically, with the exception 
of one, who differentiated between the Big Four and non-Big Four in terms 
of the perceived quality of documentation. 
[T]here is a minimum [needed]…[With] the 
current…required regulatory processes 
and procedures, you need something as a 
necessary minimum, because…not every audit 
firm is [one of the Big Four firms]…I can be 
reasonably confident that…all those Big Four 
firms…99  per cent of the times have got it 
covered, [and] are doing the right amount of 
work. But I’m certain that a lot of the small 
firms are not. When you’ve got a one-partner 
firm doing an audit, the level of documentation that he might…have 
could be very different to what [one of the Big Four firms] would 
need…But does it distract the audit firm’s objective? I don’t think 
so…[at] the small end, it’s a good thing that they have to think about 
documentation and check lists and procedure and, at the big end of 
town, they’ve got enough infrastructure and support to do it.
‘[A]t…the small end, it’s 
a good thing that they 
have to think about 
documentation and check 
lists and procedure and, 
at the big end of town, 
they’ve got enough 
infrastructure and support 
to do it.’
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4.1.1 Summary
Some among the users are concerned that increased attention to check 
lists is eating into budgeted audit time, so that other issues might not be 
investigated. While concerned about the time it takes to attend to check 
lists and the potential for the check-list approach to create form-over-
substance audits, some users feel that a standardised approach creates 
a minimum floor for required audit procedures.
4.2 Purchasers
Among the purchasers, several expressed concerns about a check-list 
approach.
[P]rocess and demonstrative compliance—that’s what an audit has 
become. We’ve got to demonstrate that we comply with the auditing 
standard.
Comment was made about the potential costs and inefficiency of 
spending time completing check lists that not only might mitigate against 
recognising other issues—‘seeing the wood for the trees’ or ‘form over 
substance’—that need investigation, but might deplete the auditor’s time 
budget for little value, ultimately impacting on audit quality. Three of 
the purchasers captured these concerns eloquently when asked if the 
increasingly prescriptive nature of auditing was becoming a distraction.
[E]verybody talks about over-regulation, ticking the boxes. I can 
understand the reason for it because of what happened a few 
years ago and the regulators want to be on top of everything. Like 
anything, if you go too far with it, it becomes very, very difficult.
I definitely see that risk [of an auditor seeking to follow only the 
check list] and…the auditor would need to be very wary of that…
to the extent that the regulator is empowered to require the auditor 
to follow their check list or submit information to them [and that] is 
separate and distinct from the auditor’s responsibility to the other 
shareholders of the company, and maybe [that] should be seen as…
one element of the audit, but not the core element of the audit—not 
the core driver. 
[A narrow view in terms of responsibilities and roles given a check-
list approach is] a definite risk…when you’ve got more rules and 
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you’ve got less time, what are you going to do? You’re going to 
play it safe, right? And then if you do have a lot of inquiry, how 
much time and confidence do you have to break out and pursue it? 
[I] don’t know…in audit—and I say this to my team on the other 
side of the fence here in finance—professional scepticism is very 
important, but when you’ve got scarcity of time and abundance of 
workload, a large part of it regulatory driven, you may well let that 
go or you may well trade it off or run it down…your professional 
scepticism is also borne by how well you understand audit, how 
well you understand…the industry that you audit and how well 
you understand that business. If you’ve got good understanding 
across all three of those, your professional scepticism is at its peak, 
but if you don’t have a lot of time or a lot of training, or [you haven’t] 
had…the time or the stewardship or the supervision to build up 
that commercial nous, then you’re going to miss things and that’s 
where the value add comes in.
Other purchasers, however, do not see the requirement to complete check 
lists as necessarily harmful:
[W]hether that’s…beneficial or not is quite hard to form an opinion 
[on], in my position—not being in an auditor’s role, not really 
having full knowledge on exactly what is in those check lists. But…
to the extent where [in] past practice there were gaps, or it was easy 
to forget things or to overlook things—and this [is] a tightening 
up of that process—I couldn’t see that as a bad thing. But whether 
a lot of this ticking the box is peer reviews and then these sort of 
things…maybe it’s after the event and it’s not going to be equivalent 
to signing the dotted line on those accounts…I’ve got to have faith 
that where it’s heading is helping the standards of the profession…
It’s methodical, it’s consistent.
One purchaser thinks the Australian model is 
superior to that of other countries—no matter 
what its flaws might be:
[I]n a sense, it’s an insoluble model, but…it’s 
produced a far better economic outcome than 
other models in other countries, so it may be 
bad—sorry, it may be flawed—it may have 
its gaps, but it has worked…the last five to 
‘[I]n a sense, it’s an 
insoluble model, but…
it’s produced a far better 
economic outcome than 
other models in other 
countries, so…it may be 
flawed, it may have its 
gaps, but it has worked.’
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10 years…[for me] as an individual, as a personal investor, has been 
positive. It’s created a greater distance between an auditor and the 
company because the auditor is afraid of losing their job and their 
livelihood…but it’s come at a cost of process and autocracy and box 
ticking. Would it free them up to do more work if they [didn’t have] 
to do that…the primary role of the auditor is to challenge what’s in 
the financial statements, to be sceptical.
Another purchaser sees check lists as potentially lessening the audit 
expectations gap:
[I]t’s much more of a check-list approach than it used to be. So…
the auditors…[are] certainly bringing in those check lists to satisfy 
the regulators…more than anything, it’s probably lessening the 
[expectations] gap because they’re coming onboard to that approach.
The next purchaser feels that increased documentation associated with 
check lists is something that was already being done before the reforms:
[E]ven our internal audit team are facing the same…issues, as in we 
are doing a lot of internal documentations…For example, you’ll be 
done documenting, half the things we do we probably [would] be 
able to finish the audit quicker [without the documentation]…that 
probably is one way that people…[could be used to add] more value 
[by being] out there doing another audit…external auditors [are] 
probably…facing the same issues because I understand nowadays 
external auditors are also subject to audit, [and] external audit 
firms are subject to audit, so obviously they would have to make 
sure that the quality and the extent of the documentation has to 
be present…I don’t disagree with the concept…it is…good. They 
should be already doing it anyway. I can’t imagine they’d just go 
in and scribble two lines and somehow just give an opinion on a 
financial statement, though they should be already doing it. So 
hopefully this is not something that is causing too much grief…[for] 
any of the Big Four firms because they should be already doing it.
The same person goes on to express perceptions of a differentiation 
between the smaller and larger audit firms:
For example, [with] the smaller size firm…there might be a bit of an 
issue because they try to do a similar thing to adopt a best practice, 
but then…hopefully if it’s a smaller client they’re looking at…the 
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time required perhaps is proportionately reduced as well in terms 
of trying to match the best practice…the concept is definitely… 
a worthwhile one. Now whether people would take it to the extent 
to be able to draw a balance, I’d probably have to wait and see. 
Maybe…the pendulum is now swinging a little bit because…[there 
were] some possible past incidences…and people were not sure, so 
therefore [they] may have drawn to the extreme and the pendulum 
perhaps might swing back a little bit when people are a bit more 
balanced in terms of what they’re looking for…[There shouldn’t 
be an issue] on the bigger sized firms anyway, because they should 
already have the practices or the normal day-to-day practices…
already more or less there.
Another purchaser similarly sees no difference from what has been 
practised in the past in terms of check lists:
[G]enerally they [have a] check-list approach anyway, regardless 
of whether it’s prescriptive. And if…parts of the thing [are] 
prescriptive, well just send your juniors out to do it. I don’t think 
that’s particularly an obstacle at all…we’d rather see check lists 
than no check lists.
Yet another purchaser does not see the check lists as a distraction:
[T]here are partners who I’ve bumped into who would be very, very 
prescriptive on issues and it’s to check to the last detail…others 
take a more commonsense approach…that’s probably going back to 
the principles involved rather than trying to drive through exact 
rule[s]…But on the whole…they’ve got the balance pretty right…
but…we’re dealing with big companies [audit firms], we’re dealing 
with [one of the Big Four] and that’s been our experience. It’s been 
pretty good.
Another purchaser discusses the level of prescription as just a further 
evolution of the audit process along a continuum from less to more 
regulation and prescription.
I was an auditor for 17 years and so when I started auditing, I started…
in the internal control era…we used to look at internal controls… 
A year or two into my training, we went fully substantive…And 
that was very check-list oriented, but it was very focused on the 
balance sheet and analytics and the like…Then we went back to 
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a more controls-based business orientation. And…
in hindsight…it’s fair to say that was fairly well 
focused towards a consulting additional services 
kind of offering. And now we’ve come back a bit 
on that to a post-independence world, where we’re 
still controls focused, because people want value in 
recommendations around controls. But I don’t think 
the auditors have found their feet yet in terms of 
the balance between controls and substantive…cost, because the 
controls that they’re looking at, I don’t think they’ve worked…
out yet…the moving of the audit models over time perhaps 
demonstrates—I don’t know what it demonstrates, to be honest; 
the market or the regulator or the evolving nature of business…[is] 
a big part of it…business is more complex and sophisticated now.
One purchaser questions objections to an enhanced documentation or 
check-list approach, querying whether auditors are reluctant to disclose 
their ‘true’ opinions: 
Let’s just look at it [from] two points of view. One is because of 
the regulations and because of all the governance issues that 
everybody has to go [through]…auditors obviously have to check 
more, et cetera. That’s one thing, but what could be the negative 
connotation of that? Could it be that they’re not willing to perhaps 
disclose their gut feel[ing] or their perception on a particular 
item because it could perhaps be challenged and it cannot be 
substantiated sometimes? And therefore, if it can’t be substantiated 
and it could be challenged…it won’t be brought into the forefront 
if it’s just a suspicion or a doubt?
The same purchaser argues that the check-list approach will not constitute 
a distraction because auditors must still complete their ‘bread and butter’ 
audit work:
I don’t think that there’s distract[ion] from what their job is. At the 
most…it adds to their workload…but if it adds to their workload, 
they’ve just got to spend so many more hours on it…it’s not that 
they’re going to have to reduce the amount of effort that they do for 
their bread and butter in audit stuff and then say, ‘God, I’ve got to do 
this additional impostor work, so, well, look I’ve done one part of it.’
‘I don’t think the 
auditors have 
found their feet 
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Another purchaser takes a broader perspective about the relativities of 
this issue between the United States under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
and Australia under its reforms:
[A]ll our experience with our auditors is that it’s very much still a 
risk-based audit. If I was to show you the audit plan, they do start 
off with identifying the risks and the point in our processes that 
those risks can occur. I don’t feel…[that] as a preparer, that it is just 
a tick-the-box audit that they do. [Companies] have just deregistered 
from the SEC because the impost of SOX costs [is not] worth the 
registration and the listing in the New York Stock Exchange. And 
SOX actually takes you down a path of ticking off boxes…if you’re 
not a SEC registrant, [we’re] back to a more commonsense, risk-
based, not the tick-the-boxes-based audit. 
Three purchasers comment specifically on audit documentation. 
The first two have some sympathy with auditors’ disquiet about the extent 
of regulatory prescription: 
[F]rom what I hear from our auditors…and some of the discussions 
we have…the gap in expectations between the regulators and the 
auditors at the moment is around the area of documentation. The 
auditors are basically saying…they would like to be in a position 
where they [can] say, ‘Once we’ve formed our opinion, that’s our 
opinion. We issue that opinion and, if it goes wrong, if something 
happens with that company, we’re still stuck having to stand by our 
opinion and we’ll be the ones in court over that.’ But they’re being 
forced down this path…by the regulators of saying, ‘No, you have 
to substantiate how you formed your opinion. You have to have all 
of the paperwork in place.’ 
Does it…distract them from the objective of giving reasonable 
assurance? I’m not sure it does…the question is: ‘Does it add 
value to the audit process?’ I’m pretty sure they’d reach the same 
conclusions without it all. The question is whether…it would be as 
robust in terms of documenting how they got to that conclusion if 
you looked at it two years later. 
The third purchaser sees documentation in a more positive light:
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[T]hat probably [also] depends on the nature of 
the documentation…[if] it enforces a discipline 
around their conclusions then…that’s a good 
thing. The concept of the auditor having a casual 
discussion with management in the corridor or 
in the coffee room or something and drawing 
conclusions from that discussion that just enabled 
them to sign off a set of financial statements…
that’s not acceptable. And if…you’re saying that 
we’re requiring them to…address [the issue of] have we thought 
through this, this, this and this, and let’s lay out logically what…
our conclusions are and why we’ve drawn them, then that’s a 
positive…It just enforces some discipline around their process, 
providing it’s succinct and productive and not bureaucratic…that 
gets back to the question of the nature of the paperwork. If it’s 
filling out exactly the same form for 10 clients for a year then that 
would be soul destroying…I don’t know exactly the nature of the 
paperwork…but hopefully it’s intended to enforce some discipline 
in making them think about aspects of the client’s business, and 
draw conclusions from that, and actually document why, or reasons 
why, they’ve drawn those conclusions…that’s an intellectual 
challenge for them, and it’s really ensuring that they’ve done their 
job properly rather than just a form-filling exercise. 
4.2.1 Summary
Purchasers observe that the regulator is auditing the auditors, but there 
is scepticism expressed about whether this can be successful, with a 
claim that what is recorded cannot capture adequately exactly what has 
happened. Among those from the purchasers who feel that the level of 
prescription faced by auditors does not present a distraction to them, a 
major reason for this is the perception that the audit firms should already 
have been complying with the documentation and other requirements, 
especially among the Big Four. Some look on it as adding rigour and 
discipline to the audit effort. The observation is made that in terms of 
internal audit, increased requirements for documentation are happening 
too. One purchaser with experience of complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act comments on the check-list approach under that act as being much 
more extreme compared with the approach under the Australian auditing 
standards. Two comment on whether the Big Four and non-Big Four are 
‘[T]hat’s an intellectual 
challenge for them, 
and it’s really ensuring 
that they’ve done their 
job properly rather 
than just a form-filling 
exercise.’
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equally equipped to deal with the level of prescription, especially in terms 
of documentation. The comments about documentation from purchasers 
reveal the essence of the debate about this required audit procedure: 
documentation as inflexible and inefficient versus documentation as 
a worthwhile discipline that contributes to audit quality by compelling 
a reflective approach.
4.3 Suppliers
Among the suppliers, many interviewees felt that the level of prescription 
created a concern for the quality of the audit. Indicative comments appear 
below and range from those that documentation provides evidence of a 
job well done to comments about added cost. The first few quotations 
from the interviews highlight that, to partners, there is a need to maintain 
professionalism in the face of increased time pressures because of check 
lists and enhanced documentation requirements, and to ensure that audits 
continue to entail substance over form.
[Prescription has] the potential to [distract]…I’m the partner signing 
off on my clients. Is this heightened regulator risk actually going 
to change my own view about what…things am I worried about, 
what are the major things from a shareholder’s perspective in these 
financial statements? I don’t think it’s going to change that. Does it 
change my focus a little bit internally on me specifically reviewing 
areas of our files, rather than relying on, as in any organisation, 
delegating some responsibility to…the manager or the director on 
the engagement? Will it change my focus on those things? Probably, 
in some ways, because…if I am the one [who’s] the partner on the 
engagement, it crystallises some of those things. 
But in terms of the external [audit]…I’ve got to do what I’ve go to do 
to get to an audit opinion. And just because there may be another 
regulator who can look at my files or who can require this or that or 
put extra things in, those are just part of things that you’ve got to 
get on with. I don’t think it affects my approach to it. 
Remembering that at the time of the interviews, there had not been a great 
deal of experience with the new requirements, the following quotation 
speaks to any distraction being only until familiarity takes over, but then 
goes on to imply it will lead to consumption of time with no apparent 
productive outcome.
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Yeah, it is a distraction…until we get comfortable with it and 
understand how it’s done, there is a risk. The reality is…[that] the 
way that it happens is, instead of people working 100 per cent of the 
time, they work 120 per cent, because the last thing a professional 
will do is let the form get in the way of the substance. It means that 
we have to ramp up and get the form right. And, yes, there’s a risk 
of distraction, but I would like to think that we are still nailing the 
substance things. 
The same person goes on to elaborate on the risk of prescription creating 
inefficient audit practices to the extent of over-auditing:
[W]hat it will do for a little while is…bring back the double audit, 
which is basically the audit that’s done…by the senior members 
of the audit team…around what are the issues and what are our 
calls on those, and are we comfortable with those, and flushing 
those out, which is to make sure we get the right answer. And 
then [there’s] the other bit of the audit, which is documenting that, 
making sure we’ve done enough detailed work to support that, the 
cycles and so forth…before this great focus on quality, they were 
quite nicely integrated. You were having the top-down driving of 
the risk approach to audit and flushing that out, and they all neatly 
linked through…it’s brought back a little bit of the dual audit.
Another supplier voices a similar concern:
The processes can be very prescriptive in terms of form filling and 
that can distract an auditor from applying his time in terms of the 
judgment areas, and that does become difficult when you are forced 
down a track of form filling. And often those forms can be fairly 
detailed. And to do it properly, it does take time, and often that time 
cannot then be spent in relation to the judgments, better knowledge 
of a client, better further analysis on the risk areas.
One of the suppliers expresses concern about the impact on auditors’ 
business models of the requirement for greater documentation and 
the difficulty of being recompensed by clients who see the audit as 
a commodity, as illustrated in the following quote:
The users of the accounts don’t quite understand what an audit is 
or what the regulations are, so they’re saying, ‘Well, why should 
an audit cost?’ They don’t…particularly see the value in an audit, 
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which is ironic, because if anything goes wrong, usually the 
auditors are the first people that they try and sue. Notwithstanding 
that, they don’t seem to place too much value on an audit in terms 
of the cost of an audit. So…trying to marry up the regulators’ 
requirements, and trying to marry up our obligations and our own 
business models, and trying to get the consumer, or the users of the 
accounts, to understand, is quite a challenge.
The majority of suppliers, however, did speak in negative terms of the 
increasingly regulated approach to audit and in particular its potential to 
distract them. These next two quotations speak about what is perceived as 
auditors’ fear of non-compliance.
[W]e auditors are so intent on complying because of what can 
happen to us if we don’t, we tend to have a very narrow vision of 
what our responsibilities are. So it does distract the auditor.
Yes, absolutely [it is a distraction], because they’ve got all auditors 
gun-shy now. They’re just saying, ‘You’ve got to strictly do each 
of these different things.’ And the only way to properly combat 
the way that we’re being talked down to effectively is to check 
list things and just to simply say, ‘Oh, well, we did that, we did 
that’, instead of…having more of a holistic approach to the audit. 
And when you look at the language, the way that they’re treating 
auditors, and then when you look at things like they’ve tripled the 
size of the CALDB in the past year…you go ‘hello?’. They’ve got 
new auditing standards, they’ve got force of law, you’ve got three 
times the number of people on the CALDB and they’re basically 
telling us that we must be very prescriptive, we must do all these 
things. Yeah, it has to have an effect on auditors, who are just simply 
going to tick a box: yes, we’ve done that; yes, we’ve done this…
We’ve only got so much time to do things and clients don’t expect 
us to increase the audit fees by 25 per cent to account for all these 
sorts of things. So we’re the meat in the sandwich. 
This next quotation highlights just how many reviews—internal and 
external—audits are subject to:
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The regulated approach [is] horses for courses. 
You have audit firms that have a lot of 
expertise and…crudely trying to group them 
into groups: the Big Four…we have technical 
expertise with high-quality standards already 
internally; we’re regulated in turn; we have 
our own self-review policies; we have every 
man and his dog coming in looking at our 
files. So we…have that basic foundation 
sorted. If you’re looking at a small-tier firm 
that might not have those internal policies, then the regulators 
probably have a job to do there, and a check list might…be quite 
helpful. It might make sure that they’re all a little bit more in line 
with at…least a basic standard. But where we have the real skills…
and what we like to focus our audit on, and where the value comes 
in, is when you…look at the…financial risks that are involved in 
the business, and trying to focus on understanding the client’s 
business; understanding where likely problems are to come up…
once you’ve identified those—usually, they’re very highly technical 
areas—[you can focus] your audit time on those aspects, as opposed 
to ticking and bashing and getting a nice, neat, make sure the 
boxes are crossed. Because we already have our work programs, our 
systems already have a lot of that built into it. 
Some of the comments about the content of the check lists were quite 
scathing in terms of the perceived harm to audit quality that could ensue. 
[T]he second aspect of it is documentation. Whilst…it is a very 
good thing, [it] is, however…starting to drive people to behave 
[differently]…there’s a lot of time being spent on documenting, and 
my big concern is that, whether we like it or not, we’re moving to 
auditors spending time behind their machines documenting rather 
than talking to clients and actually getting out and understanding 
the business and the business processes. And…there’s a balance 
somewhere in between, where it is important to document, 
but it is also important to make sure that we spend time in the 
client’s business understanding the processes, understanding the 
commercial reality of transactions.
Since increased documentation requirements most affect suppliers, it is 
not surprising that several of them comment specifically on this issue. 
‘If you’re looking at a 
small-tier firm that might 
not have those internal 
policies, then the regulators 
probably have a job to 
do there, and a check list 
might…be quite helpful.’
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The first few comments are in a positive vein, acknowledging that audit files 
are in a better state as a consequence of the emphasis on documentation; 
however, some negative comments follow.
Our audit files are better because of…getting sufficient 
documentation…I started in the late ’80s with the firm—and I’m 
not sure if the audit opinions would be different now—but…we 
probably are better in documenting how we got to that opinion, 
but maybe there was more in the partner’s head, for instance, and it 
should have been in the file. So, to that extent, that’s a good result…
certainly, the compliance burden is…far more significant than even 
within the last few years; it’s grown.
Where we’ve probably not been good, as all firms 
in this profession, is in the form and recording 
that…that’s very much the focus [of] these legally 
enforceable [standards]…getting it written and 
properly documented for the record [is] where…
we’ve been less good historically as a profession than 
we should’ve been…Yes, we have to make sure we 
cover everything and there’s more prescription in 
certain areas, and more rule[s]…in applying that, but I don’t have 
major concerns over that philosophically. Others of my partners 
would have…The fact that we’ve now got them as legally enforceable, 
we could have a debate one morning about whether that’s right or 
wrong. The fact that they’re there and legally enforceable…creates a 
very small expectation gap…between the regulators and the auditors. 
They are as well equipped as anybody to know what we do.
The same person goes on to imply that the standards have usurped much 
of what was previously involved in the auditor’s task: 
[I]n [the] pecking order, another firm will understand exactly what 
we’re doing on an audit because that’s what they’re doing. The 
regulators will be just a few steps behind…management and boards 
are a little bit away from them…And then…the general public and 
investors are quite a way behind that as to our responsibilities 
around full audit and so forth. But…it’s crystal clear now in 
those standards; it’s set out. All that’s left to the firm to do [is] an 
interpretative notice perhaps, design sample sizes and how it’s 
documented and so on.
‘Where we’ve 
probably not been 
good, as all firms 
in this profession, 
is in the form and 
recording that.’
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In the next two quotations, suppliers raise the fact that in the past 
documentation was not always adequate around judgments, creating a 
need for some assumed knowledge.
[O]ne thing that’s happened certainly within [Big Four firm 
named] and…within the Big Four [generally] is [that] our focus on 
documentation has really increased…the audit files have always 
existed, but to document it to the degree that you need to so that 
somebody could come in independent [of] yourself and reach the 
same conclusion based on that information—that hasn’t always 
been there. You’ve always had to have some assumed knowledge…
you couldn’t just pick up the information and come to a conclusion 
because sometimes the judgments weren’t that well documented. 
So from that perspective, I haven’t had too many issues where 
questions have been asked around ‘where’s this check list’, 
because it’s usually been there in some form. It’s been more the 
emphasis, the focus. 
[I]t means you’ve got to document your judgment…that’s really 
what it comes down to. And it’s a hard one because judgment is 
exactly judgment. I make a decision on my professional judgment 
on something that I do. There [are] so many different factors that 
I’m taking in to potentially make a decision on something, make 
a call on something, and sometimes to document [that is] very 
difficult. So therefore I don’t necessarily think it’s taking the 
judgment out, but what it is doing is it’s making you justify your 
judgment. So if [you] could say [that] by virtue of those actually 
taking some of the flexibility away in relation to what you would 
consider to be professional judgment…what they’re saying is…
it’s taking away…your capability to…make a judgment call…I’ve 
probably gone a little bit around in circles there, but…you can 
still use your judgment, it’s just that you’ve got to justify your 
judgment and sometimes that is difficult to do.
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[Prescription has] certainly added value for the 
record…it’s there, it is written, the evidence 
is there, whereas before the evidence wasn’t 
documented. The work has been done but 
it wasn’t documented. It is causing partners 
particularly to spend a lot more time in the 
files…a lot of that energy is [consumed in 
asking] ‘Have we constructed it correctly, 
dotted the Is, crossed Ts, documented it?’ My 
getting into the file…isn’t flushing out any 
more issues than you knew were there, because…if the youngsters 
don’t get them and bring them to your attention anyway, or through 
the file, you’re not always going to flush them out. So I’m hoping it’ll 
settle down…it certainly has over the last few months. I feel much 
more comfortable around the quality—that it’s there, that we’re 
across it. But we’ve a way to go before…it’s in the stream. So there’s 
a little bit of a risk [that] it is a distraction, but I’d like to think we 
still stay focused and we say ‘Well, okay, we’ve got these additional 
constraints. We thought we were policing ourselves pretty well, 
we thought our professional judgment was pretty good, but if you 
guys want to police us and you want to be prescriptive, well, okay, 
that’s the regime; we’ll live with it.’ But we’ll still do the substance 
of an audit as we’ve always done [it] before.
Increased cost and a trend towards a more prescriptive US-style 
regulation are issues raised in the next quotation, even though there 
is acknowledgment of an improvement to the quality of documentation.
One of the issues…in audit files over the years has been the 
quality of documentation…[I]n recent times and [with] the level 
of regulatory reviews that we’ve had that have really made us 
focus and improve the type of documentation that we have [have] 
improved the level more. It will continue to improve the level of 
documentation, which…is important…we need to continually 
keep…making [those files] better…But I don’t necessarily think 
that sort of prescriptive American-style regulation is where we 
really want to be…It will add more cost and…at the moment, 
the problem that we find is that regulators are pushing down and 
saying you must do all this sort of stuff.
‘[Prescription is] certainly 
added value for the 
record…it’s there, it is 
written, the evidence is 
there, whereas before 
the evidence wasn’t 
documented. The work has 
been done but it wasn’t 
documented.’
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The next supplier comments on the increased documentation compliance 
burden:
[T]he biggest distraction is the necessity to do 
check lists, et cetera. The regulators are very 
much pushing a documentation side of things. 
And largely I don’t disagree with the principle 
[of] what they’re trying to achieve. But what’s 
happening now is that things that we have…
physically done [previously] but perhaps haven’t 
printed on paper, we now have to put on paper…
it’s distracting because you’ve got to spend so 
much time doing check lists and all that sort of stuff now. We’ve 
mandated those…they’ve got to go on our files so that the staff have 
no choice, the audit team has no choice in completing them. And 
they’re time consuming, and they’re really just putting on paper 
things you’ve already done…that is one of the biggest challenges.
4.3.1 Summary
Many of the supplier interviewees make negative comments about 
the increasing regulation of audit. Several highlight the merit of the 
disciplined approach to documentation that is now in place, however, 
they lament the amount of time it takes. One mentions the difficulty 
of being in a transitional period between the previous and the new 
auditing standards—which was the case at the time of the interviews—
as representing a potential distraction. Overwhelmingly, however, the 
comments related to the consequences for auditors of not thoroughly 
documenting, not only what was done, by why alternative methods were 
not adopted, and the risk that this incremental documentation requirement 
would detract from a holistic approach to the audit. Disturbingly, this 
check-list focus was mentioned as pervading internal reviews of audit 
documentation too. Several suppliers allude to documentation before the 
advent of the legally backed standards as being of a quality below optimal. 
Terms or phrases such as ‘focus’, ‘improvement’, ‘better audit files’, 
‘record of key factors’, ‘recording in the file rather than in the partner’s 
head’ all appear in this section. Nevertheless, there is acknowledgment of 
the increased prescription, the compliance burden, the increased cost and 
doubt expressed about the expertise of regulators in monitoring in terms 
of their focus on the appropriate issues. 
‘[W]hat’s happening 
now is that things that 
we have…physically 
done [previously] but 
perhaps haven’t printed 
on paper, we now have 
to put on paper.’
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4.4 Standard setters
In applying the auditing standards, the standard setters themselves 
admit to difficulty in implementing documentation requirements, as 
the first quotation from the interviews reveals. Reference to the PCAOB 
requirements as a benchmark is raised as a misunderstood comparison in 
this first quotation from the interviewees.
We hear fairly regularly from the regulators, and…these days 
they’re reviewing the audit firms annually and they are looking at 
our audit files as well…they pick up things, they feedback to us…
[Something I’ve been] hearing a lot about it the last 12 months is the 
level of documentation…[For] most things they feedback, we’d say 
‘Yes, okay’; perhaps [there is] a question of degree here and there, 
[but we] acknowledge it. Documentation is quite a problematic issue 
for the auditing profession right now…I’m trying to come to grips 
with exactly what level of documentation is required by auditing 
standards. Reference is made to the PCAOB requirements quite 
often, but…possibly [it is] misunderstood…the profession’s trying 
to look at how to interpret our own auditing standards, our own 
documentation requirements and our reasonable reference point is 
the PCAOB requirements. And this has been a major concern to the 
smaller practitioners. I hear it around the board: the representatives 
of the smaller firms get very concerned around documentation. The 
larger firms are more relaxed about it in principle, but we are aware 
that we probably don’t totally meet the standard the regulator 
would like to see across the board for documentation.
While acknowledging the increased cost to create enhanced documentation, 
the comment from another standard setter reveals faith in the profession 
to document well, without detracting from time spent on the quality 
of the real audit.
[T]he bottom line is that [prescription]…shouldn’t 
[be a distraction]…human nature is that it probably 
will [be] in certain circumstances, but in reality it 
shouldn’t. There’s no reason why you can’t do the 
documentation and still do the risk assessment and 
proper thinking. I don’t think the two are…mutually 
exclusive…the question is more around [whether] 
there [is] real value in the work that’s associated with 
‘There’s no reason 
why you can’t do 
the documentation 
and still do the risk 
assessment and 
proper thinking.’
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the documentation and the costs that are put on the community as a 
consequence. And I know the profession would say—I’m sure you’d 
probably find people who would say—‘Well, the documentation 
stops us from doing the real work.’ Well, I…don’t think that’s 
right…there’s no reason why you can’t do both.
Two standard setters raise the issue of tension between a risk-based audit 
approach and a prescriptive approach that demands attention to events 
and transactions even of low to zero risk.
[M]any in the audit profession would say auditing is about risk 
assessments and determining where the issues are and resolving 
the issues. That’s…what good auditing is about. It’s not about 
documentation, it’s not about quality of documentation, it’s not 
about doing particular steps, if you are legitimately of the view 
that [there] isn’t risk attached to that area. So [it’s] that ability to…
be truly risk-based versus having to do what’s required, what’s 
described in certain things. It’s a constant tension between those 
two points of view. Now, the reality is you’re never going to have 
one or the other…It’s going to be whatever model we have in 
whatever country you’re looking at; it’s…a combination of both. 
Different sets of standards, different jurisdictions. It’s different 
places on that spectrum. The debate is often about principles versus 
prescription, as patent as that…that’s oversimplifying it, actually. 
What we have everywhere is a mixture…a spectrum and it’s really 
a question of where you’re sitting on that spectrum, because there 
is nothing that’s purely principles based and there’s nothing that’s 
purely prescriptive…We would normally say that we have auditing 
standards in Australia which are principles based, but they…have 
a fair amount of prescription in them. 
[N]ow…you document [the procedure to be used], but you’ve also 
got to document why every other way which you could have done it 
was not appropriate…that’s what’s adding a lot to the documentation 
as well as just…[having] everything on the file. So…there is going 
to be an increased cost in terms of the documentation and…that 
probably goes to the check-list approach. Whether that will lead to 
any better audits…probably not.
None of the standard setters feels there is a serious problem with the level 
of prescription, as the following quotations reveal.
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In theory, it shouldn’t [distract]…because they have their own audit 
methodology so they do have a tried and tested way of doing an 
audit and if they’ve got the right quality-control processes within 
the firm they should be isolating these regulatory requirements 
as additional to the audit and add-ons. Now, where there’s 
a lot to deliver in a short space of time then [it] could [distract] 
because you’ve got limited resources now to spread across a larger 
requirement. But…there is potential too for it to improve the audit 
in that the fact that they have to do a lot of other regulatory things 
[that] will increase their knowledge of the organisation and also the 
compliance risk associated with that. So there are benefits in doing 
all this regulatory stuff because you do…improve your knowledge 
of the business rather than just the financial statement information 
flows. 
I couldn’t go through any of the auditing standards and disagree 
with anything behind any of the intent in any of those standards.
Another standard setter sees the situation as positive:
[W]hat’s going on at the moment overall is a positive, 
not a negative. I don’t think it’s detracting. You 
can definitely see the argument and could mount 
the argument that the focus on documentation and 
being form driven and demonstrating that you’ve 
done what the standard requires, or what a regulator 
wants you to show, can lead to a check-list approach, 
but being part of a profession that—I know we had 
our HIHs and our Harris Scarfes and our Ansetts here, when Enron 
was happening overseas, et cetera—the call to the profession was to 
say, ‘Well, look, we…being the capital markets, need some evidence 
that you know what it is to be objective and independent and that 
you’re capable of exercising that independence and objectivity and 
that we’ve got some mechanism for understanding that you’re doing 
it’—hence all the oversight. 
Continuing, the same standard setter goes on to support ASIC:
[W]e’re in an era where the profession is responding and wanting to 
put up their hand and say, ‘Yes, I understand what it is to do a decent 
job’…what I read in here by the required regulatory processes and 
‘[W]hat’s going 
on at the moment 
overall is a positive, 
not a negative.’
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procedures—yes, we’ve got auditing standards in law, but it’s not so 
much that, it’s the oversight. And people are saying look, we want 
people to know we’re doing a good job. So that’s…focusing people 
very much on what sort of a trail do I feel I need to leave behind to 
demonstrate I’ve done a good job. That of itself then requires you 
to make sure you have addressed all the right areas. So, where are 
we in the cycle? I don’t see we’ve created a problem for missing 
the reasonable assurance piece. Depending on the reaction of our 
regulators and how they enforce compliance, or their interpretation 
of compliance, [that] might get us into a different spot, but I’d be 
supportive of where ASIC has been to date and don’t see that they’re 
doing that.
The same person comments on whether the use of check lists is the most 
efficient way in which to audit:
There’ll be more done but…there’s going to be more check lists 
in it…there’s going to be a principle-based approach but behind 
that there will be a lot more to the check list and so therefore…the 
audit…[will] be more expensive, it will require more documentation 
and bigger files and more people on the job, but we’ll get to the 
right answer…the real question is could that be done [in] a more 
efficient way? Probably, it could have. 
4.4.1 Summary
Standard setters give nuanced responses to the question of prescription 
as a distraction. They acknowledge the risk of it leading to a check-list 
approach, but can see the potential for it also to improve the audit and 
argue that, in a normative sense, increased prescription, especially around 
documentation, should not lessen the more judgmental aspects of an audit. 
Generally, there is support for what the regulator is attempting to achieve 
and the increased documentation is seen as a positive in that it provides an 
evidence base for a claim of a job well done. The anomaly of many auditors’ 
claims to a diminished role for judgment in the face of their calls for greater 
clarity, which can be interpreted as a call for more explicit rules, is raised 
also. Standard setters, many of whom are also suppliers, comment on the 
use of the onerous US PCAOB requirements as a reference point, much to 
the likely chagrin of smaller firms. The issue of prescription or rules-based 
standards versus principles-based standards and the tension between these 
two positions on a continuum are raised also.
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4.5 Regulators
Interestingly, some regulators recognise the potential pitfalls of encouraging 
an approach to auditing that is too prescriptive, as in the following quote:
I’m uncomfortable with the check-list approach to auditing…I realise 
how much professional judgment is involved when you’re assessing 
risks in auditing a company and in terms of finding problems and 
dealing with problems and discussing them with management. 
A check-list approach doesn’t suit that kind of environment. The 
problem with a check-list approach, like the standards, is that 
there are certain people in the industry who will try to find ways 
around it. They’ll try to find shortcuts and they may just defend 
themselves in terms of having ticked something but not having 
done the work satisfactorily. In audits, I find that as you work 
through the job, you get triggers and there are certain triggers…or 
[alarms that] are going [off] which make you chase down different 
burrows and perhaps find things that you wouldn’t have found if 
you had just complied with a check list. So I am uncomfortable with 
the check-list approach and I don’t think it’s constructive or reflects 
the professionality [sic] of what an audit does.
In other respects, however, there is little empathy for the auditor’s plight 
as revealed in the following quote:
[O]ne of the standard complaints you get from business people 
now is well, we’ve got to do all of this extra work and it doesn’t 
achieve anything because for legitimate people it’s just extra work. 
If you’re determined to do the wrong thing, well, something like 
that probably isn’t going to stop you. So…it’s probably a similar 
issue…I’ve noticed in my travels this whole issue about Sarbanes-
Oxley that some people view…as imposing…[requirements in a] 
prescriptive manner, which doesn’t take account of their particular 
needs. 
The same person goes on to say:
If you have a check list, then the auditors will treat that as the 
maximum. Well, that’s unfair. Some auditors, some audit firms, 
may treat that as the maximum work that they need to do whereas 
really…in a lot of cases, it’s the minimum.…If there is going to be a 
check list, it has to be emphasised to investors and the people in the 
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profession alike that this is the minimum…standard that you have 
to reach and there is an expectation that you move beyond that and 
deliver better results in terms of your professional judgment and 
experience.
We’re not distracting them. They may actually distract themselves 
because it all comes down to fees from clients, right? No, but the 
auditors themselves ask for [a check list]…when they talk…in 
public policy forums, they want professional judgment, but when 
they go to the Institute of Chartered Accountants or somewhere 
else, they’re always looking for an audit practice guide. They can’t 
have it both ways.
I agree there has been a loss of focus…when you’ve got so much 
regulation and you’ve got so many hurdles to get over in delivering 
a satisfactory audit, you can lose sight of…what you’re supposed 
to be doing…and you get bogged down in nitty-gritty-type stuff, 
which…is necessary in certain circumstances, but does distract. 
I’m talking now in terms of delivering the product at the coal 
face and…the engagement partner, the audit partner, should 
always have a big-picture approach and…be able to rely on his…
supervisors to do the nitty-gritty stuff, the managers to draw up 
the problems on [the]…big picture and deliver them to the audit 
partner as the big picture…recently the audit partners are getting 
increasingly bogged down in detail because of…the prescription 
in terms of regulation…My sense of working in an audit team is 
that you’ve got the people actually doing the hack work and you’ve 
got supervisors who see a larger picture and are able to draw back 
and feed up the chain…the…important problems that need to be 
brought to the attention of the next level…that feed-up process is 
being stunted as a result of the amount of hack work you have to do 
to meet the regulation, the provisions in the law.
[T]he regulators are a bit inclined to say…that for all that you 
get this objection [that] the concept that audit standards have to 
be principle based and judgments paramount, that equally the 
auditors, the firms, are actually forever asking for greater clarity, 
which really means more rules.
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4.5.1 Summary
Most of the regulators who commented on the appropriateness of the level 
of prescription placed on the audit function justified the level required. 
As with the standard setters, regulators point to the anomaly of some 
auditors asking for more guidance while championing the need for 
judgment. They also express the view that it is up to auditors to decide 
how much work to do. The prescription and compliance requirements are 
seen as a minimum benchmark for the conduct of the audit with scope for 
judgment or additional work not inhibited.
5.0 issues and implications
Users, purchasers, suppliers, standard setters and regulators were all 
interviewed with a query about whether the additional audit procedures 
required as a result of the reforms distracted auditors from the objective of 
a financial statement audit. In general, in all of the groups, some members 
agreed and some disagreed with the premise within this question. That is, 
no group of respondents was unanimous in its response. One of the most 
intriguing results from the interviews was that users believed that they 
had a relatively sophisticated and complex understanding of the work of 
an auditor and what the current regulatory requirements entailed. 
A number of users—in particular those who are professional investors—
take the view that the current regulatory requirements, with their heavy 
emphasis on compliance and documentation, have shifted the focus of the 
auditor away from the need to spend time understanding the business and 
the risks of the business. There were several representations suggesting 
that users were concerned that auditors were now forced to ‘get on with 
ticking boxes’ rather than spending time reflecting on and coming to grips 
with the business, its processes and its risks. It was interesting to observe 
that many of the users claimed to have a quite sophisticated understanding 
of the time taken to undertake these processes. 
Some users have a very different perspective, suggesting that the current 
regulatory requirements are not a distraction from the main objective of 
the audit and that in fact an audit might be largely irrelevant anyway. 
There was also a suggestion that the market was constantly assessing and 
reappraising the value of securities and that the contribution made by an 
audit was modest. One user suggests that auditors have an obligation for 
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and on behalf of their clients to push back against regulatory requirements 
if they think there is a better way for the audit to be achieved and for the 
outcome of the audit to be better delivered to the capital markets.
Other users praise the current regulatory requirements, suggesting they 
provide a floor level of quality. Various users describe the present regulatory 
system as giving rise to audits that are ‘standardised’, ‘consistent’, 
‘unbiased’, ‘objective’, ‘comprehensive’ and ‘methodical’. There seems 
to be an implication in the minds of some that these requirements will 
give rise to higher-quality auditing and they take the view that this will 
mean that the auditors will be better able to comment on the credibility of 
financial statements. A few users suggest that auditors need to go beyond 
this and be inquiring and innovative in their understanding of a business 
and the risks of a business. 
In terms of policy implication, the descriptors used (‘standardised’, 
‘consistent’, and so on) and enunciated by the users above might represent 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for there to be a high-value audit 
that attests or gives assurance to the credibility of financial statements.
Purchasers are also split between those who believe that the current 
regulatory processes are a distraction and those who believe they are not. 
Those who are critical of the current proposals suggest that for the audit to 
be of value it really needs to look at the substance behind the transactions 
and behind the documentation. Those who believe that regulation is not 
a distraction tend to share the view of users that the current regulatory 
requirements are there to ensure an appropriate job is done and that they 
represent ‘demonstrable compliance’. Those who speak positively about 
the current regulatory requirements also add that these requirements 
have helped ensure there is greater distance between auditors and their 
clients. Some note that this distance comes at a cost, including the cost of 
possibly unnecessary documentation and over-auditing, but nonetheless 
the benefits outweigh the costs. 
Further, some purchasers add that while the requirements might not have 
changed much of what is done, they have added considerable robustness to 
the audit, which might not have been present to a sufficient level before.
A number of purchasers suggest that, fundamentally, the audit 
they observe has not changed with recent amendments to regulatory 
requirements; however, it has driven up costs. Few purchasers are able to 
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identify how the audit has been changed or that the auditors provide new 
and valuable insights into the business as a consequence of the regulations.
Those who are able to make direct comparisons between Australia’s 
current position and the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the United States 
speak favourably of the Australian position and somewhat harshly of the 
more prescriptive and compliance-driven US position.
Various purchasers discuss their need for a balance and that the ‘check-
list approach’ is really just a minimum floor level, which returns to the 
point that audits that fulfil all the regulatory requirements are a minimum 
standard and there needs to be innovation and insight beyond this to 
achieve a high-value audit. 
One purchaser questions why auditors might find increased 
documentation requirements a negative development, alluding to an 
unwillingness to convey their ‘true’ beliefs. In view of this, when 
commenting on the increased requirements, auditors and audit firms need 
to be careful to explain the reasons behind their concerns and not give an 
incorrect impression of an unwillingness to commit their thoughts into 
writing.
Similarly, suppliers are divided between those who believe the current 
regulatory requirements are a distraction and those who believe that they 
are an enhancement. Those who are critical of the current regulatory 
requirements point to the ever-increasing amount of time spent on 
documentation, which has distracted them from the time they are able to 
commit to understanding the business. This point runs in tandem with 
observations that clients are reluctant to absorb substantially increased fees, 
so the number of hours available to an audit is a ‘zero-sum game’. Those who 
are critical suggest that some audit partners are becoming ‘gun-shy’ of the 
possible penalties and that they have to change their approach from being 
less principles based and reliant on judgment to being much more check-list 
oriented. Other suppliers suggest a ‘heightened regulation risk’. 
Those who believe that the current regulatory requirements are positive 
point to the fact that the regulations really represent the enforcement of a 
minimum level of quality. Often these observations come from larger audit 
firms with an accompanying implied criticism of the quality delivered by 
non-Big Four firms. The implication is that the Big Four firms do not require 
these regulatory requirements, whereas other suppliers might need them.
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Standard setters see the current regulatory requirements as a useful 
part of the quality control of an audit and not as a distraction from the real, 
continuing operation of the audit. They observe that the requirements 
give rise to demonstrated evidence that a good job has been accomplished. 
Standard setters understandably take the view that all of the auditing 
standards have an important role to play in the quality of auditing and its 
role in the capital market.
One standard setter interviewed proposes the dilemma that is 
sometimes seen in the market where, with respect to public policy, 
auditors call for audits to be judgment driven and principles based, 
whereas when interacting within professional bodies or associations, they 
seek greater ‘clarity’, which inevitably becomes something akin to a check 
list. Another standard setter observes that the biggest single change the 
current regulatory requirements have made relates to the whole issue of 
objectivity and independence. 
Other regulators acknowledge that the current requirements could 
give rise to a loss of focus and audits might indeed become bogged down 
in some of the tedium, which in turn has consequences for the nature of 
the work undertaken in audit firms. Given the scale of the change in the 
nature of the work, it has consequences for the working lives of many 
individuals who might be attracted to and retained within the profession 
(refer to Chapter 8). There was, however, also an observation that for an 
auditor and an audit client going to do the ‘right thing anyway’, the new 
regulatory requirements, particularly the requirement for documentation, 
would add cost without deriving any economic benefit for that particular 
client. The implication is that there will be an increased cost for all 
participants in the audit market to protect outcomes across the entire 
market for the public good. 
Across all the stakeholder groups interviewed, there were those 
highly supportive of the current regulatory requirements and those who 
believed that the changes had not been a step forward. Almost to a person, 
everyone called for the need for a balance between highly prescriptive 
compliance-driven audits and those involving professional judgment. 
The observation comparing the Australian requirements with those of 
United States would suggest that we are much closer to principles-based 
auditing than the more compliance-driven auditing elsewhere.
INCREASINgLy PRESCRIPTIvE AUdITS: A dISTRACTIoN FoR AUdIToRS?
| 487
There is no doubt, however, that users, purchasers and suppliers 
all have insights into the amount of time taken by the documentation 
requirements of the current regulations. Observations suggest that this 
documentation is either a benefit because it helps demonstrate compliance 
with necessary minimums in the quality of an audit or is wasteful of time 
and distracts an auditor from understanding the business. 
While not expressly included in the survey material, the debate 
between rules-based and principles-based standards triggered comment 
from some of the interview participants. 
One standard setter observes that the whole debate of rules versus 
principles has not been particularly helpful. Although Australia has come 
from a background of a principles-based environment, even principles-
based standards have included an amount of prescription. He or she went on 
to say that the IAASB would argue that its standards were principles based, 
but again, there was an element of prescription in many of those standards.
One purchaser observes that the US jurisdiction is very focused 
on prescription with a rules-based environment, whereas the United 
Kingdom (and other jurisdictions influenced by this country, including 
Australia) is conceptually founded on a principles-based environment. 
The commentator went on to observe that in Australia, regulatory agencies 
had gone on to interpret those principles to create guidance, which was 
then in turn interpreted as rules. This is not meant to be a criticism of 
regulatory agencies because sometimes they create this guidance at the 
behest of participants in the market to assist them. The commentator also 
observed, however, that the difficulty with rules was that they could 
become outdated as circumstances changed or even irrelevant because of 
environmental changes. The second difficulty with a rules-based regime is 
that rules can be used as a substitute for good judgment.
6.0 Concluding remarks
The essential focus of this chapter has been to demonstrate the belief among 
various stakeholder groups that the new public policy position pertaining 
to the regulation of the market for audit services has brought with it a 
significant cost—specifically documentation and other requirements have 
distracted the auditor from the key focus of the audit, thereby lowering 
the quality of the audit. 
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As indicated in the previous chapter, the change of the regulatory 
regime and the public policy settings that drove that change did not 
contain within them any requirement that the change of position was 
ultimately to the benefit of the economy, the efficiency of the capital 
market or any of the participants in the market for audit services. Again, 
the action that can, and one might argue should, occur is the systematic 
gathering of real world evidence of the effect on the capital market of 
these changed regulatory arrangements. Given that they have now been 
in place for some time, it is possible to pursue this and it would provide 
some degree of accountability of the legislature’s decision to introduce this 
requirement on participants in the market for audit services.
Additionally, there is some evidence from the interviews that a shared 
understanding of the minimum documentation required between each of 
the suppliers that are subject to oversight (and inspection) of the regulator 
is missing. This will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter, 
however, having some open and transparent discussion about what the 
minimum documentary requirements should entail and that this minimum 
platform be shared among all suppliers and agreed with the regulator seems 
to be a useful and accountable action that the regulator could undertake 
immediately. This might be augmented by the oversight or indeed direct 
involvement of the Financial Reporting Council and the Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board. 
The transparency of this process could assist in ensuring that the 
minimum requirement necessary has not been unintentionally lifted beyond 
the requirements in Australia by reference to the practical use in certain 
firms of the PCAOB documentation or by an intentional or unintentional 
desire to make the documentation internationally comparable. At present, 
the Australian regulatory environments are based on our jurisdiction and, 
while we might be sympathetic to international needs or requirements, as 
yet there has not been internationalisation of the legislative framework.
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THE APPRoACH, oPERATion AnD 
REsoURCEs oF REGUlAToRs 12
[There are] a lot of audit partners out there who haven’t kept 
[up] technically as well as they should. It’s not meaning they’re 
incompetent, but they just haven’t kept up as technically strong as 
they should have. And I would question where ASIC’s come from, 
because I don’t think…[there are] too many people, or any people, 
doing those reviews that are ex-partners of firms. And I just have 
a problem…it’s like me…coming and telling the doctors how they 
should operate. I’m not actually sure, unless you’ve been there, that 
there’s…full appreciation. And I’m not saying that a lot of things 
they’re doing [aren’t] good…improving the documentation and 
making sure that there’s a real good tie up probably makes sense, 
but I…don’t think it’s the be-all and end-all…there’s also a very 
dictatorial [attitude]…if they think you’ve made a mistake, they 
just go after you like a dog after a bone…the bulk of people out 
there don’t stuff up because they’re bad or devious…it’s a slip or 
it’s just an oversight…we’re humans, and yet their approach is if 
they get a sniff of anything…they just go in there…some of the 
treatment is a bit over the top.
— Supplier
1.0 Key issues
The operationalisation of the changes to the regulatory regime in the early 
part of this decade gave rise to many comments from the participants in 
this study. From their comments, the key issues that arise include:
•	 have the approach and operational aspects of regulators’ oversight  
of auditors and the audit process been effective
•	 is communication with the profession by regulators adequate
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•	 have ASIC’s inspections of auditors been conducted effectively
•	 how have ASIC inspections been received by auditors
•	 how adequate is the resourcing of the regulators
•	 how can the expertise of regulators be enhanced
•	 should the Big Four and non-Big Four be treated differentially  
by ASIC in its oversight function?
2.0 introduction
Many of the face-to-face interviews included comments about the 
regulators’ approach and operational practices, mainly in terms of ASIC, 
but also in terms of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA). This section explores stakeholders’ perceptions of the regulators’ 
attitudes, approach, competence and resourcing. Comments specific to 
ASIC inspections of audit firms are included as a separate section. 
The next section provides analysis of stakeholders’ comments about 
the issue of whether a prescriptive approach to audit is a distraction and 
whether it hinders or helps the capital market. 
2.1 Users
The first user responds in relation to whether the prescriptive approach 
helps or hinders the capital market:
[I]t certainly helps, but in general the regulator is about three steps 
behind—certainly [in] equity markets—and in general, they’re 
always playing catch-up. So…to the extent that auditors can be 
more prescriptive…that would be useful, because it really isn’t a lot 
of help to have standard-format audit opinions, which everyone just 
glances at for 30 [seconds], provided the key points are there. The 
actual information people need is more in the accounts…certainly, 
it’s useful…having a more prescriptive approach, but generally the 
problem areas [where] people have [trouble] interpreting…accounts 
are where those companies are one step ahead of accounting 
standards, let’s put it that way, or other reporting requirements…
from an investment point of view…the issues are where you’re 
caught napping in terms of a company that’s not disclosing 
something they should be. 
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The same person is somewhat disparaging of the conventional auditors’ 
role and goes on to explain his or her perception that regulators are acting 
reactively rather than proactively:
In my experience…the regulators are three steps behind…[B]y the 
time they’ve identified…the problem [it has] already blown up.  
So to the extent that auditors can be more commercial in providing…
useful information to investors…that would be a great help, rather 
than in a technical sense just looking at the accounts…the accounts 
are living documents that I need [in order] to understand the 
company…what’s really happening from an operational point of 
view and that’s how I look at accounts. So when I’ve got something 
that’s camouflaged in the accounts in terms of what’s happening from 
an underlying commercial point of view, then I can’t, or investors 
can’t, understand what’s really going on. And to the extent that 
auditors can…throw light on it, that’s what I would find useful.
Another user comments in response to the question: ‘Do you think perhaps 
there’s a gap between the regulators and auditors, and is that affecting the 
capital markets in investing?’
[Referring to a recent collapse] [I]t seems like ASIC was aware of the 
situation but only towards the end [did] they put the brakes on. 
And it’s something I’ve then questioned because I’m not sure when 
ASIC’s supposed to come in and say, ‘Guys, you don’t meet certain 
requirements’…what I can’t understand is they’d been monitoring 
them for some while. And yet even a couple of the property guys, 
the specialists, were saying, ‘Look, be careful of these kinds of 
investments’, and nothing was done. And you would’ve thought…
would an audit have helped or did they have an audit? So…there’s 
a gap there. [In] the last couple of months…there’s [been] a big gap. 
Some users give the impression that they believe it is ASIC that is 
responsible for the framework under which auditors conduct their work.
If I can use ASIC in this case as a regulator, as far as we’re concerned 
and the auditors [are concerned]…our experience of the audit 
process is that…if you have…the framework of ASIC in place, 
which obviously we’re aware of and the auditors are aware of…
the auditors generally follow that framework of the regulators as 
closely as possible, and probably in some extent to the letter. 
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ASIC might have a statement which the auditors then interpret 
literally instead of tailoring it towards each individual company. 
So I wouldn’t have thought…that there is much of gap between the 
auditors and the regulators in that sense.
The same person, when pressed on whether there is a gap between auditors 
and regulators, goes on to say: 
Do auditors really look beyond the check list? And is the check-
list approach valid for the audit process? I would’ve thought that 
perhaps there is a gap there, but…it’s certainly not one that we’re 
particularly aware of.
One user sees a commonality in the aim of both auditors and regulators:
[F]rom the angle we see it, from the auditors coming in and from 
what we see that the regulators want, we see that they’re both after 
the same thing…the auditors aren’t completely off on a tangent 
looking at different areas and displaying concern for different risks 
compared to the regulators. So in that respect, they’re not that far 
apart.
One of the users sees it as being up to the auditors to negotiate with the 
regulators to have things changed if a better way exists:
Absolutely, it’s the case of the horse before the cart, isn’t it, really? 
And…that’s where auditors have an obligation to their client base 
to push back against the regulators. If they think that there is a 
better and a more innovative way of doing something then surely 
they should be coming together to try and make those changes…as 
an investor, I don’t just sit and listen to what everyone is telling me 
about buying a particular stock; I will look at it and I will make my 
own judgment based on the knowledge and information I’ve got. 
And if I have got information or the knowledge to be able to make 
an informed decision then I should, in the auditor’s case, be able to 
push back against those regulators or approach them and try and 
get changes put through. 
Another user is positive about the role of the regulator:
[T]he regulators are there to ensure there is a robust regulatory 
environment and to do that it’s a lot of work and a lot of cost and so 
those costs are always passed on. 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (US) featured prominently in the interviews 
of users as regulation that was too prescriptive—perhaps because these 
representatives were having to comply with that act within their own 
entities. 
I wouldn’t have a clue whether it’s distracting auditors…it probably 
is a bit. And…the payback of that is an auditor either decides that 
they have to do their job the way they feel [it] is best done as well as 
following the prescriptive rules, in which case the cost of the audit 
would probably…be higher than it would…need to be. Whether…
it gives more credibility to the assurance statement, I don’t think 
it really does…people look at the regulations that came out…
the US is the most glaring example, so it’s a good one to use, and 
the initial reaction to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was: ‘Oh, fantastic, 
everything’s going to get better.’ Now the reaction is the absolute 
opposite…we’ve got all this prescriptive regulation; it’s become 
almost impossible to be a public company. A lot of people in the 
investment business are attributing the increase in private equity 
bids for listed companies to [the fact that] listed companies don’t 
want to be listed anymore because it’s just too hard these days. 
So…it’s having a lot of influences that…and…I’ll stick with the 
US because it is the most glaring example [of] regulation over the 
top…a lot of that regulation will be scaled back in emphasis over 
the years ahead. It was way too draconian from the start. It didn’t 
need to be that strong. And things like ENRON and HIH and all 
those things will happen again no matter what the regulators do; it 
will happen again.
[T]alking to the US people…their reporting requirements certainly 
amongst the companies, and I presume amongst their auditors, 
[have] made their life so difficult that…they’re subverted by 
regulation…you have to have the right balance. And…the focus…
should be [on] clarity, presenting financial information with clarity 
so people can understand it, as opposed to having overweight…
rules and regulations that everyone can tick the box [on], but 
[which]…doesn’t [necessarily] enhance their ability to understand 
what’s going on.
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One user draws a link between accounting standards and audit complexity:
[S]ometimes the…complexity of these audits can take away from 
the materiality of what they’re…trying to achieve, which is trying 
to make sure that these companies report accurate and material 
reporting…a couple of the accounting standards—employee 
accounting standards, those type of things, with the owners 
reporting on employee expenses…that [is] a necessary evil…to a 
point. If you’re going to do an audit, you need to have all the checks 
and ticks…your Is…dotted, otherwise you’ll tend to find that there 
[are] holes.
The same person goes on to query what happens at the end of an audit:
[G]oing back to…having your blinkers off, potentially…I’m not too 
sure how an audit’s done, whether an audit is performed and then 
completed—but when an audit’s completed, is there…an audit 
review back in the office…do they do a…general overview of the 
audit? [Do] you have someone go out and do the finite pieces…is 
there a final check in terms of a general overview of the feeling of 
the business, management’s credibility, a number of different things 
that might just raise a few other questions, rather than the stock 
standard audit year in, year out? Is there a review meeting post-
audit? I assume there is, where various questions are asked…of the 
individuals that undertake these.
Another user compares the resourcing of the Australian regulator with 
that in the United States:
When I was at [a merchant bank], we had all these different licences 
and you deal with the ASIC…with half a dozen matters at a time from 
licensing to a query. They never give you a case officer. You have to 
deal with six different people because they were so fearful that you 
may be able to coerce or influence one person. It was that bad. So they 
are terrible and unlike the US…where some of the best and brightest 
from the accounting firms would take fellowships at the SEC or the 
Federal Reserve and they’d work there, not on their own clients, but to 
learn and also add to the intellectual capital—albeit temporarily—of 
those venerable regulators. Nothing like that happens here for ASIC. 
So ASIC suffers two capital shortfalls: real capital and human capital. 
And structurally, I just don’t know how they work.
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The same person continues with a suggested solution in terms of resourcing 
the regulator’s required expertise:
So you know how you close the gap? You get them to share the 
resource; they cop a tax break for sending some people across and 
you…take out the non-essential rules.
2.1.1 Summary
In discussing whether increasing prescription has become a distraction for 
auditors, users often allude to accounting standards as well as or instead 
of auditing standards. They tend to respond to interviewers’ questions 
about prescription through a much more generic perspective than the 
other stakeholders. Bearing this in mind, there are positive comments by 
users about the Australian regulatory regime in comparison with what is 
seen as the overly prescriptive US Sarbanes-Oxley regime. Users speak of 
regulators as being three steps behind companies that use questionable 
accounting methods or fail to disclose what should be disclosed. There 
are implied accusations of regulators at times failing to take action in 
situations that appear to be in obvious need of activity. The standard-
format audit report is viewed as not helpful and at least one user appears 
to wish to have the role of auditors changed radically to help interpret 
the accounts. There is a perception that it is up to auditors to negotiate 
with regulators if there are aspects of the regulatory regime that auditors 
consider should be improved.
2.2 Purchasers
Purchasers’ comments reveal how well informed about the regulatory 
regime imposed on auditors they are. In the first quotation, the purchaser 
questions the need for the regulator to take a punitive or form-over-
substance approach and asks just how many real audit failures occur.
My sense of the way the regulator…is performing at the moment is 
that there’s an element of heads on sticks. So no matter if an auditor 
does go through a process and some audits fail…what should be the 
result of an audit failure? How should the regulator respond to that? 
And you know what? In terms of the numbers of audits that fail, it’s 
questionable; it’s quite subjective. But in terms of a proportion, it’d 
be interesting to know what that would be…I do sense that there 
is an element of form creeping in here versus the substance. So 
the regulator says: ‘Well, you didn’t circularise debtors and that’s  
a problem with the audit.’ Well, who cares in most cases? 
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At the time of the interviews, there were some well-known inconsistencies 
between regulatory frameworks (in this instance, between the Corporations 
Act and accounting standards). The next purchaser calls for more 
collaboration between regulators.
We have some areas of conflict between corporations law and 
accounting standards, and therefore duplication of disclosures or 
subtle differences in disclosures—like key management personnel 
reporting…[So] auditors are being placed in this position of…
audit both or I [will] form a different view of one or the other…
accounting boards are a regulator too…so regulators learn to—we 
need to…get the act together. And it’s getting better, by the way.
The next purchaser accuses ASIC of taking an excessively legalistic 
approach: 
I don’t think auditors and regulators…do have that big a gap…
[but] there are sometimes specifics of differentiation on that…ASIC 
can sometimes take a much more legalistic view as opposed to a 
commercial view or a commonsense approach, whereas…auditors…
do have a huge amount of commonsense in their application of 
things, although with the regulations and it being incorporated into 
corporations law and all of that, that obviously ties your hands…If 
that’s the law, that’s the law, but…they do have quite a commonsense 
approach, whereas…ASIC on occasions…reverts to the legalistic.
The next purchaser highlights the danger of a ‘regulate first, ask questions 
later’ approach:
[I]n a review of the regulatory framework for the Federal 
Government…one of the issues that came through strongly was that 
any type of failure or perceived [failure]—whether by [the] media 
or the public’s concern over failures in a corporate sector—tends to 
lead to a knee-jerk reaction to create more regulation. It’s perceived 
to be the only way in which politicians can properly respond—[by] 
being seen to do something. And as a consequence…we’ve got a 
bit of a culture in this country of regulate first and…ask questions 
later…there have been some spectacular examples of that recently 
where the existing systems, which were perfectly adequate to deal 
with matters which arose, were hijacked by the political process and 
sent off into royal commissions of various sorts…what’s happening 
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here [is] there’s a tendency to see this as going somewhat in the same 
direction. The whole scene in which these regulations are made 
[is] increasingly becoming more and more prescriptive, whereas 
I’ve always viewed audit as being a process of forming judgment, 
which then gives rise to an opinion…we’re in danger of losing that 
judgment and opinion process by going down this route of more 
and more prescriptive approaches to what are perceived problems. 
The difficulty being, I don’t think you can prescribe precise actions 
for every possible eventuality. So that’s the background [from] 
which I come to these things.
The same person goes on to argue that regulators are trained to think 
prescriptively:
[I]f there’s an expectation gap between regulators and auditors…
regulators understand what auditors do…[the] people I’ve spoken 
to in ASIC and APRA [seem to] understand that. The problem…
[that] arises is that regulators, and particularly the legal profession, 
are trained to think in a prescriptive sense. They do not think 
in terms of generalities or principles—at least, that’s been my 
experience. And…that’s where the difficulties arise, in that they 
look for prescription and they tend to not see the value as much in 
informing judgments based on subjective information. 
The same person continues to enunciate what to him or her is almost 
a ‘sixth sense’ held by good auditors:
[A]ll of the really good auditors that I knew had a sort of sense of 
things. It wasn’t something that…you could easily put down in a 
textbook; they had a feeling. I was always struck when I was in 
Victoria that the number of frauds we detected were, I don’t think 
there was one instance where they [were] picked up by system 
audits; they were picked up by other means. And I kept on asking 
myself why would that be the case, and…it’s partly because good 
auditors who are alert will see some anomaly and that will lead 
through with their investigation to some issue that they might 
identify…this goes…to the heart of the process of auditing, which 
increasingly is looking at risk assessment…I’d hate to see us looking 
to get so far away from the prescriptive approach that we start to 
lose those other facilities. And if they turn into technicians, which 
is what…the pressures are [going] to do…we will lose significantly 
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in the process…this would be a significant loss…[With] that sort 
of approach, you tend not to see the freight train coming at you; 
you’re too busy counting the nails on the rails and all those things…
it’s a distinction between a profession and what is essentially a 
bookkeeping-type of role. So that’s the danger…if there’s such a 
thing as a gap, it’s not so much an expectations gap; it’s just both 
have a different approach to things. 
Another purchaser refers to the trend towards greater emphasis on risk 
management and sustainability and the reporting on those aspects of 
a business:
I’m sure regulators would be [saying], you can have a financial audit 
that delivers the result that says the financial statements are okay, 
but then you can end up having an organisation that collapses down 
the track…in other words, it’s reported its risk-profile fine, [and 
its] financial statement audits reflect everything that’s going on, 
but there’s actually a very huge inherent risk in the organisation… 
[W]here this actually comes out is probably [in] a new wave of 
reporting, which is all around sustainability and organisations 
basically starting…you’re seeing now everybody looking to 
understand how an organisation is going to ensure that it’s going to 
exist for the long term, not in terms of its own survival but as well 
as its contribution to the environment overall. And…the big debate 
at the moment is the certification of stuff that’s outside the financial 
statements [which] performs the other half of the annual report, 
which is all to do with risk-management statements, government 
statements, basic issues around social and community responsibility 
and those kind of issues…[they] have become more prevalent. 
The same person goes in response the interviewer’s prompt about whether 
this issue of risk management—for example, around the sub-prime issue—
is more the regulator’s or the market’s concern:
[I]t’s both…a regulator obviously is concerned about systemic risk, 
so they’re concerned if a big person goes down…we’ve seen all of 
that with some of the collapses of Fincorp and the like, and you ask 
well, what view would the auditors have had a year before? The same 
questions I would have imagined would get asked around Enron, 
HIH—all those things. So it seems…there’s still somewhere…a gap, 
isn’t there?
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The same purchaser goes on to comment about a retrospective versus 
future-oriented view:
[T]he real challenge is—and what probably a lot of people don’t 
get is—that unfortunately the review of the financial statements is 
very much a historical up-to-today view. It’s not really a very well 
thought out view of the future. And this comes back down to the 
resourcing issue, because it’s easier for less-experienced people to 
verify what is [rather] than to have the experience to think about 
what may be—and this is the big dilemma…it’s looking at the future 
view…[and] the question is, and the profession will probably say, 
‘Well, we don’t have an obligation to report that.’
The same purchaser goes on in response to a comment about litigation 
risk, in the context of the previous quotation: 
Exactly…It’s probably an area they wouldn’t want to touch…and 
that’s why, of course, nobody certifies risk-management statements 
and things like that. It’s hard. Nobody does it at the moment. There 
[are] no requirements.
The same purchaser expands on the importance of transparency—in terms 
of financial statement disclosures and the audit:
[T]he key thing is, [has the audit client] been open in their disclosure? 
And for that you still need a fair degree of expertise to understand 
what a bank or an insurance company or a mining company should 
be disclosing. What are the relevant issues that need to be put into 
that kind of report?
One purchaser sees the emphasis on compliance and governance 
as strengthening the end result:
[C]ompliance and governance [are] becoming more important 
everywhere, so…if there is a demand [from the] regulator, it would 
just be in addition to…what the normal duties are. So at the most, 
it can strengthen the end result rather than weaken it…I wouldn’t 
have any issues with regulators, say…having an impost on saying 
do this or do that, as long as that just enhances the overall audit or 
the transparency of the audit.
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The same purchaser continues:
[The amount of time that auditors might spend on checking lists 
and documentation for regulatory purposes] would depend on how 
much wealth the company themselves knew on governance. So…
if the company’s got their own department doing compliance and 
governance for the auditor, it will be a cursory check…on whether 
everything’s working properly or not, and if it isn’t being done by 
the company then…it’s better for them to be doing it anyway.
The next purchaser raises the issue of dealing with multiple regulators for 
international operations:
[T]hat isn’t a problem to me because the auditors have to look at 
the regulations and ensure that we do comply with the regulator. 
And where there’s a particular issue, they point it out in terms of 
an interpretation. Where it does become a problem is…where you 
have to deal with a different regulator, and you have a different 
account and you talk about the fact that it’s so unnecessary to have 
so many different accounts to comply with a different regulator.
The same person explains further:
[I]t’s just that all the different financial accounts have to be audited. 
But that’s more in the line of what else…the finance director has to 
deal with. We only deal with the Australian accounts, so it’s up to 
the Australian regulator. We have close relations with the Australian 
regulator. It’s just that…he has to do so many different versions of 
it to suit other regulatory authorities. And it would be much easier 
if the standards were global rather than to have the US gap versus 
[the others]. You know they’re trying to get uniformity—and that 
is the issue.
The same purchaser responds to the interviewer’s query about whether 
there is a perception that what auditors do now is just a requirement to 
pass the regulator’s test rather than the primary focus, which is to provide 
an audit for the end user. 
[E]verybody talks about over-regulation, ticking the boxes. I can 
understand the reason for it because of what happened a few 
years ago and the regulators want to be on top of everything. Like 
anything, if you go too far with it, it becomes very, very difficult.
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The same purchaser then responds to the question: ‘Are you happy with 
the level of regulation?’ 
[T]he red tape committee has tried to, for example, bring back 
the level of regulation…there is a view that…apart from having 
different regulators with different jurisdictions…we are too heavily 
regulated. But I’m not sure exactly what needs to [be] taken back.
2.2.1 Summary
Purchasers make some interesting observations about the attitude and 
approach of regulators in the audit space. A legalistic, reactionary, punitive 
approach is generally not supported, whereas greater cooperation and 
collaboration between the various regulators, including at the international 
level, is seen as desirable. Purchasers recognise the role of judgment in the 
audit process, and prescription that discourages application of good audit 
judgment is seen as a definite negative. One purchaser urges a rethink 
on reporting to include more disclosures around risk management and 
sustainability over the long term and the assurance provision on those 
disclosures. In comments that are eerily farsighted in terms of what has 
since become the global financial crisis, this same purchaser asserts that 
what is currently not audited in terms of risk exposures is as important as, 
if not more than what is audited.
2.3 Suppliers
Few suppliers’ comments are positive in relation to the attitude and 
approach of regulators—predominantly ASIC, in its oversight role of 
auditors. This first quotation is indicative of some of the frustrations that 
are voiced: 
I had something that looked like a breach on one 
of my clients and…they tracked me down on 
holiday overseas within an hour of finding out 
and said there’s a potential problem and [these are] 
the steps we’re taking and don’t do anything with 
your client until we find out. Now fortunately, it 
was a misunderstanding and there wasn’t a breach, 
so I know our system works well and I, as a board 
member, have been through that process. But I had that discussion 
with ASIC and he was adamant that I should’ve had a whole system 
of checks that I needed to undertake personally before I sign an 
‘[T]hey tracked me 
down on holiday 
overseas within  
an hour of  
finding out.’
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independence declaration. Well, that’s just inefficient use of audit 
time and if we, in a firm this big…jolly well ought to have a system 
set up that works and then we ought to be able to rely on our 
system and we audit our own system and ASIC, when they came 
in, audited that system as well as auditing a selection of our files.
[B]ecause they’ve got a check list which says that 
I ought to have done something and I hadn’t, they 
thought I’d done something wrong in my audit…
that kind of approach is symptomatic. They’ve got 
check lists and…if something’s missing on a check 
list, they will tell a small firm that they’ve not done 
a good job, but [to] tell them how to fix it—I don’t 
think they will be able to. And…that is the only 
point of them doing that thing…you would hope to lift the quality 
of audits, not to pick on bad auditors. If you step back and say 
what are they trying to achieve in that…should their aim be to have 
a witchhunt or should their aim be to make auditors do a better 
audit? See, it ought to be to make auditors do better audits.
The same person goes on to question what it is that ASIC, through 
its reviews, is attempting to achieve:
I don’t think [ASIC] know [what ASIC is actually trying to achieve] 
yet either…they’re very much in ‘suck it and see’ mode and this 
is new law for them and they’ll go and look and reflect on what 
they found and then hopefully think about what they do need to 
try and achieve from it. And commonsense to me would be what 
they should try and achieve from it is spend some time helping the 
smaller firms, particularly in an environment where they’re saying 
we don’t like it…we want more, we want the second tier to step up. 
That should be where their focus is, but that’s probably an arrogant 
big-partner view, isn’t it? But…[we] as a firm just invest so much 
time and effort in supporting our partners to do the right thing 
that…and I realise this does sound arrogant, I find it hard to think 
that ASIC will help us improve our process across any of the Big 
Four, whereas the poor one and two-partner practices out in the 
field would love some guidance and whether it’s from the Institute 
[of Chartered Accountants] or from ASIC, we could do a lot to help 
them. But…I can’t imagine ASIC is going to help me personally do a 
better audit…and that might sound arrogant…And it’s not because 
‘[S]hould their 
aim be to have 
a witchhunt or 
should their aim be 
to make auditors 
do a better audit?’
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I think I’m great…it’s because…I have a great firm structure behind 
me to support me and train me and give me guidance and have our 
own internal quality reviews and all that stuff.
The same person continues, expressing his or her fear that the current 
approach by the regulators will lead to audits becoming unhelpful and 
not useful:
[I]n terms of different perspectives, the regulators are in the tick-
the-box mentality and their chances of getting an audit wrong if 
you just go to a tick-the-box mentality are high. The chances of 
getting sued over it may be low if you’ve ticked all the boxes, but…
ultimately, if we take that approach to doing our work, we will 
become un-useful and unhelpful…my experience in the US is that 
that’s where the US firms have gone…I’ve seen [the files of] two of 
the Big Four firms in the US recently…and they’re…just useless. 
You pick the files up, you can’t understand the business, but there 
[are] piles and piles and piles of forms saying that things have been 
done and things have been checked at different times, but can you 
get a sense of what drives the business from reading an audit file in 
the US? No, you can’t. And do we want to go that way? I hope not. 
A), you can’t keep staff, but b)…it is us becoming unhelpful and 
just focused on our own [processes] to the extent that, well why 
would you bother having that service provided? It’s not useful.
Another supplier dismisses the prospect put by the interviewer 
of a government agency performing audits:
I’m not convinced that’s useful, but then the value add’s gone and 
it just becomes something that you have to have. And then you go 
and get the other help and guidance and thinking from some other 
service…maybe that’s ultimately where the government wants to 
go, but I don’t. I’m not convinced that that’s useful…if you were 
to go down that track, that would have all sorts of implications for 
capital market transactions because of the ability of a government-
owned audit to go and report investigating accounts, reports to 
go in prospectuses and things like that would be zero and at 
the end…you’d have to have a huge fundamental rethink in the 
whole capital market…I’ve been doing a couple of US transactions 
recently and they have this concept of giving comfort letters to 
the underwriters where only the auditor can give a comfort letter 
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and I can tell you that no government auditor would be able to do 
that, so you’d then have a massive rethink of that whole approach 
to [the] capital market. It would just be really fundamental and I 
can’t see any of that’s value add[ing]. So I can’t see [that] it would 
drive more efficient capital markets or greater independence or 
anything useful.
Another supplier points out that in the United States, the rigorous 
regulatory regime imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 is in the 
process of being unwound to some extent.
[T]here is a gap…the nature of that gap is that the regulators are 
looking for a very rules-based audit, so it’s very much driven by 
sample sizes, tick and dash, follow a methodology and follow it 
rigidly. Whereas…a good audit on a financial statement is far more 
complex than tick a box, fill out a form, follow a set of standard 
procedures. It involves large amounts of judgment. It involves 
understanding commercial realities within transactions. So…the US 
is probably a really good example of where a regulator has come and 
they’ve imposed in the Sarbanes-Oxley framework, which they are 
now busy trying to unwind, because in some ways they imposed 
an overly onerous system, which was really driven around looking 
at an individual financial statement, and people say, ‘Well…if we 
stand back from that, we start to look at substance, and understand 
commercial reality, we…may get a better outcome than necessarily 
going and ticking every single box or selecting 50 transactions.’
The same person goes on to imply that in Australia, too, the trend towards 
prescription has become excessive: 
[A]uditing’s started to move towards being…much more regulated, 
taking out some of the judgment…so you have auditors now who 
complete an audit and really don’t understand the business, or look 
at a transaction and audit it according to the standards, but really 
don’t understand the commercial reality. And, in some ways…that 
level of sophistication that we’re getting in the financial markets…
we’re…trying to audit to another level. And that’s not necessarily 
good…we do need to change…we need to go back to saying that 
not everything can be addressed through rules; there is judgment. 
The auditing game is primarily based on judgement, and yes, we 
need to put [in] frameworks [on] which judgment can be based…no 
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matter how many rules you have, no matter how many things you 
follow, you only ever test a sample of transactions, and if you’ve got 
a rogue management team or a management team that wanted to 
deceive or defraud shareholders and auditors, it is going to be very 
difficult to stop that.
Another supplier concedes that regulators are influencing audit practice, 
but not yet to an unreasonable extent.
I don’t think it’s just become a plain old watchdog on behalf of 
the regulator…the regulator’s taking a much more active interest 
in the audit and the audit process, and…the initial reaction by 
regulators globally has been to make sure that policies, processes 
and procedures are followed…therefore, what they are doing is 
they are driving change in the way audits are being done through 
the way in which they are reviewing the files, the way in which 
they are dealing with the firms…the regulator is influencing what 
is happening out there in auditing practice, but I don’t think that 
we’ve got to the stage where the audit is done on behalf of the 
regulator…auditors understand fairly clearly that the relationship 
is with the shareholders.
The tension between cost pressures and the tendency of the regulator 
to expand requirements is evident in this next supplier’s comment:
[O]ne of the problems is—and I’m finding this all time, just on a 
superannuation audit—you go into…audit a large fund and…
there [are] cost pressures involved because you’re dealing with 
the members’ money ultimately. And the administrators…and 
the trustees are trying to force the costs down all the time…yet 
the regulator is all the time broadening the extent of the audit 
requirements. So…this year we’ve got to audit risk-management 
statements, risk-management plans, derivative plans as well as 
the financials, as well as member statements, to comment on with 
compliance aspects. So the length of time that an average auditor 
will take is going to be increased probably 10 or even 20 per cent…
yet we can’t increase our fees 10 or 20 per cent. That tends to then 
cause a shortcut of the process and the taking of the audit risk, and 
that can’t be good.
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The same person goes on to explain how, in his or her view, auditors are 
working for regulators:
[T]he regulators are looking to the auditors to do their job for 
them, and that’s becoming much more apparent…we’ll take…[as an 
example] a simple self-managed superannuation fund audit where 
the regulator, being the ATO, is expecting now that the auditor is 
going to be the eyes and the ears of the ATO, similar to the role that 
a tax agent may play as being a tax agent almost of the ATO. So we’re 
almost working for the regulator now rather than the stakeholders, 
who are the members and trustees in the superannuation fund 
context…that’s being translated through the whole of the…audit 
profession, where the regulator expects the auditor to comply with 
the requirements of the regulator primarily, and then worry about 
the stakeholders, the readers of the financial reports, almost as a 
secondary issue. Now if the readers and stakeholders are the capital 
markets, I’m not sure whether that process is making the capital 
market more robust, or the safety of the capital markets more robust. 
It’s certainly satisfying the regulators, who if they get it wrong, 
they’re being fired upon by the capital markets and everyone, like 
the HIH issues and so on. So…the regulators are tending to use the 
auditor processes as satisfying their own requirements more than 
looking at the end users’ requirements. 
The same person explains how prescription can be counterproductive:
The concept of materiality and risk assessment and all these 
things [is] being funnelled down into a much more a prescriptive 
approach. And the more we have to follow absolute prescription, 
the less ability we’ve got to broaden our brains to look at what’s 
really going on in the company, because we’re not being asked to 
comment on that, we’re being asked to comment just on that very 
narrow field. Again, using superannuation as an example, if you’re 
just looking at something like…a self-purpose test…you’re only 
having to comment on that and you’re focusing your attention only 
on that, there could be lots of things happening around in the fund 
which are not proper, or which may expose the capital markets or 
the fund to risk, which aren’t being commented on because of the 
prescriptive nature of the assignment.
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An obviously non-Big Four supplier discusses the pressure of work at 
peak audit season and how, while audit files might not be completed at 
that time, as expected by the regulator, it does not make any difference to 
the appropriateness of the audit opinion rendered.
I get the impression that the regulators have a very definite view 
that an audit is very much a complete process, that you’ve got all of 
your forms and check lists and everything else. And their approach 
is designed [so that] everything is completed and ticked and every 
box is completed, then you can sign off the audit report…in a nice 
world, that might be possible. But when you’re at the busy time and 
you’re trying to clear about three or four audits in a week [that’s not 
possible]…the way we operate…in the mid-tier is that we really 
focus very much on the risk and material items…and, as long as 
we’re comfortable that they’re right then we get the rest done. But 
the housekeeping and the tidying up of that file [aren’t] always as 
good as [they] could be. And there’s a combination of reasons for 
that…they’re now saying I’ve got 60 days to [tidy up the file, but] 
it won’t…alter my opinion. So, in other words…I’ve covered what 
I need to cover to be satisfied my opinion is reasonable. Doing all 
of the ticking the boxes and putting the bow around the file, while 
it makes sense, it never alters [the outcome]…the regulators really 
believe that if you don’t do all of that, how can you issue your 
opinion. Where a lot of that is…we just haven’t gone back and 
ticked the box because the box wasn’t there to tick when we were 
talking to [whoever].
The same person goes on to explain his or her perception of a difference 
in philosophy between the Big Four and non-Big Four:
[T]here is a [disjunction]…it was explained to me one time…that the 
Big Four expect to be sued because of the nature of the work, and 
therefore they’re very compliance driven and form driven and they 
do tick the box. And then if someone challenges them, if they’ve 
got all of the boxes ticked, it’s very hard to prove negligence. The 
mid-tier really doesn’t want to be sued because…we don’t have the 
resources to be able to defend them, and therefore there’s a very 
heavy focus on material items and the risk items, and the risk areas, 
to make sure that the numbers are going to make sense. 
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The same person laments what he or she sees as the lack of consultation 
over the reviews by ASIC:
[T]hey’ve kind of been chasing cats up trees, which in a sense 
isn’t going to change. It would’ve been better if they had come 
out beforehand and said, ‘Well, this is our view of life and how 
auditing should be done.’ And let’s sit down with a group of people 
and find out if that’s the way it is…done, and if not, why not, and 
how can we work together. And then to say well this is what we 
expect. Now you need to have all of these things in place, because 
they’re very document driven…all of the firms are going through 
and getting quality-control manuals and…tying it all up in the 
process and making sure everything is cross-referenced…it doesn’t 
really change what we do…I’m not saying that it shouldn’t be done, 
but…I don’t…think it necessarily improves the audit process. 
The same person continues with the theme of the lack of consultation:
[T]here would’ve been more effective ways of saying ‘This is what 
you need to be looking at doing, and this is the training that needs 
to be done…by an auditor to keep himself current, and these are the 
key areas that really we want to see.’ But they didn’t…So everyone’s 
rushing around now and getting all of the compliance stuff done, 
which is going to be there…the staff [is] going to be aware of it and 
everything’s going to be tied in, but I’m not…sure that it improves 
the audit process. 
Lamenting the role of the regulator as judge and jury, the same person 
continues:
I don’t know who set them up as judge and jury…I’m not aware of 
any consultation that they had with the firms before they started 
the process. And I still have a problem with the process because  
I don’t believe that a tick-the-box approach is an appropriate way 
of doing an audit…you’ve got to be thinking, you’ve got to be really 
looking at things. And just because I tick the box did that box 
consider everything that I should’ve considered…therefore it’s a 
lot more…like an art rather than a science. And they’re treating 
it very much as a science. And I’m not…sure that’s right with the 
complexity of transactions, the changing accounting standards…
there [are] a lot more grey areas. And a tick-the-box approach won’t 
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necessarily result in [a] satisfactory audit…there should be a bit 
more pressure on the training and how the auditors keep up-to-date 
and how they keep current. And while they look at that, that’s not a 
big part [of it]…as long as the firm’s got a training process to record 
that, they have a quick look at that…[yet] that’s…quite important.
The same person goes further in criticising the current approach of the 
regulators, calling for more cooperation and education: 
They seem to be very much focused on achieving targets of ‘we’ll 
knock a few auditors off and then we’ll be seen to be doing our 
job’. And I’m not…sure that that’s…smart…it just annoys people…
rather than what we should be [doing, which is] working together 
and making sure that the education of everyone is up where it should 
be; making sure that there [are] proper review processes and quality 
review processes in the firms…that’s where you’re going to improve 
the tenor of audit, so that I then have to make sure that all my jobs of 
a certain category have a quality review, which looks at the accounts 
and looks at the audit and makes sure we’ve done it right. And that’ll 
pick up more than me ticking all the boxes…I just have a different 
way of looking at…that communication and where they’re going, 
they’re saying that that’s going to lift the auditing standards, [but] 
I’m not convinced…you’ve got to get the education requirements 
really strong and meshed and…if you’re going to be an auditor…this 
thing’s out there, but let’s drive it, and let’s make sure that the quality 
reviews on the jobs are done on a timely basis and are good, because 
that will pick up things that the one partner may not.
In the continuing conversation with the same person, they suggest that 
the regulator does not understand the role of the non-Big Four. 
ASIC have been very critical of the mid-tiers and…unfairly…
they need to understand that it’s a relative issue. The mid-tiers, 
in my experience, do a pretty good job auditing businesses which 
are of the right level for them, perhaps with turnovers of $10 to 
200 million, that sort of thing. Yeah…there’s an expectation. I don’t 
think the regulator properly understands their role. 
The same person comments on the resourcing of the regulator: 
ASIC [are] probably under-resourced…someone [said] to me 
recently, who’s a tax specialist, ‘Well, why do ASIC vet all these 
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things?’…they don’t have the ability to do it and that’s why the 
Australian Taxation Office moved to self-assessment. They…said 
look basically it’s all up to you. You all look after your own tax 
returns and everything else. We’re going to have teams which go out 
and do audits and checks on various taxpayers. We’ll have various 
other means of determining whether people are complying with the 
law. It seems to me that the regulator is half pregnant; they don’t 
know whether they’re meant to be approving things or whether 
they mean to be saying to the marketplace you just do it, you know 
what the law is, just do it all yourself and from time to time we’ll 
check if we become aware of things…they’re stuck between…being 
the judge and jury in their role of regulator. I don’t think they quite 
know exactly what their own scope is…so when they come to the 
auditors…they’re really struggling with that.
The same person continues with an example:
I received a letter once on a client of mine where they did surveillance, 
and they wrote to me and said your programs have not been tailored 
according to—this was under the old auditing standards. But they 
specifically said that the audit program should’ve been tailored. 
Well, there were various things which were done in the audit which 
were quite specific to that particular audit without necessarily 
being documented as tailored procedures in the actual programs. 
But the point was they couldn’t even point to where it said in 
the auditing standards that that was a mandatory requirement. 
That was their own expectation. And their own expectation was 
based on the software that the Big Four use where they select the 
procedures per company in their own computer software. And the 
practical reality nowadays is that we use CaseWare. And CaseWare 
comes with standard-type programs. And whilst you will do 
separate procedures which are peculiar to that industry or that 
client, sometimes you don’t necessarily document it in the actual 
audit program. And it’s getting down to a really nitpicking-type of 
situation now. And given that the audit standards carry the force 
of law…auditors are quite rightly saying…why is it that we have so 
much scrutiny on us…[W]ho looks at the work of architects and…
[asks] why did you put that beam in that place, and so on and so 
forth? No-one does it for architects. No-one’s…looking over the 
shoulder of doctors and surgeons to make sure that everything that 
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they’re doing is appropriate…there needs to be an element of self-
reliance there, and then they just simply conduct their checks. And 
I know they are doing that, but…we’re all confused as to what in 
fact they are doing, and what their level of expertise is. 
Another supplier articulates what he or she sees as overcompensation 
by the regulatory regime for the corporate collapses:
[T]here’s been an overcompensation [by the regulators] for corporate 
collapses, a knee-jerk response to some high-profile collapses…in 
Australia and the US as well. And as a result of that, the regulation of 
the industry has just grown astronomically…everyone has the same 
goal in mind, but…we might be at the stage that it’s…[like] using 
a mallet to crack a walnut…I don’t know an auditor that doesn’t 
want to give a good, strong audit opinion that’s based on sound 
audit evidence based on an audit that’s been conducted complying 
with the auditing standards, and that they know their accounting 
standards—and I assume that’s all the regulators want as well. But 
it’s unfortunate that because of collapses we’re now spending more 
and more time on the compliance part of our role…I don’t think we 
spend less on the audit…[but] the total hours have increased…it’s 
a distraction to the extent that there’s more to do, but I don’t think 
it’s a reallocation of time; it’s just adding to the time partners and all 
of our staff now need to [take] to comply.
Another supplier raises the issue of legal liability that auditors need 
to contend with, and which might not be appreciated fully by regulators:
[T]here is a difference there. The regulators will apply the specific 
wording of the auditing standards, whereas, within the profession, 
an auditor might be more focused towards the potential liability 
that’s involved in doing an audit, and that’s something the 
regulators may not take into account in their application, or in their 
review of the auditing standards applying to an auditor’s work…
They are looking to see that the auditing legislation, as it is now, is 
being applied. And that’s clear that they’re following the auditing 
standards in its application…The added pressure that an auditor has 
is in terms of potential exposure…of the work from third parties. 
So, yes, we have got the requirements to comply with the law. 
We also have to factor in judgments that are inherent in our work 
that may expose us to liability. And that is a difficult one, where 
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the regulator may be applying specific auditing standards…With 
the exposure that comes from doing an audit, the regulator may 
be focused on applying the black letter of the auditing standards, 
which has to be done. It may not be factoring in that an auditor is 
also exposed to outside pressures in terms of many stakeholders in 
doing his work. So from that perspective, they’re coming from one 
angle. An auditor within a firm has to consider many other aspects 
as well. So that is possibly something that is…not probably factored 
into the review by the regulator.
The same person goes on to emphasise the role of auditor judgment:
The regulator is focused on compliance with the law, compliance 
with the auditing standards, and that may not be enough in terms 
of [the] judgment calls that the auditor has to make, and how 
they’re making those judgments calls is something that may not be 
looked at enough in doing their work. Their focus may be more on 
prescriptive check lists rather than [looking] at the judgments that 
were made [and asking] are they the correct judgments?
One supplier is quite pejorative about regulators, calling them an irritant 
to auditors:
[T]he gap between [the regulators] and the auditors in terms of 
expertise, knowledge, even commonsense quite a lot of the time, 
is large and, I fear, growing…the auditors are probably getting 
better and ASIC might even be getting worse…this Westpoint 
investigation I fear will turn into another Yannon and…they will 
have any number of excuses as to why this is. But…the regulators 
are an annoying irritant at the backsides of auditors without…
adding very much…I’m talking about ASIC in that context, but…
there [are] a lot of regulators. We had a diagram in this room of 
how many people regulated the audit practice and…it got up to 
eight different regulators through a variety of internal and external 
[means]…some of them global, some of them national. So if the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants and ASIC are just going to go 
round and peer review people’s files, you can…hear the sighing of 
‘Oh, my God, what is the point?’.
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The same person expresses a need for less but more effective regulatory 
scrutiny:
[I]deally, what you want is less but more effective regulatory scrutiny 
and picking off the auditors who do not have the infrastructure or 
the ability or the resources to…stay in the game. The natural result 
of that in unfettered capitalism will be either a Big Four or a big 
three or a big five or whatever it ends up being, there for a long 
time until…one of them makes a mistake. So you get concentration 
of audit power. It’s questionable whether that’s a good thing, but 
the regulators at the moment aren’t helping…in terms of the…audit 
process itself, there’s a lot of box ticking that goes on and I question 
its value. 
The same person, no longer an auditor, but still with a supplier, continues, 
implying that the purpose of the increased prescription is to build a wall 
of process behind which the actors can hide if a failure occurs: 
[T]hat is a big problem, and the regulators just keep on building 
the wall. It’s very rare that you hear a regulator say, ‘I wouldn’t…
remove that tick off the check list because that’s not relevant.’ Their 
ideal process improvement is to build an ever-larger wall, and when 
you stand back at the end of several years of putting extra bricks in 
the wall, you’re going to have a really ugly wall. But it makes it more 
standard and consistent and boring and it takes all the judgment 
out of auditing that used to be there…I used to quite enjoy it, 
[but] I wouldn’t go back to it. Now, yes, it becomes standard, it 
becomes consistent. Would that have stopped Enron, would that 
have stopped WorldCom? Would that have stopped nearly all the 
things that it’s allegedly in place to prevent? I don’t think so…
the public response to any…problem is to build a wall of process, 
which you can hide behind. It doesn’t address the underlying issue, 
but it means that everyone is safe when they get to court.
The number of regulatory or quasi-regulatory bodies conducting audit 
reviews is the subject of the next quotation.
[With] the current regulatory process and procedures…and I’m 
talking in the broader context…within a Big Four firm now, 
12 months a year, round the clock, you have somebody reviewing 
the audit files. Whether that be ASIC, in their role as regulator in 
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the market, whether it be the AQRB, which is the Big Four-funded 
quality review board, whether it be a global practice office review, 
which all the Big Four run, an internal practice office review, or 
an institute review through the ICAA. That’s five layers of review 
all looking at, broadly speaking, the same things…therefore, as a 
partner, you can end up being reviewed four or five times a year. 
It means you can have your files looked at—and often it can be the 
same files looked at—by a number of different people. That is not 
efficient in any way, shape or form, and it certainly does detract 
from the time you have available.
Another supplier takes up the theme of inefficiency:
[A] lot of the doubling up and the inefficiency comes in [when] you’ve 
got four or five different regulators who all have four or five different 
views on something, and then you end up with a check list that might 
cover the same thing four or five different ways so that you can make 
sure that everyone is happy with what you’ve done. And…that…
becomes more of a form-filling exercise and it isn’t really focusing 
on what an auditor is there to do. The auditor is there to make sure 
the financial statements aren’t materially misstated. Where…[are] 
the material misstatements are likely to come from? They’re likely to 
come from areas of complexity, or…unusual transactions, risk areas. 
So let’s focus on those instead of doing…what I would call, in some 
cases, some silly form-filling exercises.
The same person expands on the idea in terms of the futility of ending 
up with a ‘beautiful audit’ file at the expense of a quality audit:
[There are] the market issues around competition and the lack of 
[competition] with the Big Four, although I can’t see a workable 
alternative at the moment. There’s the ineffectiveness of regulators 
and yet they’re sort of irrelevant and yet still annoying. It’s like the 
mosquito effect almost—the regulators in this country. Overseas…
it works a bit differently. Probably the one that we’ve talked about 
but not emphasised too much is the effect of all of that on audit 
methodology such that it becomes such an inexorable legal defence 
document. So do you end up with sufficient judgment in there? Do 
you end up with all the partners really thinking about what they are 
saying and standing back from ever being able to say something, or 
do you end up with the world’s most beautiful file? 
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The same person continues, expanding on the danger of audit firms taking 
on engagements for which they are ill equipped: 
We do…some audits of negligence cases, usually defence rather 
than attack, when people accuse auditors of not doing the right 
thing. So I’ve got a fair bit of knowledge from that perspective. 
And most of the ones that I see are the smaller firms, or even sole 
practitioners, who take on jobs that they just shouldn’t have done, 
and clearly weren’t capable of doing…and [they] end up relying 
on…management representations, if not hearsay…one of the risks 
of having junior staff, who aren’t enjoying it and don’t really 
understand, and audit partners, senior people, who are too frazzled, 
is that you end up relying too much on what the client tells you, 
and that isn’t really the role of auditing. So that [doesn’t work]. 
The next comment by a supplier implies that check lists can reduce 
the volume of documentation:
[I]t’s interesting when you look at the [evolution] of the procedures 
in the Big Four. I can remember [when] I was a partner in [one of 
the Big Four] for a while and we went from a heavily documented 
process to having a book, which kind of indicated the types of 
controls and different systems…so you then determine what testing 
you did and documented those and then went about your audit. 
But they were finding that that wasn’t as efficient, so therefore they 
then went back to tick the box as being…more efficient…there’s 
always been the concept of the phantom auditor and people just 
ticking. And…whenever you have a tick-the-box approach that 
lends itself to that. So if you’re under a budget constraint, you’ll 
tick the box when you may not have done something. And there’s 
no need to document…it further; you just simply sign off the box. 
The same person goes on:
[I]t’s interesting…when you look at where the Big Four are within 
methodologies—they’ve kind of [had] a go at [it] both ways…And 
there’s no doubt…[that if you are] trying to get the auditor to 
think, ticking the box is not the best way…because they’re driven 
by process, not by the content…you’ve got to be very careful that 
you’re pulling that all together and challenging the numbers…
unless you do that, I’m not sure that you’ve got a lot of confidence 
or assurance that things are all right. 
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The same person says, in response to a comment about the relationship 
between a check-list approach and staff retention:
[I]t’s interesting because even in the mid-tier you don’t have that as 
much. The auditors are required to think and challenge and this is 
the best way. And when some of them…leave and see if they can 
make it in the Big Four, they’re…quite surprised that their ability 
to think through stuff is quite often at a better level than their 
compatriots at the Big Four because they’ve been driven by this [as] 
the way we do it. So we just do it this way without even thinking 
about whether that’s the most appropriate way to achieve that audit 
objective. 
Another supplier states:
[The risk of being fixated with prescription and check lists] is 
definitely there…what tends to override it is that you’ve always got 
the experience and the use of your professional judgment and the 
fact that you’ve had to exercise [that] on numerous other occasions 
gives you what you need to move beyond the prescriptive tick the 
box…the tick-the-box [approach] is still there, but…that’s [not 
what is] going to get you there. You have to do all these other things, 
you have to manage the tensions that are within organisations as 
to how you get information [and] how you decipher that. You 
might be able to tick every single box and it all looks okay, but 
it still falls over. It’s the exercise of professional judgment and…
it’s underestimated…You look at the way…the legal professional 
looks at that. There’s professional judgment exercised all the time 
in judicial cases…and that seems to be accepted that…you get 
facts and, on the balance of what’s presented to you, you apply the 
law and you come to a conclusion. Our job’s not that dissimilar…I 
get presented [with] the facts and I fit them all in the holes and if  
I colour in all the right boxes it gives me the answer. What tends to 
happen is I’m given something and it doesn’t quite fit and I have to 
work out what the range of outcomes is and how do I narrow that 
range of outcomes and what [do] my standards say—my standards, 
which are principles based rather than prescriptive.
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The same person expands on the degree of judgment auditors invoke:
[In] the US…things aren’t as black and white. There is a degree 
of interpretation required: that’s what we do…[and] you can’t 
substitute that…we’re moving now to having to document that. It’s 
not that easy to document at times, the exercise of judgment, so 
that somebody can come in and exercise exactly the same judgment 
based on the facts. But that’s what we’ll move to and, in the end, to 
get down and say well I can see that [I’ve] considered that on the 
balance. I’ve thought this and I’ve thought that and the standard 
allowed me to do this or allowed me to do this or that and gave a 
range…I’ve then looked at external expert’s advice…you have to 
piece all that together and…it’s a little bit more than…tick the box.
The verdict of another supplier is that the intellectual input is diminished 
when a check-list approach is used:
Yes…it’s a generalisation isn’t it, but form filling as a way of…audit 
is not…going to give you the outcome you should have because 
staff then aren’t learning…it’s not an intellectual [exercise]…it’s the 
issue of some [of those]…working in the US that the greater the 
intellectual input into the audit process, the better the outcome…
is going to be…[The] reality is, even in accounting more frequently 
than not, [that] there isn’t a black and white answer to any given 
circumstance, so if you don’t have an ability to exercise your 
intellect in those circumstances, how can you deal with conflicts of 
accounting?
Another supplier gives an analogy of the check list that pilots must work 
through before a plane may become airborne. Few would question the 
necessity of such a routine procedure before flying, despite the challenging 
nature of qualifying as a pilot and the skill and judgment involved.
I’ve been [with] the firm [many] years. In that period, we’ve moved 
from highly prescriptive check lists that we had without any 
legislation backing them to getting rid of those and having blank 
sheets of paper and working it out, which actually was a worry…to 
selective databases of master steps that people work out which ones 
they want to use. And in working that out…they look at the client, 
what we may have done last year, plus what’s the prescription. 
So…it’s a little bit more prescriptive but sometimes it helps people 
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to have a bit of a check list because that’s the way…you execute. 
Does it stop an airline pilot flying an aeroplane because he or she 
has that check list they go through…they need the check list, they 
know it’s right, but you know they’re doing it so that they know 
it’s happening, and I think that’s sometimes what we’re doing here.
When you get reviewed, we get reviewed internally, we get 
reviewed externally; they look for the forms. They’re not as focused 
on what judgments you’ve made. There is some of that, but if you 
haven’t got those forms, you feel like you’re exposed.
2.3.1 Summary
Suppliers overwhelmingly lament what they see as a ‘tick-the-box’ 
approach to ASIC’s audit firm reviews and believe the reviews are 
conducted with insufficient consultation. Some see this approach as 
militating against high-quality audits, with auditors resorting to ‘blind 
adherence to documentation without much thought’. There are several 
pejorative observations about under-resourcing of ASIC, particularly in 
terms of the level of expertise of the personnel charged with undertaking 
the reviews of audit firms. Claims emerge that the regulator has been 
‘shocked’ at what has been seen in the smaller firms, but non-Big Four 
suppliers are concerned that the regulator’s opinion on the design and 
implementation of what is seen as a sound audit methodology has been 
benchmarked against a Big Four approach when the smaller firms do not 
have the same level of critical infrastructure, technical advisors or critical 
mass. Non-Big Four auditors would argue that they achieve quality audits, 
but in a way different from that of the Big Four.
2.4 Standard setters
There is some trepidation among standard setters about the approach of 
the regulators: 
[A]uditors—certainly those who have been doing it for a while—
have got a view that it’s…an expression of the opinion on the 
financial reports. I’m still a bit…nervous with what I’ve seen 
[that] from the regulator’s viewpoint…it’s more a compliance 
thing. Have you complied with every standard and I don’t know 
whether they’ve taken in the relevance of a particular requirement 
to the circumstances of the audit engagement or doing the audit 
of a particular entity…They take the view [that] you do it if it’s 
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required. If it’s there, it’s a black letter rather than is it relevant 
for the entity. There may be a black-letter requirement which…
[means] you go and do it, but it has so little impact on it…so…that’s 
probably the disconnect between the two of them at the moment…
the audit profession is now coming to the [point] that…maybe it is 
a check-list approach and…even if it is probably…not…relevant, if 
it’s a mandatory thing, well then we have to do it…that’s the view 
which is being taken…ASIC takes the view that if you’ve complied 
with everything, you’ve ticked it off…then the outcome should be 
right. 
The same standard setter articulates what he or she sees as the role 
of judgment in the audit process:
[E]ven if an individual did all those things, you still need the 
professional judgment…to say does this look good, do you agree 
with what’s there…there is a component part of that and it’s that 
professional judgment bit which I sometimes have…a concern 
about…[which is] how much the ASIC put themselves in the shoes of 
the individual…in the relative short space…between year end and 
when you’re signing off the accounts. With all the information you 
have available, you’re signing off an opinion with that evidence at 
your hands…The ASIC reviews after the event are a lot more penny-
in-hand and…that’s where some of the differences are arising, so it’s 
an interesting stage…the style of audits will over time—because 
of the way it’s set up in Australia…[and] even though I think it’s a 
wrong way…there will be a lot more of a check-list approach to it. 
I still don’t think it will go 100 per cent to the American way, but…
there’s going to be more of a gradual movement to that end of it.
The same person goes on:
[O]verall, it will be principle based, but…within that principle 
base, there will be certainly a lot of check lists. Have you done 
everything? Yes or No? But…I don’t think we’ll get to the stage 
that if you’ve done everything and it’s fine, yet you give a clean 
audit report…there’ll be more of that looking at the totality of it 
and saying are we comfortable with that? Yes or No? And therefore 
you might find that will give the more principle-based thing, but…
within it…it’s going to be a principle-based regime with a fair bit of 
check lists attached to it. 
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Another standard setter addresses the tension between principles-based 
auditing standards and prescription as the extremes of a continuum:
[O]ne of the real issues between the profession and the audit 
regulators—if we can call them that—is the relative importance 
of documentation in particular, but also in…following out or 
completely closing out the prescriptive requirements in auditing 
standards…there’s this constant tension between…saying auditing 
standards are principle based and the level of prescription that 
exists in there.
The same person continues along the same theme, arguing that there has 
to be a balance between principles-based standards and prescription: 
[T]he IAASB would argue that it is principles based, but there is 
a hell of a lot of prescription in that as well. So…it’s missing the 
point a little bit to have that debate [over] one or the other…it’s a 
question of you…have both; it’s a question of getting some balance.
One of the standard setters points to the use by regulatory authorities, 
especially APRA, of auditors in an explicit delegated regulator role.
[E]xternal auditors obviously know…that their job is to express  
a reasonable assurance opinion on financial statements…deep down, 
regulators know that as well, but you take any particular entity, 
whether it’s HIH or any bank or whatever that’s heavily regulated in 
a heavily regulated industry. The auditors and the regulators have 
risks and responsibilities in relation to that organisation and those 
risks are quite different…but there is a concern…within probably 
the accounting profession and the auditors that should anything 
go wrong then there’ll be a number of serious questions from the 
regulators. So it means there’ll be a lot more scrutiny on the audit 
and the actual quality of the audit both from ASIC and from APRA, 
if it’s an APRA-regulated entity…regulators like APRA, they [also] 
try and outsource regulation to the external audit profession, so it’s 
difficult for a regulator to get highly skilled and sufficient highly 
skilled resources to regulate effectively. So what they do is they 
engage the external auditors to do a lot of their work for them and the 
examples of that are…when APRA engages the external auditors to 
do targeted reviews on particular subjects and…then they require 
auditors to notify them of all breaches…Now I’d understand how 
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regulators expect auditors to do that if they understand the nature 
of an external audit. There’s no way an external auditor, as part of 
the audit, is…going to know all breaches.
The same person goes on to argue that regulators are in danger of expecting 
more than auditors can achieve: 
[T]here is an expectation gap with regard to an external audit 
between the accounting profession and the regulator…the 
regulator’s trying to draw as much as possible from an external 
audit that’s probably not really there…so, there is danger in that for 
the accounting profession in that if something does go wrong then 
the regulator will try and draw more from the audit than it should 
do and it will also try and defend itself and use the accounting 
profession to defend itself, to deflect blame…and HIH is probably a 
prime example. Things have tightened up considerably since then 
as well.
The same person continues with this theme of an audit being ‘outsourced 
regulation’, pointing out that there is a limit to what an audit can achieve: 
[O]ther things that external auditors do are outside the scope of the 
external audit, but they have to report on compliance with a risk-
management strategy and there [are] other compliance statements 
they have to do and there [are] compliance reviews and [so on]. 
They’re all outside the scope of the external audit…[as well as] 
compliance with prudential standards. It seems to suggest that 
more and more, the regulator’s trying to build up the onus on the 
external auditor as opposed to the onus on itself to regulate…it’s 
outsourcing regulation to the accounting profession and every time 
that we come up with a new one of these things, I…think of it in 
terms of here we go again; here’s the regulator trying to outsource 
regulation to the accounting profession. The danger is that because 
they do a lot of that then they will try and draw more from the 
external audit than is reasonably there.
Later in the same interview, the same standard setter explains a perceived 
difficulty in engaging with regulators: 
[W]e, as an auditing profession, try and engage the regulators 
in a lot of things and they don’t want to be engaged because of 
their perception of conflict of interest, that when we’re developing 
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standards or whatever, if they give their opinion on an exposure 
draft or they contribute to the process in any way, then it 
compromises them when they come back and have to regulate. In 
other words, they don’t want anybody turning around to them and 
saying, ‘Well, you said this was okay. You gave it a rubber stamp 
and now, in your regulation, you’re saying it’s no good.’
Another standard setter points to an anomaly that he or she sees in the 
incentives for auditors to be provided with accurate information by clients 
compared with those existing in relation to regulators:
I don’t think the gap [between auditors and regulators] is…as 
obvious as perhaps it might appear…by that I mean the gap that 
I see is that the regulator has a view that the auditor is a quasi-
regulator and I don’t have an issue with that; that is a role of the 
auditor to form an opinion under the Corporations Act and report 
breaches of [the] Corporations Act and so forth, so it’s not…
implied; it is…a physical obligation. Where I do have an issue…
is that the auditor is afforded no protection under the corporations 
law in respect of management, directors, employees of a business 
who deal with the auditor providing that auditor with true and 
correct information. Yet the regulator has the powers that enable 
it to obtain any information and to prosecute anybody who gives 
it false information and yet we’ve got a situation where you’ve got 
an auditor who’s operating in a quasi-regulatory role who isn’t 
even supported by a legislative requirement that the entity and the 
people that they audit should give them correct information. 
The same standard setter goes on to compare the responsibilities 
of auditors with those of the companies they audit:
[W]ith the CLERP 9 changes, one of the issues I raised was…[that] 
the changes in auditing standards, black lettering, enforceable by 
law, arguably increased documentation requirements, et cetera, are 
very akin to the US auditing standards and requirements of the US. 
Look at the parallel with the US with what they require business 
to do as well. What we’ve done in Australia is we’ve probably 
implemented, to an extent, part of the US auditing standard-type 
requirement around documentation, archiving files, et cetera…put 
that costing to the auditor and left the businesses alone to a fair 
degree in terms of their obligations and what they should do. Now 
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we say that bearing in mind that the US have recently reviewed 
how they approach [surveillance]…and how people document 
their patrols and how far they have to go…they’ve eased off, but 
they haven’t taken the whole process away and…we’re seeing a 
situation where there’s more onus…back on to the auditor, and the 
businesses, supposedly under the spirit of entrepreneurial spirit 
and being able to trade freely without too much restriction and 
cost of doing business, but there’s a cost of doing business on the 
auditor and has that all been passed back to companies? And is 
there as much responsibility on companies? And you mentioned 
continuous disclosure; is there as much responsibility on companies 
as perhaps there should be around some of those areas?
Another of the standard setters questions whether what it is that regulators 
want auditors to do is consistent with quality auditing:
I don’t know that the auditor’s duty is to give value to the end user, 
being the client, because you’d say who is the client? The user[s] of 
the audit opinion…if we’re talking about a financial statement audit 
under the Corporations Act…are prima facie, the shareholders. And 
there might be debates around who else is entitled to rely on it and 
whether vulnerable people are entitled to rely on it…or there’s a 
duty of care that comes out of vulnerability. So I don’t think that it’s 
the value to the company…to the end user…the focus needs to be 
on getting a quality opinion, which is that nothing has been omitted 
that shouldn’t have been or nothing’s in there that’s incorrect. And 
again, you’ll come back to materiality, but the financial statement’s 
taken as a whole and that sort of point…is doing what it is that the 
regulators’ think we ought to be doing going to result in us missing 
what we need to do to deliver a quality audit? 
The same person continues with the theme, pointing out the danger of 
emphasising the audit trail at the expense of dealing with the issues 
uncovered:
I don’t see it being a danger yet in terms of where we are—but…the 
regulators’ behaviour when they oversight audits and the reviews 
is relevant here—[one of the dangers] is this concept of a check-
list mentality…so much focus goes on documentation and leaving 
the trail as opposed to…identifying and dealing with the issues… 
I don’t see a problem at the moment appearing or anything that’s 
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
524 |
irreconcilable, but a lot of effort and a lot of discussion does go 
into the fact that increasingly, [more] time is being spent on the 
trail of documentation that’s left than was being done previously 
and…if fees don’t increase, costs are absolutely increasing. So if fees 
don’t go up in a commensurate fashion, then might quality suffer 
because you’re focused too much on the documentation trail…that’s 
definitely a space to watch. 
Another standard setter says:
I don’t see [the check list] as the mechanics that affects the day-to-
day audit…it’s more in the back end in just demonstrating to the 
regulators that they comply, but if you’ve got a requirement black 
letter that says the auditor shall understand the risks associated 
with the business of the client…then they’ve got to do some work to 
understand those risks…you can’t adopt a check list-style approach 
to that. Black letter says this is what you’ve got to do, so it creates 
activity for the auditor, but activity in the right thing.
The next standard setter raises the importance of auditors being able 
to write and communicate well:
The funny thing is it is a bit of a challenge for our profession 
because so many of the newer requirements are almost what I call 
social requirements. They’re around communication. They’re not…
around how you ensure you find problems or deal with them; 
they’re around just how you communicate generally and clarify 
your engagement and…the skill of your communication, and 
it is very difficult to get people to write well in this profession.  
[It is] very rare to get a junior staff member who can…string words 
together articulately on a piece of paper…our most technically 
competent people are probably our best communicators as well.
Education of users is the key, according to this same standard setter:
[T]he emphasis should be on the education of the user of the reports 
and just let the audit process settle down as much as possible 
without imposing too many changes on that process, but educate 
people as to how to get the best out of the audit process. 
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The alignment of interests between regulators and auditors is the subject 
of another standard setter’s discourse:
They’re experts in accounting standards and they’re obviously 
going to become experts in how to apply auditing standards because 
they’re taking that on…I hope…they recognise that ultimately 
they’re not at war with the accounting firms. They…have very 
much aligned interests. 
[T]here is a perception that the regulatory view of the world is that 
if it hasn’t been documented it hasn’t been done, and that there 
is a need for prescriptive rules. Even…saying that, the firms like 
prescriptive rules, for all that they complain about it, because 
it’s easier to demonstrate that they’ve done the job they need to 
do, rather than…relying on judgment…there [are] clearly some 
dissenting views around that space between the regulators and 
the auditors. Equally, my sense of the regulators is that they are 
quite concerned—particularly as you cascade down the scale—
about more quality control. Although…based on their private 
conversations, there would also be an argument that even within 
the large firms, there have been pockets of less than adequate 
performance. And there’s perhaps been a bit of a cleansing process 
in some of those firms in the last few years that’s been necessary. 
Equally, if some of that process has moved people to other firms, 
rather than to retirement, you’re…just shifting the problem rather 
than removing it…So the risks are…greater, although you’re then 
perhaps working on smaller assignments that are less critical in the 
event of a failure; they’re not having the impact in the marketplace 
of a large collapse. 
The same person goes on to lament the perceived lack of communication 
by the regulator in the lead up to legally enforceable auditing standards: 
[T]ake the CLERP 9 changes…I don’t think the main regulator has 
done themselves any favours early in the piece of those changes 
in terms of not being very communicative with…the audit 
stakeholders…there was quite an extended period of enormous 
anxiety about the changes that were occurring around them without 
communicating much at all, let alone adequately, with the firms 
being impacted by the changes…that was probably unfortunate…
[but] that’s been turned around in the last six or 12 months…there’s 
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perhaps a slightly different attitude. We’ve played…probably a 
small, but nonetheless…a part in that, just in terms of the dialogue 
that this organisation’s had with both firms and ASIC itself…there’s 
an enormous anxiety out there; you need to communicate with 
them, explain how you’re going to approach the work that you’re 
going to do, that the changes to the systems aren’t necessarily going 
to mean they’re all about to be put into jail.
2.4.1 Summary
Standard setters add some perspective to the debate surrounding 
regulatory oversight, pointing out the alignment of interests that exists 
between auditors, audit firms and the regulators. There is, however, some 
concern about an exaggerated focus by regulators on compliance itself as 
constituting the basis for a quality audit. The anomaly in having allegedly 
principles-based auditing standards alongside regulatory check lists 
is raised. Even though the standard setters lament the trend towards a 
check list-based audit, they seem to see it as inevitable. Also raised is the 
difficulty for regulators of reviewing documentation that retrospectively 
attempts to provide insight into the conduct of the audit.
3.0 inspections
In the interviews with stakeholders, few issues triggered more vehement 
responses—among suppliers at least—than the issue of regulatory 
inspections of audit firms. The next section focuses on stakeholders’ 
perceptions of this regulatory oversight and the resourcing and expertise 
of regulators. This section focuses on comments directed specifically to 
inspections. No users made comments relevant here, so the section begins 
with comments by purchasers.
3.1 Purchasers
The purchasers featured in comments in this section are very aware of the 
regulatory inspection process that has been imposed on their auditors, as 
their comments reveal.
[P]ossibly there is [an expectations gap between regulators and 
auditors]. Anecdotally, I [have] heard of some ASIC surveillance of 
some of the big firms, probably going back one and half [to] two 
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years ago…some onsite inspections of files, interviews of audit 
partners. And it sounded to me—again…the risk here is that  
I come from such a small experience base because I only have one 
corporate—but the sort of things that ASIC were putting to the 
accountants, who were telling these kind of stories of the onsite 
visits, were…relatively paranoid and unrealistic…I would think 
that…showed that ASIC really had some quite negative views, even 
of the big firms, and were quite suspicious of the audit firms being 
compromised in some way by their clients. As I say, it’s some time 
ago…But I know if they’ve started to become enriched with actual 
information, they’ve started to become less antagonistic…while I…
confessedly start from an example of one…they perhaps had really 
come straight off the HIH Royal Commission and [were] starting 
from a bad example of one.
One purchaser is somewhat sympathetic to the impossibility of the 
role allocated to the regulators, who are charged with retrospectively 
determining from documents the course and adequacy of the conduct of 
the audit:
The regulator at the moment is trying to audit auditors, that’s 
number one. And how do they do that? By going through their 
working papers and trying to understand what happened in the 
real world. They weren’t there! What’s on a piece of paper can never 
substantiate what happened. It’s like a performance assessment; 
you put down somebody’s performance, but unless you’re present 
when the discussion took place, the piece of paper is totally 
unrepresentative of the situation; it just cannot capture it all. So 
the regulator is coming in and auditing the auditors and then after 
the event they look at the annual report and they come and talk 
to management or the directors about the way something’s been 
presented and they try…[to] understand something that might 
have taken weeks to discuss and debate, so the regulator’s…placed 
in an impossible situation.
In a more general context—and not necessarily associated with the reforms 
specifically—the next comment addresses perceptions of the value added 
of an audit from one purchaser’s perspective (although the comments are 
made more from a user’s than a purchaser’s perspective).
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As an external party…I can’t really comment…in terms of whether 
it should be [prescribed] or not…we would like…some sort of 
prescription, because…there’s always the relationship issue with a 
head partner and the company. There might be too much pressure 
on the audit partner to skipper, then at least if there’s a list of things 
to check off…that forces the auditor to do that. So…as a user of 
information, we’d rather have a little bit more [prescription] than 
not enough.
The same purchaser is disparaging about the value of the audited financial 
statements:
[I]n terms of information…the usefulness of the disclosures 
in statutory accounts isn’t great for the financial companies…
therefore, rather than the companies giving us a set of accounts, 
quite often we…never look at the actual statutory accounts. What 
we’re given is an investor report rather than a set of statutory 
accounts…we’re…not looking at auditor numbers here, so the final 
P&L [profit or loss statement], the statutory account, is audited, but 
the numbers we’re given are quite often not audited…to us, it’s a 
failure of what…the regulators are doing in terms of what should 
be disclosed. So the bit that’s…regulated, audited, is something…
we don’t bother to look at if…the numbers add up.
Another purchaser comments:
We have a fairly homogenous business, very similar products…
So we have fairly stable and long-established processes…[Audit 
firm X has] come in every year and done their audits. They raise 
things from time to time, but the general issues that the business 
has thought about and concluded on 10 to 15 years ago, we’re not 
operating [in] a really dynamic changing environment in terms of 
the product and the service that we offer. So very rarely do we get 
value add from the audit process.
3.1.1 Summary
Some purchasers make pejorative comments about the value of audit to 
them as they discuss regulation, which tends to be taken to refer to the 
audit itself.
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3.2 Suppliers
The passion with which suppliers spoke on the issue of regulatory 
inspections was revealed in many of the interview quotations included 
below.
I’ve had the misfortune to have ASIC review one of my files recently. 
It just came up in the random cycle and [I] have also just been 
through IQP review internally. My impression of ASIC…is that 
their approach is a tick-the-box [one]. They’re looking at our audit 
files to see if the right boxes have been ticked…so I don’t think 
it’s…a good use of a regulator’s time to come and look and say, they 
may have got their audit opinion right, but did they get there the 
right way…that’s not useful…the questions that they asked me…
were quite silly. [An example is given, but the details are withheld 
because of potential client identifiability] We’ve clearly, from all 
the documentation on file, done all those things, so the fact that 
there’s not a check list there is a ridiculous thing…to say. I just 
felt like that was indicative of their whole approach to the review 
of the file…where I get frustrated with the regulator is they…are 
using too junior people to be able to apply professional judgment.  
If it’s the right information on file…they [fall] back to a check-list 
mentality and if they’re going to do that and cause difficulties for 
firms if that hasn’t [been] done, then you will force us to [do] what 
I see a US firm [doing], which is blind adherence to documentation 
without much thought. Does that produce good audits? No. Does it 
make it harder to sue us? Potentially, but does it mean that we’ll…
get things wrong more often? Yes, I think it does. And does it give 
useful information to the endholder? No, it doesn’t…I expected to 
be disappointed by ASIC’s approach to [the] review [of] our files 
and I was resoundingly disappointed…that my expectations were 
fully met.
The same person goes on to differentiate between the Big Four and non-
Big Four in terms of the regulators’ findings:
I’ve been overwhelmingly disappointed by the regulators and that’s 
what I expected…my problem—and don’t take this the wrong 
way—the informal feedback we get from the ASIC review is [that] 
they’ve been quite pleasantly surprised by the standard of audits 
in the Big Four firms. They’ve been shocked at what they’ve seen in 
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the smaller firms, so it may be that this prescriptive way of doing 
things is a good way of getting the small firms to lift their game…
therefore, they might think that they’re doing a good job and 
they might be doing a good job when you look across the board, 
potentially, because that doesn’t overly surprise me that they’ve 
been quite surprised at what they find in the smaller firms…due to 
a couple of transactions I’ve been involved in the last two or three 
years, I would have looked at files for all Big Four firms…[and] the 
standard’s pretty good. Smaller firms, I don’t know.
Another supplier is ambivalent about the potential impact of the regulatory 
review:
As far as going through various firms now…we haven’t been 
subject to review as yet, but we will be and we know that. I’m not 
sure what they’re trying to achieve out of it. I’ve been to sessions 
where the regulator has discussed the process and I really haven’t 
come away with anything as to what their outcome is as far as this is 
concerned. So as to whether it’s hindered or helped, I don’t think it’s 
done either…I don’t think it’s…hindered; there [are] other factors 
that hinder the capital markets. I don’t think the way the auditors 
are behaving or the way the regulators [are] viewing auditors [have] 
any impact…it’s really between those two parties where the issues 
are.
The same person goes on to claim there is inequity in applying Big Four 
methodologies as the benchmark that non-Big Four firms must live up to:
[T]hey have been through a process on a number of stages with the 
Big Four. And they’ve certainly given them a bigger tick compared 
to…non-Big Four firms—absolutely, I agree with that. The resources 
is one of the issues…but the concerns that I have are more…that 
they have…formed an opinion on how an audit methodology 
should be…designed and implemented, and their opinion seems to 
be formed on what they’ve seen primarily at the Big Four. Now…
they’ve got more resources than the non-Big Four have in relation to 
things like technical support, all those sort of areas which obviously 
underpin how we do things…technically, how our methodology is 
developed, et cetera. And we don’t have those resources, and none 
of the non-Big Four firms [has] those resources; there’s no question 
about that. 
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The same person expresses the inappropriateness of regulators applying 
their opinion of how an audit should be conducted:
[T]o form an opinion on how an audit should primarily be done 
is…not the role of the regulator. And because they’ve taken what  
I would almost describe as this high moral ground then they’re going 
to be disappointed…But that doesn’t mean that what we’re doing 
is wrong or is not the right way to conduct an audit. And that’s 
the problem…this is where I say you’ve got this almost expectation 
gap because they’re saying this is the way we think you should do 
things. But we’re also saying…you’re not actually doing it wrong, 
but this is the way we think you should do these things. And…
that’s the problem.
Yet another view, quite damning of ASIC’s approach to the reviews, 
follows:
There’s a mid-tier group that’s started and they’ve had the ASIC 
accountant there. But it is still hard…They’re very aggressive when 
they come in and review the firms. And I’m not sure that too many 
of them have ever been in the firing line in terms of having to sign 
off, having to pull things together, to have a real appreciation [of] 
some of the issues, and therefore what is important and what isn’t 
important…the issue then becomes if they think they’ve got a big 
issue then they just go through you like a dose of salts. And I’m…
not sure that that’s the right approach…it would’ve been nice 
to learn what their way of life is before they started doing these 
reviews, because I’m not too sure who set them up as judge and 
jury. Who said that ASIC’s way of thinking about how auditors 
operate was the way to go…they just started the inspection 
program…talking to some of the firms [that have] been reviewed, 
some of [ASIC’s] approaches have been a bit cute and totally lacking 
in understanding about how the firms operate. 
The views of another, obviously non-Big Four supplier, in terms of ASIC 
using the Big Four processes as the benchmark, are expressed in the next 
quotation: 
[O]ne of the things which I have enormous difficulty with is [that] 
ASIC will go in and have a look at the Big Four and they’ll come 
out with their report, which says essentially that they’re all doing 
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a really good job, that they had a few nitpicking points, which 
were really minor about the Big Four. And they really do things 
very well. The Big Four have got excellent procedures and quality. 
Occasionally, there are slip–ups, which we find out about later…
then they’ve gone into the mid-tiers and they’ve looked at those 
procedures and what they appear to have done—and…a lot of the 
people I speak to…agree with me—is they’ve said okay the Big Four 
is the standard…the benchmark, now let’s have a look at the others. 
And they’ve gone, ‘Oh well, you’re nowhere near as good as the Big 
Four.’ Well, surprise, surprise; the mid-tiers don’t have the same 
critical mass and ability [and] infrastructure around the auditors 
and so on, and technical advisors and all that. 
Yet another supplier laments the fact that ASIC is all too willing to point 
out what is wrong, but loath to provide guidance on addressing the issue:
[I]t would be part of [regulators’ expertise to question audit 
methodology]. Do they have the expertise? That’s a hard one. 
It depends on the situation. One of the issues I have when the 
regulator comes in on the inspections is that they will tell you what 
you’re doing wrong. They won’t give you the guidance on how to 
address it. They’ll say that you’ve got weakness in a certain area; 
you ask for guidance as to what they expect and often you don’t get 
that…it’s from a protection point of view from the regulator that 
they don’t want to be seen to dictate what the best practice is. They 
would rather not hold themselves to be that kind of benchmark in 
terms of how to do an account. It does make it difficult though for 
the firms to know what the benchmark is. 
Another supplier enunciates the importance of how regulators go about 
their role:
I don’t think it’s…confusion about what their role is…they’re 
regulating the audit profession now and that’s clear, and that’s 
under law and so on and so forth…the query is the way in which 
they do it. And I don’t know whether these stories are true or not…
and you inevitably get the horror stories about this, that and the 
other…[There are] tales of PCAOB inspections [where]…people 
are spending more time performing the inspection than was spent 
performing the audit, and deliberately looking to find things. You 
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know, these rumours that the PCAOB is staffed by disgruntled ex-
employees of the Big Four, who are looking to get some payback. 
All that stuff has gone into urban…legend. 
On the same theme, the same person goes on to eloquently explain the 
difference between a regulator who acts collaboratively versus one who 
acts in a more aggressive manner:
[W]hether you philosophically accept or not that an independent 
body should regulate the profession, that’s where we’re at. That’s 
where we’re at in the US. It’s where we’re at in the UK. That’s the 
way it is. The rules are set and [are] there to apply to. But…it’s in 
how you interpret and deal [with] those rules. And that’s a mirror 
with ASIC in its dealing with clients. I’ve done a lot of work under 
the Managed Investments Act with compliance plans where ASIC 
have swung in the pendulum from being very tough enforcers, 
because they needed to be with some things, to more helpful in 
terms of helping people construct these things, so that people are 
more willing to come and discuss issues, and they work through 
collaboratively.
The same person suggests that ASIC could afford to rely on other review 
processes within the firms themselves, especially within the Big Four: 
[I]t’s a policing discussion. Are you a community policeman or are 
you an enforcer…you’ve got to be both. And I’d like to think that 
within the Big Four…we have some pretty rigid quality ourselves. 
We have real-time quality reviews [in which] our files [are gone] 
through independently…We have global risk reviews and so on, 
which are pretty damn tough. And those global reviewers are 
themselves reviewed as they’re carrying out the task. So we have 
some pretty strong processes and some pretty tough disciplinary 
measures…way before ASIC get in there. So you’d think that ASIC 
would—and maybe they are—be comfortable with some of that, 
rather than putting another layer on top. 
3.2.1 Summary
Suppliers hold generally negative views of the way in which regulatory 
inspections are approached and conducted. There is incredulity that a 
retrospective examination of the audit files and documentation alone can 
give accurate insight to the nature of the judgment calls made during 
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the conduct of the audit. There is a lack of respect for the knowledge 
and expertise of the regulators charged with the task of conducting 
inspections. There is frustration over the perceived lack of communication 
about the way in which the task is to be conducted and from the non-Big 
Four there is resentment that the methodology of the Big Four is used as 
a standard that must be lived up to in order for it to appear that a quality 
audit has been conducted. 
3.3 Standard setters
In a context pertaining to any expectations gap between regulators and 
auditors, a standard setter says: 
[Y]es, [the tension between audit firms and the regulator is] quite 
real…it perhaps has diminished in more recent times, but the tension 
was very real…[with] the introduction of the audit standards having 
the force of law and that potential for criminal sanctions…there was 
huge anxiety. And then overlaid with the other CLERP 9 changes 
of the reviews being undertaken…the audit inspections by the 
regulator, and all the costs that that imposes. And…the regulator 
view of the need for documentation, and at the same time…the 
tightening of audit standards coming internationally anyway, 
versus the firms having a somewhat more pragmatic [approach], or 
wanting more flexibility perhaps than the regulators were…giving. 
4.0 in defence of regulators
It is important to understand that many stakeholders expressed empathy 
for the difficult task that regulators must carry out. This section brings 
some of these comments together to emphasise the constructive nature of 
the discussions with interviewees.
4.1 Purchasers
I don’t think [the prescriptive approach] adds a thing to the 
shareholder…I understand the thinking behind it and I understand 
the politics behind it in terms of…politicians being seen to do 
things and not to be soft on this issue and that’s why it’s gone to the 
law. But…Australia on the whole’s got it pretty right.
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The next purchaser, who has worked on both sides of the regulatory 
divide, eloquently explains the pressures experienced by regulators: 
I’ve had the privilege and benefit of working within a regulator… 
I can tell you now regulators are removed from the real world. They 
do not have to exercise the professional judgment that auditors and 
preparers have to exercise; they’re very process driven. They almost 
cannot put themselves in the shoes of the directors or management 
or the auditors, but by dint of the nature of the regulatory world, 
they end up doing that…they do not face the day-in and day-
out judgments that have to be made on provisions, impairments, 
measurement of items, interpreting accounting standards that [are] 
the meat and potatoes of management, preparers and auditors. So 
the regulator sort of parachutes in and looks at things in an ex-
poste clinical way and has the benefit of hindsight and expects to 
see a perfectly laid out answer. It doesn’t happen that way. Making 
sausages is not clean; it is messy. But judgments are made along the 
way and typically they’re made in good faith and on reasonably 
good evidence and [they can be substantiated]…there are different 
perspectives because the regulator is…[under] enormous ex-poste 
pressure to justify why they didn’t do something ex-ante.
The same person puts into perspective the need to weigh the costs and 
benefits in deciding on the level of resourcing to be attributed to regulators:
The resources will always be inadequate to capture all the issues. 
There will always be a cost–benefit judgment made about which 
cases [to take on]…A regulator is not about regulating every event; 
it’s about sending signals, it’s about putting in place mitigation 
control to stop the market going berserk. Now that’s an over-
exaggeration, but it’s trying to stop behaviours at the far end of the 
normal distribution curve—well one end of the normal distribution 
curve—because the number of false evil criminal activities is 
probably less than 5 per cent…the regulator is really trying to send 
signals…so it has to make strategic interventions…the question 
about resources is…a cost–benefit [one] and it’s about managing it 
at the margin rather than doubling the resources.
The same person also expresses some sympathy for the position in which 
regulators are placed: unable to countenance failure. 
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[J]ust a word in defence of the regulators here too. Part of their 
problem is that they can’t tolerate failure…regulatory bodies 
have to report to parliamentary committees where you’ve got all 
the dynamics of opposition and government fighting it out in that 
political environment. So [the principals] at ASIC and at APRA 
have to go before parliamentary committees on a regular basis. If 
any of their charges fail, if any of their companies—particularly in 
APRA’s case—have failed then there’s all hell to pay. So all of their 
incentives and [all of] their emphasis [are on] prevent[ing] failure at 
any cost…‘drive risk out of the system’ is [essentially] the mantra. 
And in the process, unfortunately, what that does is it destroys 
businesses…this is the reason why…we’ve got to just be a little 
vigilant in this area.
4.2 Suppliers
One supplier questions whether the focus is on the really key issues:
[T]he focus hasn’t always been [on] what I see as the key issues, but  
I can understand it as well, because unless you’re out there and 
you’re having the discussions and you’re seeing it first hand, and 
you’re dealing with boards, and you’re dealing with management, 
and you understand the tensions that often exist there, the 
complexity of transactions, the timing of certain things, you don’t 
always get an appreciation of what the key factors that you should 
be focusing on are. 
The same person goes on to comment on the expertise of the regulator:
That goes to our own risk assessment, that goes to how we determine 
where we’re going to focus our efforts and…it comes down to 
materiality. It’s not all materiality, but you will look at certain 
areas and not look at others in as much detail because that’s riskier, 
because of incidents of anomaly of error in the past, because you 
know the business. You can’t understate that…that is important. 
Somebody coming in cold to review it, whilst they might try to 
come to the same conclusion as you based on the documentation 
that’s there, you can’t get that same feel[ing] and so when you 
start looking at it you can understand why the focus might be on 
something else rather than [on] what you think is the key issue…
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it’s very difficult to get that level of confidence in expertise within 
the regulator up to that same level, unless they’re out there…doing 
their own detailed work.
One supplier expresses a positive view of what could be achieved if more 
was done to include forensic auditing in audit processes:
The other thing that I…want to mention is innovation…and the 
way audits are done, and particularly technology and data, and a lot 
of the work that we do in forensic now is beginning to migrate into 
audit practice. So, for instance, I’ve just finished doing a job called 
‘forensic audit systems’…when we help, in this case, a US company 
to have a look at its operations in the Asia-Pacific area…a lot of that 
involves technological taking of data, analysing it and looking at 
things that at the moment aren’t really looked at. So…there are a 
lot of useful things that could be done that at the moment are not 
done, but within five years probably will be…the forensic side to it 
will become a huge element of auditing…I’d like to see…the human 
judgment side of audit partners who’ve come up through a more 
enjoyable profession and learnt how to do it well combined with the 
technological data analysis, which is much more objective. So you 
have the subjective side and the objective side. If you marry those 
two together…you would get a much better audit process than the 
current one, which is really there to protect the auditors and to 
satisfy the regulators…the tick ticking…Will it happen? There’ll 
be elements of it, but it will never be as pure as I’ve just described 
because you’ll always have regulators nagging away and auditors 
trying to make a buck and make sure they don’t get sued. 
Another supplier points to insolvency practitioners being able to provide 
insights to auditors as a potential way to improve audit quality:
I’m sure there [are] a lot of…fraud and investigative accountants, 
insolvency practitioners and that sort of thing [out there]…
and that’s another thing I found quite strange…that a group of 
accountants would go into a business from the insolvency field, to 
try and investigate…why a company failed and…how to restructure 
a business, yet there was never any input from auditing, which  
I would have thought would have been a fairly natural progression, 
that when you go in and you investigate what’s happened to a 
company and why it’s failed, why it hasn’t succeeded…you don’t 
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consult the auditing group to come in and say, ‘Well, let’s go through 
these accounts; why have they accounted this way?’ [There is] none 
of that—not in my experiences, anyway…And…vice versa…with 
auditing…the skill set that insolvency practitioners [have], their 
investigative powers, could be utilised in the audit field…in saying 
that check lists are great…you probably need to keep an eye on 
[them], because…if there is a check list in place, it’s easy to learn 
the check list, potentially, if someone knows what the check list is.
4.3 Standard setters
One standard setter welcomes the signal it sends to less than compliant 
clients to have ASIC involved in the oversight of an audit: 
[T]hat sends a very clear signal that there is a difference, that if 
someone is dealing with ASIC, for example, there is a higher level 
of responsibility than if you are dealing with an auditor…that 
ultimately does send a message—albeit it may be subtle—because a 
lot of people probably have never sat back and thought about it like 
that…perhaps if companies knew that [by] providing information 
to an auditor that was a half-truth, or maybe not quite the full 
picture, you might get a different level of commitment, a different 
level of communication…The discussions I’ve had with various 
regulators have said, ‘Well, if we did that, perhaps companies would 
tell you things they might otherwise not do’, but it’s somewhat 
counterintuitive that that would be a breach of the act anyway. 
So…what we’re trying to deal with here is…the exception, not 
the rule. We’re dealing with the people who should be doing the 
right thing, not those that are because…it won’t apply to them. 
But, typically, where things go wrong, and then people get upset, 
is where people haven’t been doing the right thing. It doesn’t mean 
putting something in the act will make it happen, but at least it 
sends a very strong signal that the auditor is somebody that…[the] 
entity should deal with, with integrity and responsibility, and it’s 
not a process that some may see as tick the box. Yes, we’ve had an 
audit and we’ve got the audit report; we can move on…that’s where 
I see the gap…the red tape issue is a part of it as well. 
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5.0 issues and implications
Through the interviews we have learnt that users, purchasers and suppliers 
are all highly aware of the regulatory changes, which in Australia have 
included the creation of an inspection process conducted by ASIC of 
audit firms and the processes within those firms. This inspection process 
triggered a series of comments from purchasers and suppliers in particular. 
Users, purchasers and standard setters, however, also commented on the 
whole issue of the resourcing of regulators. 
Both purchasers and suppliers recognise the need for inspections 
and their benefits, which provide quality control and potentially useful 
information to the capital market—albeit that the regulators’ reports tend 
to highlight negatives only. Nonetheless, purchasers and suppliers were 
sceptical not so much about the concept but the delivery of the inspection 
process. One purchaser makes the observation that depending on how 
the inspection is undertaken, there is never an opportunity to gain an 
understanding from the documentation in any working paper file of the 
events as they unfold in the real world. Indeed, these purchasers make 
frequent reference to the inspections and the disconnection between 
inspections and the purported ‘real world’. 
Those suppliers interviewed who were members of firms that had been 
inspected through the ASIC process were mixed in their evaluation of the 
inspection process and some were overtly negative. One Big Four supplier 
indicated that the informal feedback he received suggested that the Big 
Four emerged on the whole feeling pleased with the overall evaluation 
of their systems and processes, but the processes in some of the smaller 
firms left ASIC ‘shocked’. Observations from the non-Big Four supply side 
were that the inspection process had been contaminated by the inspectors 
observing the resources available to the Big Four and expecting—and 
indeed requiring—the non-Big Four to operate at the same resource level. 
There was, in the view of one non-Big Four supplier, a lack of empathy for 
the fact that they did things differently.
There was also considerable criticism that the inspectors do not have 
any or sufficient ‘real world’ auditing experience and that inspection 
services are limited because of this deficiency. 
Users, purchasers and standard setters make the observation that the 
regulator is inadequately equipped to undertake inspections and indeed to 
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more generally operate in an effective and efficient environment. One user 
expresses disappointment that there is a need to obtain greater interaction 
between practice and regulators and to attain more practical experience 
for those in regulatory environments. One purchaser makes the insightful 
observation that the resources assigned to regulators in economies such 
as ours are almost by definition inadequate for fully undertaking the task 
entrusted to a regulator. This person also acknowledges that the efficient 
operation of a regulator is to be selective and strategic about the work they 
undertake rather than attempting to be comprehensive. He suggests that 
Australian regulation is of this type. This purchaser also notes the beneficial 
use of secondments and sabbaticals from private-sector suppliers into 
regulators, which is common in the United States but until very recently has 
been rare in Australia. The authors of this report note that the ASIC review 
document strongly proposes to engage in this form of secondment program 
starting in 2009. Evidence the authors have gathered from purchasers, 
suppliers and users suggests this is a very positive step forward. 
Finally, one standard setter observes that audit is in fact an outsourced 
form of regulation, but there is a potential disconnection between the 
achievements and the outcomes of the audit and what the regulator might 
ultimately wish to be reported. This is not the responsibility of the auditor 
per se, but suggests a subtle re-engineering of regulatory objectives and 
outcomes.
With respect to documentation generally, it is interesting to observe that 
while participants in the market have their criticisms of documentation, 
users, purchasers, suppliers and perhaps particularly standard setters all 
observe that there is a benefit in enhanced levels of documentation. While 
there are considerable concessions that the work is being done anyway, 
there is a popular belief that there is value to be found in documentation. 
One theme among suppliers is that the documentation will provide an 
opportunity for replication of the judgments made. This adds rigour and 
substance to the judgments made during an audit and provides support 
for the argument that the judgments are not simply arbitrary but are based 
on a substantiated context. 
There is little doubt that on the demand and supply sides of the market, 
the observation is that larger firms are able to adapt to an environment 
where greater levels of documentation are obligatory. While not specifically 
observed, this might have consequences for those who supply into the market 
for audit services—at least with more economically substantial clients.
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Again, while not often directly referenced, there is a belief that 
efficiency in documentation is a necessary part of our future.
6.0 Concluding remarks
Many of the issues relating to the regulation of auditors have been dealt 
elsewhere in this report; however, there are a small number of actionable 
items arising from discussion in this chapter to which one might give 
consideration.
The chapter reveals considerable tension from suppliers in their 
consideration of the approach, operation and resourcing of regulators. With 
this in mind, it might be useful, particularly with regard to such topics 
as inspections and quality control, for ASIC and APRA (as appropriate) to 
establish an open and transparent forum between suppliers and regulators 
and possibly other important stakeholders, including the AUASB. Such a 
transparent but potentially informal forum could help resolve tensions 
and misunderstandings. This forum may or may not have the possibility of 
operating under Chatham House rules; however, the importance of having 
some degree of opening in these interchanges is seen as important and will 
contribute to the efficiency of the capital market if successfully pursued.
A common theme within the chapter is the quantity and quality 
of resources available to the regulator—particularly ASIC. With the 
introduction of secondments into ASIC, this will assist principally with 
respect to gaining highly skilled and particularly experienced auditors 
into the task. There is, however, evidence that the level of resources in 
quantitative terms is still modest and consideration might be given to the 
scale of resources available to ASIC, especially as it builds and enhances 
its inspection service through these current times of considerable financial 
strain in the world economy. 
As indicated in the first recommendation, there is a need for support, 
interaction and communication between the regulator and those who 
represent all of the suppliers of audit services—that is, all registered 
company auditors and, in some circumstances, beyond. As the market 
has emerged, there is no single peak body that can represent this entire 
group. At one point, it might have been seen as the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia, but that group has gone beyond representing the 
supply side of this particular market. How one structures a market so there 
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is one clear unambiguous peak body for the supply of the audit market 
is a challenge that is not easily resolved. Clearly, it cannot be the AUASB 
that sets auditing standards; it cannot be the organisation that maintains 
the register of company auditors because that is the regulator (ASIC); and 
it cannot be the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, 
because it has the task of dealing with inappropriate behaviour of people 
who are registered company auditors, among others. It would therefore be 
useful to have a peak body that is created from other interested parties to 
represent this particular group. 
One issue with respect to the inspection services is that there is some 
evidence that the inspections are ‘one size suits all’. No doubt, those 
close to the inspection process will feel this is a harsh and unreasonably 
generalised observation. It is, however, the case that there is evidence that 
inspections are forcing ‘check-list approaches’. The sophisticated business 
models of those suppliers with whom we communicated tended to hold 
the audit as a two-part process. One part is largely transactional, with a 
considerable quantity of work that is relatively menial and standardised, 
but through that process and supplementary to other processes, there 
is an opportunity for particularly important, unusual, innovative, risky 
transactions or events being highlighted and being put off into a secondary 
process, where considerable judgment is required. This second part of 
transactions and events cannot be subjected to a check-list approach in 
the same way that the bulk of the transactions might be. At this point, 
inspection processes that are more forensic than procedural in their 
approach might be useful. Having inspections that can capture the need 
for routine procedure and check lists as well as being insightful, forensic 
and tolerant of ambiguity would be a useful step forward and would no 
doubt assist in the inspection process.
Finally, the inspection reports that are published tend to be negative 
in orientation without providing the other side of the equation—that 
is, praise for particularly good practice. The capital market is not being 
informed of the total outcome of the inspections. The inspections to the 
extent that they can be a ‘window’ on the quality of the audit work 
done by each of the suppliers are the key to providing information to 
enhance the efficiency of the capital market. If these inspection reports 
can be written as windows on the quality of the work then there will be 






They really do dominate, the Big Four. And it’s very hard for 
the medium and…the small firms…to compete with the ongoing 
educational input those guys have all the time available for their 
staff, and all those sorts of things. It’s hard for them to compete and 
stay at the same level and…it wouldn’t be entirely healthy to have 
four or three mega-firms governing an industry, because once…you 
dominate something, you can control…the way things are done 
[and] the degree of quality to which they are done.
— User
1.0 Key issues
The issue of competition within the market for audit services raises 
important issues for the profession, including:
•	 is the level of competition in the market for audit services optimal in 
terms of its association with the quality of services provided 
•	 does the disparity in size between the third and fourth of the Big 
Four and also between the largest of the mid-tier and the smallest  
of the Big Four matter 
•	 is it feasible to expect enhanced competition to come from growth in 
the mid-tiers that could bring any of them to a level comparable with 
the fourth in size of the Big Four
•	 to what extent are unnecessarily restrictive auditee company’s self-
imposed constraints on the purchase of joint audit and non-audit 
services to blame for a perceived lack of choice among the Big Four
•	 to what extent are constraints imposed on the growth of firms by  
a shortage of skilled personnel?
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•	 if it is believed that it would be unhealthy to have less than four 
large audit firms, how best can we deal with the moral hazard for 
regulators in monitoring and acting on any transgression by  
a member of the Big Four accounting firms
•	 to what extent do the rules around rotation of audit partners trigger 
consideration by auditee companies of a change in audit firm
•	 is the level of competition in the market for audit services such that 
radical alternatives should be considered—for example, nationalising 
the audit function or allowing other professions to provide audit 
services?
2.0 introduction
The degree of competition within the market for audit services is important 
to audit quality, audit fees, auditor tenure, auditor change, industry 
expertise, client knowledge, non-audit service provision and to regulation 
of the market, among other things. The structure of the Australian market 
consists of the Big Four firms, among whom three seem to be larger than 
the fourth, and the non-Big Four firms of national mid-tiers and smaller 
firms. The survey and interview data in general convey perceptions of 
a highly competitive market. In what follows, the survey results and 
stakeholder interviews are analysed and insights are drawn.
3.0 survey data
As indicated in the interviews discussed later in this chapter, there seems 
to be evidence of effective competition in the market for audit services for 
smaller and medium-size auditees at least. In the minds of some, however, 
there is a question about the extent of competition for larger company 
clients. This led to a survey question about the level of competition for 
this part of the market, the results of which are reported in Table 13.1.
Responses to a question about the level of competition for larger 
company clients, averaged across the users, purchasers and suppliers, 
showed that a little less than half of the respondents believed there was a 
competitive marketplace for larger companies. Among all types of users, 
approximately 57 per cent agree with the statement ‘For larger companies 
in Australia there is a lack of competition in the market for audit services’. 
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Of the purchasers, directors and audit committee members are clearest 
in their view that there are concerns about the lack of competition, with 
61 per cent of that group of purchasers agreeing with the aforementioned 
statement. Among the suppliers, the group that clearly believes there is a 
competitive market is respondents employed within the Big Four firms. 
The various discussions with individuals provided support for these 
positions and showed there was much complexity with respect to the issue 
of competition, with differentiation between competition for the larger 
clients and the more modestly sized clients and between price competition 
and competition for quality, which for many respondents represented 
different issues. 


















































































For larger companies 
in Australia, there is a 
lack of competition in 
the market for audit 
services.
57 58 58 56 52 61 50 43 55 27 62
An external financial 
statement audit is of 
value to you because of 
the brand name of the 
audit firm conducting 
the audit.
32 32 33 30 34 36 31 36 30 82 16
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
With the obvious exception of Big Four suppliers to the market for audit 
services, no stakeholder group had a strong positive view that the brand 
name of the audit firm conducting the audit was of particular value. This 
view by purchasers and users is consistent with the proposition that it is 
the Big Four classification that adds value rather than simply the brand 
name of the individual firm. The highly differentiated view between non-
Big Four and Big Four suppliers can probably be explained by sharply 
differing views on the effect of a brand name on competition (Table 13.1).
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4.0 interviews
Stakeholders consisting of users, purchasers, suppliers, standard setters 
and regulators were asked in face-to-face interviews whether they felt there 
was sufficient competition in the market for audit services. Additionally, 
in conversations, issues about competition were raised in a context not 
necessarily responsive to a specific question on the matter. Responses 
appear in the following sections, together with a synthesis of the insights 
and policy implications that flow from these responses. 
4.1 Users
Among the users, none spoke positively about there being sufficient 
competition in the market for quality audit services; rather, concern was 
expressed about insufficient competition. Indicative quotes follow.
[I]f you put your audit out to tender, you’ve also got your current 
auditor, you’ve typically got at least…one other Big Four firm…
doing tax, due diligence work, valuation work—something for 
you—which excludes them. You may well have two firms excluded, 
because one’s done your tax work and one’s done valuation work 
for you recently…so when you go to put your audit to tender, if 
you can find two of the Big Four to give it to, and one second-tier 
firm, you’re doing well. And for a whole bunch of reasons, a lot of 
Australian companies don’t want to go to a second-tier firm.
[I]t’s constrained at the top, because…particularly 
with companies going international, they really have 
only got a choice of those big firms…we’ve seen some 
rotation of audit firms within those big companies, 
and…you’d normally take that as being a reasonably 
healthy sign that they do have to change their 
auditors. But the reality is that second-tier firms…
are [not] big enough. I’d have concerns about seeing 
a second-tier audit firm on…a major global company. They’re okay 
for a domestic-type company—smaller ones, but…investors want 
the comfort of having one of those big firms on the line should 
anything really go wrong.
[There is] not enough competition, especially when you’re looking 
at big jobs that only a couple of big firms could possibly do.  
‘I’d have concerns 
about seeing a 
second-tier audit 




You see even in Melbourne there would only be certain firms that 
have enough depth to do a bank or a large insurance company. 
One user asks why niche audit firms have not emerged.
[W]hen I first started working, it was the big 
eight, and the trend’s only been [in] one direction. 
There is no reason why the accounting profession 
can’t do what the legal profession has done, much 
better…in that if I’ve got a big job in legal advice, 
there’s Mallesons, Freehills, Robinsons, Clayton 
Utz, these big firms, but…beneath them…are 
specialist boutique law firms that might not cover 
every aspect. Like Freehills can cover everything. 
Whatever your problem is, Freehills can handle it. And a small 
boutique firm may not be able to handle everything, but [it] will 
handle some things better than Freehills…I can’t understand why 
there isn’t room for an audit firm that just specialises in doing 
mining companies—and just audit. No tax work, no advisory work, 
no valuation work, just say, ‘Look, we’re going to be the number-
one boutique firm in Australia for mining companies. We’ve got 500 
mining companies listed in Perth, it’s a real market, and I can make 
myself the number-one firm in Australia, and I’ll do it a lot cheaper 
than the Big Four, and I’ll do it better, by really being a boutique 
and…never putting my hand up to audit BHP or the National Bank; 
it’s just not in my interest.’
[T]hat…lack of choice…has created the conflicts, so…how does 
the industry react to it…we’ve already seen…the receiver side…
splitting off…Should you…be hiving off, which…is the ultimate 
way you go, hiving off the audit part of the firms, so there is no 
conflict? It’s going to be [something] the accounting profession 
really has to think about and deal with, because I cannot believe 
with the size of these firms now that there are these fantastic 
synergies. They’re just monoliths, bureaucrats; how in hell does 
someone in Brisbane who’s auditing some weird and wonderful 
industry…access that information net somewhere else in the world, 
five time zones away…And how are they going to make that an 
efficient process…it’s nonsense.
‘I can’t understand 
why there isn’t room 
for an audit firm that 
just specialises in doing 
mining companies—
and just audit.’
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4.1.1 Summary
Among the users, concern is raised that it is difficult for large companies 
to find sufficient firms to tender for audit when one of these firms is 
the current auditor and another might be doing tax, due diligence or 
valuation work, leaving only two and perhaps one second-tier firm eligible 
to win a tender. The banking and insurance industry sectors are noted 
as particularly problematic for competition among audit firms. Several 
interviewees commented on the difficulty for the smaller firms to compete 
with the continuing educational input and training that the Big Four 
can provide. Suggestions for remedy include the creation of boutique, 
industry-specific audit firms.
4.2 Purchasers
Some among the purchasers felt that competition in the market for audit 
services was quite adequate and that, for large-company audits, the 
presence of four large audit firms was sufficient, with scope to use the 
non-Big Four for specific advice, as exemplified in the following quotes.
[W]e’ve got four key firms, obviously large firms that we’ll go to…
that will provide decent enough competition…for us…So, I’m…
okay with that…from a competitive perspective…From an audit 
perspective at the big end of town, you’ve got the big firms there.
[B]ecause I’ve got an auditor, what it unfortunately means is the 
auditor can’t give me advice on various bits and pieces that I need. 
So then the only thing about that is it comes down to your comment 
earlier about the fact that some of the small firms, and I have gone 
down to small firms…to get particular advice. In fact when there 
have been conflicts with any of the big guys and I’ve…found that 
you can get good advice because essentially you’re not looking for a 
big audit team to come and do a big audit.
[F]our is competitive enough…they’re big…they’re scaleable 
enough and you don’t want too many because then you…come back 
to the situation…we had…where…too much competition tends to 
cut margins…the quality’s better; you don’t get competition and 
you don’t lower the standards.
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Several people, however, commented on how difficult it was to avoid 
conflicts of interest with only four big audit firms in the market, and there 
was concern about the future if another of the large firms did not survive.
It’s becoming a problem…it used to be the big six, and…if it 
ended up as the big three or the big two…that would be a very 
major issue…with four we’re probably still okay. But…we’ve got 
four major banks in Australia, so it would be interesting, and I…
don’t know who their auditors are, but the concept of one auditor 
auditing a number of those major banks would be interesting in 
terms of whether the clients would be happy with that…there’s  
a potential conflict there.
[Y]ou also need enough scope to be able to have an accounting firm 
as an auditor, another accounting firm who provides tax advice and 
maybe a third one that provides other sorts of advice…four’s about 
as tight as it could get and still work effectively. But…it works 
reasonably well. 
[I]f we had to go out and tender our job out, there’d be enough 
interest…the other firms would be interested in doing it. I don’t 
think we’d end up with a situation where we just couldn’t find 
people interested in taking on the work. When you get down to 
three, well it starts to get a little bit tight then. But the other thing 
I’m not aware of, because I don’t follow it closely enough, is the 
extent to which some of the second-tier firms are starting to try and 
ramp up a little bit to fill that gap. 
The insight the next purchaser offers is that requests for a partner change 
can occur:
[I]f we have a problem with [one of the Big Four], we could always 
ask for the partner to be changed. And that’s a high degree of 
influence.
The next purchaser identifies competition in advice in international 
tax as a problem area:
Where…we are finding there is very little competition is in 
specialised tax areas—for example, international tax. This is not 
really an auditing question; this is an ancillary thing…This is where 
the Australian Tax Office and other jurisdictions have made the…
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international tax so complex and so specialised that you haven’t 
got a hope…[of] doing it on your own. You absolutely have to work 
with advice and because of the nature of it, there [are] probably 
only two or three companies that can do it and each company will 
probably only have two or three people involved in it and they’re 
charging like wounded bulls. It’s just awful…[and] there’s not the 
market for competition because it’s so specialised and it’s very, 
very difficult…But in terms of straight audit, fine…there’s quite 
sufficient competition in the market.
The trouble is that in the last six months so many of the smaller–
medium ones have been swallowed up by the big guys…and you 
look at letters in the mail, off and on, just saying from partners 
of small firms that now…we’ve been taken over…we’ve joined as 
partners with XY and Z and now we can bring you…all of these 
other services, which we couldn’t bring you in the past.
The next purchaser points to the mobility of audit partners:
[W]hat you are seeing is the firms getting smarter around…
transferring and recognising global accounts. So you might end up 
with a partner that comes from the US or comes from the UK for 
a period. I don’t see that as something that’s out of the question. 
However, in Australia, I don’t know whether we’re necessarily 
big enough to attract quality ones from those markets. But…
competition really rests in the individual partner, and that’s about 
the only thing you can really tie it down to, because in terms of a 
process and methodology, they’re all the same.
One purchaser sees so little competition that nationalising the auditing 
function is ‘just one step away’:
I believe we’re about one step away from nationalising auditing…
there isn’t any competition really, [there is] no differentiation, so why 
not just make it one and it’s the government? And the regulator’s 
frustrated with the quality of audit, so why doesn’t the government 
take it on? That’s the sort of way you’re tending. If you look five 
years down the track, 10 years down the track, with all this tension 
that’s going on…I can see nationalisation is a real—not a threat, it’s 
probably the wrong word. It may be an outcome.
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If you’ve got your regulations set such that your auditors can’t 
provide consulting services, certain tax services and so on, you 
already need to have a relationship with two of the four. You’re 
down to three and it…just makes it hard. The same people are going 
to be doing the work for everyone. 
The concentration of the profession’s gone too far…
we’d be better off if we had maybe six firms, and 
one of the reasons for that is [that] when you get 
involved in significant corporate transactions, often 
there [are] not enough firms to enable you to have 
someone acting independently for you. I’ve been 
involved in transactions where individual firms are 
acting on both sides of the transaction. So we talk 
about having the need for independence and confidentiality and 
getting proper advice, but it’s simply [that] you can’t do it. And 
everybody says: ‘Oh, we’ll have our Chinese walls’, but…you’ve got 
hundreds of millions of dollars riding on a transaction, how much 
do you want to trust that some guy in one of the firms is not going 
to talk to the guy in the office next door to him because he said he’s 
got a Chinese wall?
[T]hat stuff’s been going on for [the] 30 years that I’ve been involved 
in the profession and it goes in cycles. The big firms think they’re 
going to get into smaller clients and grow them into big clients and 
the smaller firms want to hang on to their clients that are growing 
and they aspire to [do] the big accounts, but invariably it’s the 
margin. And the way to test that is you have a look at an analysis of 
the auditors of the top-100 companies, effectively now and 10 years 
ago, [and] let’s see how much difference there is in the type of firm 
doing the audits.
[T]he trend typically in commerce [is] organisations get bigger, 
not…fragment to be smaller, and that’s happening at the company 
level as well as at the accounting services level. It’s also happening 
in the legal fraternity. The legal firms are consolidating and getting 
bigger, as are the accounting firms, as are the financial advisors in 
the investment community. That’s the trend.
‘I’ve been involved 
in transactions 
where individual 
firms are acting on 
both sides of the 
transaction.’
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Several interviewees expressed the sentiment that the market would not 
cope with the failure of another of the Big Four and one commented on the 
problem that presented for regulators.
[I]t’s just the nature of where society’s heading…with the way it’s 
consolidating…[H]ave a look at the amount of products on the 
supermarket store now—that’s shrinking, isn’t it? That’ll keep 
shrinking…you’ll have less diversity…whether you have four 
or five firms…[Y]es, an extra one perhaps would be better. The 
collapse of Andersen’s…it shakes everyone for a while; everyone’s 
on their toes for five years, 10 years, and then does it drop off again 
until there’s another shake? And then is it just a cyclical type of an 
arena that we’re in? 
[F]or a run of the mill corporate company, medium to small scale, 
there’s really no issue because there are lots of auditors you can go 
to out in your local suburb…to get it done, but at the higher end 
of the scale, if you’re in global markets and if you’re in a large listed 
company, especially with overseas ambitions or any connections 
offshore…you don’t have much choice but to use the large top three 
or four firms, which are internationally recognised. Only because, 
if you use one of the smaller ones, which are very local perhaps, 
or which are only recognised, say, in Sydney or Melbourne or in 
Australia, that level of confidence…and dealing with overseas 
banks, [and] overseas stakeholders…becomes that much more 
difficult.
Some speculated that two or more of the non-Big Four might step in by 
merging if another of the Big Four was to collapse.
Andersen’s going down was a big wake-up call to a lot of people. 
But there again, the market always corrects itself too, so…if one 
of the current Big Four were to go under—like an Andersen’s, EY 
obviously picked up Andersen’s and brought them into the fold—
would one of the remaining three be big enough to pick up a 
Deloittes, let’s say…and bring them into the fold, or would one of 
the second tiers, a PKF or…an RSM Bird…would they just come in 
and all of a sudden they become a Big Four, because they take over 
part of Deloittes? It may not happen overnight, but in two or three 




One interesting comment relates to the double standard applied to the 
financial reporting of the auditing firms themselves compared with what 
is required of incorporated entities.
It is an absolute joke and the worst joke of all is 
[that] for all the disclosures that…the Big Four 
firms and all the accounting firms support on 
AIFRS, none of them publicly report[s] their 
results. None of them [is] subject to the same level 
of scrutiny that’s inflicted on their clients. What 
a joke. And they should be. Do you know why 
they should be? Because in substance, as far as 
ASIC and the SEC and the others are concerned, 
they are the outsourced regulators to a large extent. Think about 
the opinions and work that they render, which is a material part of 
what ASIC or the ASX or other regulators would depend on…And 
you cannot afford for one of them to fail. We’re locked into four now. 
You have no view of their solvency or their financial [viability]. You 
have nothing. [It’s] the ultimate hypocrisy.
4.2.1 Summary
Purchasers are generally, but not unanimously concerned about insufficient 
competition in the market for audit services, although they comment on 
international tax being more of a problem than audit. Their solutions 
to the audit competition concern include using the non-Big Four for a 
specific type of advice if conflicts arise in using a Big Four firm and asking 
for an audit partner to be changed if this is needed. Often the comment 
is made that it would be better to have six rather than four big firms, but 
this could be because some of the more senior interviewees still have fresh 
memories of there being six or more firms. Purchasers recognise the trend 
to consolidate and grow, perhaps because it is so common in their own 
sector. The failure of Andersen is commented on as a wake-up call to the 
profession with the implication being that it was not necessarily a bad 
thing.
4.3 Suppliers
Interviewees from the supplier group frequently commented on how 
competitive the market was, even among the Big Four. Some typical 
comments follow.
‘[T]he worst joke of 
all is [that] for all the 
disclosures that the 
big Four firms and all 
the accounting firms 
support on AIFRS, 
none of them publicly 
report[s] their results.’
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[I]n the top ASX 100, there [are] three firms that are serious, but…
that’s probably enough and…from our point of view, it always 
seems to be enough. It was seen to be a hard-fought battle whether 
you win, lose, come second, first, second or third. It always seems 
to be a pretty close call, so…there probably is enough. 
[E]very audit tender that we participate in is highly competitive.  
I don’t see any fat in the margins; I see tenders being very competitive, 
prices being incredibly tight and those are the characteristics of a 
highly competitive market…there is probably a view around certain 
companies and directors that there is a limiting choice in that they 
feel that there are only four and they can only choose out of the 
Big Four if they’re a large listed entity. But…is there competition? 
Absolutely. And what some of the top 100 might feel if they were 
limited to four…certainly some of the smaller listers, there is still a 
range of firms that they can choose from.
I find it very difficult to go below four…we’re finding with some of 
the larger organisations that use all four in different capacities—tax, 
internal audit, external audit and maybe valuation and advisory—
that they’re at the limit…at times…they can’t find anybody, any 
of the four or they might find one of the four that’s independent 
or not conflicted and that gives them a limit of choice—[of] that 
there’s no doubt. So I don’t think that we could ever get to…three 
unless it happened through one of the existing Big Four going 
down the Andersen’s path, which…I’m not sure that’s going to 
happen. So is there enough competition? Probably just enough, 
because…I’ve participated on a lot of tenders and they’re still very 
price competitive…so it’s still…competitive in terms of value and 
providing a top-notch service. I don’t think there’s complacency or 
anybody that would say that we’ve got a monopoly.
It’s less of an issue…from an auditor’s perspective. 
It’s more of an issue [for] the other services, 
because, depending on the board’s view of 
independence and multiple service providers, 
once you’ve got, let’s say, Ernst & Young as the 
auditor and you might have someone else as your 
tax advisor, if you want to do a deal…not that 
many people are finance providers. You, almost 
by default…if you’re a decent size organisation, 
‘you really always want 
to have one at least 
outside and hungry to 
come in if you want to 
maintain your position, 
and…[there is] 
probably one too few.’
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end up using all four of the Big Four. You really always want to have 
one at least outside and hungry to come in if you want to maintain 
your position, and…[there is] probably one too few…I don’t have a 
resolution [for] that and I can’t see how that could work in the short 
term. I can’t see how you could build one.
In terms of the competition…you look at it at two levels. One, 
at a general level: are there enough firms? I’d like Deloittes to be 
stronger. I’d like it to be a Big Four in Australia…the difficulty is 
[that] by the time you’ve…driven with independence, you use one 
firm to be your auditors, another firm to do something else. If you 
want to do something else, you’re left with a choice of one or two, 
plus the broader specialists; it’s quite narrow…when you get below 
that in particular industries then you find that the competition 
becomes tighter. You might find it’s a competition between only 
two, which…is not always helpful. 
The trouble with some of the competition at the 
moment [is]…the Big Four are the world’s least 
successful cartel in terms of prices and all that 
sort of stuff…we’re cutting our throats left, right 
and centre, which…is another topic, but [it] isn’t 
helpful competition, because it makes it very 
difficult to attract and retain the good staff when 
you’re doing big jobs at a huge discount because 
you need to secure your mark in the audit space, 
in the market…[T]hat competition is unhelpful, but…if it went 
down to three, we’d have a real problem…four’s a good number. 
Five or six—I don’t think you need six. I don’t think you need five. 
[I]f you say, ‘Our auditors need to be independent’…that’s one 
firm [down], we then want to have tax advice and strategic advice 
and maybe that is another sort, and then you have a third firm 
that maybe does the other services. Now if there are only four for 
a multinational and then…you start to rotate audit, that then is 
complex to manage. 
Structural shifts in the market were also commented on, with the Big Four 
setting up separate sections with lower cost structures to penetrate the 
smaller-company markets and the non-Big Four and the smallest of the 
Big Four consolidating. Illustrative comments include:
‘[I]t makes it very 
difficult to attract and 
retain the good staff 
when you’re doing big 
jobs at a huge discount 
because you need to 
secure your mark in the 
audit space.’
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[T]here’s a huge amount of competition, particularly within second-
tier firms. The competition in the top-200 listed companies, which 
is the domain of the Big Four, is absolutely intense, and because of 
the rotational nature of auditors…that competition is starting to 
spill into the second tier. And the Big Four now are reducing their 
prices substantially to try to knock people like ourselves off. So…
the audit profession is subject to intensifying cost pressures…that’s 
a bad thing because it just leads to shortcuts and a lowering of the 
standards…We’re finding it more and more difficult and more and 
more competitive to win jobs because of the Big Four coming into 
our space. 
I think it’s going both ways…the mid-tiers are 
penetrating a bit up into what was traditionally a Big 
Four-only zone…there’s a level of…audit clients that 
will always be Big Four because they’re just too big 
for the mid-tier, the mid-tier just can’t service them. 
And whilst…just about all of the mid-tier firms 
around Australia are generally federated models…
they’re individual[ly] owned…there’s a bit of 
movement in that at the moment in integration, but until they’re…
fully integrated, their ability to…service those really large national 
clients is just not there. And they will always be the domain of the 
Big Four. So then there becomes that kind of grey area in between, 
where they’ve either been previously serviced by the Big Four or 
by the mid-tier. And…what you’re seeing is it’s a bit of both: the 
mid-tier are going up a little bit more and the Big Four are coming 
down a little bit more. 
[W]e do undersell ourselves because the risks are getting higher. 
We’re required to do more work in fraud and regulatory compliance 
and the quality control and all the rest of it. So we should be 
charging premium rates, but we’re not as a market. So you’d have 
to say it’s competitive because if it wasn’t competitive…audit fees 
[would double] overnight, and the companies would just have to 
pay. But it is competitive and therefore it’s key keeping audit fees 
at a more moderate level…the big firms have now all got their mid-
market groups, which is really trying to compete [in] the market 
that’s been the mid-tier…interestingly enough, the write-offs that 
they experience on that work are huge. And they’re undercutting 
‘The mid-tier are 
going up a little bit 
more and the big 
Four are coming 




mid-tier firms…for instance, my charge rates would be probably 
30 per cent less than the Big Four, so you’d think that I’d have 
a distinct advantage. But when you’re putting in a tender for  
a reasonable client and you find your competition [is] one of the 
mid-tier divisions of the Big Four, they’ll quite often undercut you.
[W]e take clients off the Big Four ourselves. We’ve taken clients 
obviously off a lot of other mid-tier firms and vice versa. In many 
respects, we’re all swimming in the same pool. And the Big Four on 
the one hand are keen to drill down very much to the SME market 
and that’s why Ernst & Young have got their enterprise section, 
which is specifically designed to take on smaller clients. It’s almost a 
Jet Star operation to Qantas, it really is. And Deloittes have also got 
a Jet Star operation, so they’re using different charge-out rates… 
It’s a completely different cost base. 
The next supplier observes intense competition at the point in the market 
for which the Big Four and the non-Big Four compete:
[W]e’ve got…a bit of a scramble among the mid-
tiers in Australia to get themselves to the size that 
they can take on these bigger audits. And then 
you’ve got this competing irony of the Big Four…
coming down into SME level because there’s not 
enough work for them at the top end. And there’s 
not enough work for them at the top end partly 
because they’ve had to hive off their management 
consulting divisions. So they’re going ‘What else 
are we going to do?’…then you’ve got Baring Point and all these 
other businesses out there, which are taking work off the Big Four. 
So the Big Four are having to compete in other ways.
[T]here will be a lot of structural issues for the mid-tier as they 
continue to merge and they’ll have all these corporate culture clashes 
as they merge…it’s not necessarily healthy for the marketplace, but 
ultimately…we’re going to see some, let’s…call them ‘supersized 
mid-tier’ firms…after that then there’ll be a distinct third tier. 
That’s the way it’s going.
[They do so] at their peril though, because they will target a larger 
client, but…they may be at risk of providing poor service to some 
‘[y]ou’ve got this 
competing irony of 
the big Four…coming 
down into SME level 
because there’s not 
enough work for them 
at the top end.’
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of their own clients. And the middle-market, mid-tier firms have 
picked [up] a fairly large number of audits from the Big Four for that 
reason. So it works both ways. But there is competition from the Big 
Four too for our larger clients, yes. 
[T]he Big Four have got their limitations. They 
cannot service certain clients because the overlay of 
the way they do things is just too costly and…they 
get to a certain level and they can’t afford to do those 
audits any longer. Or if [they] are doing them, their 
fee quotes are so high that those clients are dropping 
down into the mid-tier…And I’m seeing a lot of that 
happening lately. We’re quoting a lot of jobs which 
were previously Big Four clients…they’ve just said, ‘Look, we’ve 
had enough of the fees and we don’t see what value we get out of 
being with the Big Four.’ So…it’s in that grey zone where you’re 
getting all the movement. 
One supplier comments on the danger of smaller firms accepting 
engagements for which they are not equipped: 
[N]o-one really wanted Arthur Andersen to go the way that it did. It 
was pretty horrible, particularly for the people there. Ideally, you’d 
want more competition, but this is the real world. I don’t know how 
you fix that…the bigger danger at the moment is small firms trying 
to audit things that they just can’t really do. 
[P]erhaps you could still do it with four, but…the regulator pushing 
the way he’s pushing means that there is no ability to differentiate. 
So there’s no reason to compete in that space. The only reason to 
compete is at the individual level.
Several suppliers commented on the difficulty that would be presented if 
another of the Big Four failed, and of the moral hazard this would create 
for regulators.
[F]our’s adequate. Obviously, it would be better with more firms. 
To service those type of clients you’ve got to have the resources, 
you’ve got to have the expertise. So I don’t see it as a huge issue 
at the moment. You wouldn’t want one of those firms to merge or 
disappear.
‘[W]e’ve had 
enough of the fees 
and we don’t see 
what value we get 




The theme emerging from the next quote is that some good might have 
emerged from Andersen’s collapse:
Absolutely—far too much competition in the marketplace from 
our point of view…the Andersen’s one, it’s very regrettable that 
we lost that firm…and I feel dreadful for the 95 per cent of people 
who were doing the right thing in that firm, but there were some 
not good things going on, allegedly. And if it was the collapse of a 
firm that needed to bring that out and get houses put in order, and 
sort out anything that wasn’t right that was happening in the other 
firms, then that’s good that comes out of bad.
The theme of the next and subsequent comments is that three large firms 
would simply be insufficient:
[F]our is probably still okay. The concern I would have is, is any 
regulator around the world going to put another one down if 
something happens, because we can’t have three.
[I]f you take the Andersen example…it was 
proved that they didn’t have a case…the case 
went away three years afterwards, but because 
of the action taken, that firm went down pretty 
quickly. If that was to happen again, would any 
regulator…do that? Because what are you going 
to do, are you going to knock another firm over 
and only have three? That…starts to become a 
problem. And the problem with that is that the 
one that goes down will go to the other three, which will make them 
even bigger, which makes the gap between them and the next level 
even bigger. So you’re miles away from ever getting another one 
joining…there’s a big gap now, but the more you take one out, the 
top one isn’t going to splinter and go into these little ones to create 
another one. It’s going to go to three big ones. 
[T]he number’s okay, but the concern would be [whether] a regulator 
somewhere [is] going…to be able to act as they would act and…
put another one down, if it came to that because of the particular 
circumstances?
‘[T]he one that goes 
down will go to the 
other three, which 
will make them even 
bigger, which makes 
the gap between them 
and the next level  
even bigger.’
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The next supplier comments on the increasing barriers to entry:
[T]he risk profile, the cost of audit, PI insurance, the fallout [are]…
making it harder and harder, and all this regulation that’s been put 
on to the profession is making it harder for some of the smaller 
firms to…be in audit…you’ll find at the bottom end of the market 
there would be a lot of smaller firms who are…getting out of doing 
audits because the cost of…being accredited, the cost of running 
the appropriate quality-control systems, the cost of managing the 
regulator just doesn’t make it an efficient business model for them.
Perceptions of the role of regulators in driving the Big Four market 
are obvious too, as exemplified in the following quote: 
[T]here’s reasonable competition, but it’s stratified. In other words, 
any big listed company is going to go to the Big Four…the mid-
listed and even smaller are going to be comfortable with a mid-tier 
firm, but once they get [to] a certain size then they’re naturally going 
to go to the Big Four…There’s certainly a lot more competition at 
the mid-tier level with the size of the firms, but…in the back of my 
mind [I] get the feeling that ASIC thinks that all listed companies 
probably should be done by the Big Four, and…that’s a silly 
approach to have. And I’d say who have been the auditors of the 
major corporate collapses? It’s the Big Four. 
[I]f somehow those smaller firms were able to package their product 
and enter into some sort of agreement with each other, it would maybe 
go somewhere towards it, but that’s the only solution I can think of.
4.3.1 Summary
Suppliers, both Big Four and non-Big Four, tend to see the market as very 
competitive—so competitive that despite increasing cost pressures, audit 
pricing is seen as cutthroat. Non-Big Four suppliers see the increasing 
penetration of SME divisions of the Big Four into the smaller-company 
market as a relatively new phenomenon designed to take market share 
from them. They tend to see this as a new business model on the part of the 
Big Four pitched at capturing both premium paying audits and the next 
tier of more price sensitive audits. At the same time, the mid-tier firms are 
seen to be competing heavily for smaller listed clients with the Big Four. 
A perception emerges from the interviews with suppliers of convergence 
of Big Four competition penetrating from the larger clients towards mid-
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size clients and of non-Big Four competition penetrating from the small to 
mid-sized clients towards larger clients. At the point in the market where 
these two forces overlap, it can be expected that clients are experiencing 
exceptionally heavy competition for their custom. Additionally, at the 
lower end of suppliers, there is a view that more of these firms are ceasing 
to supply audit services. A view is expressed that it is due to constraints 
on the supply of non-audit services to clients that the Big Four has been 
driven to seek market share elsewhere. 
On another theme, several suppliers comment on the moral hazard 
problem for regulators should another of the large international audit 
firms fail in the way of Andersen. The sentiment seems to be that four 
major firms is just enough, but a reduction to three would severely stress 
the market in the view of the suppliers.
4.4 Standard setters
One of the standard setters pointed out the need to be clear about defining 
the lens through which competition was viewed; was it just the Australian 
market for audit services or the global market, was it on an industry basis 
or total market basis and was it just audit services or the wider assurance 
market that should be assessed in terms of competition? While defining 
the scope of the market was important, most of the standard setter group 
responses looked only to the Australian market for audit services and, as 
with the users, purchasers and suppliers, most comments were reflective 
of a high degree of competition in that market, but some concern was 
expressed about the lack of choice between the Big Four in certain 
situations where potential conflicts existed.
It’s quite fierce competition…all auditors are quite proud of the 
quality of the service and the audit they do and they’re taking it 
from the point of view of…providing that assurance service to the 
best of their ability for the clients so that the clients get value for 
undertaking the audit. So it is quite a competitive marketplace…
in certain areas, they always do overlap…so in that area [there will] 
be competition, but…in the mid-tier, the competition doesn’t alter 
whether the Big Four are involved or other mid-tier firms…in other 
words, we find there’s just as much competition if an assignment 
comes up and there’s only mid-tier people who are going for it as 
well as…a situation where there’s mid-tier plus Big Four. It’s always 
competitive and…it always has been and probably always will be 
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and I don’t know whether the merging of firms in the mid-tier will 
lessen the competition. It might be one or two of them probably 
and they will perceive greater advantage and that would be about 
the difference.
The next standard setter comments on the fact that often the choice even 
among the Big Four is restricted:
[I]f you look at some of the regulator requirements 
around the number of previous members of firms 
that can be on boards or in financial reporting 
roles, as the US rules set them, in clients, means 
that there may often be a firm precluded for 
whatever reason. And similarly, if there may be 
a particular service that is incompatible with an 
audit being provided by a firm then you’ve got 
another firm perhaps knocked out, so you’ve got 
a choice of two…[P]eople feel perhaps locked in and I’ve heard that 
many, many times—that the choice in a practical sense comes down 
to one out of two because of different factors that might be present. 
Sometimes those issues have come about through entities…creating 
a rod for their own back through…interpretation very narrowly 
of what is or isn’t compatible with conducting an audit. So you’ve 
got policies that just say [that] dealing with…any tax matters are 
incompatible, et cetera. So, if you’ve only got four to start with, it’s 
not hard to knock out two and…that’s where there might be limited 
choice. But looking at it from the point of view of a partner and a 
Big Four audit firm, when audits are put out to tender, it is very, 
very rare to see the…outcome of that tender not result in a lower 
fee. So, what does that tell you about competition?
Restricted choice is the theme of this next quotation, too:
[W]e don’t have a monopoly or even an effective oligopoly because…
the concentration’s [not] here. So there’s competition when it comes 
to fees when this work comes up, but you’ve probably got limited 
choice. At best, you’d be choosing one out of four for skill sets 
generally…and probably one out of two in a lot of instances.
A standard setter alludes to the gap between the third and fourth of the 
Big Four:
‘[T]he choice in a 
practical sense comes 
down to one out 
of two because of 




[At] the large end of town…there is real concern about there only 
being four firms, and that even in a market of the Australian context 
there are not enough providers, and there’s such a gap between…
even three and four, let alone four to five, six, let alone further 
down. So further consolidation to the extent of trying to perhaps 
have fifth and sixth alternatives that are larger would be desirable. 
Among standard setters, some interesting comments were made about the 
role of regulation in relation to price pressures. 
[W]hat’s driven [price pressure] has been external pressures, rather 
than necessarily what the profession has done. I don’t think price 
pressures ever completely go away…they will reappear more 
strongly in the coming period than they have been in the last few 
years. It’s been because of the responses to the failures and the 
additional requirements put not just directly on auditors, but…
pressures that have been put on, directly and indirectly, directors 
that have been a big part of those changes.
In terms of keeping the market competitive, the following comment from 
one of the standard setters advocates systematic testing of the market at a 
time aligned with the signing audit partner rotation requirement:
There is always price pressure. You…can’t escape that. There is still 
tendering happening in the marketplace and…[there] always will 
be and it’s in the listed company environment, which is where the 
big firms really want to focus their audit practices. Audit partners 
rotate every five years, so companies are starting to accept [that] 
they have a five-year change in relationship. Well, if you’re going 
to have that change, perhaps we build in a five-year testing of the 
market as well so there will always be competitive pressures.
One interesting comment compared the recent competitive pricing 
pressure with that when audit tendering first became common in the 
1980s, reflecting that the pressure to keep costs low was now coming from 
the purchasing side rather than the supplier side. 
[L]et’s say that we go back to the ’80s where we went through 
that…tender process. A lot of audits [were] put out to tender, a lot 
of fees [were] cut. Arguably, that was done at a time where firms 
were buying audits because they could provide other services. So 
we’re in a slightly different environment, but what they might be 
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doing this time is building a bigger base with a view of taking out 
competition…it was the profession last time that probably…created 
that tender situation, with some firms going out and aggressively 
buying work…you’d probably see it more from the corporates 
this time round, trying to lower their costs…the issue then is, is 
there sufficient competition in the market…Audits have invested in 
these large corporates what is a tiered-type approach and delivery 
of service…there probably is sufficient competition…what will 
happen is the definition of quality will change because the regulator 
will form a view and an assessment of what it believes is quality 
and nine-tenths of reality is perception and if that’s plastered all 
over the reports, the papers and whatever else then presumably that 
will have some effect. 
Several comments reflected the difficulty of creating more firms truly able 
to compete in terms of the availability of skilled personnel and of building 
sufficient scale.
[There are] only a certain number of firms in the marketplace, but 
there [are] only a certain number of skilled people in the marketplace. 
So if there were more firms, those people would be spread across 
more firms. It doesn’t mean there [are] less skills available to you, 
but it may mean that you have a better framework for engaging 
those skills if you’ve got more competition. So now if you can access 
skills from five, six, seven, eight good firms then…that’s definitely 
healthier and definitely better for you as an organisation than being 
tied to two, three or four.
The difficulty in ensuring a supply of appropriately skilled staff before 
engagements are won is alluded to in this next quotation:
[E]conomically, that will be tough for [the non-Big Four] to compete 
with the Big Four for skills…In other words, [to] pay the money 
they need to pay [to attract staff] before they get the jobs to support 
it. That’s not a catch-22…in the Big Four; it’s not quite like it used 
to be in that a partner could leave and take no clients. These days, 
you engage the firm more than the partner. So if you wanted to 
attract a consolidated middle-tier firm wanting to attract skills from 




[C]onsolidation of middle tier might be one [way to create more 
competition]. You’re not going to increase competition through new 
entrants to the market…It couldn’t have the scale. 
The difficulty of building scale by having staff break away from one of the 
existing firms is pointed to in this next quotation:
You won’t find people breaking off…to do a general audit practice. 
It’s possible. It’s happened in the past, but they haven’t really built 
the scale and the trouble is, to do it and build scale, you could build 
scale in an industry space. Build scale across the board, no, it would 
be very tough.
That there has already been a close call with regulators for at least one of 
the Big Four firms since the Andersen collapse is the point of this next 
quotation:
Four is trying to gollop up bits of five and six, or five, six and seven, 
or however it plays out…to play catch-up. So…that’s unrealistic for 
all that it might be seen to be desirable. It was a terrifying prospect 
that you might’ve had some serious damage done to [one of the Big 
Four] in the US so soon after the Arthur Andersen debacle and that 
was even seriously contemplated. You wonder if sometimes the 
regulators learn anything from their past transgressions. 
Other appropriate courses of action beyond bringing an auditing firm 
down exist in the case of transgressions and should be explored, which is 
the subject of this next quotation:
I would…agree that a regulator, the last thing they could afford to 
do would be to put down one of the Big Four. So in other words, 
that…does have some ramifications as to how the situation got 
treated, but…I don’t think the process of bringing down a Big Four 
is really…they’re losing sight of what the reality of the situation is. 
That was just sensationalism, maybe from the regulator’s point of 
view. I don’t think that really achieves what you want and there are 
other ways of doing it without effectively destroying a firm…the 
thing is…people need to be more aware of what is an appropriate 
course of action in that area…I don’t see it happening as much 
now…people are a bit more aware of what the obligations are and 
there’ll be other more appropriate courses of action taken.
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In terms of potential ways to increase competition, ideas included allowing 
other organisations (for example, legal firms) to undertake audits and 
mergers between two or more of the non-Big Four:
[A]nother way to increase competition in the market…is to allow 
other people to do audits…I don’t think we really want to go there, 
but…do you allow other types of organisations to do audits? Then 
you can increase your choice. But who those would be? They’ve 
got to be qualified accountants, certified, registered company 
auditors…I don’t know that they exist.
Could a legal firm set up an audit division…it’s a left-field thing. I 
don’t see why not. Make your professional services fit.
A standard setter muses about how some of the non-Big Four might build 
scale to create a firm to rival the Big Four: 
Is it a bit like the four banks and the two 
supermarkets because it’s what barriers to 
entry are…you’re not going to break the Big 
Four up—not that I can see. So how do other 
players in the market become more competitive 
in their space in terms of building scale…the 
ways of doing it would be consolidation of the 
middle tier into two or three super audit firms, 
which is a possibility, but people like Grant 
Thornton, BDOs, PKFs have been trying to do 
that. You could put two of those together, a Grant Thornton and a 
BDO…Grant Thornton are quite big in the UK and the States and 
they’re generally number five behind the Big Four. So if you got 
mergers of number five and six or five and seven…then you might 
get more serious. There’s always the catch-22 [with]…industry 
specialisations because you can’t get the experience and the skill 
without the jobs, and you can’t get the jobs without the experience 
and the skill…so if you’re going to create more competition by 
merging middle-tier firms then they’ve got to start attracting talent 
from the other Big Four to get the skills to enable them to compete.
‘There’s always the 
catch-22 [with]…industry 
specialisations because you 
can’t get the experience 
and the skill without the 
jobs, and you can’t get the 





Standard setters leave little doubt that in their opinion competition has 
historically been and remains fierce in the market for audit services, 
whether it be within the Big Four or between the Big Four and non-Big 
Four. Further, there is a view that current attempts by the mid-tier firms 
to grow naturally or through acquisitions will not impair competition, 
although the supply of skilled labour is seen as a constraint on growth. 
Nevertheless, standard setters acknowledge the lack of choice for companies 
in need of large, international audit firms. Standard setters, several of 
whom are also suppliers, comment on the exacerbation of this situation by 
companies that constrain their own choice, perhaps overly conservatively, 
because of perceived independence or potential conflicts that might arise 
in purchasing joint supply of audit and non-audit services. Such a large 
gap between the third and fourth of the Big Four firms and then between 
fourth and fifth is seen as not generally desirable, but difficult to change. 
Standard setters acknowledge the delicate balancing act for regulators 
between maintaining competition and effectively monitoring and acting 
on any transgression by any of the Big Four.
4.5 Regulators
One interviewee from the regulator group commented on how difficult it 
would be if another of the Big Four did not survive. 
A classic [example] was [one of the Big Four] in Japan…which 
‘failed’, and one of the ramifications that came out of that was [that] 
even though [this firm] was suspended, there was a concession given 
so they could…get back to doing audits for a period because…the 
financial system couldn’t work otherwise.
5.0 issues and implications
Overall, among users, purchasers, suppliers, regulators and standard 
setters, there are few concerns expressed about the amount of competition 
either between the Big Four and non-Big Four or within these sectors. 
There are interviewees within each group, however, who express concern 
about the paucity of choice for large corporations, or those with extensive 
international structures, among the Big Four and fears for what will happen 
if one of the Big Four does not survive. Other comments are made about 
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the difficulty of attracting a sufficient number of skilled audit personnel if 
an expansion or merger of the non-Big Four is used as a vehicle to create 
a true addition to the top tier of suppliers, and the difficulty of building 
scale if personnel within the Big Four break away.
A significant number of users believe that with only four major audit 
firms there is a lack of competition. Observations were made that once one 
had Big Four suppliers in certain tax and valuation work, there remained 
perhaps one or two outside the group that would comprise the competitive 
field for an audit engagement. Users also observe that for a significant 
portion of the market, the Big Four are really the only potential suppliers, 
and certain investors seek out and give preference to global brand names 
such as the Big Four. One user makes the observation that the sheer scale 
of the Big Four is an advantage not matched by the smaller firms and, 
in particular, the scale provides the opportunity for training and skill 
development, which in turn means that there is a lack of competition 
and potential dominance and even market control by a small number of 
players. This in turn could indicate that the quality levels are dictated by 
a small number of firms. 
Purchasers are more mixed in their views and make observations that 
are both positive and negative with respect to the presence of competition. 
A positive view expressed by some purchasers is that the quality of the 
non-Big Four suppliers in Australia is such that one can turn to them for 
specific advice on certain matters, which makes the potential field for 
audit suppliers, even if one is restricted to the Big Four, more competitive. 
Other purchasers believe that the Big Four for the big end of town are 
sufficiently competitive and there are several observations that there is 
significant competition in Australia once one looks beyond the larger 
ASX-listed companies.
One of the more complex observations is that too much competition 
has the effect of driving down quality; however, this comment makes 
evident the dilemma that some users believe is present in which too 
much competition drives down quality while the purchasers suggest 
that too many purchasers drive down quality. Finding the appropriate 
number seems to be difficult if not impossible. Other purchasers observe 
that in Australia there is no sense of market failure at the larger end of 
town. There always seems to be someone able to take on the audit and 
execute it to the satisfaction of the purchaser. Other purchasers suggest 
that for some services the non-Big Four are stepping up and becoming 
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more competitive. There is a notion across a large number of purchasers 
that, at the margins, between the Big Four and the non-Big Four, there is 
considerable competition, with the Big Four establishing ‘enterprise’ or 
‘middle-market’ divisions that compete fiercely with non-Big Four firms—
particularly with respect to price. 
Another feature of this middle ground is that members of the Big Four 
are seeking to integrate into their practices some components of the non-
Big Four firms; this in turn lowers competition. While some purchasers 
believe that the market for audit services has normal market self-correcting 
mechanisms, there are other observations suggesting that the sheer scale 
of suppliers in the market for audit services signifies that structurally it 
is hard to see how a large audit firm can develop through natural market 
forces. 
While there is some scepticism of the present circumstance and indeed 
one observer suggests that we have so little competition that we could 
give consideration to the nationalisation of the audit industry, there is an 
observation that much competition exists, particularly at partner rather 
than firm level. Indeed it is observed that the Big Four have such a global 
presence that they have the ability to move partners around even from 
outside Australia in order to provide competitive service to clients on a 
qualitative basis rather than just looking at competition on a fee basis. 
Suppliers from the Big Four and the non-Big Four firms are quite vocal 
on the issue of competition. Several suppliers make the observation that 
there is quite extreme price competition and every time an ASX-listed 
company comes up for tender, the battle is intense. There are repeated 
suggestions of very tight margins and considerable fee pressure.
Frequently, suppliers suggest that competition for all but the very 
largest of clients is intense from a number of alternative suppliers. On the 
other hand, suppliers recognise that purchasers feel that at the upper end 
the amount of choice available is limited. Similarly, one senior member 
of the profession representing a supplier perceives that for one to have a 
market in which there is seen to be competition, that competition can be 
generated where a large listed company might have an inner circle of three 
of the Big Four in one way or another, but must have one not supplying it. 
That is, if one of the Big Four is outside this inner supply circle then there 
will be some degree of hunger and interest to enter it.
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Several suppliers observe that for some clients Australia effectively has 
a market comprising three rather than four large suppliers and that some 
of the behaviours of the fourth-largest supplier in Australia involve the 
integration of some parts of the middle-tier suppliers.
Suppliers also recognise that some of the mid-tier are moving up and 
some of the Big Four activity is moving down into smaller audit purchasers.
There is also a belief that structurally it will be hard to see another big 
player in the audit supply market. Perhaps one of the only feasible ways 
would be to have an integration of two of the mid-tier firms on a national 
or even global level. The probability of that happening is not high.
One supplier suggests that the presence of the Big Four with work 
divisions that cater for middle-market clients effectively creates a second 
brand name for the Big Four, with potentially different standards of 
quality and cost structure. 
Other suppliers indicate that, in fact, the Big Four are ending up 
competing with firms in non-audit work areas that were once part of their 
parent organisations. The presence of these consulting firms competing 
in some of the areas in which the Big Four are working has meant there 
is less work for the Big Four, which in turn places pressure on all parts of 
the organisation, including on staff retention (refer to Chapter 8) and the 
ability to interchange between audit and non-audit work. 
If indeed there is to be a further large supplier, it will imply some 
degree of merger activity and all the costs and difficulties involved with 
mergers.
While some suppliers acknowledge that the presence of more competition 
would be healthy, one effect would be that some firms engaging in audits 
might not have the expertise or skill set to undertake them. The potential 
costs to the economy of this possible quality issue could be significant. 
Other suppliers express concern that the regulatory environment and the 
expectations of the standards of quality for audits have meant that some 
suppliers are moving out of the market, thereby lowering competition. 
Related to that is the issue that the level of regulation has meant that the 
ability of each Big Four firm to differentiate itself on quality terms from other 
members of the Big Four is limited and in fact the quality differentiation 
comes at partner not at firm level. This represents a challenge due to 
mandated audit partner rotation requirements (refer to Chapter 11).
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Several comments from suppliers discuss other aspects of regulation 
and how the regulatory environment has in fact been changed by the 
relatively small number of large audit suppliers. Specifically, one 
comment was that the Arthur Andersen collapse presented a shock to the 
system relating to audit quality and had therefore reinforced a message 
throughout all of the remaining large suppliers that quality was important 
and minimum quality standards needed to be maintained. Additionally, 
there are repeated comments that the presence of one failure of an audit 
firm has meant that regulators struggle to ensure the non-recurrence of 
the collapse of another accounting firm. Put bluntly, there is a moral 
hazard for regulators. If they do find reason to make another audit firm 
not commercially viable, the number of large suppliers will be restricted 
even further. One specific comment was that if another firm went down 
then the staff and clients of that one firm within the Big Four would 
probably reposition in the remainder of the Big Four, making a Big Three 
and extending the gap between that larger audit firm group and the next 
tier. As economic circumstances adjust with the global financial crisis, the 
potential moral hazard might be more real—at least in some jurisdictions 
around the world.
There is a common belief that competition, particularly at the mid-tier 
level in the audit market, is intense but recognition also at the larger end 
of corporate Australia that there is more limited choice. Limited choice, 
however, is not seen to be having an effect on the existing intense fee 
competition, at least in much of the market where interviewee organisations 
are represented. Additionally, there are repeated observations about the 
substantial gap between the Big Four suppliers and others and the fact 
that the number of providers is limited. Another observation relates 
to the presence of partner rotation and the fact that this might inject 
behaviour into the market in which audit partners are rotated every five 
years, then auditees might seek to ‘test’ the market each five years or so, 
as the relationship with the incumbent auditor is forced to change anyway 
through rotation.
One standard setter also observed that, in the 1980s, audit firm fee 
competition was intense and initiated essentially by the audit firm in 
order to win consulting activity. Through regulatory change, this is now 
not possible, but there is still considerable price pressure in fees, driven 
this time by clients rather than audit firms. Their motivation appears to be 
the desire for cost efficiencies.
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Another observation by a standard setter is that although there are a 
limited number of larger firms, there are also a limited number of skilled 
individuals working within the entire market. A structural situation in 
which there are more firms and those skilled individuals are more evenly 
spread gives more potential to access the right people. Certain regulators 
also recognise there is a moral hazard with respect to the behaviour of the 
existing Big Four and a need to be careful not to downsize the number 
of large players. When asked how the number of large suppliers could 
be increased, there were several creative suggestions, but in reality the 
likelihood of this happening was seen as relatively modest. Also, there was 
an observation of something akin to a ‘catch-22’ situation in that an audit 
firm needed to have the ‘right’ clients to develop the appropriate skills 
sets but also required the appropriate skills sets to gain the ‘right’ clients.
One regulator made the observation that the moral hazard problem 
already existed and had already occurred in Asia: while one firm was 
subject to regulatory sanction, sufficient concessions were given so that it 
continued to trade.
The remaining quandary is that despite the presence of sometimes 
intense competition, the majority of purchasers do not currently see 
financial statement audits as a value-for-money service provided to the 
market.
6.0 Concluding remarks
While sensitivity exists, particularly around the big market capitalisation 
levels, there is not inconsiderable evidence of the presence of competition 
in the market for audit services. This competition exists with respect to 
the quality of differentiated products and also to prices. 
In terms of public policy matters, there is an issue that we have not 
been able to resolve about whether the ACCC has jurisdictional rights over 
a group of partnerships that operate within a particular market within 
Australia, and clarification on this matter would be useful. If there are 
regulatory processes to oversee competition, it might be to the advantage of 
the Australian economy and the efficiency of capital markets in Australia. 
Second, there is considerable nervousness among many stakeholders 
that the number of large-end suppliers (repeatedly viewed as the Big 
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Four, although in some cases in Australia it is seen as the larger three 
firms of the Big Four) is really the minimum number that makes for a 
competitive efficient market in the supply side of the market for audit 
services. The fact that this number seems to be at the very edge of what 
is acceptable to ensure a competitive and efficient market means that it 
places the regulator in a position of ‘moral hazard’. That is, the regulator 
has the power to inflict considerable damage on an audit firm such 
that it might dramatically downsize or even fail (as we have seen with 
Andersen). This regulatory power may in fact be exerted not only within 
its own jurisdiction but by other regulators in other jurisdictions, and the 
consequences could be quite profound for one or other of these Big Four 
practices within Australia. This places pressure on the regulator, at least 
the one within their own jurisdiction, to exercise care in their dispensing 
of penalties or criticisms. If those penalties or criticisms are such that it 
could cause one of the larger firms to downsize or fail, it could be that the 
regulator has to pull back to ensure that there remains a minimum number 
of suppliers in the market.
The second point intertwined above it is that we operate in a global 
market and even where great care is exercised in managing and monitoring 
each of the larger Big Four audit suppliers, the effects on the viability 
of those suppliers could come from jurisdictions outside their own and 
where they have little control or ability to manage the circumstance. In 
this case, it seems inevitable that ASIC will need to develop a contingency 
plan in the event that one or perhaps more of these larger Big Four firms 
collapses or is not always able to supply audit services in the Australian 
market. It is possible that ASIC already has this contingency plan in place, 
but that is not known and we are not able to verify its existence. If it 
does in fact exist, it is such an important public policy document that it 
probably should be open to some degree of inspection.
As we know, the importance of having a market for deposit-taking 
institutions is important in the Australian economy—for economic 
efficiency and social reasons. The importance of this public policy 
position is such that a regulatory body, APRA, was created to oversee 
these institutions. APRA is able to access the financial data to determine 
the continuing viability of these institutions on a month-to-month basis. 
Given that we are at the very limit of the large suppliers of audit services, 
some parallel ability to observe the financial viability of each of those large 
suppliers in the market for audit services now seems warranted. Unlike 
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many organisations, the Big Four do not publish financial statements and 
therefore neither the clients nor the market generally are able to make 
their own assessment about the continuing financial viability of these 
partnerships. The ability to assess their viability could be an important 
structural benefit to the Australian economy and would give assurance of 
the continuing viability of each of these large players. Such a mechanism 
would be seen as invasive, but it could be conducted on a confidential 
basis, possibly by ASIC.
The level of competition has been discussed essentially at firm level; 
however, underlying all of this is the viability of staffing levels and, for 
our purposes in regard to this chapter in particular, registered company 
auditors. There is some evidence that this pool of registered company 
auditors can be divided into those that are genuinely active and those 
that might be seen as barely active or inactive. The exact number of active 
registered company auditors is not known to us, but is believed to be 
ageing and/or shrinking and poses a serious medium to long-term threat 
to the competitive environment within the market for audit services 
in Australia. No single body seems to have responsibility for ensuring 
the viability of this pool of active registered company auditors. This is 
a matter that could be attended to by the Financial Reporting Council, 
which has oversight of this general area but not this specific issue. Related 
to this issue is the ability to assess the competency of the pool of registered 
company auditors and their capability to in fact actively participate at the 
relevant level of activity within the market for audit services. A parallel 
and equally concerning fact is that the APRA-approved auditor pool is 
also small—perhaps too small—for the tasks it is required to undertake 
to fulfil the legislative requirements required by APRA. This too is an 
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I wouldn’t advocate that you make it easier to stay private [unlisted] 
necessarily because there are other…issues…For the country as 
a whole, it would be good if more companies did step up to that 
plate and had access to capital markets…there are stock exchange 
requirements in terms of continuous disclosure, for example, that 
already create some differentiation between listed companies and 
private companies and there are the public requirements of lodging 
accounts that already create that differential. To differentiate it any 
more in terms of audit requirements…would be rather dangerous.
— User
1.0 Key issues
While the issue of differential auditing is one that intermittently 
elevates in profile, at the time of the interviews, it was prominent. 
The key issues around this topic include:
•	 if there are to be differential auditing standards, what is the best basis 
for differentiation—listed–unlisted, small–large, public–private or 
some other distinction even within these sectors
•	 to what extent, if any, would the move from private to public 
company be discouraged if it involved also moving to a higher level 
of auditing standards
•	 how would those dealing with listed and unlisted companies in terms 
of, for instance, credit worthiness evaluate financial reports audited 
to different standards
•	 are calls for differential auditing standards misplaced such that 
the call should really be for a differential reporting framework 
incremental to that currently existing
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•	 should cost be a primary driver for decisions about differential 
auditing standards
•	 would differential auditing standards add to or detract from the audit 
expectations gap?
2.0 introduction
Stakeholders were asked about differential auditing standards in the 
context of listed versus unlisted companies. Note that this differs between 
questions on the audit mandate, which go to the issue of whether or not 
the company is a small proprietary company. Responses, especially from 
users, sometimes confuse this issue of differential auditing standards and 
differential mandates. Note also that if there are differential standards for 
one class of audited entity, there is a need to understand what criteria one 
uses to create a framework for these differential standards. In the minds 
of some interviewees, their responses were more about the quality of the 
audit delivered than the auditing standards and this was based on an 
assumption that the outcomes were heavily influenced by the standards. 
2.1 Users
The notion of differential auditing standards appealed to some users. 
From a cost point of view, this first user likes the idea; however, there is 
some confusion evident in terms of differential auditing standards versus 
differential audit mandates. 
[I]f you’ve got two different types of businesses—one being a listed 
business—you’ve…potentially a number of different stakeholders…
and they don’t have access to…the reports…like you might do in 
an unlisted company or private business, where shareholders have 
probably got more of a say in the running of the business. So…the 
audit standards over a business which is listed would potentially 
be a lot more onerous than an unlisted business…it probably 
would, from a cost point of view, be a fairly…good thing to have. 
However…trying to keep it all standardised…maybe potentially 
the audit requirements for a listed company could be clarified a 
little further, rather than being so complex and changing so often, 
that they can tend to be confusing…you could potentially have 
different sets of reporting, because there is a different end user. 
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A qualified ‘yes’ to differential auditing standards is received from this 
next user:
[Y]ou’re basically saying that the non-listed companies should 
maybe have a bit more relaxed standard because they don’t have 
the capital behind them? Yes, I agree. Especially if the non-listed 
companies have got a small amount of shareholders and those 
shareholders might be really close to the company anyway, and 
the general public isn’t being offered equity in there, or…[isn’t] 
able to buy into those non-listed companies, then definitely. But 
any company that has…a public offer…should keep the same set 
of auditing standards because you need to [be] able to rely on them. 
So I guess a yes, but depending on the make-up of the shareholders 
of that non-listed company.
One user points to the cost burden imposed on entities that are mandated 
to purchase audits, implying that the status quo of a differential mandate 
is preferred, without really addressing the notion of differential auditing 
standards: 
The cost burdens are a bit of a sore point at the moment, but…one 
of the main points as far as the standard of auditing is concerned is 
the cost…where do you draw a line? You don’t want to have to force 
some non-listed companies that might not have the financial clout to 
have…an audit to the extent that it’s going to cost them such a large 
amount of money that it’s going to potentially bankrupt them…
if the auditing standards are set across the board then it becomes 
a case in the auditing firms [of] what processes they had in place 
to ensure that the minimum standard is applied across the board 
and then there [are] only varying degrees for the more regulated 
entities…I would’ve thought that happens in practice already.
The idea of differential auditing standards does not, however, appeal 
to several other users.
I just don’t think that it’s really focused on by the capital markets.
The subject of this next quotation is that it will become much more 
attractive to stay private if public companies require a higher level of 
auditing than private companies:
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I don’t think it would be helpful. I can see a 
rationale why you would have maybe a lesser 
auditing requirement for [an] unlisted company, 
because all the stakeholders presumably have 
privileged access to the accounts and often 
more direct involvement in the company itself. 
But I’m covering the small end of the market, 
those companies that have just made that step 
from a private company into the public sphere, 
and when you make that step there are a number of hurdles that 
you have to overcome. The reporting requirements in the public 
arena are much more onerous than they are as a private company. 
[As a] private company, you don’t have to give any details of your 
accounts. In the public sphere, not only do you have to publish 
regular accounts with some detail, but you also have to spend a lot 
of time with various stakeholders. So if you make it more attractive 
to stay private, that step into the public arena becomes that much 
more of a hurdle.
Another user, who does not believe in differential auditing standards, sees 
it as being up to users of the auditor’s report to determine the level of 
assurance they want to take from that report:
[That] falls to the users of the accounts, and the users of the accounts 
in the unlisted sense can be anything from a private individual 
putting money into a private company to support a mate or a good 
idea all the way up through the banking system to somebody like 
[name of company]. We invest in unlisted companies as well. I…
don’t believe in different audit standards for different levels…the 
auditing standards are applied in the assurance statement given 
by the auditor; what work have they done? I’m not a professional 
investor so it’s difficult, but as a professional investor, I would like 
to know what they do…the scope of what they do, to guide me 
with how much assurance I can take from the statement. 
The same user voices a personal view that, in his or her mind, it is the more 
naive investors who are likely to invest in unlisted companies, implying 
that it is inadvisable for them to be investing in companies audited to a 
lower level.
‘[I]f you make it more 
attractive to stay 
private, that step 
into the public arena 
becomes that much 
more of a hurdle.’
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[T]he risk you run in unlisted companies, if there was a…lower 
standard applied to the auditing of those companies, the people 
who potentially could invest in them [are] potentially naive to 
some extent…[there are] a lot of listing rules that apply to listed 
companies, which make the whole governance issue more robust. 
Those rules don’t apply to unlisted companies so…I don’t think 
there’s a right and wrong answer. I can understand what the 
push is for, but…it depends on what the users of the auditor’s 
recommendations…want from them. If users are willing to accept 
a very much lower level of auditing standard and consequently a 
very much lower confidence assurance on the company’s accounts 
then maybe it’s fine.
The next user observes that there is already differentiation of entities that 
are not as regulated, but a single level of quality is preferred:
[I]f you had differential standards then there [are] going to be 
different perceptions out there in the market as to the relative 
value of an audit of this entity compared to the value of an audit 
of another entity. So aren’t you better off having one standard 
across the board, but with lesser degrees for entities that aren’t as 
regulated…that already happens in practice, doesn’t it?
The difficulty of comparing companies—for instance, for loan worthiness—
when differential auditing standards are present is pointed out:
I suspect this will come from the burden of auditing costs on the 
unlisted sector. If you’re talking about the capital markets as a 
whole, I would have thought it would cause problems…banks are 
lending to unlisted and listed companies that are in the same sector; 
they like to be able to compare them. If you can have different audit 
bases, I would have thought that’s a major problem. 
One user raises the increased cost burden with differential auditing when 
a company moves from private to public:
I wouldn’t be looking at differential [standards]…you’ve 
got to get back…from small to big companies, listed to 
unlisted companies, that very similar information and 
similar veracity of that information…There are a lot 
of public unlisted companies. Why should they have 
different audit standards to the listed public companies? 
‘[T]hat’s going 
to increase the 
cost of capital, 
so…it would 
be inefficient.’
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Similarly, [with] the private companies…it would also increase the 
burden of cost when a company moves from private to public, 
which many do. If they’ve got to change the numbers, the fastest 
way to get it through is that you’ve got a constant set of numbers. 
We’re involved very actively in raising new money in IPOs [initial 
public offerings], in floating companies. Everybody goes back to 
the last three or four years’ results. If they’ve got a different level 
of audit applied to them, you’re going to have a different level of 
costs [and] comfort on them, and that’s going to increase the cost of 
capital. So…it would be inefficient.
The user argues that for the sake of efficiency, the capital market needs 
one set of reporting across the listed and unlisted sectors:
[W]e’ve created this two-tier approach…the 
regulated market is probably too regulated, but 
the unlisted [market is] not regulated enough. And 
then you have things like we’re seeing in the current 
marketplace, where it’s ludicrous to think that a 
private equity investor can make money purely and 
simply by taking a listed company and taking it into 
the unlisted area…there’s absolutely no sense in it. 
And yet they can, because you don’t have all these requirements 
from a compliance perspective. So it’s something that I’ve been 
finding it difficult to get my head around. It seems to be a bit of 
nonsense really…if you want to make an efficient capital market, 
you really should have the same reporting across both areas.
The comments from the next user reveal indifference to the issue 
of differential auditing standards:
I don’t think [there should be different standards] and the reason…
[why is] we’re kind of indifferent. The assumption still remains that 
the auditor behind the scenes does a job which fulfils its objective, 
which is fair and true information. Whether the standards or the 
procedures behind there change whether you’re listed or non-listed, 
I don’t think the market’s really focus[ed] on.
2.1.1 Summary
Users reveal some confusion about the existing situation with respect 
to the audit mandate for listed and unlisted versus public and private 
‘[I]f you want to 
make an efficient 
capital market, you 
really should have 




companies. Bearing this in mind, their comments reveal the full range of 
responses for the notion of differential audit between listed and unlisted 
companies: indifference and positive and negative sentiments. Those who 
support the idea of the application of differential auditing standards cite 
the cost of an audit as an issue, plus the difference in accessibility to the 
accounts. Those who prefer the status quo cite the implications for the 
cost of capital, the incremental hurdle to become listed and the fostering 
of an efficient capital market as reasons for their support.
2.2 Purchasers
Only one purchaser is interested in differential auditing standards, and 
even then, the response is qualified to a preference for size distinction 
rather than a listed/unlisted distinction:
[A]uditing is a little bit different than accounting standards, but…
it does seem…that [with] some of the depths and level of assurance 
that auditors need to take…large organisations [and] complex 
organisations could be differentiated from those which are very 
small and perhaps fairly simple organisations. So…it’s more size 
rather than whether they’re listed or not listed. 
The interviewer then comments: ‘So you don’t subscribe to the argument 
that one of the costs of being publicly traded is the cost of a more 
substantial, more detailed level of audit because you’re in the public 
arena?’ The response is:
No, I don’t…it’s wrong to think that way…there’s a presumption 
that when it’s not listed that somehow the capital is raised by a form 
of big business which should be able to look after itself.
The same person adds:  
My difficulty is that many of those people draw on funds 
that are from the community, or the public as a whole—
you know, superannuation funds and so on. So…if there’s 
a differential standard which perhaps led to a failure of a 
company, it’s going to equally impact on the community 
as if it were a publicly listed company…there’s some sort 
of unofficial view out there that if you’re publicly listed 
then it’s mums and dads, and if it’s not then it’s only big business. 
But it’s all mixed up, and it’s not as simple as that.
‘[I]t’s all mixed 
up, and it’s not 
as simple as 
that.’
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Other purchasers, however, were not supportive of the desirability of 
differential auditing standards for listed versus unlisted companies.
[W]hether they’re listed or not doesn’t do away with 
their need for accountability, and I understand that 
when they’re listed…they’ve got a broader public 
support for their capital, rather than perhaps a 
tighter level. But…the auditing standards basically 
give an assurance, and my preference would be 
not to differentiate between listed and non-listed. 
However, I’m very comfortable about differentiating 
on…economic size. 
The same person continues, deviating somewhat from the question 
in shifting the conversation to differential accounting standards:
On the Australian capital markets, we’ve got about nearly 2000 
stocks listed, but it’s only the top 200 to 300 perhaps that are 
meaningful in any market capital sense, and they would represent 
something like about 96 per cent of the total market capitalisation. 
So there’s a whole tail of very, very small companies [for whom] the 
cost of producing full sets of accounts with full auditing processes 
become fairly prohibitive. It’s for that reason that IFRS is moving, 
for example, to produce scaled-down accounting standards for 
SMEs. And…there is a case to argue for SMEs having some form 
of differential standards, and…I would see that as being a subset, 
rather than a completely different set of standards. 
The negative view of the proposition of differential auditing standards 
is continued in the next quotation:
[P]articularly in our view as stakeholder to unlisted companies, 
we’d want very high standards on both. No, we wouldn’t be 
differentiating.
2.2.1 Summary
No purchaser is supportive in an unqualified way of differential auditing 
standards based on a listed/unlisted criterion; however, some confusion 
between differential auditing and accounting standards is revealed. 
A size distinction does, however, receive some support. The need for 
‘[W]hether they’re 
listed or not 
doesn’t do away 




accountability by both listed and unlisted sectors is cited, as is the 
pervasiveness in both sectors of superannuation investments. 
2.3 Suppliers
Overall, suppliers are not supportive of the notion of differential auditing 
standards, especially once reflection on the issue takes place.
I would support anything that would [close] that…expectation gap 
between what…people think auditors do and what auditors actually 
do. Anything that would make that smaller…is a good thing, and…
commonsense would tell you [that] yes, the requirements of a big 
listed entity are not the same requirements as a private company 
that needs an audit or whatever. So yes…if that could be made 
practical that would be a worthwhile project.
Continuing, the same supplier comments on potential confusion that 
could arise: 
I’d presume that there would be a set of 
guidelines for whether you fall into a category A 
or a category B, [which would be okay] so long 
as everyone consistently applied the categories. 
The only downside to that is then you’re 
introducing a different set of rules [and] if you’re 
an outside observer…there could be a little bit 
of confusion as to which rules the auditors are 
applying. So in some ways, that might…make 
the expectation gap even worse if people don’t know which 
category a particular entity falls into…I would…be concerned 
about…I don’t know whether that would make it easier for us or 
not. Certainly, from an efficiency…[and] cost point of view, that 
would be great because we could…then cut down on a lot of the 
more specific detailed procedures that you have to do on a listed 
entity that you might not necessarily need to do on a non-listed 
entity. But in terms of the confusion, it might…make it a little bit 
more confusing for the users.
‘[I]n some ways, that 
might…make the 
expectation gap even 
worse if people don’t 
know which category a 
particular entity  
falls into.’
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
588 |
Another supplier is similarly negative about the idea:
I don’t think we’re talking about the level of an audit…an 
audit is an audit. Obviously, the audit gets more complex 
depending on the nature of the entity and their operations, 
but…the underlying audit requirement should be the 
same.
Two suppliers, however, see it as a marginal issue: 
I can see the argument, but…it’s such a complex issue and I…
wouldn’t think that auditing standards are the key matter there…
For instance, there is already a flight from some jurisdictions of 
listing because of the onerous nature of the listing requirements, 
which really has very little to do with auditing and a lot to do with 
the way the capital markets run themselves. So…this is a marginal 
issue. The answer to many of these questions…will be does it 
increase cost? That will often be my answer. Clearly, for non-listed 
companies, there is some differential cost in that, yes. Do I think 
that matters? Not much.
I don’t have a strong view. I could probably argue it both ways 
and it doesn’t really impact upon me very much…the principle of 
keeping it as simple as you can is a good one, and obviously listed 
companies have different stakeholders to unlisted companies. But 
again, I don’t really have a strong view and I’m probably not the 
best person to ask.
The challenge of complying with the auditing standards and having 
smaller clients see the value added is articulated in this next quotation:
One of the challenges that…mainly the auditing profession is 
going through is a concept of…[the] size of organisations and 
how we overlay the requirements of the auditing standards—
and particularly now that they…form part of the law…how we 
apply those standards down to smaller organisations…It’s a big 
challenge because the cost benefit to the shareholders and directors 
and management of having to overlay such an extensive audit 
methodology into smaller clients—they don’t see any value of that 
at all…we’re going through it at the moment with our clients…
Absolutely, methodology has got to be applied to all companies 
regardless of the size, but it’s a challenge because we’re having to do 
‘[A]n 




all this additional work, and the client doesn’t see any cost benefit 
out of it.
2.3.1 Summary
Suppliers are not supportive of the prospect of differential auditing 
standards, although two are somewhat ambivalent. Potential confusion 
for users is cited as a genuine concern and the proposition that ‘an audit 
is an audit’ is put, indicating that this could be a minimum standard that 
needs to be maintained.
2.4 Standard setters
One standard setter responds to the issue of differential auditing standards 
and is not supportive of the proposition:
The short answer is no. I…have strong views from seeing stuff 
from a different perspective…the way of doing that is around 
[the] reporting framework, not around the auditing, not around 
the assurance framework…you get to the nub [of] that issue by 
thinking about what information is really required to be reported, 
and by implication, it’s scaled down for non-listed or certain…
different categories. And then…you’d look to have assurance over 
that scaled down.
The same person continues:
[A] lot of the debate around differential auditing 
standards is getting mixed up between the reporting 
framework and the assurance framework…it’s 
a reporting framework issue predominantly…
there might be some stuff on the edges, but…it’s 
predominantly a reporting framework issue.
2.4.1 Summary
The one standard setter commenting on the issue of differential auditing 
standards points to the reporting framework, not the assurance framework, 
as the source for change in relation to this issue—if change is desired.
‘[A] lot of the 
debate…is getting 
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2.5 Regulators
Some support for the proposition of differential auditing standards is 
received from one regulator:
I’m looking at it from the perspective of being an investor and…
there is a lot of danger for an unsophisticated investor, investing 
in unlisted shares and there should be some kind of…disclosure to 
ensure that they…know what they’re getting into and they probably 
can’t get out of [it]…there should be some kind of differential there.
The same regulator continues:
[A]udits can be very costly and you can get more assurance if you 
know the company is listed and is a disclosing entity and is required 
to jump through the hoops of the standards—all the standards.
Another regulator is opposed to the idea because of the variety of size and 
importance of companies within the unlisted sectors, although he or she 
seems to be more amenable to the concept if it is based on unlisted, public 
company turnover.
The only reason I’d be a little bit wary about 
that…is that there are some very substantial 
unlisted businesses [and] some people who are 
dealing with them will…want to rely upon the 
accounts, like financiers and…other people…the 
whole concept of having a differential auditing 
standard in the sense of saying…you’re not going 
to audit those accounts as closely…There [are] 
a lot of very small listed companies who really 
aren’t all that important from an economic standpoint and you 
could probably have differential auditing standards for them and it 
wouldn’t make a lot of difference. But there are some major unlisted 
companies [for whom] it probably would make a lot of difference 
and people would in fact be concerned about that…The irony of 
this is…it may even be better to do it more in terms of turnover 
or something, rather than being the distinction between listed and 
unlisted. It’s probably a bit arbitrary in some respects.
‘[T]here are some very 
substantial unlisted 
businesses [and] some 
people who are dealing 
with them will…





While one regulator is somewhat supportive of the notion of differential 
auditing standards, based on a cost argument, it is not clear whether he 
or she has more of a differential disclosure regime in mind. A second 
regulator is troubled by a listed/unlisted criterion, arguing that many 
unlisted entities are major entities, and that turnover would be a better 
distinction. There seems to be an argument that even among public 
companies, differential auditing standards based on a size differential 
could be of benefit.
3.0 issues and implications
The very notion of ‘differential auditing’ causes confusion in the minds of 
at least some participants in the market for audit services and in particular 
users, who confuse the issue of differential standards with differential 
mandates. From users, we can see that there are mixed views with regard 
to the advantages and disadvantages of differential auditing standards. 
Some of the motivation for the positive view comes from the perception 
that they will cause cost savings. Some users, however, are adamant that 
differential auditing standards are not appropriate and that differential 
standards will cause inefficiencies to the capital market because of the 
enhanced attractiveness of remaining private as opposed to going public. 
Also, there is concern that differential auditing standards will cause 
confusion and decreased understandability in the capital market. The risk 
that the capital market faces and the lack of genuine understanding of the 
issues involved here are behind many of the views expressed. 
Purchasers, on the other hand, show little support for the idea of 
differential auditing standards. They note that the criterion of listed 
versus unlisted is inappropriate. There are positive suggestions that a 
size-based criterion would be more functional. Perhaps least supportive 
of all were suppliers. They describe a genuine concern about the ability 
to effectively communicate the level of assurance that is being given as a 
reason not to pursue this as a policy initiative. Standard setters (who are 
often drawn from the supplier side of the market for audit services) are also 
not supportive of differential auditing standards, although one standard 
setter draws a sharp distinction between differential auditing standards 
and differential accounting standards and suggests that the debate might 
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be confused because of the intersection of the two. 
Regulators do provide some support for differential auditing standards. 
Again, much of the motivation seems to be focused on the costliness of 
obtaining assurance. A further rationale is around the fact that there are 
some large unlisted businesses operating in the Australian economy and 
this difference would mean that certain companies operating within the 
economy would be audited to a differential standard. On balance, while 
there is some support by regulators, there is concern that the criterion of 
listed/unlisted is inappropriate and that size (possibly measured by way 
of turnover) would be a more relevant criterion. One might speculate that 
the discussion of differential auditing standards is also confused somewhat 
because of the existing availability of an audit firm-delivered ‘review’. 
Existing standards on the preparation and execution of these assurance 
services already exist and are well developed and in a mature state. 
All things considered, there is only limited support for differential 
auditing standards and if there is to be a discussion around this issue, it 
should focus on the size-based criterion rather than that of listed/unlisted.
4.0 Concluding remarks
There is no doubt that some confusion exists between the audit mandate 
and the issues around differential auditing standards. The discussion and 
debate around differential auditing standards seems to wax and wane 
as an issue of priority, and there is no clear agreement on the criterion 
to be used to distinguish between different levels of audit requirement; 
some argue for listed/unlisted because of the presence of the public in 
the capital market, while others note that the distinction should be drawn 
along the scale of auditee as the economic substance of some unlisted 
companies is significant. 
There is no policy action or operationalisation that is evident from 
this as the debate does not appear to be conclusive. There are, however, 
actions that can occur for certain organisations that face the need for an 
audit as a possibly unintended consequence of legislative action in years 
or even decades past. Unincorporated associations sometimes based on 
state or territory legislation find themselves subject to the requirement to 
undertake an ‘audit’. One might argue that, in terms of the criterion listed/
unlisted and in terms of the criterion large/small, these organisations do 
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not warrant an audit and the participants in these organisations would 
be fully satisfied with a review performed by an audit firm. This is not 
necessarily a call for differential auditing, as the presence of reviews is well 
established with clear levels of assurance being provided. Removal of these 
auditees from the debate might assist in clarifying the issues involved. 





Do I think the shareholders are getting value? Yes…a strong internal 
audit function and a well-planned one would provide benefit to 
shareholders and to non-exec. directors, and to a lot of people…
because they are, effectively at least, eyes and ears for people that 
aren’t involved on a daily basis. But from an audit point of view 
at this point in time, and maybe it’s just until we settle in a little 
bit more with the auditing standards as law…I’d be using it as an 
indicative mechanism. 
— Supplier
1.0 Key issues 
The issue of the external auditor’s reliance on internal audit and whether 
that had changed from the past and to what extent the capital market 
valued internal audit was raised with stakeholders. While this was a 
second-order issue in terms of the future of audit, responses raised the 
following issues: 
•	 how frequent is the presence of an internal audit function in 
organisations
•	 what benefits can an internal audit function provide to an 
organisation
•	 can the market assess the value of internal audit
•	 does the market value internal audit
•	 do boards of directors and/or audit committees value internal audit?
•	 is the external auditor relying more than was the case in the past on 
the internal audit function? 
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2.0 introduction
Stakeholder groups were asked questions about internal audit—in 
particular, variations of the question: ‘Do you think auditors are perhaps 
placing more reliance on internal audit than in the past, and do you think 
the market might be looking more at the value of the internal audit?’ 
Analysis of the responses by users, purchasers, suppliers, standard setters 
and regulators is presented next.
2.1 Users
This first quotation reminds us of the fact that not all entities maintain an 
internal audit function: 
Not as far as my companies are concerned, the companies that  
I research, because they’re generally too small to have a real internal 
audit function.
Several users say that the internal audit function is worthwhile. For 
instance, the first quotation speaks about its role in ensuring compliance 
and building an ethos of what is and is not acceptable: 
[A]n internal audit is fairly important…in the broking industry…
we have internal audits quite often, from a compliance point of 
view of what we do…they’re an important part of just building 
an ethos through a whole organisation that certain things are 
acceptable and certain things are not…an internal audit procedure 
is highly important because it stops any impropriety during the 
year, potentially, rather than just once a year. It’s probably cost 
effective, to a point, for a company to have internal auditors.
The same user goes on:
[There are] certain things where they could rely on an internal 
audit…it all comes back to materiality and that sort of thing. 
Obviously, large issues…need to be reviewed by the external 
auditor as well, but smaller certain issues [can] probably…be 
assumed correct under an internal [audit]…[I]s internal audit now 
compulsory? I think there [are] certain cases in the US whereby 
they’re stating that it is.
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In this next quotation, the idea is put forward that internal audit can 
potentially save companies money or a corporate collapse:
It’s probably an expensive operation for certain businesses to have 
internal audits, but…it potentially could save a lot of dough, or a 
corporate collapse as well, over time. It’s just one of those things…
in this day and age that you probably need to have.
The fraud-detection potential of an internal audit function is raised in this 
next quotation:
[Y]es, for the larger companies, risk management 
[and] internal audit are an issue that the market is 
more concerned about, and that they are looking to 
for companies to have. That is certainly something 
that my fellow analysts would probe when they’re 
looking at a company. What are your arrangements, 
and what is the internal audit, how is it organised? 
So…there is an awareness, at least in the analyst 
community, about the limitations of external audits. The fact that 
it’s not continuous audits, that in itself places more value, more 
responsibility, on the internal audit function of the company. And 
I’m thinking back [to] National Australia Bank, for example, [and] 
the Homeside debacle…there was a failure of the internal audit…
to really understand the implications of valuation models that were 
being used, and the people there were content to just sign off on 
black box-type…justifications. You know, ‘We’ve got the formula 
but…it’s too complicated for you to understand’, or it’s a trade 
secret…So yes, the internal audit function…is becoming more 
important for the larger companies in particular, and…the internal 
audit is the front line for fraud detection. It’s not the external 
audit…that’s the last line of defence.
Another user sees the external auditor reinforcing the work of the internal 
auditor, rather than the other way around:
I would be worried if external auditors were relying totally on 
internal auditors, because…I see the external auditor as being 
almost a second check against the advice in the role that the internal 
auditor is giving…it’s almost like a back-up…just a second opinion 
to make sure that something hasn’t been missed, so that we can rely 
‘[T]here is an 
awareness, at 
least in the analyst 
community, about 
the limitations of 
external audits.’
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100 per cent on our financial statements at the other end. And it 
gives us that extra level of comfort…internal auditors are important, 
and…you can rely on them to a point, but I wouldn’t like to see the 
situation where you had external auditors putting together an audit 
opinion purely based on the internal audit situation. 
The same person continues, emphasising the regularity of input that 
internal audit provides:
[T]hey both have an important role to play. And the internal audit 
should be more of a…regular input to the process. Whereas the 
external auditor is really a one or twice a year, come in and just do 
their spot checks to make sure, just to confirm in their own mind, 
that what the internal auditor says is happening, is happening. But 
they do need to make their own assessments.
There is not a great deal of enthusiasm for the propositions that external 
auditors are placing more reliance on internal audit than in the past or the 
market valuing highly the internal audit function. 
[I’m] not sure about the external auditors. I would hope that they’re 
still doing what they need to, to get their assurance done. I’m sure 
that they’re testing the processes of an internal audit and to the extent 
they’re satisfied. I don’t mind the fact that they rely on the internal 
audit perhaps, but…I would hope that it’s not to the exclusion 
[of] doing their own work. And in terms of the market placing the 
value…I don’t think that it really comes up…the assumption is that 
between the auditors and the internal auditors, what people are 
looking at on the financial statements is true and correct.
Some users, however, are more firmly of the view that the external auditor 
is not relying to a greater extent than in the past on the work of internal 
auditors, as these next few quotations reveal: 
I haven’t seen any evidence of external auditors 
changing the reliance that they’re placing on internal 
audit…it doesn’t seem to have changed…in the 12 years 
or so that I’ve been doing this kind of job…I  don’t 
even know whether the market does even think about 
internal audit. I’ve not ever had any discussion with 
anyone about that kind of thing or seen any indication 
that the market even thinks about it.
‘I don’t even 
know whether 
the market does 




I haven’t seen any evidence of an impact.
[T]he expectations of the external auditors [are] to check that 
that internal audit process is efficient and working, and not 
compromised…the example of that most recently is National 
Australia Bank, where hindsight was something very poor in the 
internal audit process that linked into management processes and 
all the rest of it. And you would hope an external auditor would 
have looked at that—which obviously again wasn’t the case—
and said, ‘The way it works is not actually going to achieve what 
everybody, internally and externally, thinks it is achieving.’ So…
there’s probably more focus on them as a very external third-party, 
independent checker of internal audit processes.
The interviewer prompts: ‘So more so in the past?’ The response is:
I suspect NAB and HIH and Enron and WorldCom and all the rest of 
it have increased that expectation.
‘How about auditors?’ asks the interviewer. The response is:
But they should have been doing it in the first place.
One user is more certain that there is greater reliance by external auditors 
on internal audit and the justification for this response is given as cost 
pressures.
[F]rom the external auditor’s perspective, they probably are being 
forced to rely on the internal audit processes more than they would 
in the past and that would be the pressure on costs more than 
anything…that’s perception; I haven’t got evidence to support that. 
And I’m not sure there is exactly a problem with that, provided the 
governance of the internal audit function is appropriate, the skills of 
the people that are doing the job [are] appropriate. And the external 
auditor can verify [it] by testing what approach they’ve taken and 
what the outcomes have been and what the recommendations 
have been…I’m not too sure that there is…a problem with it. In 
a badly governed internal audit environment…it would be a huge 
risk to rely on the internal audit function, but generally speaking, 
certainly the company we look at, that doesn’t seem to be an issue…
it is happening and…it’s happening because of the cost of audits 
these days…the real implications are the external auditor needs to 
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do that work on the internal audit function to satisfy themselves; it 
adds to the reliability of the work done by the internal auditors and 
how much comfort they can take from that work.
The same person continues: 
[T]he market…of institutional investors has never 
really focused on the internal audit function at all. 
I’ve had analysts who, obviously quite a few of 
them…work for me, and we would rarely ask to 
see internal reports or do anything like that…[In 
the] the marketplace, [there is] probably not a huge 
amount of interest or following [of] the internal audit 
function. Maybe that should change, I don’t know. 
I doubt it. I don’t think it will change.
There is not a great deal of enthusiasm from users for the proposition that 
the market values internal audit:
[I]n terms of the market placing the value…that…doesn’t…
really come up…the assumption is that between the auditors and 
the internal auditors, what people are looking at on the financial 
statements is true and correct.
[T]he market, myself included, assumes that the audit process is…
working as it’s intended.
In terms of [the] market placing more value [on it], I don’t know…
the actual companies would place a lot of value on it. The market 
probably wouldn’t know or care.
[A]s far as the market placing more value on it…it’s more of an 
internal quality-control process than anything…any external 
parties are aware of. I don’t think the market is that aware of the 
internal audit procedures other than it’s something that…most 
people within our market do, but obviously the better that you do 
perform that internal audit it, should assist you in the audit process 
at the end of the year. I don’t know whether they’re placing more 
reliance or less on it.
‘[T]he market…
of institutional 
investors has never 
really focused on 





The comments of users show that many value the internal audit. 
Specifically mentioned are its roles in ensuring compliance, building an 
appropriate ethos and in fraud detection. There is little support from users 
for the proposition that external auditors are relying more than in the past 
on internal audit. One user argues that cost is driving auditors to increase 
this reliance, but there is little agreement. There is virtually no support for 
the proposition that the capital market places value on the presence of an 
internal audit function and, in fact, an assertion is made that institutional 
investors ignore it.
2.2 Purchasers
Purchasers see internal audit as a valuable function, as is evident from 
these first two quotations: 
[T]he external auditor is absolutely crucial and the work that 
they do and the final assurances they give are absolutely critical. 
But if I want to look at whether my systems are working well 
in the company, and whether or not some of the areas…[in] risk 
management are operating properly then I would expect internal 
audit to be targeted to do that work.
[In industry] that relationship [between internal and external 
auditors] has been always very close…So my long-term picture of 
that is that external audit and internal audit worked together very 
closely…looking at each other’s audit plans.
The same person continues:
[T]he function of internal audit has always been—within this 
[company] and I suspect within all [companies in this industry]—of 
critical importance, and I doubt if that’s changed all that much; maybe 
the sophistication and the talent within it, but not the actual role.
There is, however, no support for the proposition that the market 
is placing more value on the internal audit function:
I don’t even know whether the market does even think about 
internal audit. I’ve not ever had any discussion with anyone about 
that kind of thing or seen any indication that the market even 
thinks about it.
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Is the market placing more value on the internal audit 
function? I think it is…we do as a private company. But 
in terms of listed companies, you know you can’t afford 
to make any mistakes, and especially large mistakes that 
are going to be picked up as part of an audit, so to have 
that internal process in place, whether it be in the form 
of a set procedure like a check list…most would do it.
The purchaser continues, pointing out the importance and usefulness 
of internal audit as a training ground within financial institutions:
[T]hat is essential. It is essential that the internal auditor be 
protected…I also follow a view that…this is one of the most 
effective and useful training grounds for rising young executives…
so internal audit…is not something which is sort of [a] lowly job 
within the organisation; it’s something which is really important…
it’s a really, really good tool. It’s very hard to achieve though 
because most people perceive this role as sort of a backwater…but 
you get a lot out of it if…it’s done properly. This is not to get away 
from the basic tests of fraud and all those things; you still need that 
capability. But…you need more these days and it’s essentially under 
the heading of risk management.
2.2.1 Summary
The purchasers who comment on the issue of internal audit tend to see 
a close relationship between external and internal audit. Purchasers see 
value in internal audit, not least because of its potential for training in risk 
management and other aspects within financial institutions. No purchaser, 
however, perceives that the market values the internal audit function. 
In fact, there is doubt expressed that the market even thinks about internal 
audit at all. 
2.3 Suppliers
The first supplier reminds us of how few entities have an internal audit 
function:
I still haven’t seen the trend back towards having fully fledged 
internal audit functions for a lot of our clients…you’ll find that 
the majority of our clients, out of this office, don’t have an internal 







market was…not doing so well, with the cost 
cutting, et cetera. From a commercial perspective, 
that would have been one of the areas [that was 
cut] and I haven’t seen it come back yet. I do 
have a number of US-referred clients that have 
an internal audit…so there is a function…The 
first observation would be I don’t think entities 
themselves, the ones I deal with anyway…are 
placing a huge value on internal audit, otherwise 
[they would] be putting that function in place in some way. So… 
I don’t see it impacting external auditors at this point…because  
I don’t have a number of clients that have internal audit. 
The same supplier continues, explaining how for the one client with an 
internal audit function with which he or she is familiar, there is some 
reliance on the work of that auditor:
The one that I do, there is a critical assessment of how good that 
internal audit function is, the quality of the people, the scope of 
work that they do. And then based on that assessment we will 
reduce the level of work we do in some areas. Now if we make 
that assessment and we feel that that internal audit isn’t…to the 
standard that we would like then we’ll do work over the top of 
it. Again, if you think about the key…judgment assessments of an 
audit, it’s unlikely that an internal audit function looks at those 
areas anyway. They look at more the underlying, lower processes. 
So…from a material issue on an audit perspective, whether there’s 
an internal audit function there or not, there’ll be the same effort 
on those issues because they tend to not get involved in those; it’s 
more on the process…side.
The next supplier, however, even though positive about the role of internal 
auditors, does not rely on their work, justifying this by the additional 
procedures that need to be carried out if such reliance is made.
‘I don’t think entities 
themselves…are 
placing a huge value 
on internal audit, 
otherwise [they 
would] be putting that 
function in place in 
some way.’
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[I]f I was looking at internal audit, if I thought 
it was just reviewing their results, seeing 
what they came up with, it would give me 
a better feel[ing] for what the internal audit 
environment was like, but at this stage, I’m 
not placing full reliance on it…I’d like to 
because it would save me work, but…any 
time you place reliance on a third party there’s 
a whole heap of procedures that you have to 
do. And I would’ve done those before they 
were law as well, but the cost saving is not 100 per cent…you can’t 
just chop off a whole heap of work, because you still have to do 
some work to make sure that the people doing the internal audit are 
appropriately qualified and the program is appropriate and covers 
all the risk areas. So it would ultimately be more efficient for me 
to be able to rely on internal auditors, so long as they plan their 
work properly and they reported to the right level of the board, and  
I thought their work would cover what I would see as all the risks.
The next supplier also points to the additional work required before 
reliance on the work of internal audit can be forthcoming:
In terms of…external audit placing more reliance on internal audit, 
[I’ve seen] very little…I was expecting more…an external auditor 
always has to make up their minds about how far they want to rely 
on any expert, but particularly internal audit…in practice, I haven’t 
seen any visible change in that over the last few years or even 
months. And I was expecting them to do a little bit more of that. 
Perhaps in the public sector there’s some increased reliance…[but] in 
the private sector, not really…So yes…the market does and external 
auditors perhaps surprisingly don’t. It may be that the external audit 
methodology is now so standardised, consistent and inexorable a 
methodology that there isn’t room to rely on internal auditing. Why 
would you do that? It’d be more effort to do the work you need to rely 
on an internal audit than it would be to go and do it yourself. So the 
fact that I see a difference in the answers to those two questions—do 
the external auditors know the market: yes—may actually be driven 
by some of your previous questions about the need for external 
auditors to change under regulatory pressure…ironically, that leads 
to less efficiency, not more, in that particular context.
‘[A]t this stage, I’m not 
placing full reliance on 
it…I’d like to because it 
would save me work, but…
any time you place reliance 
on a third party there’s a 
whole heap of procedures 
that you have to do.’
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One supplier who had been an internal auditor implies that the time 
available to an internal auditor, unfettered by fee constraints, permits 
a depth of checking that external auditors cannot always achieve:
I started life in the profession as an internal auditor and we used to 
work hand in glove with the external auditors and we both relied 
on each other…the external auditor could say to me, ‘Why don’t 
you check such and such.’ And I used to do operational auditing 
mainly…And I would not have any time constraint on checking 
such and such because I was employed by the company. I would 
check, go through that program and then report back to the 
managing director at the same time as the external auditor, so that 
the three of us could work collaboratively to make robust the whole 
audit process, internal and external. And that had the result of 
significantly reducing the audit fee to the company—and this was 
a major company…or ensuring that the external audit fee didn’t go 
up as much as it would normally have gone up if the internal audit 
process was not hand in glove for the externals. And we used the 
ACA and the CPA standards, relying on the use of another auditor…
and it worked extremely efficiently.
The same supplier, currently a board and audit committee member, goes 
on to discuss the level of cooperation between the external and internal 
auditors that can be observed in that organisation, and he or she obviously 
values the relationship. 
I’m on the board of a company at the moment which also has 
an internal audit process. I’m on the external audit committee 
representing the directors on the committee along with another 
fellow, and we work hand in glove with the internal auditors and 
we have nothing leaving us. And the internal auditors are working 
with the external auditors and it does work very well.
Another two suppliers point to the board of directors as particularly 
valuing internal audit, the second one commenting also on the value 
of internal audit to the market.
[B]oards of directors particularly are looking at internal audit 
functions quite often as a useful ally in the organisation to… 
go through and have a look at things, and of course using things 
like the auditing committee, they have a direct conduit to that… 
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I’ve also noticed that executive management, 
although…to some degree that has always been 
the case depending on the personalities, are also 
more inclined to use internal audit to do things. 
Is the market placing more value on the internal 
audit function…yes…that’s partly cyclical. 
It has gone through some ups and downs…
perhaps because external auditing has become so 
boring, internal auditing seems to be able to attract more people to 
it. It seems to be a more prized role.
The same person continues: 
[I]t may be that internal audit has also had a bit of a boost to 
its morale by its role in uncovering some of these United States 
corporate collapses—WorldCom particularly—which if it hadn’t 
been for the heroism of the internal audit people that wouldn’t have 
come out as soon as it did…So yes…the market does [value it] and 
external auditors perhaps surprisingly don’t. 
2.3.1 Summary
Suppliers remind us that not all their clients maintain an internal audit 
function. When that function is present, suppliers appear to value internal 
audit, yet surprisingly few state definitively that they rely on the work 
of internal auditors. Two offer the additional procedures necessary to 
investigate the internal auditor and his or her work as potential reasons 
for this. The experience is, however, mixed since another supplier, who 
had been an internal auditor earlier in his or her career, and who is 
currently an audit committee member, obviously values the close working 
relationship between the internal and external auditors in that company. 
Other suppliers support the value to boards of directors, especially non-
executive directors. 
2.4 Standard setters
Only one standard setter, who is also a supplier, is asked a question in 
relation to current reliance on internal audit compared with before the 
recent regulatory changes. 
‘[P]erhaps because 
external auditing has 
become so boring, 
internal auditing seems 
to be able to attract 
more people to it.’
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I wouldn’t say there’s more reliance. Well, cut out stocks for a 
moment, because that’s different. But I would’ve said it’s similar, if 
not slightly less.
The same standard setter continues in response to a question about 
whether or not the market is placing more value on internal audit:
Yes…well the directors are…their focus, similarly as their focus on 
external audit has gone up and they’ve acknowledged [it]…boards 
are, as a generalisation…much more focused around internal audit 
and what they’re doing than they were before. 
2.4.1 Summary
Standard setters confirm the suppliers’ view that boards of directors are 
placing more value on internal audit than in the past. There is, however, 
no support for the proposition that external auditors are relying more on 
internal auditors than in the past.
2.5 Regulators
Regulators are confident that external auditors are placing increased 
reliance on internal auditors, but think that the market cannot assess what 
internal auditors do.
[T]he external auditors are placing more reliance on internal 
auditors. Of course, it depends on their quality, but once they’ve 
been assessed as being solid and, turning out high-calibre work, 
yeah, there is reliance on them. I’m not sure about the market… 
I don’t have an opinion on that. I can’t see how the market can 
assess an internal audit function without…looking at what they do.
The same regulator continues, explaining that cost pressures are driving 
this perceived increase in reliance:
[S]ome of the market would be because of cost pressures. They’d 
know that external auditors are getting increasingly squeezed and 
would expect them to rely on internal auditors, but some of the 
market…the institutions, would be aware of that. I’m not sure 
whether the rest of the investing community would be aware of 
that though.
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Another regulator agrees that external auditors are placing more reliance 
on internal auditors: 
[I]nternal audit is a very big issue in the securities 
industry and [the] major players…have very 
aggressive internal audit teams, often on an 
international basis, major security brokers…I don’t 
know whether or not they’re placing more reliance 
on the internal audit function…the true position is 
that the whole concept of internal audit has become 
increasingly more important in a sense…as part of 
the internal audit is the whole…compliance function, which is very 
big in financial services…I know that boards of directors are very 
concerned to ensure that they’re getting the compliance function…
[and] audit functions operating properly. So to some extent some 
of the things which probably would’ve been picked up by an audit 
are now being dealt with internally…Because…now it’s not just 
you being good enough just to make the audit; you’ve got to be 
having procedures in place to deal with things in advance…it’s 
probably right that they’re placing more reliance on the internal 
audit function…you’ve got a proper internal audit, or internal audit 
function…some organisations do.
2.5.1 Summary
Regulators believe that external auditors are placing more reliance on the 
internal audit function. There is no firm view about whether regulators 
believe that the market values internal audit. One regulator points out 
how difficult it is for the market to value audit when it cannot see what 
that function does in an organisation.
3.0 issues and implications
While it is clear that there are organisations of substance that do not have 
a well-maintained or substantive internal audit function, it is the case that 
many of the users expressly value the presence of internal audit capacity, 
whether it is outsourced or in-house. Despite the fact that users value it, 
they see little interaction between the work of external auditors and the 
role of the internal auditor. Additionally and importantly for the issue of 
the role of audit in the capital market, there seems to be little support for 
‘[T]he true position 
is that the whole 
concept of internal 





the proposition that users value the internal audit as part of the value of a 
company in the sense of its appreciation in the capital market. Purchasers 
on the other hand see a relationship between the internal and external 
audit functions. Additionally, purchasers also value the role of the internal 
audit function and see it as an important part of the risk-management 
profile of an organisation. Consistent with users, purchasers do not see the 
internal audit function as having a positive consequence for the presence 
of the organisation and its participation in the capital market. There is 
some scepticism about whether the capital market thinks about or has a 
view of the role and value of the internal audit function.
The suppliers of the external audit function surveyed on this matter 
also take the view that not all clients maintain an active and substantive 
internal audit function. There appears to be little evidence that external 
auditors rely on the work of internal auditors as a valuable contribution 
to the external audit process, despite the fact that they recognise its value. 
Regardless of this, suppliers recognise that boards of directors and audit 
committees as well as executive directors and management appreciate 
the importance and value of the internal audit function. Consistent 
with certain others, standard setters do not support the proposition that 
external auditors rely on the work of internal auditors no matter how 
valuable or substantive that contribution might be.
Regulators do see external auditors as placing more reliance on the 
internal audit function, but they do not necessarily recognise that it is 
perceived as valuable to the market. A critical issue here is that the capital 
market might not discern the value, substance and significance of the 
work of an internal auditor.
On balance, the work of the internal auditor is, for those who are able 
to distinguish it, perceived as valuable, substantive and a contribution to 
the economic wealth of the organisation. There is considerable scepticism 
about whether it is observable to the capital market and the issue then 
becomes how the value and contribution of the internal audit might 
be better appreciated, potentially by the external auditor and, more 
importantly, the board of directors and those who participate in the 
capital market.
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4.0 Concluding remarks
The evidence of the lack of observability of the internal audit function 
provides a challenge for internal audit to add to the efficiency of the capital 
market. Because of the need for careful validation of the work of internal 
audit, there are significant cost pressures on external auditors being able 
to use the work of internal auditors. If, indeed, it is believed that the 
work of internal auditors could be of value in determining the credibility 
of financial statements, care might be given to reconsidering how the 
validation by the external auditor of the work of the internal auditor 
might be undertaken in an efficient way. This might require organisations 
such as the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board to reconsider what 
are the appropriate threshold requirements to determine that validation.
Additionally, and possibly more importantly, because the work of 
the internal audit is essentially unobservable to the capital market, 
consideration needs to be given to how that work can be provided with 
greater transparency. It is noted, for example, that the ASX Corporate 
Governance Guidelines recommend the existence of an internal audit 
function be disclosed to the capital market. An important advance on this 
would be if those guidelines were also able to describe the nature of the 
work and the scale of the undertaking in any given listed company. In that 
way, there would be a window on the quality and extent of the work of 
the internal audit that might be more satisfying to the information needs 
of the capital market.
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[T]here is scope for auditors to give assurance around other things…
particularly [on] the topic of the moment: climate change. We’ve 
been looking at triple bottom-line reporting and this sort of stuff 
for the last 10 years, but only in specific circumstances has there 
been an appetite for that…we’ll see a lot more general appetite [for] 
that. We do give opinions around internal controls and so forth, 
so…there will be broader and deeper, or more shallow, assurance 
being given generally…we’re comfortable…we know what we’re 
doing on that. The question is: we know we’re doing [it], but how 
do other people interpret that and see it?
— Supplier
1.0 Key issues
Provision of assurance on various types of non-financial information has 
long been mooted as a potential growth area for public accounting firms. 
This chapter examines this issue in the context of questions about the 
demand for, willingness to supply and regulation of specific types of 
non-financial information and the assurances provided for it. The generic 
challenges surrounding these types of reports and assurance on them 
include:
•	 is there a demand for assurance provision of non-financial information
•	 given the range of types of non-financial information, is there a 
preference for assurance to be provided on some types ahead of other 
types 
•	 what level of assurance is appropriate for the various types of non-
financial information; are some types unsuitable for audit or review-
level assurance
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•	 is there a likelihood of confusion if assurance is provided on many 
different types of non-financial information or at several different 
levels
•	 can an entity’s auditor provide independent, objective reports on 
directors’ or management’s integrity and judgments when he or she 
has to work so closely with those personnel during the external 
audit?
2.0 introduction
Assurance provision of non-financial information is the subject of this 
chapter. It reports on stakeholders’ perceptions, elicited through the 
survey questionnaire and face-to-face interviews, on a range of reports 
over which assurance could potentially be provided by external auditors. 
The list of these includes assurance on:
•	 the presence of material fraud in a company
•	 a company’s internal control procedures
•	 the integrity of senior executive managers in a company
•	 the risk-management approaches of a company
•	 the performance of senior executive managers in a company
•	 the environmental and corporate sustainability performance of a 
company
•	 the quality of corporate governance in a company
•	 conflicts of interest of directors of a company
•	 senior executive managers’ projections for the company
•	 the reasonableness of non-financial information contained in a 
company’s annual report
•	 the environmental and corporate sustainability performance of a 
company.
Analysis of the survey and interview data follows in subsequent sections.
3.0 survey
Participants in the mail and telephone surveys were asked to indicate 
whether they believed provision of specific services involving reporting 
on various non-financial data was best provided by an external auditor 
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and, if so, the extent to which they believed that the value of this service 
warranted an additional fee. Responses are reported in Table 16.1.
From Table 16.1, there seems to a high degree of shared and positive 
agreement with respect to the auditor providing certain reports. These 
include reporting on: the presence of material fraud, the company’s internal 
control procedures, risk-management approaches in the company, the 
quality of corporate governance and conflicts of interest in the company. 
For each of these, the users, purchasers and suppliers took a more positive 
than negative position. On some other matters, purchasers were more 
conspicuously differentiated from the other two groups. For example, 
while about one-third of users reacted positively to the auditor reporting 
on the performance of senior executives, purchasers and suppliers were 
much less positively disposed to such reports.
Table 16.1 Responses on services best provided by an external auditor 


















































































For each of the following services, please indicate whether you believe this service is 
best provided by an external auditor by placing a cross in the appropriate box in Part (i). 
Report on the 
presence of material 
fraud in a company.
81 75 79 89 66 67 66 62 70 67 70
Report on a company’s 
internal control 
procedures.
80 76 81 85 79 84 78 75 81 77 82
Report on the 
integrity of senior 
executive managers in 
a company.
50 46 51 53 33 33 32 38 27 34 25
Report on the 
risk-management 
approaches of a 
company.
75 73 77 76 70 70 72 64 63 66 62
Report on the 
performance of senior 
executive managers in 
a company.
34 32 32 37 14 16 12 19 12 11 12























































































performance of a 
company.
44 45 48 40 31 22 31 43 32 46 28
Report on the 
quality of corporate 
governance in a 
company.
77 77 79 75 74 63 80 76 68 66 69
Report on conflicts of 
interest of directors of 
a company.
74 73 74 74 61 56 60 70 53 34 58
Report on senior 
executive managers’ 
projections for 
the company (for 
example, sales growth, 
earnings potential).
40 38 41 42 32 33 30 36 30 25 32




in a company’s annual 
report.
49 52 55 40 48 43 47 59 47 56 45
Percentage of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ on a five-point scale.
Generally, for the other questions, there was ambivalence (for example, 
the report on the reasonableness of non-financial information contained 
in a company’s annual report) or a generally negative reaction (a report on 
senior executive managers’ projections for the company). 
Overall, users seem to be the most positive with respect to the 
availability of these reports. It might be important to note that of the 
three stakeholder groups—users, purchasers and suppliers—it is only 
the users who do not have direct contact in the transactions that create 
these reports and who might have the least clear understanding of the cost 
and complexity of obtaining and using these reports. In other words, for 
users, these reports could be thought of as a free good.
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4.0 interviews
Not all interviewees were asked about every potential report listed in the 
introduction and hence not all categories of stakeholder are represented 
in the interview analysis below. By the same token, some stakeholders’ 
comments cover a number of these potential reports. In such cases, the 
comments are not repeated but are included under the category first 
mentioned by the interviewee. The types of reports on which comment 
is made are presented in the same order in which they appeared in the 
survey instrument. Each of these relates to the auditor providing a report 
on the issue at hand. 
4.0.1 The presence of material fraud in a company: users
Among the users who discussed the issue of whether a report on the 
presence of material fraud in a company would be valued, the response 
was positive.
In terms of fraud, it’s a tricky one, because where do you…draw the 
line in terms of what auditors can…sign off [on] and that they’ve 
provided comfort on…the markets would probably appreciate it. 
I…can’t get my head wrapped around how you’d do it.
Fraud assessment…I’m a trusting person. I’d assume that…most 
CEOs and directors of public companies act in the best interests 
of the shareholders and the company. I assume that’s the case, 
but I know it doesn’t always happen. So maybe, [auditor sign-off] 
would…be helpful.
4.0.2 Report on the presence of material fraud in a company:  
 suppliers
This supplier sees fraud and risk assessments as within an auditor’s ambit, 
and adds internal controls to that list, pointing out that the US Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 requires auditors to certify client reports on internal 
controls:
On a couple of those things…like fraud, risk assessments, even 
if you go as far as internal controls…that effectively is what’s 
happening with Sarbanes-Oxley in the US. So there are entities here 
that have to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley and therefore auditors are 
already making those extra assurances on some of those things. So 
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a Sarbanes-Oxley-compliant client has to confirm themselves that 
they’ve got adequate internal controls and the auditor has to certify 
that that is the case. So some of those things around controls—
fraud, risk management—are already in place under Sarbanes-
Oxley. They’re not really here from an Australian perspective. So 
there are some benefits to that. 
The same supplier continues, explaining that these assurances are not 
necessarily going to prevent fraud and manipulation:
Some of my concerns…around that would be that…
Sarbanes-Oxley and that sort of assurance and 
reporting…came in because of the likes of Enron 
and WorldCom et cetera…it’s still not going to stop 
the ultimate manipulation. If someone wants to be 
fraudulent then it is very difficult for any of those 
processes to stop that anyway…[so] there’s got to be 
a balance there…the Sarbanes-Oxley stuff has gone 
to…too low a level on individual controls rather than focusing on 
that bigger picture.
4.0.3 Report on the presence of material fraud in a company:  
 regulators
The one regulator who commented on a report on the presence of material 
fraud in a company was enthusiastic about the idea:
Definitely. When we invest, we want to make sure that the companies 
that we invest in are doing what they say they’re going to do, and 
that they’ve got good systems and processes in place to protect 
against fraud, for instance. That doesn’t mean that any of us would 
think that fraud won’t potentially happen, because it’s probably 
quite hard to set up a system that is going to prevent fraud. But if 
you’ve got enough checks and balances, you should be able to pick 
it up pretty quickly if it does happen, and then let the market know 
about it. So yes…you need the safety mechanisms put in place to 
prevent against those one-off fraudulent-type effects or other risks 
in a particular business to try and get some comfort…[about] what 
the risks are to invest in that particular company.
‘If someone wants 
to be fraudulent 
then it is very 
difficult for any of 
those processes to 
stop that anyway.’
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4.0.4 Summary: report on the presence of material fraud in a  
 company
Users commenting on the desirability of auditors providing a report on the 
presence of material fraud in a company are positive. Suppliers, however, 
see some obstacles, even in the area of fraud, which is acknowledged as 
having a nexus with the financial audit. Auditors’ legal liability is raised 
as an issue. A supplier notes the reality that such an auditor’s report 
will not prevent fraud or other manipulations. Another supplier fears 
that users will not understand the message intended by auditors in such 
reports. Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) compliant companies are, however, already 
in receipt of assurance on their internal control reports, and of course 
internal controls have a relationship with the propensity for fraud to 
occur. The single regulator to comment on this area is enthusiastic about 
the idea. 
4.1.1 Report on a company’s internal controls: suppliers
As with one of the suppliers in the previous section, this next supplier 
reminds us that the SOX regime is already requiring auditors to provide 
assurance about management reporting on internal controls:
I’m not a fan of the SOX regime, but…more and more people want 
to understand things about companies’ controls and therefore they 
would like to know what we’re doing in relation to controls and see 
information about that…Because of the whole background of SOX, 
people want to have confidence in company controls and therefore 
want the independent sign-off, but also because accounts these 
days are so complicated, most people don’t understand them…mum 
and dad shareholders don’t understand them. They are more likely 
to want to be able to rely on a whole lot of information which is 
peripheral to or falls outside of the financial statements and therefore 
some general comfort that the company systems are reliable and 
therefore that any financial information that’s spat out is reliable 
is quite useful for them…[That’s] why…there probably should be 
more information disclosed around controls and outcomes. 
The same person continues:
Also, people are less interested in historical information and 
therefore more real-time stuff is of interest…we’ll never audit real-
time information and release it [in] real time, so…if you could get 
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the position where we’d audited controls and therefore people knew 
information was reliable because it had come out of that controlled 
environment, that would be useful…that’s probably the main thing 
where…people would…find it useful and the market ought to 
find it useful to say our work’s done, more can be disclosed…in 
terms of how it can be disclosed…it is a SOX-style of sign-off, but 
it would want to be much more tailored…my observations on the 
SOX process is that most people have said yes, it’s had some use, but 
the costs far outweigh the use. The way the law’s been interpreted 
has just been so over the top and there’s been far too much work, 
so I haven’t given a lot of thought to how it should be disclosed…
whether it’s certification of the CEO, CFO certification or something 
much more prescriptive, I don’t know, but I would have thought 
something around controls would be the main thing that…people 
[would be] wanting to see disclosed more…in relation to work that 
we…do at the minute.
4.1.2 Summary: report on a company’s internal controls
Bearing in mind the suppliers’ comments in the previous section on reports 
on fraud, a single supplier further reminds us of the US SOX regime and 
the fact that assurance about management’s reporting on internal control 
has been found to be useful—but costly. Suppliers perceive that there is 
demand for this type of assurance.
4.2.1 Report on the integrity of senior executive managers in a  
 company: users
There was concern among some of the users about the type of expertise 
and the subjectivity that would be involved in auditor-provided reports 
on the integrity of senior executive managers. Potential conflicts of interest 
between auditors and management were raised in light of the current 
auditor-appointment model.
[T]hat comes down to one auditor’s view on 
someone else, and…that’s a bit dangerous.
[T]hat’s really hard…[auditors are] not trained 
psychologists.
I’m looking at the small companies that I mainly 
deal with and I’m asking myself how long would 
‘I’m asking myself 
how long would an 
auditor survive [who] 
gave a critical or an 
unfavourable opinion 
about the integrity of 
management?’
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an auditor survive [who] gave a critical or an unfavourable opinion 
about the integrity of management…there’s an inherent conflict 
of interest that is hard to resolve under the current appointment 
process of auditors, because auditors do get appointed by the 
companies; they don’t get appointed independently. If that were 
the case, if there was an independent panel allocating auditors to a 
company, then the situation would be different.
One user, however, is in support of a report on management integrity:
[A]s an investor in listed companies, I’d find that more valuable 
than reading the financial statements. An analyst can wade through 
the financial statements and provide a research note for us, but to 
have an opinion on the management and the way they go about 
business…would be helpful. Something a little bit more tangible 
than just reading numbers…would be good.
4.2.2 Report on the integrity of senior executive managers in a  
 company: purchasers
The purchaser group also raised the notion of a potential conflict 
of interest.
How would they know? I can’t possibly imagine 
an auditor saying that management didn’t have 
integrity…it’s just too conflicted, the relationship, 
the way it’s set up at the moment between 
management and auditors, who pays the bills and 
all that kind of thing. It’s the kind of thing that I, 
as an audit committee chair, ask the auditors in a 
private session without management. I wouldn’t 
expect them to go public on their views on that 
kind of thing.
4.2.3 Report on the integrity of senior executive managers in a  
 company: regulators
The view from regulators coincided with users’ and purchasers’ sentiments 
that the relationship between management and auditors was too conflicted 
for auditors to be able to provide such a report.
‘[I]t’s just too conflicted, 
the relationship, the 
way it’s set up at the 
moment between 
management and 
auditors, who pays  
the bills.’
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[T]hat’s a good idea…there is a serious obstacle in the fact that 
management appoints auditors9 and have some influence and 
leverage over their dismissal and the ability to appoint someone 
else who is more malleable. So unless the system of recruitment 
or appointment of auditors changes…auditors will be in a very 
invidious situation and it might be hard for them to be objective 
when assessing management’s ability. I like the idea of assessing 
management because it’s one of the principal risks of investing in a 
company, but I can’t see that idea could work in practice unless the 
structure of the industry is changed.
4.2.4 Summary: report on the integrity of senior executive  
 managers in a company
The potential conflict of interest in having an auditor provide a report on 
the integrity of senior executive managers, when managers have influence 
over auditors’ dismissal and replacement, is seen as too great by users, 
purchasers and regulators.
4.3.1 Report on the risk-management approaches of a company:  
 users
Opposing views were expressed by users about auditor provision of 
a report on companies’ risk-management approaches, as can be seen in 
the following two quotations. One was enthusiastic and could see value 
being added, but the other felt there was a problem if companies were not 
already aware of their risks and that to have an auditor opine on this issue 
would be ‘dangerous’.
I do see merit in comments—for example, about the risk-management 
processes—because here it is easier to develop a framework against 
which to evaluate what’s happening in the company. And looking 
again at the small companies that I research mainly, this would be…
beneficial to those companies because a lot of them don’t have that 
kind of…formal risk-management process. If they were forced to 
look at it, the company, from that perspective, it would…in many 
cases improve their business. So I can see a rationale for that. 
9 In fact, members appoint auditors under the Corporations Act 2001.
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It’s in a consultation paper about potentially 
having auditors audit the top-five risks that a 
company is exposed to. And that kind of thing…
would be a really bad idea…if it’s the kind of 
non-financial information that auditors have 
some idea about, then possibly, but otherwise…
we could be expecting auditors to be opining 
on something that they really don’t know much 
about or don’t understand, and…that’ll be a very 
dangerous situation. If you’re going to rely on your auditor to tell 
you…whether you’ve got it right in terms of your top-five risks for 
the company…there’s a problem there.
4.3.2 Report on the risk-management approaches of a company:  
 regulators
While the only regulator to discuss an auditor-provided report on the 
risk-management approach felt that there was merit in auditors providing 
more assurances generally, there was doubt about the merit of this issue.
It’s very difficult because a lot of the audit statements these days 
don’t tell you a lot. But then you can’t expect an auditor to be 
sitting on the shoulder of every director either…it’s a really hard 
one…what auditors provide today is probably on the light side. It 
would be better to have more assurances, but I haven’t given a lot 
of thought…to what the nature of those assurances should be…
expecting them to be looking at everything that a director says is 
ridiculous…[there are] benefits of regulation, or stipulations that 
auditors do certain things, but the onus can be quite phenomenal 
and you may not get a lot of benefit out of it. 
4.3.3 Summary: report on the risk-management approaches of a  
 company
Bearing in mind the comment from a supplier in the first section of this 
chapter on fraud, which covers risk-management reports too, there is 
some support for this type of assurance being provided by auditors. One 
user takes this from the perspective of the entity, rather than of other 
users, and comments that it would be dangerous for companies to rely 
on such reports. The regulator who commented saw merit in auditors 
‘If you’re going to rely 
on your auditor to tell 
you…whether you’ve 
got it right in terms of 
your top-five risks for 
the company…there’s a 
problem there.’
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being required to provide more assurances but he or she had not thought 
through the nature of those assurances.
4.4.1 Report on the quality of corporate governance in a company  
 or on conflicts of interest of directors of a company: users
There was little support among users for an auditor-provided report on 
the quality of corporate governance and on directors’ conflicts of interest. 
Quotations from the interviews reveal the extent of opposition to this 
proposition.
I don’t see why you would need that…I get back to the powers of 
the corporations law, particularly where you’re dealing with listed 
companies that now under corporate governance [guidelines] should 
have a balance of independent directors. I would have thought 
that burden rests with them, not an audit process…to have it as 
a standard reporting requirement…is unnecessary…it’s just going 
to add to the whole cost of the system in an already overregulated 
system.
[W]e should rely on independent directors…[and] under the 
corporations law…there is enough to ensure that there are those 
checks and balances internally in the company as it is. 
4.4.2 Report on the quality of corporate governance in a company  
 or on conflicts of interest of directors of a company: suppliers
The following supplier feels that auditor-provided assurance reports 
dealing with statements made by directors would not be appropriate, 
because it would mean providing assurance on directors’ judgments and 
assessments. 
In terms of directors’ statements…that gets very difficult from 
an assurance perspective, because…it will be about judgment 
and assessment…you could get 10 people around this room and a 
director could make a…comment about the future or its business, 
or its assessment, and you could have 10 different views. So how do 
you provide assurance on something that nearly everybody is going 
to have a slightly different view or take on…that area is fraught 
with difficulty. And then how would the capital markets or the 
investor group perceive that assurance? Because…what would you 
be saying? Are you saying that he’s right or he’s got a reasonable 
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basis to say that…I’d be concerned about what you’re trying to say. 
At least if he says something like we have a specific fraud detection 
program in the company then that’s something I can assure people 
that it is in place, because I can go and say well what have you got 
in place to do that? If it’s factual about what’s there then that’s okay, 
but if it’s views about things or where things are going…it’s very 
hard.
4.4.3 Summary: report on the quality of corporate governance in a  
 company or on conflicts of interest of directors of a company
There was no observable support at all among users for an auditor’s report 
to be provided on the quality of corporate governance or on conflicts of 
interest of directors. The predominant feeling is that the responsibility for 
these aspects of corporate life lies with directors. Suppliers also show no 
support, with concern about the subjectivity involved in such assessments.
4.5.1 Environmental reporting and sustainability performance:  
 suppliers
One member of the supplier group commented positively on an auditor-
provided assurance report—specifically on the environmental and 
corporate sustainability performance of a company, as long as
[if was] relevant and provid[ed] assurance in areas that are relevant 
to users…I see this whole area of sustainability and CSR [corporate 
sustainability reporting] as an area that is relevant because one 
thing that I see happening in the sustainability space…[is] market 
participants seeing that there’s value in having some attestation 
attached to a sustainability report, or some sort of corporate 
social responsibility measure, but then going out and getting that 
attestation from people who don’t have a framework from within 
which to provide the attestation. So you’ve got engineers—and I’m 
not saying engineers don’t know about engineering—but do they 
know about auditing? So that’s an area that the profession needs to 
think about…it’s a logical [outcome]. You need to have the skill set 
to provide the assurance, but you need the assurance framework, so 
that’s a place for the future.
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4.5.2 Summary: report on the environmental and corporate  
 sustainability performance of a company 
The single supplier who directly addressed assurance provision on 
corporate sustainability performance information was positive about 
this type of auditor reporting, noting that auditors had an appropriate 
framework within which to conduct these assessments, but that this was 
not necessarily the case for other categories of report providers.
4.6.1 Report on senior executive managers’ projections for the 
 company: users 
Among the users, there was scepticism about whether auditors would be 
willing to provide assurance on forecasts and about the value of providing 
such assurance when no convincing or persuasive list of criteria against 
which to evaluate the forecasts existed. Two illustrative comments follow.
I’m dubious about the value of providing audit opinion on those 
kind of statements, and the key question I ask…[is] what are the 
standards that you would evaluate the forecasts against, or those 
statements against, those non-financial statements? 
I’d be surprised if you would find auditors willing enough to stake 
their reputation on potential forecasts. I don’t think really that’s 
their job…their job is to make sure that what’s being reported is 
compliant and being reported correctly and…to a certain standard 
so that everyone’s comparable…Forecasts can tend to be a little bit 
of the unknown…it would be helpful, but I just don’t know if that’s 
the job of the auditors to do that.
Several felt that it would be valuable to have the auditor provide assurance 
on forecasts and that the capital market would value such assurance. 
[T]here is certainly some scope for the forecast stuff, most 
definitely…capital markets would be very happy…[with that] as 
a service.
When pressed on the type of report provided by the auditor, the following 
comment ensued, drawing attention to the auditor’s legal liability:
It’s just got to be clear what’s being done [in giving certification on 
those forecasts or perhaps a review]…if it’s going to be done…if it’s 
completely disclaimant away [sic] there’s no point. Do you know 
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what I mean? And reviews tend to be disclaimant away [sic] a bit. 
By the same token, I can’t get my head wrapped around how you’d 
deal with the liability of certifying something.
Assurance about explanations of why forecasts were not met also featured 
as a potentially valuable exercise. 
[C]omparatives are fairly interesting—potentially comparative to a 
forecast—and why [they did] or why they didn’t meet their forecast 
projections. It could be something that would…provide some 
assurance that what they’ve said in the past has come to fruition…
it gives…an indication of credibility on behalf of the management, 
that they’ve…done what they said they were going to do…and if 
they don’t…achieve it, why they haven’t done it…And it’s pretty 
important to relay that back to clients.
The issue of legal liability for the company providing the forecast was, 
however, a concern expressed by one person:
[T]he concern…is…if these statements suddenly 
become [the] subject of an audit report that 
attaches a different level of liability to them. That, 
in my experience, means that the companies 
will consult their lawyers before they make any 
announcements whatsoever, and that really works 
against the interests of the financial markets…
the purpose of such an audit opinion on non-
financial statements would be to test the veracity, 
the content, the reliability of the forecast. But in the absence of very 
clear and set measurements, or a stance against which we could 
compare it and evaluate it…the financial markets, the press, the 
analyst community, [do] a better job of probing how much of that is 
real, how much of that is baloney, than the auditors could achieve, 
keeping in mind that if there is an auditable report, or an audit 
report on those statements, in the first instance, the information 
flow would be reduced. So at this stage, no, I would not advocate 
it…it would do more harm than good.
Another of the users was worried also about legal liability, but this time 
from the auditor’s perspective:
‘[T]he financial markets, 
the press, the analyst 
community, [do] a 
better job of probing 
how much of that is 
real, how much of that 
is baloney, than the 
auditors could achieve.’
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[A]s an outcome, it’s the right idea how it kind of lands…it’s got a 
cost benefit reality to it. It’s just so costly to get over the liability 
that maybe that outweighs the benefit.
One of the users felt that such assurance would be of little value because 
auditors would not have the required industry knowledge to be able to 
credibly provide it.
Generally speaking, I don’t think that will add a lot to the audit 
process…they’d struggle to come to grips with what that meant…I 
don’t necessarily think the assurance would be of any value at 
all…it sounds okay to us, because there [are] suppositions in all 
those forecasts—like certain level[s of] economic activity, certain 
industry dynamics. It’s not necessarily an auditor’s place to [do]…
no-one understands those things.
4.6.2 Report on senior executive managers’ projections for the  
 company: purchasers 
Only one of the purchasers responded in the specific context of forecasts. 
That comment, similar to one from the user group, related to the legal 
liability of the entity in providing such forecast information.
[B]efore anything like that happens, I’d like to see the business 
judgment rule extended for directors of companies to be able 
to make some kind of meaningful commentary about future 
performance without being exposed…it’s exactly that forward-
looking information that would be much more useful to use as a 
financial statement than this backward-looking stuff we’ve got at 
the moment. So if we did get to that point and if companies weren’t 
providing that kind of information then you could have something 
that says yes, it’s been compiled from this or it seems reasonable 
in those circumstances, but it’s always quite fraught trying to get 
those kinds of opinions on forecasts.
4.6.3 Report on senior executive managers’ projections for the  
 company: suppliers 
Two of the suppliers commented explicitly on the provision of assurance 
on forecast information. The reactions were mixed, with one in support 
and the other not so.
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No, absolutely not. Forecasts, any comment that 
an auditor—and I’m speaking about it from an 
auditor point of view—that we could make on 
forecast would be so heavily qualified that I 
don’t know what benefit it would provide to 
the shareholders. It would add another layer of 
cost that they’d [have] to pay for and…they’d 
end up with something that said, ‘Well, you 
know we can’t guarantee this will happen; we 
can’t guarantee that will happen.’ If these five limited assumptions 
happen exactly as they’re said, and exactly in the same order and 
whatever, then yes we can. But…anything that we could provide 
would be too limited. I can’t see how it would provide any value 
whatsoever to a shareholder, or to the market, because we’d basically 
put every caveat on it that we could…It’s too risky from a forward-
looking point of view.
[F]inancial information that is not strictly part of the financial 
statements…auditors can play a valid role there. Looking at 
forecasting…evidently you’re into the future, auditors can 
certainly make sensible comments on the assumptions and bases 
on which that forecast is being prepared, as you would for instance 
in a prospectus; proper disclosure statements and all that sort of 
thing. So they could certainly add some value there. Are they the 
best people? I don’t know; there are probably others who could [do] 
it as well or better. If you start applying the corporation finance 
disciplines of a Big Four firm to it, it becomes very expensive, very 
quickly. And…you’d have to ask is the…benefit of that greater than 
the cost. I’m not convinced it is for future forecast information. Also, 
if management are making forecasts, people need to understand [it] 
is their prediction of the future, and it has inherent uncertainties, 
and everyone should make up their own mind about that. And if it 
later transpires that management have made up these numbers then 
they should pay the price…So, [auditors are qualified to handle] 
financial information in the past…[but] into the future, less so—
although…they could sensibly comment on assumptions and bases.
‘I can’t see how it 
would provide any 
value whatsoever to a 
shareholder, or to the 
market, because we’d 
basically put every 
caveat on it that  
we could.’
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4.6.4 Summary: report on senior executive managers’ projections  
 for the company
Users are troubled about the legal liability issues—from a company and 
an auditor perspective—if auditors provide assurance through their 
reports on projections for the company. The single purchaser commenting 
specifically on the projections or forecast issue wants to see some attention 
paid to the business judgment rule to limit directors’ liability before this 
type of report is supplied. One supplier feels that auditors would place 
too many caveats on such a report for it to be of any value, while the other 
feels that such reports could add value, but they would be very costly. 
4.7.1 Report on the reasonableness of non-financial information  
 contained in a company’s annual report: users
There were mixed feelings among users in relation to auditors’ provision 
of a report on the reasonableness of the non-financial information in a 
company’s annual report. 
This next user comments on how hard it would be to expect auditors to 
provide assurance on statements that are inevitably forward looking when 
the financial statements themselves are retrospective.
The most crucial thing…is reviewing the non-financial information 
to ensure that it’s not inconsistent with the…financial information. 
So when you’re referring to in your spiel about how the company 
has performed for the year, your results that you’re talking about 
aren’t inconsistent with the results that have been shown in the 
financial information…Where the difficulty lies is when you look 
at the non-financial information there’s a tendency to talk about 
performance this year and where you’re going from there, so that’s 
where the difficulty would be for the auditors…how to verity that 
information. And certainly you wouldn’t be able to do it to the same 
level of assurance that you’ve provided financial information. So 
you couldn’t sign an audit report on financial and non-financial 
information because there’s often talk about markets, talk about 
future expectations and future performance—that sort of thing.
One user felt that for companies where such assurance would be the most 
use, little voluntary non-financial information was likely to be disclosed.
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[I]t’s a hard one in terms of what companies are prepared to pay 
for. Obviously, companies seek the law and they say, ‘Well, if we 
comply with accounting standards, that’s what we should pay for.’ 
So it would probably take an exceptional company to go to the…
further stage where they’d provide even more disclosure…it would 
be useful in cases, particularly where companies are at the financial 
edge or when there are accounting/financial problems. But in those 
cases, my experience has always been that those sorts of companies 
are less likely to try and disclose information.
One user is sceptical that such assurance would be useful because 
it is likely to be surrounded by disclaimers if provided:
[W]e’ve already got enough obligations around disclosure and 
the accuracy of information provided into the public domain and 
all the rest of it. Is an audit of that going to increase any more?  
I wouldn’t have thought so…So no, I’m not sure you need auditors 
clearly involved more in that space, given you should already have 
enough comfort about it, given the current structures under the 
corps law and all the rest of it.
4.7.2 Report on the reasonableness of non-financial information  
 contained in a company’s annual report: purchasers
Purchasers were generally against assurance being provided on the non-
financial information in an annual report, worried that it would lead to the 
second-guessing of management. Two illustrative comments follow.
I have reservations about that…because…it can take the form of 
second-guessing of the board…The board is accountable and the 
board should be required to make its reports in those areas. If the 
shareholders wanted assurances, they’re really saying, ‘Is the board 
basically reporting honestly to us?’ And…that takes us down a 
different track…if a board makes its assurances and is reporting 
to the shareholders then it’s held accountable to those, and 
there are regulatory mechanisms in place to punish them if they 
mislead their shareholders…I’m not really…keen on the auditors 
going in and giving an assurance. The other worry…is that I saw 
what happened in the NSW Government when it established the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption…in the end, because 
the ICAC became involved in ruling on whether the government had 
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made appropriate decisions or not, the government has got into the 
habit, before they’d made a cabinet decision, of shooting the stuff 
off to the ICAC to get it checked to see if it was okay. And what was 
happening effectively was a transfer of authority from an elected 
body to an unelected body. So I feel the same way about directors 
of companies…it’s a kind of slippery slope when they start to move 
things away and say, ‘Well, the auditors are going to check to see if 
that’s okay.’ 
[T]hat could be within danger of being quite subjective. And no,  
I didn’t find it a particularly appealing idea from the point of view 
of the audited company. From the point of view of a stakeholder 
into other audited companies as discussing customers, et cetera…
it would be quite a potentially useful prism, but it’s one that we 
attack ourselves anyway. 
4.7.3 Report on the reasonableness of non-financial information  
 contained in a company’s annual report: suppliers
Suppliers were generally sceptical that clients would be willing to pay for 
assurance services provided on non-financial information.
They’ve got to see value out of it…one of the challenges from an 
audit perspective is…about all this additional work that we’ve got 
to do, that we’ve to actually communicate to not only the directors 
and management, but…to the shareholders as well…[that] they’re…
getting some value out of that. And that’s a challenge sometimes…
in the end, some of them just want to see the report…But for those 
who [are] genuinely [interested], you can…communicate somewhat 
what they would consider to be value items out of it, then it becomes 
a little bit easier to pass that cost on. But it’s a hard one.
Others from the supplier group made it clear that they were not comfortable 
with providing assurance on non-financial information.
I definitely would not want to be putting my signature on that sort 
of stuff…as a normal part of events, I would read certified financial 
statements and I would read the directors’ reports obviously. And 
it doesn’t form part of my opinion, but I would always make sure 
that it’s consistent with what’s in the financial statements and [that 
it’s] consistent with my understanding of what’s happened in the 
entity. So I always…make sure that that’s the case. But in terms of 
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risk assessment and those sorts of things…the level of expertise 
and the level of in-depth knowledge that you need to have about 
the company, which management obviously would have to be able 
to conclude on those sorts of aspects of the business…would be 
beyond what we would ordinarily gather from a normal audit 
relationship…that would be stretching our role quite far. And…
the costs would become quite prohibitive if we [had]…to do that.
Suppliers raised questions about whether the level of assurance being 
provided on non-financial information would be understood by users of 
the assurance.
[T]he auditors can properly give assurance on the financial 
information, but to give assurance on non-financial information…
we’re getting into areas where the auditors would have to have the 
expertise for us to be talking about a whole range of things. I don’t 
know where you stop with…stuff like that. 
The same person continues:
[Part of the rationale for my answer is that the business acumen of 
auditors has a limited focus as opposed to a more generalised one], 
because they will be looking, as they must do, to [give] an assurance 
within a degree of confidence, which means that it automatically 
would mean that you take a conservative view. 
4.7.4 Report on the reasonableness of non-financial information  
 contained in a company’s annual report: standard setters
The one general comment from a standard setter on the issue of assurance 
provided on non-financial information was positive.
[C]onceptually…it would be helpful…my understanding from 
talking to analysts [and]…the research suggests that some of the 
more meaningful information is non-financial…it’s not included 
in the financial statements, and it may well be still…financial…so 
if some of those things are…reasonably important as indicators of 
value then conceptually having the receivers of that information or…
encouraging some more of that information being made available, 
and then putting some sort of assurance over that framework would 
seem to be a logical extension of what we currently have, which 
is…focused…on what [is] required by [the] accounting standards.
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4.7.5 Report on the reasonableness of non-financial information  
 contained in a company’s annual report: regulators
There was a view from regulators that assurance provided on non-financial 
information would not be of great value to the capital market and would 
present an ‘onerous’ burden on auditors.
The reality of it is that announcements are price sensitive at the time 
made, so…there’s [not] much point going back and…[having] an 
auditor maybe trolling back over statements which are made a year 
previously…also fundamentally…the auditor is [not] going to have 
the level of expertise…because…[those are] commercial judgments 
about things and [I don’t know] whether or not you’re really going 
to be able to say a lot of sensible things about it…The reality…is 
that that information has got to [be] right when it’s released and I’m 
not sure an audit process some time after it’s really going to achieve 
a great deal. 
[T]his is a very difficult area now…quantifying and assessing 
whether something should be disclosed or not would be quite an 
onerous burden on an auditor. I can’t see how it could be regulated 
or proscribed so, can you get me an example of non-financial 
[information?]…I can see it’s a good idea, but…it would be difficult 
to implement in practice.
4.7.6 Summary: Report on the reasonableness of non-financial  
 information contained in a company’s annual report
Users have reservations about auditor provision of assurance on the 
reasonableness of non-financial information in annual reports. Concerns 
are expressed about the difficulty for an auditor of providing assurance on 
statements likely to be future oriented. One person feels that companies 
most in need of providing non-financial information are the least likely 
to provide it and another feels that companies would feel compelled 
to pass such information past their legal counsel first, which could 
inhibit disclosure. One user feels there is a role for compliance plans to 
receive such treatment, but overall there is little enthusiasm from users. 
Purchasers are not supportive—one because he or she sees it as second-
guessing management and the other because of the degree of subjectivity 
involved. Suppliers are sceptical that there is demand for this type of 
assurance, given its cost compared with the value likely to be derived 
from it. Another supplier feels that the depth of knowledge required to 
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give such assurance would be beyond that acquired through the normal 
audit relationship. Suppliers are concerned too about whether readers of 
reports would understand adequately exactly what it is that auditors are 
providing assurance on. Regulators are very negative about the prospect 
of auditors providing this type of report, arguing that it would be very 
difficult to regulate, that it is not clear that auditors would have the 
requisite skills and that the dated nature of the information would make 
assurance provided on it of dubious value.
4.8.1 Assurance on information outside the financial report:  
 general comments—users
Several stakeholders made comments that were more general in their 
perspective of auditor-provided assurances beyond the financial report. 
Users’ comments appear first, with the next quotation pointing to the 
benefits of such assurance.
[Auditors] probably should [provide some sort of assurance on 
non-financial information]…the auditors probably have expertise 
in different areas rather than just numbers these days, and…as 
far as we’re concerned, looking more at the compliance plans [of] 
audit…it’s important that those processes are audited other than 
the financial numbers being audited…There [are] a lot of internal 
processes and procedures, and…compliance plans et cetera that we 
have to adhere to…Even though it can be painful at times, it does…
provide a benefit to us [in the long term] because it’s another set of 
eyes looking at things and they’re interpreting things in a different 
way than we are and they might look at things [from] a different 
angle. So there are benefits.
Not all users, however, are supportive, as the next two quotations 
demonstrate:
I’m dubious about the value of providing 
audit opinion on those kind[s] of statements…
If somebody can come up with a convincing…
or even a persuasive list of criteria that could 
be applied to evaluate those non-financial 
statements then maybe I would change my 
mind. But at the moment I really see that as a 
problem of what kind of measurement do we 
‘If somebody can come 
up with a convincing…
or even a persuasive list 
of criteria that could be 
applied to evaluate those 
non-financial statements 
then maybe I would change 
my mind.’
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apply, what kind[s] of criteria are the basis of an audit opinion on 
non-financial statements. 
[‘Would the capital market find it helpful if 
auditors provided some assurance on non-financial 
information?’] No, I don’t…think the work that they 
do—this includes the Big Four firms—helps them 
in any way understand how a board would work. 
If you were talking about the structure of the board, 
on the SRI issues…it’s not really their game, that’s 
not what they’re about…providing assurances on 
non-financial stuff leans to a specialisation in something—SRI or 
governance or whatever it might be. I don’t…think it’s something 
that an auditor covers or needs to cover and doesn’t have the 
experience and depth to cover.
4.8.2 Assurance on information outside the financial report:  
 general comments—suppliers
Suppliers generally felt an assurance report on information outside the 
financial report was feasible for the auditor to prepare, but they could 
see some drawbacks in terms of the time it would take. This first supplier 
does see a report on fraud and risk management as having a nexus with 
auditors, but is still ambivalent about whether or not auditors should be 
supplying the service.
I’m generally keener on auditors focusing on their 
strong suit, which is financial information. And 
auditors are quite often not very good at reviewing 
non-financial information…some of the ones you 
mention—fraud being one and risk management 
perhaps as being another—do have some nexus with 
the auditors and it does make sense for them to make 
some comment on that. I’m not strongly in favour. 
In fact…I would quite like it to be someone other than the auditors 
who does that, but someone should do it. Should it be the auditors? 
I’m in the middle. I neither agree nor disagree on [fraud and risk 
management]. It’s very hard to give a high level of assurance on 
intangible things, and if you do attempt…to give even a reasonable 
level of assurance on non-tangible items you have to do a lot of 
work, it takes a lot of time and that adds to the cost. 
‘[A]uditors are 
quite often 




‘I don’t…think it’s 
something that 
an auditor covers 
or needs to cover 
and doesn’t have 
the experience and 
depth to cover.’
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The same supplier discusses the likely impact of this type of reporting on 
auditors’ legal liability:
The other example I’d put on record is the [state X] Auditor-
General’s Office, which is one of the few that has to comment on 
KPIs [key performance indicators] and achievement. Now that’s 
perhaps a little more tangible even than this, and it’s questionable 
how much value that adds in the great scheme of things. I’m also 
reluctant to take away the responsibility from management and 
[the] board for delivering on those less tangible matters. And whilst 
no doubt everyone will say that they are still responsible, but the 
auditor expresses an opinion, this will no doubt create a degree of 
expectation gap where people rely on the auditor to get it right. 
And in practice I see that quite often, but the auditor has looked 
at this, the auditor has looked at these KPIs. But it turns out that 
they weren’t right. So whose fault is it? People think the auditor. 
Now the only thing that saves the [state X] Auditor-General is that 
the [state X] Auditor-General cannot be sued. Once you get auditors 
who do not have that legal immunity from prosecution, you have a 
completely different legal dynamic. So, I’m probably tending on the 
negative to doubtful.
The same supplier comments: 
Even just a review will cost. Auditors, particularly Big Four 
auditors, are not good at just a quick review. It’s not what they’re 
geared up to do; it’s not what their methodology is designed to 
do; it’s not what intuitively they want to do…the type of people 
who work in audit division in [the] Big Four tend to bring the 
whole sledgehammer to crack the nut, and the legal and regulatory 
framework has encouraged…that position. To just do a review of 
those things, sure they could. Would it help? I don’t think so…
These views will probably be a very individual and dissenting 
minority and not shared by most of the rest of the Big Four, but 
nonetheless that’s what I think.
4.8.3 Assurance on information outside the financial report:  
 general comments—standard setters
On the matter of providing comparative non-financial data between 
companies, one standard setter comments:
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[T]o get comparability if you’re going to get—just to pick a simplistic 
sample, sales pipeline-type information. To get comparability then 
you need all the relevant companies to be doing basically the same 
thing. So…you probably need some encouragement in some form or 
another in the reporting framework to get them to do that. And…
if you build that, expand that reporting framework, then it’s just a 
question of what assurance. 
The interviewer then comments: ‘So, in the circumstance where you have 
a client in one industry and there is no mandate to disclose certain things, 
but they want to and then they want assurance around it?’ The response 
from the same standard setter is: 
That has happened. It goes back to these investor reports…to some 
extent. That is what is in some of those investor reports, although 
they have probably got less information in them, less of that type 
of information in them now than what they probably had a few 
years ago. And there are some limited examples…of those investor 
reports having some assurance put over them.
4.8.4 Summary: assurance on information outside the financial  
 report: general comments
In general comments about the notion of auditor-provided reports on 
information beyond that included in financial reports, there was a range 
of views. Users tended to be supportive but suppliers were generally 
not—arguing that the Big Four would tend to bring a ‘sledgehammer to 
crack the nut’ mentality to such engagements. The one standard setter’s 
comment in this section refers to his or her perceived need for a mandated 
approach and a formal framework for such assurance to be provided. 
The reader is reminded that the issue of assurance that goes beyond the 
statutory audit is addressed in Chapter 17.
5.0 issues and implications
With reference to the survey, certain positive results with respect to 
additional and/or enhanced assurance services are observed. Positive 
results relate to potential reports on material fraud, internal control 
procedures, risk-management approaches within the auditee, the quality 
of corporate governance and reports on conflicts of interests of directors, 
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specifically with respect to users. Purchasers and suppliers show some 
scepticism, although there are positive responses in relation to reports 
on material fraud, internal control procedures and, to a somewhat lesser 
extent, risk approaches of the auditee. Suppliers and purchasers also 
received relatively positively the idea of the auditor reporting on the 
quality of corporate governance. Some of the more detailed comments 
from various stakeholder groups, however, suggested that a considerable 
amount of conditionality exists around the positive responses observed in 
the survey. 
On the issue of providing assurance on non-financial matters generally, 
a number of mixed views are expressed within the interviews. Even 
among users, there are mixed views on the positive/negative aspects 
of these potential additional assurance services. The point is made 
that if there is additional assurance around these disclosures then this 
might inhibit the provision of enhanced disclosure by directors and/or 
management. The mere fact that there is an assurance process around a 
further statement, irrespective of the topic or content of that statement, 
changes the nature of the statement itself, it is argued, and therefore might 
limit or inhibit as full a disclosure as would otherwise be made. In other 
words, the presence of assurance could change the statement itself and 
the propensity to make such a statement too. Additionally, users express 
some scepticism about the level of disclaimers that would be placed on 
these assurances and whether, as a consequence, the assurances given 
would be useful. Another suggestion is that there is adequate regulation 
around many of these additional disclosures and, as a consequence, 
assurance services on these disclosures are unnecessary. Purchasers also 
take the view that assurance around some of these additional statements 
would represent ‘second-guessing of the board’, which is there to 
oversee company management on behalf of the shareholders. Suppliers 
also see various positive aspects to additional assurance being provided 
to statements made to the market, but are sceptical about whether 
purchasers are prepared to pay for that assurance and if there is value in 
its provision. There is also some question about whether these additional 
assurance services would be well understood by the market and if indeed 
it would be possible to provide assurance when some of the additional 
disclosures could represent subjective statements, which, given different 
perspectives, could be either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Standard setters are more 
positive about the possibility of assurance on additional statements, but 
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suggest the need for universal reporting and a framework within which to 
report. Regulators are more sceptical, questioning whether there is value 
in these assurance engagements other than in the unrealistic circumstance 
of provision of real-time assurance. 
With regard to certain additional assurance services, there are some 
quite positive views among particular stakeholders. With respect to 
reporting on material fraud, users believe that the market would appreciate 
these additional assurance services, but questions remain about how it 
would be best achieved. Suppliers believe that assurance around issues 
such as fraud and risk management would have a nexus with the existing 
audit framework and therefore the auditor would be a credible supplier of 
these additional assurance services. Others believe that auditors might not 
be the ‘right’ people to provide even reasonable assurance. One suggests 
that the audit technology used might not lend itself to the provision of 
additional assurance services, equating it to bringing ‘a sledgehammer 
to crack a nut’. Regulators are quite positive about auditors providing 
additional assurance around the presence of material fraud. Regarding 
internal controls, more positive than negative views are expressed and, 
again, suppliers see a nexus between their current role and the provision 
of additional assurance around internal controls. 
Users, purchasers and regulators openly question providing assurance 
about the integrity of senior management. The nature of these concerns 
revolve around two aspects: 1) whether the type of expertise an auditor 
possesses is appropriate for the provision of such assurance; and 2) more 
generally, the view that there is an inherent conflict of interest between 
the appointment of the auditor on the one hand and the assessment of the 
integrity of management on the other hand. 
Risk-management approaches by the company also attracted some 
scepticism. Suppliers see that there is some nexus between what they 
currently do and the provision of additional assurance. Users have more 
mixed views, as do regulators. 
With respect to a report on the quality of corporate governance, users 
support the general notion that the provision of independent directors 
is the appropriate mechanism to ensure there are adequate checks and 
balances, rather than an assurance mechanism of the type that might be 
provided by auditors. 
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Another possibility for the provision of assurance is on reports about 
environmental and corporate sustainability, but the observation is made 
that whoever provides the assurance needs to have the relevant expertise 
(such as that required in the climate change area) as well as an appropriate 
assurance framework. Therefore, the provision of one of these in the 
absence of the other would represent an inadequate solution for the 
provision of that additional assurance.
There are more extensive observations about management forecasts. 
On the one hand, users question whether suppliers are willing to provide 
assurance and the nature of the appropriate framework or criteria 
on which these forecasts would be judged. An alternative might be to 
provide a commentary on the adequacy of previous forecasts, thereby 
adding to the understanding of the quality of forecasts in the past. Users 
suggest there are issues around the legal liability of the company in 
making these forecasts and indeed legal liability for auditors in providing 
assurance around them. Purchasers too raise the issue of the legal liability 
in making forecasts. Suppliers have strong but mixed views. Some argue 
that the conditions around such an assurance would be so qualified that 
the assurance could be of questionable use. An alternative would be to 
provide assurance around the assumptions made in the construction of 
forecasts rather than the forecasts themselves, and the authors observe 
this is already the case in relation to initial public offerings (IPOs). 
With respect to the provision of non-financial information in company 
annual reports, suppliers are comfortable with ensuring that the non-
financial information contained in annual reports is not inconsistent 
with conventional financial reports as already mandated by the auditing 
standards, but are somewhat sceptical about stretching that role further. 
Additionally, there is some question about whether the market would 
understand such assurance. 
While generally there is a considerable amount of questioning of the 
value of these additional assurance services, a common observation is that 
the market would not understand such assurances. History tells us that 
new information in the market might not be well understood and there is 
a need to be patient so that the market can be educated.
Many but not all of the additional assurances services that generated 
discussion represent, at least in part, information that is captured by the 
auditor in the process of formulating the background information used 
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within the audit process. For example, the determination of the presence 
of material fraud, the understanding of internal controls, the assessment 
of the integrity of senior management in understanding the approach 
used by the auditee in risk management and the quality of corporate 
governance generally are inputs into the audit process and, some would 
argue, are necessary conditions for the completion of an adequate audit 
in many instances. The distinction here is that rather than being inputs 
into understanding the background of the audit so the audit can be 
completed competently, these assurance engagements represent outputs 
that would be used to inform the market rather than inputs used to inform 
the auditor in completing the audit process. The important distinction 
between inputs and outputs is that outputs would be used to inform the 
market. The auditor would be held accountable for those assessments and 
therefore would require clear subject-specific guidance within which 
those judgments might be made and clear expertise in making them.
6.0 Concluding remarks
There is the potential for positive action in relation to provision of the 
types of assurance raised in this chapter, which could provide utility to 
the capital market. As indicated in the survey and the interviews, there 
is positive sentiment towards the provision of assurance on some matters 
beyond the statutory audit. For example, there is support for assurance 
on reporting of the sustainability of entities. It is noted that while a 
framework exists within which this assurance can be provided, what 
is potentially missing is subject-specific guidance that would provide 
clear pathways for assurance on specific areas. These specific areas could 
include sustainability and topics such as conflict of interest of directors, 
internal control (which already conspicuously exists in the United States) 
and corporate governance. 
In fact, each of these three topics could be subsets of the more 
generalised area of the risk approach of the auditee. It is the last of these 
topics—the risk approach—which could be one of the most highly 
value-adding assurance engagements for the capital market. Provision 
of this subject-specific guidance could be undertaken by the Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board, perhaps in combination with other 
stakeholders including the ASX, the professional accounting bodies and 
the Australian Institute of Company Directors. 
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With respect to the issue of sustainability, the International Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board is already tasked to provide this topic’s 
specific guidance. Additionally and as an important motivation to those 
in Australia who engage in these actions, the international board—while 
it recognises the importance of these specific areas—does not see them 
specifically as fitting within a generalised framework of the risk approach 
of the management of the company. This provides Australia with an 
opportunity to provide leadership on this matter.
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The profession itself has been unable to define a systematic 
framework that…defines what reasonable assurance even is.  




One of the issues that the auditing profession has grappled with for some 
time is the notion of differential levels of audit assurance. The auditing 
standards have settled on one level of assurance for audit (that is, reasonable 
assurance), with the other level for assurance being a review (not an 
audit—that is, limited assurance). This chapter examines stakeholders’ 
responses to the proposition that audit engagements could result in either 
higher or lower levels of assurance than is ‘reasonable’. In doing this, the 
key issues around audit, as opposed to review, include:
•	 could there be circumstances in which auditors might be able to 
sign off on an audit at a level of assurance different from ‘reasonable 
assurance’; and, if so, what might these circumstances be
•	 if circumstances exist for audit where deviation from reasonable 
assurance can be given, is that assurance to be provided at a higher 
or lower level than reasonable assurance
•	 is it possible for auditors in an audit engagement to provide a higher 
than reasonable level of assurance such that it constitutes a guarantee
•	 is there demand for levels of audit assurance higher than reasonable 
assurance at the price it is likely to cost
•	 what would be the consequences for auditors’ legal liability if either 
or both higher or lower levels of assurance in an audit existed
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•	 would readers of audit reports be confused if differential levels of 
audit-level assurance existed in the marketplace 
•	 is there confusion in the marketplace about audit and review levels of 
assurance provided?
2.0 introduction
Stakeholders were questioned in the face-to-face interviews about their 
view of whether scope existed to sign off on audit engagements (not 
review engagements) at a level of assurance different from that currently 
in place—that is, reasonable assurance. This chapter provides analysis of 
responses to this line of questioning.
2.1 Users
Some users are enthusiastic about the possibility of higher or lower levels 
of audit assurance than is currently provided by an auditor: reasonable 
assurance.
[Is there scope to sign off at a higher level of assurance?] For sure. 
It may be at a lower level too…When we saw the audit report of 
this particular organisation that went down, on the face of it, you 
would’ve thought they were confident in their numbers…they had 
a couple of provisos, but I would’ve thought if they had an option 
to maybe a lower level, they might’ve taken that where you’d think, 
okay maybe you need to be careful of this organisation. And…by 
the same token, if they’re really confident then obviously they’re 
staking their reputations on it.
The same person continues after more probing by the interviewer:
[F]rom the limited experience that I’ve had at looking at the audit…
you go back and say look I’m interested in the financial health 
of this organisation. If they’re just saying we are satisfied, that’s 
one level. But it could be we need…more information, or we have 
limited satisfaction or whatever. Maybe it’s a signatory to say, ‘Look 
maybe you need to be careful.’10
10 One could argue, however, that this already exists with the emphasis of matter. 
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The same user continues:
[Would companies be prepared to pay for different levels of assurance?] 
For sure. And you know if you’re doing damage to the investor 
market, capital markets, say, ‘Well, why do we need to do that?’ 
So you’re right. And it always goes down to one versus the other…
what you’re trying to do, which you may not be able to…those 
companies that you think are not going to be around for a while, 
people are aware of them. So it just speeds up their death. But who 
would be willing to provide the death certification is another story, 
isn’t it, and [it] can be quite expensive too. Or people say, ‘Well, we 
won’t bother with it.’
Yeah, that’s right [one level of assurance and no variation 
perhaps], no matter what you’re looking at. It’s not an absolute 
level of assurance…otherwise just the costs that get imposed on 
organisations.
[In response to the question: ‘So you don’t feel they would be willing to 
pay extra because of all those added costs, if there was a variation?’] 
[T]he need would have to be demonstrated about what it is. I’d need 
to see what the question or the issue was that needed that extra 
level of assurance, rather than just simply be saying that we should 
be providing a higher level of assurance for the sake of it.
2.1.1 Summary
One user is enthusiastic about the possibility of levels of audit assurance 
other than ‘reasonable’ being provided on financial information. This user 
appears to argue that auditors could base the level of assurance on the 
confidence they have in their report and the continued viability of clients. 
Another user, however, wants a single level of assurance across financial 
and non-financial information. There is modest evidence provided that 
users would be willing to pay for differential levels of assurance.
2.2 Suppliers
This first supplier speaks about audit clients seeing the audit as a necessary 
evil and, as such, the likelihood of these clients being prepared to pay for 
a higher than ‘reasonable’ audit assurance level is unlikely.
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[T]he average small company and SME who might 
require an audit sees the audit process as being purely 
a reactive necessary process to satisfy the regulator, 
and is generally very reluctant to go and ask the 
auditor to broaden their scope and pay for broadened 
scope. If the auditor has to strictly comply with the 
financial reporting for the requirements…under 
audit, it’s very difficult for the auditor to broaden 
their scope under the prescribed climates…Taking superannuation 
audit, we have to comply with the auditor’s report and we can’t 
necessarily even narrow our scope to say that we can’t comment on 
an item or an issue which we’re obliged to comment on; we can’t 
narrow that scope. And similarly, we can’t broaden the scope under 
that report unless it’s a special-purpose audit which the client, the 
trustees, are asking us to do. And then there’s no formal audit report 
to cover that…generally, users of financial reports regard the audit 
as being a necessary evil, or the management regards the audit as 
being [that].
The same person continues, implying that the threat of legal liability 
impedes auditors providing many potentially value-adding services:
[A]s soon as an auditor is trying to value add—and we all do try 
to value add—but as soon as we say something is good in trying 
to add value to the process, or something is enhanced to add value 
to the process, if it turns out that that’s wrong…we’re dead…
consequently, even though we’d love to value add, because of the 
competitive nature of our profession, we’re scared to do it half the 
time. Like the regulator in superannuation wants us to write positive 
management letters as well as negative management letters…I’m 
loath to put my hand up and write a positive management letter 
and say the industry fund that I’m auditing is all hunky-dory and 
there’s nothing wrong with it, because you know that there is going 
to be something wrong with it within the confines of materiality. 
Another supplier expresses doubts about the potential for provision 
of a higher level of assurance:
[W]hether you go for a higher level of assurance…that depends on 
the circumstances. If we talked about a listed environment, would 
the readers of financial reports get some comfort out of it, or is there 
‘[g]enerally, users 
of financial reports 
regard the audit as 
being a necessary 
evil.’
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scope to do a higher level of assurance? I have some doubt whether 
you could. It would vary from organisation to organisation.
The same person continues, discussing a lower rather than higher level 
of assurance: 
[A]s you get down into the lower forms…there’s probably some 
scope to have different levels of assurance down at that level, 
particularly where…you’ve got private family companies that are 
being audited by virtue of the fact that they pass the thresholds 
under the Corps Act. You’re effectively reporting to—it might be 
two shareholders, both family members—so therefore what are they 
looking for? Well, they’re primarily getting the audit done because 
they have to under the law, but they don’t necessarily always see 
much value out of it. So potentially there’s some scope for some 
lower level of assurance there. I don’t know how far you’d bring the 
bar down…that would be questionable…[but] there is some scope 
for that, particularly down the track.
The same person continues, making it clear that explanation of the 
scope of a higher-level assurance engagement would need to be given 
in the report: 
A higher level? Look, as long as you scope it out properly as to 
what…constitutes that higher level of assurance you’re giving. 
Now does that mean that there’s more concentration on work 
around the internal controls and we report more significantly on 
internal controls? Yeah…there’s some scope to do that. But…you 
would need to make sure that what that higher level of assurance 
is has been properly scoped out and is understood, certainly in the 
report as to what you’ve done there…You’d need to be very careful 
of that one.
[W]e have the three levels that are clear at the moment. We have 
the positive assurance, the negative assurance and the agreed 
upon procedures,11 which…give us enough scope to move around 
financial statements generally. I would not be averse to giving an 
opinion on a specific aspect, because at the moment…if you get 
a question on goodwill or debtors or something in the financial 
11 Some would argue that ‘no assurance’, as is the case with an agreed-on procedures 
engagement, is not a level of assurance.
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statements, our stock standard phrase before we get into that is, we 
give an opinion on the accounts as a whole et cetera. 
The same person provides some examples of when directors might want 
to have additional assurance provided:
I can see some scope where…the directors would want to have 
additional assurance when we’re doing our audit in particular 
places. And that’s commonplace…we’ll do some extra on tax. Or 
we only have to do three stocktakes around your 10 sites, but we’ll 
do five to give you extra comfort. If you’re doing that, you know 
there are ways in which that can be disclosed as having to give some 
extra comfort around those. So I don’t think it’s a problem on that.12
The same supplier then discusses the prohibitive cost of high levels 
of assurance:
The only way you could get further positive assurance across the 
financial statements as a whole, I’m not sure what the mechanisms 
[are] because we’re doing that and it’s a reasonable assurance. 
Whether we get into territory [where] we can give absolute 
assurance is beginning to get into the realms of statistical stuff. 
So…there’s scope for it, but…the price would be so prohibitive 
that people wouldn’t choose to do it. And…the only purpose to do 
it would…be to try and get the auditors on the hook if there was 
something wrong with it. And there’d always be test cases around 
that. Goodness knows what it would do to the PI [professional 
indemnity] market and so on. 
No…we should all have the same level of assurance and the 
same standards because that’s the only way you’re going to get 
uniformity in terms of reporting in opinions both nationally and…
internationally. You start playing around with that one and then 
you might start saying well which standards are we going to apply? 
No…we’ve all got to have an agreed upon type of procedure for the 
level of assurance that’s requested, and it shouldn’t be a question of 
money or anything else.
12 The existing auditing standards framework does not facilitate public disclosure of such 
assurance, but it could be provided to directors and/or audit committees.
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2.2.1 Summary
Suppliers are mixed in their views of varying the level of assurance 
provided in an audit engagement. The views range from a certainty that 
one level only is appropriate in order to ensure uniformity in reporting 
options to a view that such engagements and reporting would be viable 
and that demand would be present. One supplier gives an example of 
where a higher level of assurance might be given as directors seeking to 
have more audit work done around a specific account balance than the 
auditor considers necessary—albeit the outcome would be communicated 
privately to directors. Another supplier raises the fact that the cost of 
absolute assurance would be prohibitive, because of the professional 
indemnity premiums required.
2.3 Standard setters
This first standard setter, as per the overarching quotation at the 
beginning of this chapter, points to how difficult the profession has found 
it to articulate even how the well-accepted ‘reasonable assurance’ level is 
defined, implying that until that definition is under control, other levels 
of audit assurance are problematic. The same standard setter, in response 
to the interviewer’s comment, ‘Is it not well defined?’, responds:
Well, certainly not well defined and therefore on the side of 
recipients, it’s not well understood. 
The interviewer comments: ‘So, you’re saying the supply side of the 
market doesn’t define it well?’ The same standard setter’s response is:
It doesn’t define what it’s providing.
The interviewer comments: ‘So there’s no hope?’ This same standard setter 
responds:
No hope for those on the demand side being really clear about what 
they’re getting…if they think about it, [they might] have some 
notion of there being an audit sign-off and that’s part of the job 
that needs to be done as a director, or as a shareholder you might 
vaguely understand. Well, the sophisticated shareholders would 
have some understanding of the process presumably and know that 
it’s got to be there, and probably think that it’s valuable much of 
the time, or most of the time. Would they be willing to pay more for 
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a higher level? Possibly. And it may be much more in the context 
of a very explicit assignment, rather than the general financial 
statement audit.
Another standard setter speaks about the difficulty of providing higher 
than reasonable assurance:
[T]he guarantee issue is probably very difficult to obtain because 
you’re dealing with information provided by a third party which, 
in turn, you are then expressing a view on. And…if you go to 
most things…do you know what most…‘guaranteed’ means? You’d 
rarely see ‘guaranteed’ on anything other than, ‘We guarantee that 
if you bring this back within 30 days, we’ll replace it with a new 
one.’ Well, that’s pretty easy to do, isn’t it? 
The same person continues, giving examples of how it would be virtually 
impossible for an auditor to provide a guarantee:
If you…go through the concept of what it is that 
we see in the marketplace that’s guaranteed, even 
these rental streams that are guaranteed, they’re 
guaranteed as long as there’s sufficient funding 
in the vehicle that’s providing the guarantee…Go 
and read the fine print—they’re not guaranteed 
at all, so you then turn around and say, well 
how might an assurance practitioner provide a 
guarantee? And again, you get to the fine print 
and…you’d find that you’d be back to the reasonable assurance or 
moderate-type levels again. And you say well what areas would 
people want guarantees on? No-one’s going to guarantee that the 
value of fixed assets or non-current assets is recoverable because 
it’s dependent on future outcomes and assumptions. No-one’s going 
to guarantee that the tax benefits are recoverable…the reasoning 
being that if you…go through the standards, they’re all based on 
probability anyway…they’re not even at a guaranteed level, so 
you’d be asking somebody to sign off on something at a higher level 
than it’s…being presented under anyway in the first instance. So…
unless directors were prepared to guarantee something then the 
auditor or the assurance practitioner’s not.
‘[U]nless directors were 
prepared to guarantee 
something then  
the auditor or  
the assurance  
practitioner’s not.’
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Using another example, this time non-financial, the same standard setter 
emphasises the difficulty of an auditor providing a guarantee:
Probably the closest thing you could ever get to a guarantee would 
be—and even then you’d have to be dealing with pretty good 
governments—would be government bonds where someone had 
some [debtor] fees and [could] swear there was an investment in the 
government bond that was going to provide the cash-flow stream. 
But then you probably wouldn’t need the guarantee because of 
the nature of the investment. So you go through some of the other 
examples around management integrity, objectivity, corporate 
governance, environmental, I don’t think anyone’s going to provide 
a guarantee. Let’s say someone wants a guarantee that X-company’s 
emissions outputs are so many tonnes of carbon a year…you’d be 
relying on an engineer’s assessment of the output, which could 
change depending on whether there was a breakage in a gas tube 
somewhere or something else that could happen.
The same standard setter continues, implying that even with almost 100 
per cent re-performance of the transaction processing, a guarantee would 
still be difficult to elicit from an auditor: 
Guarantees are absolute, and the funny thing is you…
look at the audit reports that a lot of government 
entities want on various matters and they…ask for a 
certification, which is effectively a guarantee. Those 
reports typically get wound back from a certification 
to ‘and in my opinion’ or ‘in our opinion’, and an 
audit or assurance-type report because a guarantee is 
absolute. And…you’d say well, most investors would 
love it if someone can say, ‘Yes, we guarantee these accounts are free 
of error’…you’d have to almost do a 100 per cent re-performance 
and then you’d probably want your work audited. 
The same standard setter invokes moderate assurance available under 
review engagements against which to juxtapose the concept of reasonable 
assurance:
[W]hen you put it in perspective…what an audit is predicated 
on is [that] someone’s got adequate systems to generate reliable 
financial information, which if you test over a sample basis you 
‘[y]ou’d have 
to almost do a 
100 per cent 
re-performance 
and then you’d 
probably want your 
work audited.’
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get to a reasonable conclusion that the outcome that’s presented is 
reasonable. That’s…the gist of it—and that there are processes to 
deal with the judgmental factors outside of that. But that’s why the 
moderate level of assurance sits there because really what it’s saying 
is: ‘You presented me with this information; based on that, nothing’s 
come to my attention.’ Really what someone’s saying when they say 
that is: ‘There may be something else outside of that which I haven’t 
been made aware of and if I was, I [would] have a different view.’ 
2.3.1 Summary
Standard setters are not positive in their response to the interviewer’s 
question about the possibility of levels of assurance other than the 
reasonable assurance for audit engagements. One standard setter points 
out that even that well-accepted concept has not been defined. A second 
standard setter provides examples—financial and non-financial—to 
illustrate what he or she sees as the virtual impossibility of auditors 
being able to provide a higher level of audit assurance that constitutes 
a guarantee.
2.4 Regulators
The first regulator comments on the confusion that he or she perceives 
will be felt when unsophisticated audit report readers find another level 
of audit assurance to comprehend:
[In response to: ‘How do you communicate the relative levels of 
assurance?’] Good question. [I] don’t know because…people who 
aren’t attuned to audit are even going to get more confused. Because 
as soon as I try and say: ‘This is not just the product which we’ve 
tried forever and a day to explain what it is, that now my product’s 
actually this bit, and this bit, but this bit isn’t this bit.’
Another regulator, however, can see a place for differing levels of audit 
assurance, depending on the nature of the subject matter:
I’m not saying this is my view, but opining for a minute, that 
the assurance provided within the financial statements on the 
robustness of the numbers is as we know it now. The commentary 
by the auditor in another section of the annual report around 
management’s commentary on its performance might be at a lower 
level of assurance. 
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2.4.1 Summary
Confusion among audit report readers if more than one level of assurance 
is provided on an audit engagement is how one regulator sees it. Another, 
however, can see that reasonable assurance could be provided on the 
financial information with a lower level of assurance around management 
discussion and analysis.
3.0 issues and implications
The field of differential levels of audit assurance evokes some thought-
provoking observations from various stakeholders, including users, 
suppliers, standard setters and regulators. Users demonstrate on the one 
hand a desire for higher levels of audit assurance, but only relative to 
a demonstrated need for that assurance, and on the other hand some 
not inconsiderable confusion as to what is presently available and 
communicated in the market for audit services. On the part of one user 
there appears to be confusion about differential levels of assurance as 
opposed to the differential information conveyed in an audit opinion.
Suppliers by and large are relatively guarded against higher levels of 
assurance and there are multiple reasons for this. First, they observe that, 
from their perspective, users are not necessarily enthusiastic about the 
current audit product let alone something that is enhanced. Repeatedly, 
the audit process is described as ‘a necessary evil’ or is seen simply as 
a compliance commodity that is not necessarily high value adding—at 
least for some stakeholders. Second, there is concern about higher levels 
of assurance attracting the threat of legal liability, which might attach to 
audit reports set at this higher level. One supplier observes that there are 
circumstances where a lower level of audit assurance might be viable—
that is, where the stakeholders or recipients of the audit opinion have lower 
levels of information need and the audit opinion adds lower information 
value than would otherwise be the case (for example, where a company is 
a closely held family concern). Higher levels of assurance might be possible, 
but the need would have to be clearly defined and clearly scoped. There 
was an assumption by suppliers who believed higher levels of assurance 
were possible that this higher assurance would in fact be communicated 
privately to directors as opposed to communicated openly to shareholders 
and other parties. An observation is made that extremely high levels of 
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assurance would come at a prohibitively high cost so the market for it 
could be limited, if it exists at all. Another limitation to differential levels 
of audit assurance is around the fact that there needs to be uniformity, 
if not complete consistency, in the calibration of levels—nationally and 
internationally.
Standard setters believe that it is hard to articulate—or perhaps more 
correctly, communicate—the current level of audit assurance to the market 
for audit services in Australia. Having differential levels would add to 
the confusion in the market. There is also a very lengthy enunciation 
that higher levels of audit assurance in the form of a guarantee or a near 
guarantee would be impossible. Even if those words are used, there would 
be limitations and conditions on them that would in fact mean that the 
‘guarantee’ would cascade down to reasonable assurance anyway. Generally, 
standard setters are not positive about differing levels of assurance. This 
viewpoint contrasts with one regulator, who believes that it is possible to 
have differential levels of assurance where those differential levels attach 
to different components of what is communicated to shareholders. Here, 
reasonable assurance could attach to financial information and a lower 
level of assurance could attach to the management discussion and analysis 
component of an annual report. Another regulator is concerned that the 
differential levels of assurance would give rise to misunderstanding in the 
market and then questions how easy it would be to communicate with the 
market on these differential levels of assurance.
Across these various stakeholder groups, there is only limited interest 
in differential levels of assurance, although there is a prospect of it in 
specific circumstances. Consequently, in certain conditions, differential 
levels of audit assurance might be possible, but otherwise, there is little if 
any enthusiasm for differential levels of audit assurance.
4.0 Concluding remarks
There is some evidence that demonstrates that for all stakeholders 
in the capital market, having differing levels of assurance for audits 
has considerable cost in terms of potential confusion, without great 
enhancement to the efficiency of the capital market or informing the 
participants within that market. It is important to remember of course 
that the framework within which auditors operate allows for review 
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engagements and audit engagements where review engagements provide 
only ‘limited assurance’ and audits provide ‘reasonable assurance’. The 
one potential anomaly here is that reasonable assurance, which is included 
as black lettering in the auditing standards, thereby becomes an upper-
level cap on the amount of assurance that may be obtained, at least for 
statutory audits. This is so despite the fact that boards of directors may 
seek much higher levels of assurance over particularly controversial, high-
risk or pressing matters. 
At present, to use one contemporary example, if a board of directors 
desired higher than reasonable assurance on an executive termination 
package then it could not ask for it as part of the statutory audit opinion 
and obtain anything other than reasonable assurance. If the board was 
to ask, not unreasonably, for a special report to be distributed to only 
the board and/or audit committee comprising such information then that 
would be seen as either ‘agreed-on’ procedures or an additional assurance 
assignment that is outside the framework of the auditing standards. 
Agreed-on procedures bring no assurance. So if the engagement was 
conducted as agreed-on procedures, a board would be unable to receive 
assurance. If the engagement was an additional assurance assignment 
within the framework of the auditing standards, the board would not 
be able to seek assurance beyond ‘reasonable’ and if the engagement 
was taken as additional assurance to some level beyond reasonable then 
it cannot be conducted within the auditing standards. Put bluntly, 
reasonable assurance becomes the cap of the level of assurance that can 
be provided under the auditing standards, which might be unsatisfactory 
to the purchasers in the market for audit services. While this might be 
broadly acceptable, there could be instances where there are issues of high 
value or high risk where greater than reasonable assurance is needed by 
the client and can be provided. Policymakers need to consider whether 
‘agreed-on’ procedures engagements may in fact give some level of 
assurance, including higher than reasonable assurance and whether this 
would be useful beyond traditional agreed-on procedures engagements, 
or alternatively, that, where feasible, further audit engagements may 
give assurance above the level of reasonable. We note that there might 
be considerable potential confusion with the public reporting of the 
outcomes of these engagements. There are, however, some stakeholders, 
including audit committees and boards of directors, who seek from time 
to time such assurances and who presently have no way of having them 
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1.0 introduction
A market values no product or service unless the underlying characteristics 
and contributions made by the product or service are known to that 
market. Markets act efficiently and will price goods and services according 
to the value that the buyers in the market see exhibited by the product or 
service. The price paid for the product or service will be the intersection 
of the price demanded by the suppliers and the price the purchasers are 
prepared to pay. 
Goods that are seen as ‘compliance’ goods are invariably subject to 
price minimisation by purchasers. Typically, a compliance good is one that 
is required by regulatory authorities and is not valued inherently itself. 
There are those in the market for audit services who believe that auditing 
is a compliance good. There are others who believe auditing provides 
substantial benefit to shareholders, to the board of directors of a company 
and generally to the community. This benefit extends to the capital market 
and to the quality of information used in that market. Whether or not it is 
seen as something of value, it is the case that the inherent characteristics 
of the audit are not well exposed or necessarily understood to all in the 
capital market. This, in some circumstances, has given rise to a mismatch 
between the value delivered and the value expected. This mismatch has 
been called an ‘expectations gap’.
Auditing is in a class of goods and services that is referred to in the 
economic literature as an ‘experience good’. An experience good is 
something that you cannot fully understand the characteristics of until 
you have experienced the delivery of the product. Many services, such 
as dental, medical and legal services or even airline travel, can also fall 
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into this classification. The essential characteristic of these products is 
that you have to experience them to understand their qualities. You might 
have some prior description or review of the service. You might even have 
family members or colleagues who have experienced them, but, unlike 
physical goods, these products need to be experienced by the individual 
for the individual to have a full understanding of the nature of the 
product. Compare, for example, the purchase of a new motor vehicle with 
the purchase of audit services. One can test-drive the motor vehicle and 
one can choose colours and options, but one has the opportunity to see 
the product before purchasing it. The purchase of an audit is based mainly 
on reputation and the promise of delivery of something of a quality and a 
nature that is desirable.
Audit is therefore difficult to understand without experience of it. 
Further, even if there is experience of it, key stakeholders see little of the 
experience. For instance, directors know little of what transpires during 
their company’s audit. This means that compared with, say, dentistry, full 
understanding is doubly hard. At least with dentistry you get to live and 
feel the experience. 
It is in this context that the comments in the next section and 
the recommendations that follow it should be read. Many of the 
recommendations seek to assist in overcoming the level of information 
asymmetry existing between audit and those who cannot experience it 
directly.
2.0 where, then, will the future of audit take us? 
During the early years of the twenty-first century, policymakers and certain 
participants in the market for audit services have taken important steps 
to map out the future of audit. In Australia, the changes to the regulatory 
regime (CLERP 9) after the spectacular corporate collapses of the early 
years of this decade have seen some important ‘big-picture’ changes. We 
have seen changes in auditing standard setting, with greater representation 
in the process from those outside the supply side of the market; the legal 
backing of auditing standards; more detailed requirements over the 
independence of the auditor; a reduction in professional self-regulation 
and co-regulation; together with an increase in regulation and oversight 
by Australia’s principal regulator in this area. There have been similar 
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changes in other jurisdictions around the world to a different extent 
and with a different nature, but regulatory change has been one of the 
hallmarks of auditing in the past several years in many parts of the world. 
The unresolved question remains whether these changes have had their 
intended effects.
2.1 What were the intended effects of the regulatory  
 changes?
There were many well-intended changes to the regulatory regime in the 
earlier part of this century that could have provided value to the market 
for audit services, enhanced the audit attestation function and enhanced 
financial information that was crucial to the efficient operation of the 
capital market. It is difficult, however, to conclude that all these regulatory 
changes have had the intended effect. The intended effect can be gleaned 
from the six overarching principles for the Corporate Economic Reform 
Program in general, reproduced in the CLERP 9 Discussion Paper as:
•	 analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed changes
•	 development of a consistent, flexible, adaptable and cost-effective 
regulatory and legislative framework
•	 reduction of transaction costs for firms and other market participants
•	 achievement of appropriate balance between government regulation 
and industry regulation
•	 removal of barriers to entry for service providers
•	 improved harmonisation between Australia’s regulatory framework 
and those applying in major world financial markets (Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program Discussion Paper, no. 9, 2002:14).
The stated objective of CLERP 9 is useful also: ‘The underlying objective 
of the reforms is to improve the operation of the market by promoting 
transparency, accountability and shareholder activism’ (Explanatory 
Memorandum to the CLERP 9 Bill 2003:Clause 1.4). The relevant portion 
of the introduction to the CLERP 9 Bill states that the bill sets up a 
framework that includes measures designed to improve the reliability and 
credibility of financial statements through enhanced auditor independence 
(for example, partner rotation and disclosures around non-audit services), 
improved enforcement arrangements (for example, legally backed auditing 
standards) and measures to better allocate and manage risk (incorporation 
and proportionate liability) (Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
No. 9 Bill [2002]:2–3).
THE FUTURE oF AUdIT
662 |
2.2 Have the regulatory changes affecting auditing brought  
 a positive cost/benefit outcome?
Some would argue strongly that the enhanced regulation has meant 
that the documentation requirements have been strengthened and have 
resulted in better quality auditing. The extent to which decision making 
is now documented and thus defensible is stated by several interviewees 
as a positive. It has, however, not come without cost. In some instances, 
this cost has been difficult to separate from other costs because of the 
existence of other contemporaneously timed changes in financial reporting, 
including the introduction of AIFRS.
The costs of these changes are evident at many levels. Some have 
argued strongly that these changes and the documentation requirements 
in particular represent a distraction from the primary objective of the audit 
and have meant more time and effort have been spent on documentation 
rather than dealing with the substantive issues of the audit. The changes 
have also meant that many see there has been an extension in the routine 
nature of much of the work, which might not suit the present generation 
of audit firm recruits—that is, generation Y. 
The withdrawal of co-regulation as the primary policy position and 
the creation of separable regulatory frameworks have produced potential 
separation between those who regulate the audit market and those who 
supply into it. In effect, this could have exacerbated a second expectations 
gap that runs parallel to but is separable from the expectations gap 
between users and audit suppliers. Interviewees discussed an observable 
gap in expectations between regulators and suppliers. 
The changes have also given rise to a potentially unintended 
consequence. The remuneration and rewards for members of the auditing 
profession have been seen to decline in relative terms while the risks 
and the level of scrutiny and potential penalties have increased. If true 
and sustained, this development has a consequence for the long-term 
recruitment and retention of staff interested in and passionate about 
auditing. The nature of the change in the work and the increase in the 
mechanical and routine aspects also mean that there are potentially less 
opportunities for auditing staff to develop their business acumen and gain 
an understanding of their clients more broadly.
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We have found evidence that auditing staff has not only acquired 
more limited reward opportunities and faces higher risks, they have 
severe limitations on alternative income possibilities through investment 
because of the changed independence requirements. These independence 
requirements also have the effect of potentially causing inefficiencies in 
the supply of consulting services to audit clients. Similarly, the rotation 
requirements mean that potential inefficiencies are introduced especially 
where an audit client is in a particularly complex or highly regulated 
industry; the five-year cycle could give rise to inefficiencies in the conduct 
of the audit, although it could provide enhancements in independence. 
With the changes, we found no difference in the frequency or extent of 
reading of the audit report compared with before the regulatory changes. 
It is noted, however, that the audit report remains standardised and 
has not been substantively altered, adjusted or elaborated on with the 
regulatory changes.
In the interviews that were conducted, we did not find many who 
believed that the legal backing of standards added to the value of an audit; 
indeed, we found few individuals independent of the audit standard-setting 
process itself who believed that legal backing would make much difference. 
We found no-one who was prepared to say that the capital market had been 
enhanced by the legal backing of standards. Perhaps there are others who 
we did not interview who would be prepared to take such a position. 
We have no evidence that the change in membership of the Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board has not had a positive consequence in making 
it more accountable to a wider group of stakeholders within the market 
for audit services. There is no evidence that the legal backing of standards 
has in fact enhanced the credibility of financial statements, the quality 
of auditing and its role in the capital market or reduced the likelihood 
of unanticipated corporate collapse. The introduction of regulatory 
changes related to independence has been important and has caused 
structural change in the market. We do not know if we have avoided an 
independence catastrophe as a consequence of these regulatory changes, 
but we might have. We can conclude, however, that the changes have 
given rise to considerable cost—financial and non-financial. The changes 
to oversight, including but not limited to regulatory inspections, have also 
had costs and have, we would argue, profoundly changed the structure 
of the work, which will have considerable continuing consequences for 
audit firms and their staff.
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Despite the potential negatives listed above, we still see a market that 
does not seek to change a mandate to the auditing profession that makes 
it obligatory for all listed companies as well as many others to undertake 
a statutory audit of one form or another. The key to the value of the 
audit is to ensure that the market sees the characteristics it brings and 
chooses to value them. The future of audit is all about ensuring that value 
is delivered, the alternative being the ‘compliance good’ philosophy and 
driving down of costs and fees as a consequence. One interesting outcome 
of recent regulatory change has been the dissipation of auditor concerns 
about legal liability.
2.3 Responses by a market that is increasingly under  
 pressure
The recent past has seen considerable pressure applied to audit firms and 
indeed the market for audit services generally. As suggested above, these 
pressures come in many forms but, when viewed from the supply side of 
the market, there is evidence of pressure with respect to the price of the 
services delivered. There are also pressures related to the inspections and 
regulatory oversight—sometimes, we are advised, from many different 
sources; pressure in terms of recruiting appropriate staff at junior and 
more senior levels and a loss of opportunities to deliver auditor-provided 
non-audit services; and pressures from changes in the expectations of 
work patterns and scale of work by generation Y employees. This list is 
not comprehensive. 
One component of the strategic response by at least some in the market for 
audit services has been to ‘commoditise’ the audit work. Commoditisation 
is a common mechanism used in industries where there is a provision of a 
service to respond to price and other pressures. Its application in auditing 
could therefore have been entirely predictable. Parallels can be found in 
the transport industry, the pharmaceutical industry, in such practices as 
conveyancing and even in the delivery of medical services in some parts 
of the world. Commoditisation has the effect of driving down costs but it 
has been shown to remove some of the ‘glamour’ or intrinsically satisfying 
aspects of service delivery. Consider, for example, the airline industry and 
the comparison of airline travel a quarter of a century ago with the ‘low-
cost carriers’ of today. The same basic functional service is delivered but 
the removal of the prestige or mystique of the service is apparent. 
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The commoditisation response also has the effect of making the work 
more standardised and formulaic and, as a consequence, it is easier to 
document the processes that have been undertaken in the work. While 
this commoditisation response might have occurred with or without the 
regulatory changes of recent years, it seems likely that these changes have 
at least exacerbated these responses. We saw no evidence that this trend 
was reversing or perhaps reversible. Given this, policy settings need to 
minimise any potential adverse consequences of commoditisation so as to 
maximise the net benefits of this trend. 
The intersection of the commoditisation response (and the consequential 
effect on the nature of the work), together with, as noted above, the reality 
that much of the quantity of the more procedural work is undertaken by 
generation Y employees results in what might be seen as a ‘perfect storm’: 
the expectations of the nature of work have gone in one direction and the 
reality of much of the work available to be undertaken has gone in the 
other. We have evidence that there have been attempts by audit firms to 
deal with the symptoms that have arisen here. This includes the creation 
of variety by rotation of clients to provide diversity of work (including the 
creation of ‘middle-market’ work), giving staff exchanges and facilitating 
graduate studies. These methods, however, all deal with the symptoms 
of commoditisation but the trend towards commoditisation itself remains 
unchanged and probably unchangeable. 
What are the other responses to a market that is increasingly under 
pressure? These responses could come from firms, regulators or those who 
set policy. 
One strategy could be implemented by a cooperative engagement by 
firms and regulators at least and would involve creation of a mechanism 
for the market to observe the value of the inherent good or service being 
provided. If the value of the product or service can be better displayed 
to the purchasers of that service, the drive-down in costs and the 
understanding of value are made more possible. Put another way, this 
would ensure the transparency of the value of the product to the client. 
There have been previous attempts to provide transparency of value and 
the accounting firms PriceWaterhouseCoopers and KPMG in recent years 
have attempted to make more evident the processes that go on within 
major audit suppliers. 
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Perhaps in ensuring that the market sees value, we need ‘windows’ on 
processes and outcomes so that auditing is more observable by the market. 
When was the last occasion you saw a newspaper report with the headline, 
‘Auditor does good job’, or when were we informed of the number of audits 
conducted in the past calendar year that were successful and aided the 
efficiency of the capital market? Where we do have a window on audit 
outcomes including positive ones? Where we have them, they are invariably 
‘bad’ news stories. The very inspection service that the regulator has set 
almost inevitably means that only bad news is ever revealed. No evaluation 
exists of particular processes within accounting firms as being ‘above 
satisfactory’ or ‘equal to world’s best practice’. One can understand why 
a regulator might not want to do this, but it does not add to the efficiency 
and competition to drive up the value of the audit and, in that sense, it 
does not aid the efficiency of the capital market. 
2.4 Where to from here?
What, then, is the future of audit? If the market increasingly becomes 
suspicious of and even cynical about the value of the audit, the ultimate 
prize of a mandated audit could be at risk. We observed no evidence that 
the removal of the mandate, which would make audit entirely voluntary, 
was on the minds of market participants.
Throughout the chapters in this report are policy suggestions that might 
assist in addressing some of the challenges we infer from participants’ 
observations. For example, one suggestion is recruitment of staff who are 
better ‘fit for purpose’ given the commoditisation trend. Is it the case that 
particularly intellectually able graduates, who will expect, indeed demand, 
variety and challenging work, should be the targets of recruitment? 
Are the current selection criteria in graduate intake processes optimal? 
There are other policy recommendations—for example, the area of 
materiality (or tolerance for error) has not been exposed to considerable 
debate in the wider market for audit services. Providing information, 
transparency and communication vehicles—at the very least between 
auditors and audit committee members—increases the value of the audit 
and permits a more informed discussion on the matter. One can see value 
in the audit by simply changing the materiality level and understanding 
the consequences of that to cost and to the quality of the audit. The 
need for more flexibility in audit reporting, for more dialogue between 
regulators and suppliers, for peak bodies with overarching responsibilities 
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where currently non-comprehensive arrangements mean that overlaps or 
underlaps occur, for more research into the efficacy of regulatory changes 
and for plain-English, widely available explanations of audit processes 
and the role of audit in enhancing capital market efficiency—these are 
some of the actionable recommendations made within each chapter that 
arise from studying the responses of the many participants in this project. 
The next section summarises in full these various suggestions, before final 
‘concluding remarks’ are made.
3.0 summary of recommendations
Below is a summary of each of the recommendations that is drawn from 
the individual chapters. The table is provided as a summary of the 
individual recommendations and their specifics. The recommendations, 
however, should not be read out of context of the wider discussion. In 
particular, we emphasise that many of these matters are not new and, 
for some of the recommendations, it is not the first time that they have 
been made—but this does not reduce their validity or their importance. 
In a number of instances, progress towards achievement of the ultimate 
recommendations has been made. We do not imply that in all cases, 
ineffective or inappropriate progress has been made. We would assert, 
however, that progress towards achievement of the recommendations 
might have some way to go. Additionally, in a number of cases, we have 
made suggestions that have not been pursued previously or arrangements 
that are not presently in place. 
These conclusions, recommendations and potential action items might 
be of use to the reader as a summary, but we again remind readers that they 
need to be considered within the context of the wider discussion in this 
report. The authors have expressly not ordered these recommendations 
with a view to priority or specific importance. They appear in the same 
sequence as they appear in the text, with reference to the chapters in 
which the words of the various participants either explicitly or implicitly 
gave rise to the suggestions.
Some of the recommendations are more easily implemented than others. 
Some require legislative change, which some might consider too difficult to 
achieve. The recent furore over executive remuneration, however, demonstrates 
that where there is a will, legislative change can be made quite quickly.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A key outcome of this research has been to make inferences from the invited 
opinions of many different stakeholders in the market for audit services. 
These invited opinions suggest a number of challenges in that market and 
ways in which such challenges might be addressed from the viewpoint 
of contributing to capital market efficiency. Although challenges are 
identified in this report, the innate ‘stress testing’ of auditing brought 
about by the GFC bears witness to its present robustness. 
By faithfully incorporating the words of participants who contributed 
to this project, we have left the power of their words untouched. At the 
same time, using this ‘window’ to the views of participants in the market 
for audit services at a point in time, we have sought to synthesise and 
distil themes and common perceptions. These perceptions, we judge, are 
interpreted as ‘fact’ by those who hold them, but we have come to learn 
that ‘fact’ is in the eyes of the beholders and might not be shared by others. 
We have concluded that various stakeholders see that the external 
financial statement audit is valued and that there is no call to reduce or 
eliminate its mandate. We conclude, however, that the audit expectations 
gap survives. We are of the view also that it is not possible to close this gap 
completely and that to aim to do so is an unrealistic expectation. Our view 
is that efforts to minimise the gap should focus on where they have most 
likelihood of success and, for a number of reasons, this likelihood does not 
lie with a focus on retail investors. Suppliers and regulators share a similar 
advanced level of sophistication in understanding financial information 
and share also a common motivation to minimise any expectations gap 
between them. We conclude that this might be where efforts should 
focus, while simultaneously generating relevant educational materials for 
more general use. Efforts, we believe, should focus on specific topics our 
research has led us to believe contribute to misunderstandings, such as 
materiality. 
In terms of reforms to the regulatory regime in the past several years, 
we find some evidence of unintended consequences. There is a recognition 
that audit documentation quality has improved, but at a cost. 
The apparent ‘commoditisation’ of the audit has multifaceted 
consequences. We point to some of these consequences and provide 
suggestions as to how they can be managed. We also observe that the audit 
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opinion provided across a whole range of auditees is almost identically 
worded. This in and of itself could have contributed to an undervaluing 
of the financial statement audit in the market for information. We suggest 
amended audit report wording and reporting formats to address this issue.
We infer from participants’ comments that some audit committee 
members and even directors exhibit less than complete understanding of 
matters relating to the external audit and we make recommendations for 
ways that these cohorts might be better alerted to address this. 
We observe many challenges relating to the staffing of suppliers to the 
audit market. These relate to more junior staff and generation Y issues, 
as well as the challenges for providing appropriate incentives for more 
senior staff and the limitations some of the regulatory changes have caused 
there. Some of these issues might be suppressed by the GFC, but the core 
underlying characteristics seem unlikely to change.
The working title of this research project has been ‘The Future of 
Audit’. While it is always the case that the future is what you make of 
it, this is true in particular for the market for audit services in Australia 
and beyond. The absence of a call for the reversal or reduction of the 
audit mandate is a powerful starting point for the future. The absence of 
reference to auditors’ legal liability in statutory audits, as could have been 
expected to arise as a concern from prior research into the expectations 
gap, is noted also. 
There are no doubt challenges, many of which are noted in the 
preceding 500 or so pages. Importantly, we find evidence of unintended 
consequences of recent regulatory changes. Lessons need to be learned 
before further changes and implementation of such changes. The 
forthright views of participants in the market have been documented 
here. These might be useful in informing policy positions and changes to 
those positions by a range of stakeholders, including those who set public 
policy, those involved in the supply of audit services and those who set 
auditing standards and give guidance to the audit market. 
The authors have attempted to avoid platitudes or ‘motherhood’ 
statements in writing this report. Those who were expecting them will be 
disappointed. Similarly, those who choose to ‘cherry pick’ more critical 
observations in this report will not be representing its contribution 
faithfully or in the spirit in which it is intended.
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The ‘future of audit’ is not without its challenges and there are actions 
that can be taken by key participants in the market for audit services. 
Auditing is now and can be expected to remain a key part of the delegated 
regulation within the Australian economy. 
Bibliography
Knott, D., Protecting the Investor: the Regulator and Audit, Speech, 





A nATionAl sTUDy on THE FUTURE oF AUDiTinG
SECTIoN A
Please place a cross in the box that you feel best describes the 
stakeholder group to which you belong: 
Users of external audit 
services:
  Accounting 
professional
  Financial advisor
  Financial analyst
  Financial lender
  Financial planner
  Private investor




  Other. Please 
specify:  
 
Purchasers of external 
audit services:
  Audit committee 
member
  Chief executive 
officer
  Chief financial 
officer
  Company director
  Other. Please 
specify:   
 
suppliers of external 
audit services:
  Auditor (Big 4)
  Auditor (non-Big 4)
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SECTIoN b
The following questions seek your opinion on issues relating to the scope 
and value of external financial statement audits.
1. For each of the following services, please indicate whether you 
believe this service is best provided by an external auditor by 
placing a cross in the appropriate box in Part (i).  
If you indicate “yes” in Part (i), please specify the extent to which 
you believe that the value of this service warrants an additional fee 
by placing a cross over the most appropriate response in Part (ii).
services: Part (i):
The service is best 
provided by an 
external auditor.
Part (ii):
The value of this 








a) Report on the 
presence of material 
fraud in a company.
o o o 1 2 3 4 5
b) Report on a company’s 
internal control 
procedures.
o o o 1 2 3 4 5
c)  Report on the 
remuneration received 
by directors of a 
company. 
o o o 1 2 3 4 5
d) Report on the 
remuneration received 
by senior executive 
managers of a 
company.
o o o 1 2 3 4 5
e) Report on the integrity 
of senior executive 
managers in a 
company.
o o o 1 2 3 4 5
f) Report on the 
risk management 
approaches of a 
company.




The service is best 
provided by an 
external auditor.
Part (ii):
The value of this 








g) Report on the 
performance of senior 
executive managers in 
a company.
o o o 1 2 3 4 5




performance of a 
company.
o o o 1 2 3 4 5
i) Report on the 
quality of corporate 
governance in a 
company.
o o o 1 2 3 4 5
j) Report on conflicts of 
interest of directors of 
a company.
o o o 1 2 3 4 5
k) Report on senior 
executive managers’ 
projections for the 
company (e.g., sales 
growth, earnings 
potential).
o o o 1 2 3 4 5




in a company’s annual 
report.
o o o 1 2 3 4 5
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2. Would you like the external auditor to report on any other aspect of 
a company’s activities or operations? If so, please specify what these 
are in the space provided below, and indicate the extent to which 
you agree or disagree that the value of this service would warrant an 
additional fee.
other services: The value of this service 






1 2 3 4 5
b.
1 2 3 4 5
c. 
1 2 3 4 5






a) An external financial statement audit 
provides direct assurance about:
(i)  the integrity of senior executive 
managers in a company.
1 2 3 4 5
(ii)  the prudence of the business decisions 
made by a company.
1 2 3 4 5
(iii)  the adequacy of the internal control 
system of a company that is relied 
upon in the preparation of financial 
statements.







b) An external auditor has a responsibility to:
(i)  detect all material fraud in a 
company’s financial statements.
1 2 3 4 5
(ii)  detect all material errors in a 
company’s financial statements.
1 2 3 4 5
(iii)  warn the audit committee of a 
company about early signs of risk 
areas.
1 2 3 4 5
(iv)  act as a whistleblower to the 
appropriate regulatory authority.
1 2 3 4 5
c) An external financial statement audit is of 
value to you because:
(i)  of the business acumen that the 
auditor brings to the audit.
1 2 3 4 5
(ii)  of the specialist industry knowledge 
that the auditor brings to the audit.
1 2 3 4 5
(iii)  the auditor provides an unconditional 
guarantee about the truth and 
fairness of a company’s financial 
statements.
1 2 3 4 5
(iv)  the auditor has a good understanding 
of the company’s business.
1 2 3 4 5
(v)  the audit opinion issued is an expert 
opinion.
1 2 3 4 5
(vi)  of the brand name of the audit firm 
conducting the audit. 
1 2 3 4 5
d) Audited financial statements are too 
complex to understand.
1 2 3 4 5
e) The notes to the financial statements are 
too complex to understand.
1 2 3 4 5
f) The audit report is too complex to 
understand.
1 2 3 4 5
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4. For the following question, please place a cross over the most 
appropriate response to each part:
Questions: Poor Excellent
a) In general, how do you rate the 
business acumen of:
(i) audit partners? 1 2 3 4 5
(ii) junior auditors? 1 2 3 4 5
5. Using a scale of 0% to 100%, please provide the most appropriate 
numerical response to the following questions:
Questions: Please specify 
numerical response
(0% - 100%)
a) How confident are you that an auditor will 
detect all material fraud in a company’s 
financial statements?
%
b) How confident are you that an auditor will 
detect all material errors in a company’s 
financial statements?
%
The following questions seek your opinion on the legal and 
regulatory environment for audit services. 
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a) The recent regulatory and market 
responses to high profile corporate 
collapses have assisted in: 
(i)  improving the general public’s 
confidence in the capital market.
1 2 3 4 5
(ii)  enhancing the credibility of financial 
statements.
1 2 3 4 5
(iii)  enhancing the quality of an audit. 1 2 3 4 5
b) The regulation of the market for audit 
services will reduce the number of 
corporate failures occurring in Australia.
1 2 3 4 5
c) In response to high profile corporate 
collapses, regulation now requires 
auditors to comply with additional 
mandatory audit procedures. In your 
opinion, complying with the additional 
mandatory procedures will:
(i)  distract auditors from the objective of 
a financial statement audit, which is 
to give assurance on the credibility of 
financial statements.
1 2 3 4 5
(ii)  increase the costs of conducting an 
audit.
1 2 3 4 5
(iii)  add value to a company’s business 
operations.
1 2 3 4 5
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7. For this question, please place a cross in the most appropriate box for 
each of the listed changes:
Questions: Please place a cross
a) Are you aware of the following specific 
changes that have occurred in the 
regulation of audit services in Australia?
(i)  the introduction of legally enforceable 
auditing standards.
o NO o YES
(ii)  reforms pertaining to auditor 
independence.
o NO o YES
The following questions seek your opinion on general questions 
relating to the provision of audit services.






a) External financial statement audits 
currently represent value for money.
1 2 3 4 5
b) For larger companies in Australia, there 
is a lack of competition in the market 
for audit services.
1 2 3 4 5
9. Can you suggest no more than three issues that the audit profession 




10. Is there anything else that you would like to comment on in relation 





Please complete Section C.
SECTIoN C
The following questions seek some general information about you. 
The information you provide will only be used for analytical purposes. 
1. Do you read annual reports 
and audited financial 
statements?
  No   Yes
2. Do you use or rely 
on audited financial 
statements in your 
decision-making?
  No   Yes






  Poor Excellent
3. How do you rate your 
understanding of financial 
statements?
1 2 3 4 5
4. How do you rate your 
understanding of the 
external financial 
statement audit, which 
includes the level of 
assurance that the audit 
provides?
1 2 3 4 5
5. To which of the following 
age brackets do you 
belong?
  18-24 years
  25-34 years
  35-44 years
  45-54 years
  55-64 years
  65-74 years
  75+ years
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6. What is the highest level 
of education you have 
obtained?
  < grade 10 
  grades 10–13
  TAFE or equiv
  Undergraduate 
degree
  Postgraduate 
degree









  No   Yes




Thank you for participating in this survey.
Two reply-paid envelopes have been supplied. 
Please return the completed survey in one of the envelopes, and use the 
other envelope for the prize draw.
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